Second Swedish sighting of Russian mini-submarine or LDUUV - UUV - Malsten

Location of the publically known (Swedish website) Malsten (Island) Station (with observable facilities) which operated  undersea cables joining SOSUS and magnetic anomaly sensors. Now modernised?

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See Malsten Station (blue arrow) in relation to Stockholm. Malsten's Cold War vintage equipment may have been replaced by a much more extensive wireless  "SeaWeb" style anti-submarine network in the Swedish archipelago. A modern SeaWeb network would rapidly detect and track any Russian mini-submarine or LDUUV.

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This is a continuation of my October 25, 2014 article on Sweden's first sighting (and sonaring) of a suspected Russian mini-submarine just off Stockholm in mid October 2014. That article theorised that the suspected Russian mini-submarine's close proximity to Stockholm may have indicated its mission was for a Russian agent's drop-off or pick-up or interception of telecommunications signals emanating from Stockholm. In retrospect this seems unlikely and unnecessarily complicated as any agent could cross land borders, go by air or just transmit. Interception might be more efficient within Stockholm - say equipment in the Russian Embassy there.

More likely activity in October 2014 is Russian electronic monitoring of nearby Swedish and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) naval exercises. The submarine may not have been in authentic "distress" rather it used distress messages as a ruse intended to draw "trip" more Swedish and/or NATO sensor "interrogations".

Reconnaissance aircraft indulge in a similar radar tripping activity by flying close to borders -  basically forcing a would-be adversary to turn-on its usually covert sensors. Russian Bear reconnaissance aircraft, under increasingly combative Putin, have stepped up activity against NATO allies partly for the intelligence take. It is unknown if Russian mini-submarines have been engaged in similar activities, but possible.

If such mini-subs have no crew (being large diameter unmanned underwater vehicles (LDUUVs)) the financial and political costs and risks are less. See my earlier post on LDUUVs and the discussion below.

"SECOND" SIGHTING OR LATER SIGHTING OF THE SAME SUBMARINE OR LDUUV

Subsequent (presumably) authorised leaks by Swedish and UK sources in mid January 2015 indicate that Swedish and NATO forces continued to look for suspected Russian submarine activity later in October 2014. UK concern about a suspected Russian submarine off the Scottish coast may be a totally separate (perhaps routine?) matter. A Russian attack submarine (SSK or SSN) may routinely station itself off the coast of northwest Scotland in order to intercept (or gain intelligence) concerning UK (and perhaps US) nuclear submarines entering and, more importantly, leaving UK naval base HMNB Clyde.at Faslane.

Having looked at US advances in large diameter unmanned underwater vehicle (LDUUV) technology I think that a crewed Russian mini-submarine is unnecessary and dangerous when a remotely controlled LDUUV could be used. This is assuming Russia is technically advanced enough to deploy developed LDUUVs? LDUUVs can include unmanned "conning towers" of the type photographed off Stockholm (see intentionally blurry image with little sense of size/scale). If Russia sent a LDUUV Russia could "trip" (activate) Swedish (and NATO?) fixed and mobile anti-submarine warfare (ASW) sensors. The Swedish reaction against a LDUUV (Swedish corvettes, smaller craft, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft) would be worth the Russian military intelligence "take" - even at the calculated risk of a LDUUV being destroyed or captured. 

Sweden alone has insufficient national power to threaten or more fully embarrass Russia. So Sweden likely feigned its inability to find the Russian LDUUV rather than admitting Sweden's limitations in exerting force on the Russian craft. The risk of a self-destruct mechanism in the Russian craft may also have played on Swedish minds. An enterprizing Russian controlled LDUUV may have also moved into the international waters or territorial waters of NATO allies in the Baltic or less likely (due to LDUUV range limitations) the North Sea. The more NATO reacts in military terms the more it reveals to Russian naval intelligence. 

