US, UK, Canadian Undersea Surveillance IUSS Official Site

The following is a continuing project that I’ll incrementally add to. The US Navy Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) website https://www.csp.navy.mil/cus/ intermittently disappears – so below is a (hopefully) lasting public record.

Only in the US does a highly sensitive IUSS have a public website shopfront. The website can be read from the Antarctica to Northern Fleet, Russia. Replacing the well known Cold War North Atlantic US, UK and BTW Canadian SOSUS system is the IUSS which is much more diverse in sensors and allies.

IUSS exists in the highly classified distributed Intranet of the US Navy. All major navies, like Russia’s and China’s, have their own IUSS. Smaller Western navies, or navies well disposed to the US, have varying degrees of access to the mainly US paid for and managed IUSS. The IUSS has as many mobile nodes as the fixed nodes that are easier to picture.

Western and allied submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, naval surface ships and some USNS ships are themselves mobile IUSS nodes. Also see https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2222990/ocean-surveillance-ships-t-agos/

Those mobile nodes with weapons, icluding land based anti-ship missiles and fixed and/or  mines weaponize the IUSS network.

It is a measure of IUSS’ distributed nature that it formally exists under Commander, Submarine Force, US Pacific Fleet. Yet its more immediate “Commander, Undersea Surveillance" https://www.csp.navy.mil/cus/ , is based on the Atlantic facing US East coast at Bullpup Street Virginia Beach, Virginia, USA.

I’ll run through the publicly available details of the IUSS.

About IUSS 

https://www.csp.navy.mil/cus/About-IUSS/

Mission Statement

To support antisubmarine warfare command and tactical forces by detecting, classifying, and providing timely reporting of information on submarines and other contacts of interest; to provide command of Naval Ocean Processing Facilities (NOPFs), to include direct tactical control of associated Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) ships; to gather long term acoustic, oceanographic, and hydrographic information.

Additional Information:

The Integrated Undersea Surveillance System mission is multi-faceted, encompassing not only the operations of detection, localization and tracking of submarines and the collection of acoustic and hydrographic information, but also the maintenance of processing and communications equipment necessary to carry out the operational mission. 

Since the inception of the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) in 1954, personnel stationed at Naval Facilities, Naval Ocean Processing Centers, Joint Sites, training commands and on the COMUNDERSEASURV Headquarters Staffs in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, have pursued the Undersea Warfare mission.

[Data certified UNCLASSIFIED by DoD/DoN and IUSS Authorities]”

See many details of the “Origins of SOSUS” at https://www.csp.navy.mil/cus/About-IUSS/Origins-of-SOSUS/ up to 1954 – ending with:

“… In reflecting on the early years of SOSUS, what is most striking is how much was accomplished in remarkably short time. Certainly a major factor was serendipitous confluence of events – the discovery that low-frequency sounds could travel great distances in the ocean, the realization that submarines radiate identifiable low-frequency energy, and the pioneering work at Bell Laboratories on visual speech analysis. 

Ease of contracting was also an important element. The Navy’s resolve to conduct undersea surveillance was crucial. The commitment of WECo and Bell Laboratories and their decision to assign some of their best people to the project were of considerable consequence.

[Data certified UNCLASSIFIED by DoD/DoN and IUSS Authorities]”

Leadership 

https://www.csp.navy.mil/cus/Leadership/

Captain Steven Faulk, “Commodore” 
https://www.csp.navy.mil/cus/Leadership/Commodore/

Gregory Schmeiser, Deputy Commander https://www.csp.navy.mil/cus/Leadership/Deputy-Commander/

CDR Craig Hempeck, Chief Staff Officer, https://www.csp.navy.mil/cus/Leadership/Chief-Staff-Officer/

CMDCM(SS) Jeffrey Barnes, Command Master Chief https://www.csp.navy.mil/cus/Leadership/Command-Master-Chief/

 

IUSS Commands [Typically larger Naval Bases host IUSS main oceanic "Command" bases (below) and US or allied (including Five Eye) Naval Bases host more minor regional IUSS bases that are off-shore of the continental US] 

https://www.csp.navy.mil/cus/IUSS-Commands/

Naval Ocean Processing Facility Dam Neck, Virginia USA, covers 

Atlantic Ocean Operations 

https://www.csp.navy.mil/nopfdn/  [also see  ]

Naval Ocean Processing Facility (NOPF) Dam Neck (DN) proudly boasts its mission, “To provide timely and accurate acoustic cueing to operating and supporting forces, and to conduct continuous maritime surveillance for homeland security 24/7/365.”

