Australian Naval Shipbuilding 30-40% pricier. Submarines Unmentionable.

A Virginia SSN being completed in a massive Newport News shed. Will Australia ever build such submarines efficiently?

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On April 16, 2015 Australia's Minister for Defence [Media Released] a RAND Corporation Report Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise – preparing for the 21st century. Probably the most significant finding is that “The cost of building naval ships in Australia is 30-40 per cent greater than United States benchmarks,…”. In contrast to South Korea's shipbuilding success Australia's shipbuilding industry has long been afflicted with the higly unionised British disease. Responsibility averse government and private sector management is another major failing.

Even with this defacto 40% tariff protection Australia cannot compete because ships and submarines  routinely completed 1 or 2 years late - often with subsequent modifications necessary. 

For Submarine Matters the absence of any discussion of Australia’s future submarine build in the Report compromises the whole report. It is akin to taking Future Frigates out of the equation.

The RAND Report, in part, found that:

·     "Australia could sustain a naval ship building industrial base by carefully managing a continuous ship building strategy in the longer–term, with a regular pace of delivering the new ships. But this would need to be premised on reform of the Australian naval ship building industry and significant improvement in productivity.

·       Australian naval ship builders can sustain an 18-24 month pace of large ship construction starts if Defence carefully manages its acquisition program and keeps the Future Frigates operational for 25 to 30 years [ie. needlessly shorter period than usual].

·       The gap between the completion of the Air Warfare Destroyer project and the start of the Future Frigate – Labor’s valley of death – cannot be overcome, but the impact could be lessened.

·       The cost of building naval ships in Australia is 30-40 per cent greater than United States benchmarks, and even greater against some other naval ship building nations. Australia is currently one the most expensive places to build naval vessels. This premium can be reduced by improved productivity through:

o  -  Establishing a consistent production and build demand.

o  -  Selecting a mature design at the start of the build and limiting the amount of changes once production begins.

o  -  The necessity of ensuring a well-integrated designer, builder and supplier team.

o  -  Matching the industrial base structure to demand.

o  -  Ensuring there is visionary leadership provided by company management.

The RAND report is a critical input into the Defence White Paper and the Naval Shipbuilding Plan. The Government will now carefully consider the report’s analysis and findings in preparation for the release of these documents later this year."

SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (SMH) COMMENT

On April 16, 2015 David Wroe http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/major-local-shipbuilding-report-excludes-submarine-costings-20150416-1mmed1.html reported:

“But the report strikingly left the future submarine project out of its calculations, concentrating instead on surface warship such as new frigates and patrol boats.

When asked why, lead researcher John Birkler told reporters submarines had been "specifically excluded" from RAND's terms of reference by the Abbott government. "We were asked not to include submarines," he said.

Mr Birkler went on to indicate that RAND had been told by the government last year that Australia planned to build its submarines offshore.” “His remarks, backed up by a table in the report that places the future submarine project in the "build offshore" column, is clearly at odds with the government's repeated insistence that it had at no point decided to have Japan build the new fleet of up to 12 submarines.”

[In unconvincing contradiction] “A spokesman for Mr Andrews said that at "no stage were RAND Corporation informed by the government or the Department of Defence that an offshore submarine build was the only option being considered".” See WHOLE SMH ARTICLE

MY COMMENT

The Report's productivity improvement recommendations are US best practice. This is understandable given the US authorship. The recommendations, however, appear to be technologically and economically unsustainable for Australia. Australia cannot cover all the design and development functions unlike the output of Soryus at the MHI-KHI shipyards and unlike output of the Virginia class at Newport News and General Dynamics Electric Boat.

Pete

Misleading advice to US Congress on Chinese Submarine Numbers?

The US Navy has used 13 Chinese MING-class (Type 33 to 35A) training submarines (based on the German Type XXI U-Boat, 1945) to boost the Chinese submarine fleet to a threatening "more than 60" which means 61.

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The US Navy and the Pentagon have always been totally truthful in their advice to Congress or that is the ideal, anyway.   

The latest example are comments of a senior US Admiral in late February 25, 2015 who said  “[China's] submarine force has grown over a tremendous rate. They now have more diesel and nuclear attack submarines than we have so they’ve passed us in total quantity - but in quality they are still not there,”  

"but in quality they are still not there” is correct.  

Admiral M's use of flowery language - particularly China is building some "fairly amazing submarines" - should put any cynical politician on guard. 

So how many submarines does China have? The answer from the Pentagon is "more than 60"

The Pentagon's Annual Report to Congress: China Report 2014 (ever after called China Report 2014) reported on Page 7 "more than 60 submarines" and on Pages 7-8 actual submarines types and quantities were identified - which were less than 60. These were: 

-  3 JIN-class (Type 094) second generation SSBN. The JL-2 SLBM's are still being tested and PLAN doctrine suggests the JL-2s are not usually carried, for security and political reasons. 