Off Stockholm in 2014 the Russian submarine or LDUUV is likely to have also deployed antennas to send any vaunted "distress calls". The intelligence take (if necessary) could also be sent by UHF radio to Russian UHF receivers or by satellite relay to Russian naval intelligence. Alternatively the Russian craft could merely store the take for handing over once it reached a Russian port or mothership. 

MALSTEN STATION

In terms of Swedish fixed anti-submarine sensors Malsten Station SOSUS (and magnetic anomaly) sensors have been public knowledge in Sweden for decades. Malsten is a small island on which a small hut stands. The hut is (or was) used to power cables that carry sound (SOSUS) and magnetic anomaly sensors. The cables stretch out for a few 100 metres on two sides of Malsten island. The cables and sensors were originally decades old technology - perhaps 1950s vintage. The sensors presumably are (or were) sensitive enough to detect mini-subs or LDUUVs crossing over the cables - alerting the Swedish Navy of illegal entries into Swedish waters. Here is another link on the Malsten Station. With advances in electronics and communications there would no longer be a need for Malsten to be physically manned - other than for security. Sensor detections could (can?) be automatically relayed to Swedish naval bases or to a more centralised Swedish military HQ in Stockholm itself.

Malsten may have been modernised and re-activated (since the Cold War) to meet the resurgent Russian threat. Possibly Malsten and other Swedish SOSUS arrays have been replaced by a much broader undersea and islet-rock-mainland wireless network of the SeaWeb type that may cover much of the Swedish Archipelago. Whether Sweden would coordinate its network with any larger NATO "SeaWeb" network is unknown.

So in conclusion there is much (probably Russian) undersea activity in the Swedish archipelago. Much would happen that is not admitted publically by Sweden, NATO or Russia. When a member of the Swedish public spots a Russian mini-submarine or LDUUV there is some embarrassment in  Sweden. Sweden's defence efficiency is called into question (by Swedish politicians and the Press) due to an evident inability to stop encroachments or (in theory) identify who or what is encroaching.

The Swedish Government feels obliged to reveal some of what it knows - but only a small portion due to diplomatic and security reasons. The UK and NATO might reduce Swedish embarrassment, while increasing Russian embarrassment, by mixing in headlines about what is probably regular detection of Russian submarines off the Scottish coast. The press is happy. The public is reassured - perhaps, and specialist submarine blogger-journalists have more to write about :)

Pete

LDUUVs UUV AUVs and Undersea Cable Tapping?

US Navy image of a Penn State ARL developed Sea Stalker large-diameter unmanned underwater vehicle (LDUUV).

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As well as looking at submarines this blog looks at many related hardware and software issues. To that end unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are an increasingly interesting topic. The Sea Stalker provides an example of a large-diameter UUV (LDUUV). The sophistication of the latest LDUUVs make them closer to the ideal od autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). For undersea cable tapping a more highly developed, specialised and deeper diving LDUUV is a possibility.

The current status of UUVs in the US Navy paints a confusing picture. Perhaps such confusion is  intentional for security and commercial competition reasons. There are small UUVs, medium size torpedo tube fitting UUVs (like the Bluefin-21 deployed by the US Navy in search of Malaysian Airlines MH370 off Western Australia). Then there are LDUUVs. The US Navy is learning what to ask for in LDUUV requirements by simultaneously testing LDUUVs like the Sea Stalker.

There may be widely varying degrees of remote control and autonomy of LDUUVs. LDUUVs might increasingly be used in littoral waters too shallow for full sized submarines or full sized high value warships. LDUUVs might also be used for missions too dangerous due to high possibilities of detection by anti-submarine or anti-shipping forces (eg. defending foreign submarines, ships, aircraft, anti-ship missiles etc).

The ability of a surface ship to deploy a LDUUV potentially permits that ship to have some of the intelligence gathering and weapons capabilities of a submarine. By weapons that might mean an LDUUV attaching small limpet mines to ships in harbour or an entire LDUUV exploding under a high value ship in harbour or other chokepoint.