NOPF DN was commissioned in September 1979 and is a tenant command of Commander, Undersea Surveillance, a unit of Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. As one of the few remaining Integrated Undersea Surveillance (IUSS) facilities,

NOPF Dam Neck has become the premier Undersea Surveillance Site, conducting operations throughout the Atlantic Ocean, North Atlantic, and Norwegian Sea. In May 2009, NOPF Dam Neck officially became a Joint Combined Command welcoming the United Kingdom Detachment and an increased area of responsibility. This expansion also made NOPF DN the largest contingent of United Kingdom personnel in the United States. It is comprised of approximately 300 Enlisted, 20 Officers, and 7 civilians from the US Navy, UK Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. Together, they are the cornerstone of the IUSS community.
 

Naval Ocean Processing Facility Whidbey Island, Washington State USA

covers Pacific and Indian Ocean Operations 

https://www.csp.navy.mil/nopfwi/About/  [Also see]

The mission of NOPF is to provide timely and accurate acoustic cueing to operating and supporting forces, and conduct continuous maritime surveillance for Homeland Security.

NOPF is divided into two major divisions that operate in the same facility- The shore side and the sea side (Sea Component West). The sea side consists of STG's that rotate out to the five SURTASS ships that operate under NOPF. The shore side has various rates that all support the operations watch floor in completing it's mission.

NOPF has approximately 325 enlisted personnel, 25 officers, a detachment of 30 Canadian forces personnel and 15 civilians. This is an excellent duty station which is located right off the water and near a beautiful cliff-side park. The parking is readily available and the building is the nicest on base. Leadership .

Canadian Detachment [at Whidbey Island]

https://www.csp.navy.mil/nopfwi/canadian-detachment/

Welcome to Naval Ocean Processing Facility Whidbey Island (NOPFWI). With your posting, you are about to join an exclusive bi-national team responsible for providing timely and accurate acoustic cueing to operating and supporting forces throughout the Pacific, and conduct continuous maritime surveillance for Homeland Security. I am pleased to extend a warm welcome to you on behalf of the Canadian Contingent.

NOPFWI is the pride of the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System; the workplace is modern and comfortable, and the equipment is state of the art. You can be assured that your tour in this new environment will be professionally challenging and personally rewarding.

As you may well be aware, the US Pacific Northwest is a beautiful part of the world in which to live. Oak Harbor is a pleasant community with most of the conveniences you should need. Vancouver and Seattle, each with their own attractions, are only two hours away. All this should combine to make your stay in the United States a full and enjoyable time. 

IUSS Operations Support Center (IOSC) Little Creek, Virginia USA

https://www.csp.navy.mil/SUBPAC-Commands/Support-Commands/Commander-Undersea-Surveillance/IUSS-Commands/IOSC-Little-Creek/

The IUSS Operations Support Center (IOSC), located on Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek in Norfolk VA, is responsible for all aspects of logistic and technical life support for world-wide IUSS in-service assets, including eleven SURTASS ships, [ https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2012/navy/2012surtass.pdf?ver=2019-08-22-111611-643 ] three IUSS Fixed Sites. The IOSC provides array support to all Navy combatant ships. Additionally, the IOSC acts as the In-Service Engineering Agent (ISEA) for the IUSS program.

As ISEA, the IOSC manages and directs the support of contractors world-wide, acts as the liaison to field activities and laboratories, and provides configuration management, engineering change, technical documentation, preventative maintenance, RM & A, and Planning and Engineering for Repairs and Alterations (PERA) support.

Resident Navy commands within IOSC include, SPAWAR Systems Center, Charleston, SC (SSCC), Navy Array Technical Support Center (NATSC), and Military Sealift Command (MSC). There are also a variety of Contract Companies working at the IOSC.

[Tomorrow: How Australia might tie in with all this. Certainly our subs, ships and MPAs.]

US IUSS Sensors Precisely Knew Titan’s Implosion Location

It is no surprise part of the tragedy reported today: 

“After the [Titan submersible] was reported missing, the U.S. Navy went back and analyzed its acoustic data and found an anomaly [a very loud sound] that was “consistent with an implosion or explosion in the general vicinity of where the Titan submersible was operating when communications were lost,” a senior Navy official told The Associated Press on Thursday. 

The official spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive acoustic detection system. 

The Navy passed on that information to the Coast Guard, which continued its search because the Navy did not consider the data to be definitive." 

The “sensitive acoustic detection system” is called the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) (some details below). The many sensors of IUSS, some relatively close to the Titan implosion and many more distant in the Atlantic Ocean, would have very accurately triangulated the precise location (rather than “the general vicinity”) and time of Titan's implosion off the US/Canadian coast. 

A major and understandable concern of the IUSS organization, which is part of US Naval Intelligence, ultimately relying on the NSA, was that the covert sources and methods to process the large amount of Titan implosion data not become a major public issue.