-  2 SHANG-class (Type 093) second generation SSNs are in service,

-  4 HAN-class (Type 091) "aging" first generation SSNs  . These rely on 1960s technology. China Report 2014 does not specify numbers. However only 5 were built of which at least 1 is considered decommissioned.

-   12 YUAN-class SSP (called Type 039A or Type 041) as the 039A has very little resemblance to the 039 it is commonly referred to as the Type 041. The Type 039A/041 possibly has Stirling Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) sold to China by Sweden

-  13 SONG-class SS (Type 039)

-  12 KILO-class submarines acquired from Russia in the 1990s and 2000s

The China Report 2014 only details 46 submarines. 

Question: So how is "more than 60" derived?

Answer: reach 61 Chinese submarines (presumably) by adding:

-  13 MING-class (Type 033 to 035A). These are 1950's technology that are not mentioned in China Report 2014. They are used by China for training only. These are totally obsolete, being closely based on the 70 year old Russian ROMEO-class which in turn were based on Germany's Type XXI U-Boat of World War Two. Two of them may now be going to the navy of Bangladesh. Figure of 13 here. MINGs may be equivalent to US post-war GUPPY uprades. and

-  2  XIA-class (Type 092) SSBNs. They are 1970s technology and also are not mentioned in China Report 2014. One may be active. The other is considered lost in an accident.

So "more than 60" means 61. One of those 61 (a XIA) may be permanenetly submerged and two MINGs might soon be gifted to Bangladesh - hence 58 on publically known figures - and that is a stretch. 

Meanwhile "A spokeswoman said the U.S. Navy had 71 commissioned U.S. submarines." 

It should be left to the reader to assess whether Admiral M and the China Report 2014 are accurate or misleading.

FURTHER ANALYSIS

There is a vast gulf in quality and also availability of the US’s 52 all nuclear propelled attack submarines (SSNs) verses China’s 6 SSNs and 50 diesel-electric (SSKs). The US has paid a much higher price for nuclear submarines because they are of much higher quality overall than conventionally propelled submarines.

It is hard to measure quality but such measures like generation, displacement and crew size would be indicative.

Within the US submarine service the average US attack sub would be 5th Generation nuclear Los Angeles http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles-class_submarine of:

- 6,000 tons surfaced

- combined Blue/Gold crew size 2 x 130 = 260, giving it at least twice the availability of a one crew Chinese sub.

The average Chinese attack sub is 2nd generation diesel/electric Song Class http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_039_submarine .

- probably 2,000 tons surfaced

- crew of 60.

In terms of number of US attack subs this US Navy Fact File of August 2014  http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4100&tid=100&ct=4

 indicates about 53 SSNs, including:

  3     Seawolf

41-2  Los Angeles (maybe 2 less since Aug 2014?)

11     Virginias (including North Dakota commissioned Oct 2014)
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53 Attack submarines nuclear (SSN)

14 Ohio SSBN
  4 Ohio SSGN
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71 Total US Submarines

This is verses a total of 61 Total Chinese submarines - of which 56 or 57 may be attack subs.

A small number of Chinese submariners would have gained experience on the two 2nd Generation Shang class SSNs.

Some USN submariners may have gained experience on SSKs of US allies.

A good comment on the pattern of US Navy-Pentagon fear mongering is here.

Pete

Australian Nuclear Submarine Option - Virginia SSNs

Largest diagram of Virginia SSN. Click to expand. Note the 12 vertical launch tubes near the bow will be replaced with Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT) at the mid-section for various uses (28 missiles, divers, autonomous underwater vehicles  (AUVs). Also see huge diagram.

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PETE'S COMMENT

If Australia is considering paying $2 to 3 Billion per Soryu or for other 3,000+ tonne conventional diesel electric competitors then Virginia (nuclear propelled attack submarines) SSNs should also be an option.

However I think the political considerations make SSNs a remote buy. There would need to be a major threat, amounting to a strategic need, for SSNs. Domestic opposition is, at present, too great. There is too much opposition at the political left and even the center in Australia. 

When the US raised in February 2012 selling or leasing Virgina SSNs to Australia Australian concerns may have also been:

- the complete infrastructure, basing costs and other issues seemed too expensive financially and politically. For example any nuclear submarine facilities could be nowhere near the current Fleet Base East which is in Sydney. Public opposition and separation safety standards may have meant a whole new base would need to be built on Australia's east coast. 