LDUUVs as CABLE TAPPERS

The following is a logical outgrowth of the publication decades ago of undersea cable tapping under  Operation Ivy Bells http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ivy_Bells  Also see the Wikipedia entry on modified Seawolf-class SSN USS Jimmy Carter "Past submarines outfitted this way were used to tap undersea cables, to intercept communications of foreign countries."  It is therefore assumed undersea cable tapping remains a reality.

For the delicate task of tapping undersea fibre-optic cables LDUUV's offer advantages over medium-large submarines (close to cables) or divers.

LDUUVs:

-  being without a crew are semi-deniable (unlike manned submarine crews and divers they cannot be questioned in front of the world media)
-  do not involve friendly deaths or risk of injury
-  may be capable of far deeper operation (1,000s meters?) than manned submarines and divers. LDUUVs could operate at or beyond estimated "crush depth" as there is no crew at risk
-  if the capture of a LDUUV is imminent remotely initiated or autonomous destruction could take place (of electronics, including hard-disc records and other high technology). The whole LDUUV could also self-destruct (preferably keeping would-be capturers at a safe distance)
-  are potentially of shallow water tapping in the littorals (too shallow)
-  can operate in areas too dangerous or too politically sensitive for manned submarines
-  would present a far lower sonic, visual and magnetic signature (and other emissions) than a manned submarine (thus reducing detectability)
-  can utilise their thrusters and specialised splicing technology for tapping or other work
-  are less likely to damage or break a cable, by mistake, than a much larger submarine attempting to work on a cable directly
-   not only submarines could operate, release and retrieve LDUUVs but mine-sweepers on up in a navy or more delicately large "trawlers" on up in commercial shipping terms
-   are not restricted to the US Navy or other agencies but LDUUVs may be possessed by foreign navies and agencies such as those of Russia (near Stockholm in late 2014?) and China.

SEA STALKER LDUUV DETAIL

The US Navy appears to be sponsoring the development of LDUUVs by private companies and academic institutions while it sets requirements for upgraded LDUUV technology. The Navy's approach is pragmatic. It is difficult to set requirement for a technology if one does not have some idea of its ever greater practical capabilities.

Since conducting a 2006 study, the US Navy has been developing requirements for submarine-deployable LDUUVs with payload capabilities much greater than the limitations posed by medium sized UUVs (that can fit in 533mm (21 inch) diameter torpedo tube). Examples of medium sized UUVs are the Bluefin-21 (hence 21 inch - which transmits data to the mother ship or sub) or upgraded Mark 48 torpedos (which carry sensors for data transmission). 

The Sea Stalker is a 38-inch (0.97m) diameter platform with a speed of nearly 5 knots. The US Navy has conducted some experimentation with the Sea Stalker UUV, a development of the Sea Horse UUV built by the Pennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory (ARL).

In August 2014, the Sea Stalker was delivered to Naval Undersea Warfare Center Keyport, Washington state (northwestern USA) to be employed by Commander, Submarine Development Squadron FIVE, Detachment UUV for capabilities testing and proficiency training in preparation for the delivery of future large diameter UUVs. 

On November 25, 2014 US Naval Sea Systems Command (with Sea Stalker, other public LDUUVs and covert LDUUVs in mind) released a refined draft of top-level requirements. The requirements or instructions were: 

"The Increment 1 LDUUV will have mission capabilities to include Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment and below-water Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance to improve battlespace awareness. [Increment 1] will be capable of launch and recovery by...Virginia-class submarines [by] Virginia Payload Modules or Modernized-Dry Deck Shelter." 

The Sea Stalker may already have been tested  (as Large Training Vehicle 38) including:

-  launched and recovery from the USS Bainbridge (DDG-96), and
-  launch and retrieval using the dry-deck shelter of an Ohio-class SSGN submarine and modified SSN USS Jimmy Carter?. 