The main job of acutely precise IUSS sensors in the Atlantic Ocean are to detect and track the very small sounds made by Russian nuclear submarines. Undersea implosions are relatively easily heard compared to submarine movements. 

It took the availability of an overt source/sensor (a rare, very deep diving, remotely operated vehicle (ROV) to find fragments of Titan on the seafloor) to make it a public fact that the fate of Titan was now known. It was also out of concern for the next of kin that they shouldn't be told out of nowhere "secret sources, that we can't talk about, indicate your loved ones are dead..."

Some Details of IUSS

On June 20, 2023 I wrote of the importance of “fixed undersea sensors” to hear sounds made by Titan. These sensors principally mean ordinarily Top Secret seafloor microphones. In reference to Titan the microphones precisely locating the implosion are strung along:

1.  the Atlantic coast of the North American continent (including Canada)

2.  from northern Canada, to Greenland, to Iceland and then on to northern UK

3.  other relevant microphones protect the US nuclear submarine test ranges in the Bahamas, Caribbean Sea.

The location and large number of these microphones make triangulation of the implosion more precise.

These microphone arrays are operated by US, Canadian and UK naval personnel as part of the worldwide Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) network.

From time to time these microphone arrays (a niche type of signals intelligence) become a semi-public issue, like now. Then the existence of IUSS quite literally submerges, being quickly forgotten by the public. 

For much more about IUSS see this Submarine Matters article of May 17, 2022. 

Japan-US-Indian IUSS cable link completed across Bay of Bengal

With the completion of the Port Blair to Chennai undersea IUSS sensor cable link 
(see Map A below) India and the US have concluded political/technical agreements to most fully exploit it. USNS Zeus (T-ARC-7) is the most likely ship to have laid the sensor cable link. Alternatively as Japan has been involved in Pacific IUSS cable laying the Bay of Bengal, Indian Ocean layer might be KDDI PACIFIC LINK?

India is reliant on the US Navy (backed by the acoustic signature "dictionary" records of US Naval Intelligence and the NSA) to most thoroughly identify Chinese submarines and surface ships physically crossing the link or Chinese sonar signals being triangulated by nodes.

The agreements include a Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) within the US Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS). This agreement part was reported early September 2018 in the Indian media.  

The sensor link could be described as a major Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) (old name "SOSUS") infrastructure project with the link being an extension to the Indo-Pacific undersea "fishhook" sensor link. (see Map B)

The Port Blair to Chennai link can be patrolled by the Sea Guardian Predator B/Reaper UAV variants (see Indian website) sold to India by the US in 2017. 

In time of conflict if the link sensors and/or Sea Guardians detect hostile Chinese (or Bangladesh Navy Ming) submarines or ships then Indian P-8I "Neptune" maritime patrol aircraft, sold by the US, can use their sensors or weapons. Indian submarines, surface ships and land based cruise missiles can also "weaponise" the link.

Map A - Port Blair is a base on India's Andaman & Nicobar Islands territory while Chennai is a major city with an average size naval base on India's south eastern coast. (Map originally in this SubMatters article https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2016/01/p-8-poseidons-becoming-operational-and.html )

---

Map B - May depict past or current IUSS (was SOSUS) undersea Indo-Pacific sensor positions. Note the Indian Ocean point of the "hook" terminated near Port Blair, Andaman Islands, This is from page 54 “Map 4. The US ‘Fish Hook’ Undersea Defense Line” of Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter, The Tools of Owatatsumi Japan’s Ocean Surveillance and Coastal Defence Capabilities (2015, ANU Press) http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p309261/pdf/book.pdf?referer=444. (Originally published at this 2015 SubMatters article https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2015/09/how-to-trap-chinese-dragon-seawebs.html and at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2016/05/part-2-undersea-webs-us-japan-se-asia.html).

---

Map C - India's coastal defence intelligence network, with the Command Centre at Gurgaon in central India. It is likely that the network of India's NSA (the NTRO) may coincide to a degree. (Map originally in this 2016 SubMatters article https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2016/05/a-steady-development-of-internet.html )

---

IUSS links are likely to be in many more strategically important places - some of importance to India.

Pete

Australia and Possible IUSS Connections

Ultimately operated by the US-Canadian IUSS Pacific-Indian Ocean, Naval Ocean Processing Facility, Whidbey Island, Washington State, is the following. Above is the track of an IUSS undersea array from Japan, through Southeast Asia, to India. Many customer countries, such as Australia, would use the array's data to keep an eye on interesting submarines, like China's. 