Note that Australia moved its submarine base from Sydney Harbour Fleet Base East,  specifically HMAS Platypus (for subs) in the 1980s to Fleet Base West HMAS Stirling, Western Australia. There were several reasons for Australia's decision including the desire to host nuclear submarines of Australia's allies away from a major city. Implicitly Fleet Base West also offered the option of being the base for Australian nuclear submarines.

- the degree of US sincerity that it was a real offer may not have convinced Australia. Australia would have had to rely on much US influence in placating Australia's neighbours.

-  the crew number requirements of a Virginia are daunting. Crew may be 115-135 or even around 250+ if there are alternating Blue-Gold crews (2 x 115 to 135). This means the Australian submarine service, as it is, would not have the money to pay, train and maintain such large crews. Decades of training in reactor maintenance and safety are required. SSNs mean an extra national effort would be needed - hence the strategic threat would need to be major. 

Australia and the US would also be concerned about igniting a nuclear propelled arms race in the wider region (eg. from such nuclear knowledgeable countries as Japan and South Korea). There might also be increased acceleration in the current SSN building programs in India and China.

- Australia's near neighbour Indonesia can also increasingly afford nuclear technology (with Indonesia's GDP now passing Australia's by some measures). So Australia didn't/doesn't not want an arms race so close to home.

Accepting Australia's current budgetary worries, but leaving some room for escalation to SSNs, my ideal Australian submarine buying plan would be a low-then-high mix:

- 6 medium-large size SSKs 2,500-3,000 tonne within next 10-15 years (each less than $2 Billion). With crews of around 45 so at least 4 could be crewed at any one time. The future TKMS built Israeli AIP Dolphin 3s and Dutch Walrus replacements (for which Sweden, France and TKMS are competing) will likely be of this displacement. Much work on this submarine size has been underway for a decade, so Australia would not again be building a unique "orphan" SSK. 

- 4 Virginia SSNs (or the US follow-on SSN at that time) at some point in future, and based on strategic threats 

Note - A little over a month after I published Australian Nuclear Submarine Option - Virginia SSNs an article in the Australian Financial Review, March 23, 2015 "Nuclear submarine option pushed by industry" also raised the (or my?) idea of buying 6 conventional submarines first then perhaps a number of nuclear submarines sometime later. Fair is fair given my partial use of an AFR article below :-)   

SSNs have major advantages in less-or-no indiscretion time (fully submerged so cannot be seen by Chinese or Russian satellites), much more range, speed (great for the 3,000 km transit gap) and much greater operational availability.

In terms of possible threat - China is likely to be pragmatic over an Australian purchase of future (conventional) submarine even if that submarine is likely to be superior to any Chinese conventional submarine. China would recognize that such an Australian SSK will be a second rate submarine compared to China's increasing numbers of SSNs. China would be much more concerned if Australia bought superior submarines, that is SSNs from the US, UK or France.

The SSN option was raised by the US Ambassador to Australia in early 2012.

ARTICLE

To read the whole article see the Australian Financial Review (AFR) of February 22, 2012  http://www.afr.com/p/national/us_floats_nuclear_subs_option_uPMgRrev3KjNwBLfFxpdeO

"US floats nuclear subs option - 22 Feb 2012 [following written by John Kerin]

VIRGINIA CLASS AT A GLANCE

• Type: Attack submarine
• Cost: US$2.5 billion
• Displacement: 7900 metric tonnes (submerged)
• Length: 240 metres
• Beam: 10 metres
• Propulsion: S9G reactor
• Speed: 25+ knots (46km/h)
• Range: unlimited
• Crew: 135
• Armament: 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles, 4 533mm torpedo tubes
• Built: 2000 - present
• Active: 8
• Planned: 30
• Ships in class include: Virginia, Texas, Hawaii, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Missouri, California, Mississippi, Minnesota, North Dakota, John Warner

The United States has indicated for the first time it would be willing to lease or sell a nuclear submarine to Australia in a move that will inflame tensions with China and force the Coalition to declare its policy on ­bolstering regional defence.

US Ambassador to Australia ­Jeffrey Bleich told The Australian Financial Review yesterday that whichever option Canberra pursued as a replacement for its Collins class submarines, Washington viewed ­Australia’s subs program as crucial to security in the Asia-Pacific region.

“Decisions about the design of the Australian submarine are up to Australia’s leaders, including whether they pursue diesel power or nuclear power,” Mr Bleich said. “Whatever they decide the US is willing to help.’’

His comments suggest the US would be open to discussing nuclear submarine technologies with Australia at a time of severe budget constraints here and in the US, despite Defence Minister Stephen Smith restating Labor’s opposition to any nuclear submarine purchase. But Australian sources maintain they have been told by opposition figures that Coalition leader Tony Abbott will consider the nuclear option if he wins an election due in 2013.