Sea Stalker can be powered by a lithium battery when operated from US surface ships with an endurance of seven to 10 days. On submarines it may currently only use alkaline (D-Cell) batteries (for safety reasons?) in which case its endurance may only be three days. It can loiter offshore, [and in-harbour (etc?)] collecting intelligence with two antenna masts, transmit and receive information via an Iridium satellite or (presumably) other US satellites. It is also useful for command and control [of what? special forces? other LDUUVs?].

SOURCES

(Sea Stalker) AUV System Spec Sheet

Autonomous Underwater Vehicles Application Center (AUVAC) reports http://auvac.org/people-organizations/view/244 

On requirements and some physical realities SEAPOWER Magazine, December 1,   2014 reports http://www.seapowermagazine.org/stories/20141201-lduuv.html:

navaldrones.com reports http://www.navaldrones.com/Sea-Stalker-UUV.html:

Pete

Bangladesh, Philippine, Burma and Thailand Submarine Issues

One of China's remaining Type 035 Ming-class conventional submarine soon to be scrapped or sold off to Bangladesh (and other small nations?).

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A Russian built Kilo conventional submarine - main users are Russia, India and China. Vietnam is a growing operator (having bought 6).

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India feels threatened by the prospect of increasing Chinese submarine proliferation in the Indian Ocean. Such proliferation comes through such means as:

-  Chinese anti-piracy conventional and nuclear propelled subs moving across the Indian Ocean for operations off the Horn of Africa,

-  submarine visits to such ports as Columbo, Sri Lanka, and

-  sale of Chinese subs to such Indian neighbours as Bangladesh (around 2019) and perhaps in future to Burma and Pakistan (see India's "West Coast Worries").

For more than a year there have been reports of a pending sale of obsolescent Chinese Ming-class submarines to Bangladesh. See my article http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/12/china-selling-two-type-035-ming-class.html of December 24, 2013. It is highly likely that, after expected delivery of the Mings in 2019, part of a Bangladesh Ming crew and on-shore maintainers would be Chinese for a transition period. This would cause a range of anxieties in India.

In late 2014 Indian intelligence and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs have pushed the possibility (or for India a hope) that Bangladesh might buy Russian submarines instead.

It is unclear whether these "Russian" Submarines would be:

- new build Kilos (surely too expensive for Bangladesh without credit-finance)

- used Kilos from Russia (cheaper but probably unreliable with a short remaining service life) or

- ex-Indian Kilos (cheaper but probably unreliable with a short remaining service life).

Two nations that probably will not buy submarines in the short to medium term are:

- the Philippines (it usually receives low-or-no cost used naval and coastguard vessels) - see http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-philippine-navys-submarine-quest/  December 31, 2013, 

- Thailand - http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/thailand-eyes-submarine-fleet/, January 4, 2015,
  Pete's Comment: If Thailand bought used Ming subs from China Thailand might receive them in 2019 - depending on Chinese modifications. Used Kilos are harder to estimate. If Thailand prefered 2 or 3 new submarines costs would be much higher and involve:
- significant lead times for negotiating, ordering and building submarines - generally around 6 years for a new customer like Thailand
- in the case of South Korea as a supplier a backlog of pre-existing orders might perhaps cause delays. This may mean a minimum delivery year of 2020 for Thailand to receive the first sub then add 3 years for commissioning (tests, trials and training) the sub into the Thai Navy ie. 2023.

Pete

[Superseded] "Future submarine selection December update expected"

New Japanese Defence Minister Gen [his first name is NOT an abbreviation for "General"] Nakatani. Nakatani intends to introduce a range of conservative (or internationally normal) defence policies to replace Japan's traditional "peace" constitutional defence policies.

[Note the December 15, 2014 article below was superseded on December 21, 2014 by the appointment of new Australian Defence Minister Kevin Andrews. 
 Superseded because a new Defence Minister Andrews (and his new Ministerial office staff) will have insufficient knowledge for perhaps two months to answer media and industry questions about a submarine selection process. 