Note the Indian Ocean point of the "hook" terminated at India's Andaman & Nicobar Islands but now extends to Chennai, Indian mainland. Source the late Desmond Ball's and Richard Tanter's, The Tools of Owatatsumi Japan’s Ocean Surveillance and Coastal Defence Capabilities (2015, ANU Press) page 54, Map 4. 

For submarine operations and for IUSS acoustic sensors a great many temperature, salinity, wave motion, seafloor geography and baseline acoustic measures are required to feed supercomputer records of US Naval Intelligence in conjunction with the NSA. Such an amount of data permits 3D modelling.

America's Five Eye partners all do their bit to collect data using sensors on submarines, ships, wave-gliders, AUVs and floats. Floats and AUVs might be assigned certain depths from the surface down to 2,000 meters. After several months the floats or AUVs come to the surface to radio the vast amount of data they have collected or rendevous to be "captured" by friendly ships.

The environmental including acoustic records held on board submarines are tailored to their missions and are constantly updatable. They assist submarines to move discretely and improve the efficiency of IUSS undersea sensors, frequently assisting ASW operations. 

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) constantly conducts measurements often in the context of Australia dual civilian-naval Integrated Marine Observing System (IMOS).   

IMOS uses passive acoustic hydrophone equipment to monitors natural and "man-made noise sources". Such sources include submarines, surface ships and even maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters flying over hydrophones. 

Hydrophone arrays are strung together physically-electrically (or within acoustic communications range) and are connected to shore stations. For Australia data is then fed  constantly by landline, radio or satellite to major naval bases like Fleet Base West (near Perth) and East (in Sydney). All feeds would also go to Defence HQ Canberra. 

Feeds may be transmitted almost instantly to subs, ships and aircraft pursuing targets or land processed to improve the "picture". Feeds may also go to Five Eye allies and Quads (India and Japan). 

Returning to Integrated Marine Observing System (IMOS) in more detail:

The RAN and Australian Defence Science and Technology (DST) Group would not be the largest "Operational Partners" of IMOS unless there were concrete military advantages.

As Australia's submarines operate out of Fleet Base West, just sould of Perth, eastern Indian Ocean littoral and deeper oceanic conditions are of major interest.  

Courtesy "IMOS in Western Australia" See a much larger, more readable image here.
---

The map above relates to IMOS Indian Ocean Deployments including an IMOS technician who dropped Argo Floats along the track above. 
---

Just Guessing the Following

One could assume from the float track immediately above that an IUSS array from Fleet Base West to Australia's Cocos-Keeling or Christmas islands may be a good idea.

Moving west an array from one of those islands to the US/UK base at Diego Garcia might be a useful Five Eye project. India might also be a customer for that feed data. 

From Diego Garcia an array might be well placed to terminate at the US Naval Base at Djibouti. See map below.

Separately an array from Fleet Base West to the seabed north of Antarctica might be a useful way to intercept Chinese SSNs and future SSBNs which may travel the more discrete east to west route south of Australia through the Southern Ocean.

All guesswork.

China's January 11, 2018, Type 093 Submarine Incursion A SIGINT Probe?

Comments here by "PUNTER" and others, has prompted me to revisit the January 11. 2018 incursion of a (probably) Chinese Type 093 SSN into the Japanese claimed “Senkaku” islands-sea area. The incursion appears to be a:

-  Chinese politico-strategic demonstration that China also claims those islands-waters, 

-  a reconnaissance-intelligence exercise to test the efficiency of Japanese and probably America

   ASW fixed and mobile sensors, OR

-  a miscalculation by China's Navy (PLA-N) that its 093 could carry out a mission undetected by
   Japanese (and possibly US) sensors.

The Chinese exercise would allow China to “trace” or “track” predictable responses by Japan’s intelligence agencies and politico-military chain of command the exercise could yield some decoded SIGINT benefits and undecoded traffic analysis analytical benefits. 

The incursion by the 093 and a Chinese Type 054/054A Frigate was beneficial to Chinese electronic interception as it attracted Japanese MPAs and surface craft. If a Japanese submarine was also sent then Chinese tracking of it would be an even greater intelligence prize. 

BACKGROUND

Two Type 093s, were built in the 2000s, and at least 2 or 3 more improved (could be called Type 093As) were commissioned in 2016. The Type 093A reputedly have vertical launch YJ-18 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles and may be as stealthy as unimproved US Los Angeles class SSN-688s) and  much quieter than China’s first and noisy Type 091 SSNs.

Side view of a Chinese Type 093. Note old fashioned (maybe 1990-2009 design) cruciform rudder, instead of modern x-plane rudder. See much larger.

---

The January 11, 2018, Type 093 forced to surface or it surfaced to show the Chinese flag. Note that the cruciform rudder may indicate that the Type 093 might have only have been "old style" "unimproved?"  (Mark. 1(?)) build in the 2000s (Photo via Kyodo News).