Opposition defence spokesman David Johnston has gone as far as saying the Coalition would support Labor if it sought to examine the nuclear submarine option. Neither Mr Abbott’s office nor Mr Johnston were prepared to comment on Mr Bleich’s intervention last night

But leading defence analysts, including former Liberal minister Peter Reith, have urged both sides of politics to consider nuclear subs.

A senior Defence source said ­Australia would probably be able to buy a 7500 tonne Virginia Class submarine for around $2.5 billion, but because it would come off a mature production line its price would reduce over time.

Labor has been considering the purchase of 12 conventional submarines to replace the Collins, with an Australian designed and built option costing up to $36 billion, or $3 billion each." 

To read the whole article see the Australian Financial Review  http://www.afr.com/p/national/us_floats_nuclear_subs_option_uPMgRrev3KjNwBLfFxpdeO

Further Reading 

See http://navyleague.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/nuclear-powered-submarine-paper-nov-2010.pdf This is a more learned discussion of the cost and benefits of nuclear submarines for Australia. Title is NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES FOR AUSTRALIA November 2010, carried by The Navy League of Australia. It is based on a presentation of “Three members of the Navy League of Australia, Rear Admiral Andrew Robertson AO DSC RAN (Retd.), Rear Admiral David Holthouse AO RAN (Retd.) and Rear Admiral Chris Wood RN (Retd.) gave a presentation in late November 2010 on Nuclear Powered Submarines to the Nuclear Engineering Panel of Engineers Australia (Sydney Branch).” http://navyleague.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/nuclear-powered-submarine-paper-nov-2010.pdf (pages 1 then 9 to 17 may be the most relevant).

ANU’s Stephan Fruehling wrote in ASPI Strategist a most interesting article on this:  Nuclear propulsion and the future of Australia’s submarine force of March 11, 2016

http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/nuclear-propulsion-and-the-future-of-australias-submarine-force/

Pete

Australia may select Japanese Submarine

The Maritime Executive (MAREX) reported, July 9, 2014 that http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/Australia-Inches-Closer-to-Japanese-Submarine-Deal-2014-07-09 : 

July 09, 2014

Australia Inches Closer to Japanese Submarine Deal

BY MAREX

Australian Defence Minister David Johnston hailed the signing on Wednesday of an agreement with Japan as “an important milestone”. The agreement will deepen bilateral defense science and technology cooperation.

Australia’s Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe signed the agreement in Canberra during Abe’s visit to Australia. “This is an important milestone in the Australia-Japan defense relationship, and an integral part of the broader efforts to strengthen our strategic partnership,” said Johnston.

The agreement will facilitate deeper bilateral defense technology cooperation, and the first project will be the Marine Hydrodynamics Project, an important topic in relation to designing a submarine’s hull to ensure its low noise, stealth capabilities and to improve propulsive efficiency. 

The sharing may not be all one-sided. Scientists from Australia have invented sound-absorbing hull and mast tiles that absorb the radio-wave pings sent out by searching sonar sets. Japan is also said to be interested in radar technology developed in Australia that has proved to be effective at shooting down incoming supersonic missiles.

Currently the Japanese constitution prevents that country from taking military defensive action on behalf of allies, but Abe is looking to change that to allow for the concept of “collective self-defense”. Consequently, allies might be more inclined to assist Japan if needed. Australia and Japan have already agreed to work together on submarine design, and this change in policy is viewed as contributing to a growing alliance between the countries. 

Australia may ask Japan for help in designing a new class of submarine or may consider buying complete submarines from Japan. Australia’s previous government had promised to build 12 submarines in Adelaide for a total cost of around $40 billion, the country’s most expensive defense project. However, the Abbott government, elected in September last year, may downsize that and is said to be considering other options.

Of-the-shelf European submarines have been rejected in the past for being too small and lacking in range for Australian conditions, so Japan’s Soryu class are now an attractive prospect given the willingness of Japan to engage with Australia on the project.

“The language being used is unprecedented in terms of speaking of the special relationship, the depth and breadth of the friendship and their preparedness to share sensitive information with us,” Australia’s minister for foreign affairs, Julie Bishop told The Australian.

However, Australia still claims to be in discussions with other countries including Germany, France, the US and Britain. “This is not the only option available to us at this stage. It’s one of a number,” Johnston says.

The ability of any Japanese submarines bought by Australia to operate with the US fleet of nuclear submarines will be a significant factor. Any new Australian submarines are likely to include the same combat system and [US Mark 48] torpedoes as the US Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines and near-silent propellers developed in the US.