- Also Japan has experienced political processes recently (the December 14, 2014 Japanese Elections, delaying Japan's Diet sitting schedules and mid December 24, 2014 appointment of new Japanese Defence Minister Nakatani) that will delay Japan's ability to formulate new new defence policies that would inturn backup a Japanese Soryu announcement.

- Also the Australian Government will be on firmer negotiating ground as Australia's Defence White Paper 2015 will be closer to publication - a paper that will partly justify the new submarine aquisition.] 

Brendan Nicholson in The Australian December 15, 2014 expects Prime Minister Abbott to make the future submarine selection update-announcement before Christmas. Full string of the now outdated commentary is http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/tony-abbott-to-surface-with-plan-for-submarines/story-e6frg8yo-1227155893557:

Title "Tony Abbott to surface with plan for submarines"

TONY Abbott is expected to announce within days the start of the process for selecting the navy’s new submarines from a range of international options and for building and maintaining them.

The Australian has been told the Prime Minister’s announcement is likely to include the creation of a new defence industry entity to work with an experienced international submarine designer and builder.

The expected re-election of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government with a substantial ­majority will remove a significant hurdle to Japan providing new submarines for Australia.

Japan, Germany, France and Sweden are all keen to provide the submarines. The Japanese are ahead of the others because they have the most experience building conventional submarines large enough to meet Australia’s needs.

The government is developing a three-stage strategy to save the shipbuilding industry, involving buying submarines overseas but maintaining them in Adelaide, completing the navy’s three Air Warfare Destroyers and building eight new frigates in Australia.

While a Japanese submarine has for months been the most likely option, Japanese domestic politics remained an issue.

Defence officials are in discussions with their Japanese counterparts to see whether the submarine technology they have on offer would suit Australia’s ­requirements.

If that deal does go through, Australia is likely to share in the design and building of a new class of submarine that will be an evolution of Japan’s Soryu.

If Australia does buy a Japanese submarine, it will be modified to extend its range and fitted with the same potent combat system and torpedoes as US nuclear-powered attack submarines.

The new submarine is likely to be powered by advanced lithium batteries, which take up less space than lead-acid batteries. More batteries can be carried, which significantly increases the submarine’s range and reduces the time it needs to run on or near the surface while running its diesel engines to recharge the batteries. Modern conventional sub­marines using such systems can stay submerged, without snorkelling, for three weeks." ENDS.

Connect with my own commentary of December 10, 2014 Australian Future Submarine Choices - Need for a Plan B at : http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/12/australian-future-submarine-choices.html

Pete

Mixing Australian Conventional and Nuclear Submarines

Click on image to expand. Submarine program matters are highly complex being a mixture of what would be ideal (such as the Virginia SSN above) and what is politically, economically and technically feasible. Timeframes are also essential considerations.
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On December 26, 2014 Alexander Judzewitsch provided a comment on my post Future submarine selection December update expecte..:

"Collins subs cost us more than $605m per year to maintain. An early replacement can save us billions which could be spent on new subs with lower maintenance costs. Replace 10 years early saves more than $6Bn and that is possible.

Nuclear powered subs are the only ones that give us the capability we need in a production submarine. Both these have been stated as essential for our new subs. So why not arrange with the USA to crew and possibly lease two Virginia class subs starting in say 5 years? It would save huge sums in maintenance and two operational SSNs have far greater capability than all of our Collins. The Americans would be happy to have us pay for two boats to work in our region as it would save them the cost of doing it. That leaves open the options of having all SSNs or a mix of diesel-electric plus SSNs as we could add SSKs or SSNs to our capability depending on what is available and our perceived needs in the future. The above suggestion meets all of the requirements stated so far and saves heaps of money."