---

For security and deception China has variously called the Type 093 (or allowed it to be called) "unimproved [2000s build]" "improved [2016 build], plain 093, 093A, 093B and 093G. "Shang" is a NATO reporting name. What the 5 Type 093s are called seems to rely more on what the non-Chinese observers decide to call it rather than usually secret Chinese designations.

FURTHER THEORIES ON THE MISSION

The Type 093 perhaps entered the Miyako-jima (island) part of the Senkakus:

-  without an expectation of detection, or

-  to see how close it could get to Japan’s seafloor SOSUS array or Japan's Integrated Undersea

   Surveillance System (IUSS) (here's the US IUSS) which is SOSUS + many additional sensor 
   platforms). The map below may be the US-Japanese SOSUS-IUSS.

This method of gauging the sensitivity of Japanese and US sensors is very useful to China. Also ease or difficulty of detection would assist China in indicating how many additional stealth improvements or efforts with existing stealth features are required.

If, it is an old Type 093 then China may wish to deceive Japan-US into conclusions that the submarine “could be too easy to detect”

I would conclude “there is not enough information to back up [the easy to detect] theory”.

Better to be a bit pessimistic in intelligence assessments than too optimistic.

“Map 4. The US ‘Fish Hook’ Undersea Defense Line” in Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter, The Tools of Owatatsumi Japan’s Ocean Surveillance and Coastal Defence Capabilities (2015, ANU Press) page 54. The map may depict past or current locations of the eastern Asia - inner western Pacific SOSUS-IUSS seafloor array. 

---

Pete

India's Decision To Field A Wide Range of Submarines

The Arihant ATV - testbed for India's future SSBNs and SSNs with the range to approach Chinese targets in greater open-ocean safety.
-
The following are excerpts from an article from Nuclear Threat Initiative. The article provides some details about India's Submarine types, capabilities and objectives.
India Current Capabilities - Updated October 2010

"The Indian Navy currently operates 16 submarines, which are based at Visakhapatnam on the east coast and Mumbai on the west coast. An additional west-coast base is also being constructed at Karwar.
[- Ther backbone of the fleet is formed by ten Kilo-class Type 877EM - or Sindhugosh-class - units that are being progressively retrofitted to accommodate the Klub/3M-54E Alfa cruise missile system.
- India also operates four Shishumar-class Type 209/1500 vessels designed by ...HDW.
- two aging Foxtrot-class boats, which are currently being used for training purposes.
- In addition to the 16 active submarines, however, India is also
- in the process of constructing six Scorpène-class boats that are being indigenously built at the Mazagon Dock in Mumbai, albeit under the supervision of French technicians.
- India expects to float a tender on six more diesel submarines within the next year...requests for information are already believed to have been issued to DCNS, for additional Scorpenes; HDW in Germany, for the Type 214; Russia for the Amur 1650; and Spain's Nevantia for the S-80A.]...WHOLE ARTICLE"
-
PETE'S COMMENTS
-
The wide range of foreign sourced submarines (Russian and western) certainly reflects India's evolutionary non-aligned status.

Reasons for the wide selection probably also reflect political motivations - not just the search for subs with the best performance at the time.

Wide selection probably also reflects India aim to transfer technology to its ATV project. The more foreign designs and testbeds (including Nerpa/Chakra) the better.

However wide selection also brings with it technical and managerial inefficiencies, leading to delays and cost overruns.

A special problem for India is the Straits of Malacca and other narrow waters obstructing Indian submarine access to China. India may well be restricted to the short-medium range K-15 as its SLBM for 20 years. Placing China's northeasterly major cities in SLBM range may require Indian submarine positioning in the South China Sea or Western Pacific. Chinese submarines, including China's more advanced (than India) SSNs, may block the narrow straits to China. China may also have deployed under-water sensing (SOSUS type) arrays in these straits - warning of Indian submarines approaching. [Seabed or thethered sensing is even more opaque a subject than the daily movements and confrontations of submarines in the oceans around us!]  All this may mean Indian submarines may need to get in adequate range of China by moving through relatively open waters via the southern Indian Ocean-south around Australia's Southern Ocean-South Pacific to China. This long voyage (if unrefueled) would require nuclear endurance - one reason for India's interest in SSBNs and SSNs.
-
"Invalid" commented on January 31, 2011 3:47:00 AM

"SOSUS networks in Straits of Malacca is useless or not feasible because of heavy traffic in there to generate enough noise in the straits for a sub to sneak in."

At 16.50 January 31, 2011 concening possible capabilities of Integrated Undersea Surveillance Systems (IUSS) Pete commented

"Hi Invalid

You appear to have fairly determined views. What is your database?