If Australia bought foreign off-the-shelf submarines it would be a serious setback for the local shipbuilding industry. However, after delays and cost overruns in the Air Warfare Destroyer project, the government has already chosen to build a new series of naval supply ships in either Spain or South Korea." ENDS

PETE's COMMENT

Note that Japan in the next few years plans to develop a new generation submarine to start replacing the current Soryu's by the 2030s. What the Soryu's probably don't have (vertical multi-purpose locks (VMPLs)? Lithium-ion batteries?) - which Australia probably wants - might be incorporated into Japan's next generation submarine. 

Pete

Australia's Future Submarines - Some Considerations

A MOTS solution for Australia's future submarine?

For the latest on Sweden vs Germany see June 11, 2014’s Australia's Future Submarine - Swedish vs German Claims http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/06/australias-future-submarine-swedish-vs.html . It is unclear whether Germany or Sweden hold the strongest intellectual property rights to the Stirling AIP.

Australia's future submarine decision making process is at the very basic stage of what do we want, when and why? Concerning when? - the usual complex decision making cycle will mean the first of the new submarines will probably be launched on or after 2030 the last in about 2040. The six or more submarines will have the usual thirty year operating life meaning they will be with us until 2070.

It was assumed that such basic issues had been ironed out under the previous Labor government. However Australia new (since September 2013) Coalition Government claims nothing has been resolved other than  the future submarine will be: conventional diesel-electric; probably larger than the Collins; not necessarily 12 submarines; and the submarines will probably be assembled in Adelaide, South Australia.

The major challenge for the future submarine will be improvements in anti-submarine sensor technology in the operating areas of Australian submarines. Australian submarines would be most vulnerable to detection if they were on the surface. Surface movement might have been possible in World War Two, but today surface movement would be too detectable even at night. This is due to the increasing presence of efficient sensors on satellites, ships, UAVs, fixed undersea arrays and manned aircraft. Diesel electric submarines must "snort" for short periods - that is suck in air while the submarine is close to the surface. The air is used principally to drive the diesel engines to recharge the batteries. The period of the snorting process (known as the "indiscretion rate") renders the submarine vulnerable to detection by many types of sensors because the snorkel must be run on the surface, the submarine is running shallow and the diesel engines are relatively noisy when running. 

Longer periods and longer travel distances of quiet operation is thus desirable and likely to be present in Australia's future submarines. The Australian solution might be AIP achieved by Stirling, Fuel Cell or MESMA and/or increased battery capacity (possibly Lithium ion). All these solutions add to the weight and size to the submarine. 

Australia also has to consider the 3,000 km each way transit distances to travel from the major bases at Fleet Base West, Rockingham, Western Australia and Sydney 6,000 km to northern Australian waters. For a conventional submarine to transit those distances quietly takes much longer than SSNs travelling at 30+ knots. Due to secure transit requirements 2,000 ton European theatre submarine designs are inadequate. Hence European MOTS won't meet Australian needs. Japanese MOTS in the shape of the 4,000 tonne Soryu might meet Australian needs. The HDW 216 if it is a sufficiently developed design (perhaps present in Singapore's HDW 218SG) might possibly meet Australia's range-discretion-endurance needs. 

If Australia could select ANY submarine design it would probably be a current US, UK or French SSN MOTS. The most efficient energy source in terms of power to weight and discrete operation is nuclear. This would address Australia's transit speed, range, endurance, and other operational needs (not only in littoral waters) while more compatible with US alliance requirements. However, for Australian domestic political reasons, the nuclear option is banned.

In terms of comparative cost the higher capabilities of nuclear propulsion, along with shorter maintenance rotations, would mean that fewer SSNs would be required - perhaps down to 4 blue-gold crewed SSNs instead of 6-8 single crew SSKs. This may make an SSN force equivalent in cost to a more numerous SSK force. The rising nuclear propulsion capabilities of regional powers, China and India, must also be considered and, to an extent, countered. Japan could also develop nuclear propulsion rapidly.

It has long been envisaged that Australia's future submarines might field Tomahawk cruise missiles for land attack. It is conceivable that during these submarines' operating lives (through to 2070) that the warheads might not all be conventional. It would be risky to entrust Australia's possible future missile arsenal to the limitations of SSK operation.

Pete

Ongoing debate on Australia's SEA 1000 future submarine requirements.



The HDW Type 210mod "Ula Class" submarine specifically built for Norwegian conditions, with a submerged displacement of 1,150 tons.



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For the latest on Australia's future submarine issue see June 11, 2014’s Australia's Future Submarine - Swedish vs German Claims http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/06/australias-future-submarine-swedish-vs.html . 



For my preceding post "Australian SEA 1000 Future Submarine, shipbuilding-budgeting issues"   http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/11/australian-naval-shipbuilding-and.html Anonymous has commented as follows:

"Anonymous said...