PETE's REPLY:

Hi Alexander Judzewitsch:

I agree the maintenance costs and low availability (dry dock downtime) 6 Collins subs is excessive.

Your claim that $6 Billion can be saved in retiring the Collins ten years early is incorrect on several counts:

-  the Collins has become a more efficient sub for Australia’s needs operationally due to many sunk costs expended over the last twenty years. This included fixing such deficiencies as the combat system, propulsion system and quieting.

-  The 6 Collins would not be suddenly removed all at once then replaced by a new subs all at once. The 6 Collins would be steadilly retired at a rate of one-per-year (perhaps 2020-2025) or slower. Rather there is a staggered purchasing, building, launching and commissioning process for each new sub.

-   New subs would have high initial startup infrastructure costs.

-  New subs would have their own maintenance costs.

-  “Nuclear powered subs” mainly meaning the Virginia SSNs do many things well but there are niches for conventional subs (SSKs) as well.

-   A US crewed and leased Virginia may serve the interests of the US in a major war rather than risk destruction in the defence of Australia. It mayalso respond to US orders that might effectively bring Australia into a major war in Northeast Asia.

-  Australian would need to be fully aware of how a Virginia operates and preferably partly or wholey crew it.

-   Two Virginia's are not enough. If one is in dry dock the other couldn't cover east coast, west coast, south and north, as well as forward deployment (say in the South China Sea).

-   Four Virginias would be better.

-   I agree a “mix of diesel-electric plus SSNs” would be even better.

-   Nothing in submarines “saves heaps of money” until deals are made and purchasing-building-commissioning and downstream program costs are experienced and finalised over the three decades of a submarine’s service life

On December 24, 2014 - two days before you made the 26 December comment - I commented as "plantagenet" on On Line Opinion pretty much in line with Alexander Judzewitsch arguments but over a more extended period :    

"Getting Virginia nuclear powered subs would be a longshot in the next few years. So we need to work with what is likely...I see Australia ultimately needing two classes of submarines:

6 x medium conventional subs ([2020-2025]). Ideally they would be currently in-production subs (with extended range). That is:

- Soryus (Abbott's Plan A?)

- Plan B? HDW 214 (Dolphin 2 version?) or Scorpene? Their introduction from around 2023 would gradually remove the 5 working Collins from our navy.

4 x Virginia nuclear powered attack subs (SSNs) (Plan C) from 2035, but ultimately serving as SLBM carrying "baby boomers" the main platform for Australia's nuclear weapons (talking 2040 at least). This would depend on a perceived increase in threats - most likely from China.

Combining nuclear and conventionally propelled subs in a fleet is fairly common (India, China, Russia and eventually Brazil). Nuclear and conventionally propelled subs can perform a wider range of missions more economically than just one class.

Pete

 Wednesday, 24 December 2014"

Submarine program matters are highly complex being a mixture of what would be ideal and what is politically, economically and technically feasible.

ANU’s Stephan Fruehling wrote in ASPI Strategist a most interesting article on this:  Nuclear propulsion and the future of Australia’s submarine force of March 11, 2016

http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/nuclear-propulsion-and-the-future-of-australias-submarine-force/

Pete

Christmas in Australia 2014

Australia's Christmas (in the Southern Hemisphere) is the hottest time of year. Temperatures average around 30ºC (86ºF) during the day and 17ºC (63ºF) at night. Christmas feasts are frequently at midday on December 25 and are often cold cut seafood, ham and turkey or hot barbecued meats cooked outside. 

Here's an Aussiefied Christmas Carol:

An "Esky" is a portable insulated container for keeping food or drink cool!

CHRISTMAS sandman 

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SURFIN SANTA AND FRIENDS IN AUSTRALIA 

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A TYPICAL CHRISTMAS BEACH SCENE IN AUSTRALIA
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 australia is very much part  of the
anglosphere. here is a carol from elsewhere in the sphere. 

mERRY CHRISTMAS

Pete