Modern digital equipment permits descrimination between ship, submarine and natural sounds. Such equipment can also filter out much distortion/noise.

However sound/sonic sensing is just a small part of the spectrum of sensors (probably) available to seapowers and their allies. It is significant that the US no longer describes its network as merely "SOSUS" - rather the broader term Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) has been more recently used.

[If one looks at the sophistication of visual spectrum networks, for example closed circuit TV (CCTV) in Beijing or London, one can get an idea of the network centric possibilities of IUSS. CCTV can detect a particular face amongst millions and follow that person across a city.] In addition to sound IUSS may well include visual spectrum, nightvision, magnetic anomoly, active sonar, infrared sesors, robotic undersea vehicles used to follow slower SSKs in particular and pressure/ripple sensors.

Undersea sensors would be just one component of a sensor network against submarines which for India would include "spy" satellites, sigint ground stations, surface ships, SSKs, aircraft and tracking information from allies (possibly the US, Russia and Singapore etc). If a Chinese SSN entered the Indian Ocean all these sensors and alliances would watch and probably handover intensively. [Information sharing may well occur amongst those countries that see China as a potential threat.]

The funneling dictated by the geography of the Strait of Malacca would assist in triggering or "scripting" the many sensor platforms available.

Regards

Pete

November 2017 Donor Report: The IUSS in the Pacific & Indian Oceans

Hi Donors

I've just emailed you the November 2017 Donor Report: The IUSS in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

IUSS is the American Integrated Undersea Surveillance System.

Please check your spam bin if you don't see it in your IN box.

Regards

Pete

Director

Submarine Matters International

The DASH Program anti-submarine sensors - TRAPS & SHARK

A team from DARPA prepares to send its Submarine Hold at RisK (SHARK) unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) on a mission to hunt submarines. Photo from DARPA/Bluefin Robots

The following draws on a WIRED - Danger Room article, April 3, 2013 http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/04/darpa-subs/ and other sources.

Robots, Deep-Sea Sensors Help Pentagon Futurists Hunt Subs DARPA announced on April 3, 2013 that it’s successfully tested two methods of detecting quiet submarines under its Distributed Agile Submarine Hunting (DASH) research program. The methods are:

• Transformational Reliable Acoustic Path System (TRAPS) - a series of [presumably aircraft, ship or submarine] dropped-and-forget sonar devices. Each device is a fixed, passive sonar node, designed to sit on the sea floor (unlike existing sonobuoys that float) and communicate back to a floating “stationary surface node” through a wireless acoustic modem when something that sounds like a sub [or a surface ship? drug smugglers? pirates? etc] churns past. The idea is to trade sophistication for a distributed array of sensor packages that, once networked, will set up a vast, trap of sound detection. TRAPS may be viable if it is durable, inexpensive, the modems can handle the depths and no one hacks or spoofs the signals. There is no tech support under the waves. “This is a gamble,” DARPA program manager Andy Coon said in a prepared statement, “but we believe the potential payoff will be high" [see DARPA Press Release].” 

• Submarine Hold at RisK (SHARK) - a yellow unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV). Its torpedo shape indicates it is suitable for aircraft, ship or submarine deployment. Described by DARPA as a “mobile active sonar platform,” SHARK is supposed to track submarines once they’re initially detected, presumably by the TRAPs or current Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) technologies - see diagram below) systems.  DARPA disclosed on April 3, 2013 that it took the SHARK to an unspecified depth in February 2013, which Andy Coon likened to “going to another planet.”

US Navy engineers have yet to figure out how to design a long-distance UUVs, as the propulsion and fueling systems necessary to get the things to span oceans aren’t thought to exist - short of nuclear power. Current thinking from the Navy holds that UUVs will launch from existing aircraft, subs and surface ships, supplementing the manned platforms through scouting and a wider communications network.

It’s unclear what range DARPA wants to provide SHARK. Speed is another factor particularly in shadowing fast SSNs not just slow SSKs. If DARPA can devise, cheap and durable ways of propulsion and efficient fuelling for long-range travel, it’ll usher in not just a new wave of sub-hunting, but a new wave of unmanned subs. And it’s worth noting that DARPA’s SHARK team includes Bluefin Robotics, which is spearheading some of the Navy’s most ambitious experiments with robotic submarines.

DASH isn’t DARPAs only anti-sub program. It is also working on a largely autonomous surface ship called the ACTUV, (see http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/03/anti-submarine-drone-ship-actuv.html ) which DARPA wants to prowl the seas hunting subs with its advanced sonars for up to 90 days at a stretch. There’s some reason to suspect ACTUV may complement the DASH program. Defence giant SAIC is building both the SHARK UUV and the TRAPS.
----------------------------------

The US Navy network, known as the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) multi platform sensor network, may eventually incorporate TRAPS, SHARK and ACTUV technology.