So what is the military issue behind a bigger son of Collins-class?

Range of a Collins-class submarine today is reached by even smaller submarines like Type210mod or A26. To gather intelligence a small submarine is better suited and a diesel-electric submarine is even quieter than a large Virginia-class submarine.

What about crew size? A Virginia-class submarine is manned with about 130 men. A modern Type210mod needs just 15 men (21 for 3-watch). Therefore 3 crews of Virginias 26 small submarines could be manned. For price of one Virginia class submarine Australia could get at least 4 Type210. For A$30billion Australia could buy more than 40 Type210mod.

This submarine could be built in Australia. The advantage of building a steady stream of small submarines is to include improvements in the next batch and to keep the knowledge alive how to build them.

Just 3 operational submarines are easier to track and even very fast submarines can’t be everywhere at once. Also a fast submarine is very noisy. A trip around Australia is roughly 7,000 nm. For each submarine 2,300 nm to patrol. With 26 submarines the area is less than 300 nm. With just 3 operational submarines it is very hard to lose one with a crew of over 100 men.

US combat System due to US weapons? What a nonsense! South Korea ChangBogo-class (Type 209) can fire Harpoon missiles. If Raytheon dislikes selling some Tomahawks Australia could just ask Israel about some Popeyes. Israel operates Popeyes on Dolphin-class submarines (Type 209).

Oh, more range. What about submarine tenders? Even the US Navy has a few.

Going big will result in too few submarines. Going to Virginia will add a capability already existing in the Pacific and Indian Ocean. After 6 or 12 small submarines Australia can still switch to a larger submarine type but then with better knowledge.

November 22, 2013

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On this current post I am responding with:

Hi Anonymous

The HDW 210mod and all existing SSKs (including the current sized S-80) fall far short of Australian SEA 1000 (future submarine) requirements.

The SEA 1000 submarine needs range, endurance, speed, multi-mission capabilities and weapons load far above existing SSKs.

If you compare the totality of HDW 209, 210mod ("Ula"), 212 or 214's published capabilities with Collins http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins-class_submarine you'll see the difference.

Note that SEA 1000 needs higher capabilities than even the Collins, especially for the added weapons load of 8+ Tomahawks in a VLS and an AIP capability (achieved by "usual" AIP, advanced batteries or nuclear).

Ideally an SEA 1000 should be operationally autonomous (from US SSNs) and hence capable of shadowing a fast moving SSN for at least a week.

The crew size of 135 for a Virginia being much larger than for SSKs (or the 60 for a future French Barracuda SSN) is indeed an issue.

Tomahawk is a requirement because Harpoon missiles are far too short in range for many land attack scenarios and because Tomahawk is US combat system compatible.

There are too many current uncertainties about the suspected Israeli SLCM Popeye. Popeye may include considerable "off the books" US, French and/or Indian content making it difficult for Israel to export.

Regards

Pete

Australian SEA 1000 Future Submarine, shipbuilding-budgeting issues

For the latest on Sweden's Saab perhap's buying ASC see June 11, 2014’s Australia's Future Submarine - Swedish vs German Claims http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/06/australias-future-submarine-swedish-vs.html . It is unclear whether Germany or Sweden hold the strongest intellectual property rights to the Stirling AIP.

A rough sketch of what Australia may want in its SEA 1000 future submarine project. Nuclear or diesel-electric propelled, if diesel-electric then additionally AIP or very large advanced battery capacity, multi-use vertical launch system, US combat system, US weapons including Tomahawk. Probably the not yet developed HDW 216, an enlarged DCNS Scorpene and in development Spanish S-80 are front runners with the SEA 1000 program planners. US Virginia Class, UK or French nuclear attack subs are outside chances. The chance that Swedish Kockums might be chosen (again) is reduced due to the Collins experience and TKMS-HDW.



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Australia's new centre-conservative Coalition Government has made no decision on what its project SEA 1000 future submarine will consist of.

The previous centre-left Labor Government (voted out in September 2013) indicated in White Papers and other reviews that 12 future submarines would be constructed from around 2025 to around 2035. The previous Government decided these submarines would be large (up to 4,500 tonne) and hence of unique design, diesel-electric, built in Adelaide, South Australia and that they would probably use the US combat system and US conventional weapons (including the Tomahawk cruise missile). These unique large diesel-electric may effectively be Collins Mk. IIs but not built with Kockums as a major contractor unless TKMS negotiates deals in that direction. The Labor decision was made due to several considerations including:

- economic-industry development potential for the depressed South Australia economy

- popular with Labor's trade union constituency

- Federal and State level electoral considerations ie. votes in South Australia

- ideological anti-nuclear grounds, including popularity with Labor's Green Party ally and

- technical grounds (mainly that Australia possessed no nuclear propulsion support industry, that is if we needed one at all...)