For more information, dated year 2000, for the older systems FDS and ADS, see http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2000/navy/00fds.html .

Federation of American Scientists 1996 info on Fixed Distributed System (FDS)  technology https://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/fds.htm and 1998 info on Advanced Deployable System (ADS) http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/ads.htm
-
COMMENT
-
In addition to sound current IUSS may well include visual spectrum, night-vision, magnetic anomaly, active sonar, infrared sensors and pressure/ripple sensors. DASH technologies will upgrade some existing sensor capabilities.

Undersea sensors would be just one component/platform of a sensor network against submarines which would also include "spy" satellites, sigint ground stations, surface ships, SSKs, SSNs, aircraft and tracking information from allies. If a Chinese SSN entered the Indian Ocean all these sensors and alliances would watch and probably handover intensively.

The funneling dictated by the geography of the Strait of Malacca would assist in triggering or "scripting" the many sensor platforms available.

Link with the following on this "gentleseas" website

LIDAR an anti-submarine warfare sensor, January 16, 2014, http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/01/lidar-anti-submarine-warfare-sensor.html

Anti Submarine Drone Ship (ACTUV), March 18, 2013, http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/03/anti-submarine-drone-ship-actuv.html , and 

Satellite Detection of Submarines. April 11, 2012, http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2012/08/satellite-detection-of-submarines.html

-

Pete

2nd Response to WahooDaddy - Australia need be passive on Taiwan's Defence

On 7/28/2025 12:53 PM WahooDaddy commented in red. My responses are in black:

Working as a coalition, with the Aussies and JMSDF and other regional partners, what d'you think the subsurface warfare scene would be like in the South and East China Seas?

Quite complicated - see my previous article for Maps and the US-Western allies'  IUSS. Many naval coalitions have a history of inefficiency in terms of interoperability (communication including language, standard procedures, common weapons and ammunition). See the weak and poorly coordinated American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command easily destroyed by one country, the Empire of Japan, in early 1942.

Without full US involvement, with its internationally dominant submarine force and its full access to the IUSS undersea sensor network, regional countries with significant submarine forces (Japan, South Korea, Australia, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan (in about 5 years) and others) would be too weak to face the PRC Navy. 

This is considering the PRC has SSNs, large forces of conventional submarines, anti-submarine: surface vessels; UAVs; UUVs; satellites; large maritime patrol and carrier aircraft and land based missile torpedoes. 

The PRC likely has built up its own "IUSS" (weaponised with smart mines and submarines)  with many undersea arrays in the open, straits and narrows of the East China and South China seas. The islands the PRC has seized in the South China Sea present excellent platforms for criss-crossing undersea arrays.

Do RAN/JMSDF subs have the endurance to stick it out against the PLAN? If the balloon went up with the PRC invading Taiwan, would the RAN/JMSDF hang back, or try to support kicking the PLAN back from their ops in the Taiwan Strait?

No, the RAN has long transit distances, northwards, from its submarine base at Fleet Base West, south of Perth. Also other Australian bases are very distant for our slow diesel powered ships and subs to help Taiwan. The RAN would have trouble (our subs running out of fuel and food) discretely patrolling for PRC subs and surface ships passing through the Malacca Straits. So the RAN has to operate south of those straits. 

RAN Collins subs running their diesels, probably make them too noisy in the South China Sea against an enemy like the PRC. Japanese subs (all shorter range) cannot patrol much further south than the Luzon Strait, though when using air independent power (AIP) they are at least quieter. Singapore's force of 4 to 6 conventional subs (with AIP) are best placed to quietly shadow the PRC's conventional subs, but are very unlikely to attack them.

If the PRC invaded Taiwan the RAN, with a destroyer and frigate, moving as fast as the slow (15 knot cruise speed) supply ship probably would be too late and weak to  take on PRC forces. For speed and discrete movement Australia needs SSNs to be relevant in a PRC war against Taiwan. We are unlikely to have fully manned Australian SSNs until the late 2040s.

Japan is already better placed in seas south to Taiwan. But again, without US involvement all the allies would hang back because the PRC navy is too powerful in ship numbers, nuclear propulsion, emerging full sized aircraft carriers and long range anti-ship (and maybe sub) missiles. 

The picture would become considerably more complex if Russia and North Korea coordinated actions with China. Such as North Korea bombing or invading South Korea and Russia embarking on other territorial objectives in Putin's playbook.

I'm trying to look at it from a non-US perspective. I appreciate your thoughts and feedback!

No worries :) We'll talk off-line about what you're doing with these views.

Cheers Pete

Australia & India Boost Indian Ocean Surveillance Links

Australia's Asia-Pacifice Defence Reporter APDR, on April 14, 2022, reported an Indian
P-8I maritime patrol aircraft was deployed to Darwin to exercise with a RAAF P-8A aircraft. 

Earlier Gessler, in very interesting March 24, 2022 posts (with Pete's comments in [...] brackets) wrote: 

An article was published in the Australian Financial Review (AFR) by Andrew Tillett   following up on the recently-concluded Virtual Summit between the Prime Ministers Modi of India and Morrison of Australia (which was incidentally right after PM Modi's in-person summit with the Japanese PM Kishida).

Tillett talks about an impending 'deployment' of Indian spy planes (journalist-speak for
P-8I maritime patrol aircraft) to Australia. [Pete comment: More in the "spy" sense P-8s can also be fitted with Airborne Ground Surveillance (optical, infrared, radar and signals collection sensors)].

As the AFR articles are behind a paywall, I'm only going to reproduce bits & pieces, and often paraphrasing: 

"The types of exercises [Australia has] done with the Indians in the past have been pretty light on, but this would be a step-up in terms of complexity. This is where we were 15 years ago with Japan: fairly uncomplicated maritime surveillance, then it becomes co-ordinating ships and aircraft at sea. Exercises are ladder of complexity and this is the first step being climbed." - said Peter Jennings of ASPI. 

Two examples of the previous exercises Mr. Jennings is alluding to are: 

https://news.defence.gov.au/international/poseidon-power-major-exercise and

https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-anti-submarine-exercise-us-7710105/

The second AFR article, indicates: 

"After several years of Australia and India stepping up the tempo of joint military exercises, the leaders also announced an Indian maritime patrol aircraft would be deployed to Australia sometime soon as part of strengthening collaboration on maritime issues. 

It’s unclear where the aircraft will be based but it is expected that Australian aircraft will also pay a reciprocal visit to India, as the leaders spoke about the need to keep open critical regional maritime corridors..." 

The two articles draw a lot from the joint statements issued via official channels, though the joint statement did not actually mention any specifics of an aircraft deployment: 

https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/35008/JOINT+STATEMENT++INDIAAUSTRALIA+VIRTUAL+SUMMIT

The important part under the "Security and defence cooperation" section goes:

"[Leaders] welcomed enhanced maritime information sharing and maritime domain awareness...Leaders underscored the importance of reciprocal access arrangements in facilitating deeper operational defence cooperation and its contribution towards free and open critical regional maritime corridors."

I'm not entirely clear regarding the nature of the Indian P-8's visit. Though the line in the second article about it being 'based' as opposed to the reciprocal Australian aircraft's 'visit' is interesting, but I don't know if that is anything substantial to go on. But what I can tell you is that India has been wanting to operate aircraft out of Australia's Cocos (Keeling) Islands, [which sit in the Indian Ocean] for quite some time.

[Pete comment: Wikipedia states: 

"The 2016 Australian Defence White Paper stated that the airfield [on the Cocos Keeling's West Island] would be upgraded to support the RAAF's P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.^[53] "]

This interest is documented in publications as well...

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/islands-opportunity-where-india-and-australia-can-work-together

https://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/australias-strategic-imperatives-in-indo-pacific-rpsingh-230222

The 'reciprocal' part may come in with regard to Australia's access to operate from facilities on India's Andaman & Nicobar Islands. [Pete comment: The Islands' capital, Port Blair, hosts several bases including Indian Navy and Indian Air Force].

Or perhaps even the new [South China Sea like] Indian base being built on one of Mauritius' two Agalega islands in the Indian Ocean. [Mauritius is Indian military dominated. The Agalega island might be available for Australian use or at least visits].

See an investigative video on the base here and above. The Indian base on the Agalega islands seems tailored for operations of Indian P-8Is or other large aircraft.

I'd wait and see regarding what kind of 'deployment' AFR is talking about (because it could simply be another joint exercise). But as a closing note, I'd say that in addition to building Domain Awareness underwater (such as through 'Fish Hook' 

[older, deep oceanic term "SOSUS" and the modern, broader term US "IUSS" network. Also see SMI's references to IUSS] 

it is also important for QUAD nations to extend that cooperation into Surface, Air and Space domains. This is in order to build and maintain a full spectrum of surveillance and domain-awareness capabilities against PLAN activities in the Indo-Pacific, which would only be growing by leaps and bounds in the coming years and decades.

[Please link the above with Submarine Matters' September 11, 2018 article Japan-US-Indian IUSS cable link completed across Bay of Bengal ]