Australia's new conservative Liberal-National Coalition Government has not yet made a decision on what will be in the SEA 1000 future submarine in part because:

- the new Coalition Government has only been in power for two and a half months

- the highly complex 30+ billion dollar project deserves several long reviews

- Australia does not currently have the Defence money to fund the project

- naval shipbuilding and budgeting for Australia is currently taken up by the 2 Canberra Class Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs) and the 3 Hobart Class (Aegis) Air Warfare Destroyers (AWDs) projects under construction, and

- the issue is still unresolved under the new Government as to whether Australia may buy nuclear propelled attack submarines rather than diesel-electric

Its not necessarily set in stone that 12 subs will be built rather than 6 diesel-electric or 4 to 6 nuclear propelled. The built in Australia requirement is not a given. Industry-jobs-votes requirements in Australia may be met in other ways including offset agreements and heavy maintenance facilities constructed  in Australia including nuclear propulsion support (if needed...).

If, as is likely, 4 Virginia Class can do the job of 12 diesel-electric Collins Mk. IIs then on the crucial issue of lower overall price, a deal is possible.

A final Australian decision may take 4 years into the new Government ie 2017.

In terms of arguments favouring nuclear propelled Phil Radford a freelance writer, based in Sydney, has written the following article of May 15, 2013 in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI's) The Strategist http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-farewell-to-nuclear-submarines-for-now/

A farewell to nuclear submarines, for now

The Defence White Paper signals full-steam ahead for Australia’s most expensive defence project ever: the design and construction, in Australia, of 12 conventionally-powered submarines. With A$200m committed to funding initial designs, however, the enormity of the challenge will start to surface. Australia now has to create submarines with greater range and endurance than anything built by countries with generations of experience.

Hopefully, Canberra analysed its alternatives to the point of exhaustion. In about two years’ time, Adelaide will start to fill up with the 1,500-or-so foreign draughtsmen and engineers that RAND says Australia will have to import, just to execute the design work. And as these experienced submarine designers wrestle with the performance parameters set by government, they’ll pose one very awkward question: “Why are you asking us to design a nuclear-powered submarine without a nuclear engine?”

Currently, the government has no answer. The White Paper simply says that “consideration of a nuclear powered submarine capability [… has been] ruled out”. This reticence is mistake. As Collins Mk II rises from the drawing board, the case for purchasing nuclear-powered boats will only get stronger.

First, consider the money. The projected cost of an all-new 4,000 tonne conventional boat is estimated by ASPI to be over A$3 billion, which includes all project costs. This is approximately the same as the sail-away cost of a much larger Virginia class nuclear submarine off an established production line, and could even be more than a French or British nuclear submarine which would almost certainly sail away for less than $2 billion. Defence would still have to purchase the support systems to get the boats into Australian service, but the industrial and program costs sunk into getting a first-in-class to work would be borne by someone else.

Besides being less risky to procure, these nuclear-powered vessels would be far more powerful than conventionally-powered boats. They could arrive on station faster, stay there longer, carry more weapons, and fight more aggressively. As a deterrent, they’d be many times more formidable.

The Royal Australian Navy might play a simple war game once the new design matures. They could invite a retired American submarine captain over and say : “Sir, to achieve a specific objective in the middle of the Pacific or Indian oceans you have a straight choice between having, under your command, one single nuclear-powered boat, or ‘X’ number of our Collins Mk.II?” Even at this distance, his ‘X’ is likely to be two or three. Expressed as an opportunity cost in dollars, the answer is horrendous.

The objections to going nuclear are clear; but as the challenges of Collins Mk.II become less opaque, the question will be: did the Government diligently and unemotionally address them?

If the over-riding justification for an Australia-built fleet is operational independence, then Government should look squarely at what the current fleet delivers. Only one third of the Collins fleet is generally seaworthy. Refitting them takes four to five times the work required on similar comparable European vessels. And upgrading them requires US help for the most complex elements—the sensors, combat system and weapons.

Australia could almost certainly sustain a fleet of nuclear boats to a higher level of operational availability than currently possible. Neither the US nor UK boats ever need refuelling. The core is closed for the lifetime of the submarine, so the additional nuclear engineering required for through-life support is modest. Establishing a first-class nuclear-boat maintenance facility in Australia would be expensive, but pales beside the gargantuan cost of re-launching the Australian Submarine Corporate (ASC) as a construction yard.

Alternatively, Australia could avoid the cost and political risk of building maintenance facilities here, and instead operate the boats on a similar cycle to the United States Navy’s Guam-based submarines. This would mean the submarines having only a small maintenance footprint here and returning to US West Coast for periodic refits, which is pretty much how the RAAF maintains its fleet of C-17 strategic transports.

In either case, you don’t need a construction yard to maintain a submarine. The activities are quite different. British nuclear boats never re-visit the Barrow yard where they are built.

Nor would the fact Australia’s boats were foreign-built boats necessarily diminish the country’s strategic independence. There’s a fundamental difference between depending on an ally to come to your aid (which, in extremis, Australia does now) and depending on your ally not to obstruct you from paying to defend yourself. That’s why the UK ultimately trusts US not to abuse its position as the supplier–owner of its Trident ballistic missiles, on which the UK’s independent deterrent relies.
Does the case against nuclear boats ultimately rest, then, on Australian jobs foregone? That flank, too, is exposed. Re-booting ASC will merely kick-start thousands of careers that will go nowhere once each design and construction phase is complete. Better, surely, to play the international defence procurement game, and trade jobs on submarines for offsets in industries where Australia can build competitive advantage—and careers with a future.

The stakes couldn’t be higher. Asia is rising and submarines will become Australia’s primary defence asset for many decades. For now, the government has passed on the one weapon that could deliver genuine independent strategic security. But like a pair of lethal mines, cost and capability are floating right in the path Australia’s home-grown subs. This won’t be the last we hear of Australia’s nuclear option.

Phil Radford is a freelance writer, based in Sydney. He specialises in naval strategy and defence procurement." 

Australian Nuclear Submarine Option may be realizable.

The Virginia Class Submarine - buy it if we can - best SSN in the world (along with the Akula II). Will the US trust Australia with Virginia technology? Click image to expand so its readable.

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For an excellent description of the Roles and Requirements for Autralia's Future Submarine see Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, April 6, 2011 http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/134/ROLES-AND-REQUIREMENTS-FOR-AUSTRALIA-S-FUTURE-SUBMARINE .


The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has written an update on the Future Submarine SEA 1000 program. This ASPI Report is 'Mind the gap: getting serious about submarines' Strategic Insights 57 -  Thursday, 19 April 2012 http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=335&pubtype=-1 (see 'Download PDF' which is free).

On page 15 the option of buying nuclear has received an increasingly serious airing, though significant problems remain - particularly US willingness to transfer extremely sensitive nuclear technology. The ASPI update includes (p.15) a nuclear issue I raised in 2009 - that is any US export of a submarine reactor would probably include 85% HEU (low end weapons grade) fuel - a complex proliferation issue.

Australia's future submarine program is desperately late as ever but the longer the wait the higher the chance that US Virginia Class nuclear submarines might be selected. France, should also be watching this process as Brazil might not be the only nuclear submarine customer.

I think Australia should put its long term submarine acquisition planning on hold until the US is serious in making the nuclear submarine option possible.
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Pete

Trident Debate - Cruise Missiles Ineffective in Leading a UK Nuclear First Strike

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One of four British Vanguard Class SSBN - at its Scottish base area (from UK DailyMail).
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The UK Trident missile system on the current Vanguard submarine platform (from UK DailyMail).
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A British Royal Navy Tomahawk Cruise missile - which may replace UK Trident - or more likely a mixed Trident ballistic and cruise missiles on each sub solution..
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The UK has been unable to decide for the last decade or so whether it will replace its Trident SLBMs (its only current SSBN missiles) with an updated SSBN of 3 or 4 subs. The UK might choose nuclear tipped cruise missiles as the new deterrent or a combination of Trident and cruise. Fortunately US Multiple All-Up-Round Canister (MAC) technology could provide for each Trident tube to carry a Trident ballistic missile (with several MIRV'd warhead) or up to 7 Tomahawk cruise missiles. 

The issue of Britain's post Vanguard SSBN nuclear armed submarines is naturally an issue for the Royal Navy, Ministry of Defence, UK financial departments, shipyards, unions and pacifists. Many pacifists argue for no replacement SSBNs or Tomahawk cruise only.

Concerning ballistic missiles vs cruise, the UK Ministry of Defence appears to primarily rely on the alleged technical disadvantages of cruise (in terms of payload, range, speed and vulnerability) compared to ballistic missiles - see The Future of United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent (Trident White Paper) 2006, page 25 http://www.mod.uk/nr/rdonlyres/ac00dd79-76d6-4fe3-91a1-6a56b03c092f/0/defencewhitepaper2006_cm6994.pdf .

I've conjured up the scenario of a first strike by Britain against a nuclear enemy to highlight the downsides of cruise. Speed (in a first strike scenario - say against Russia, China or a nuclear armed Iran) might be the most compelling issue. If a ballistic missile armed enemy detects a UK cruise missile attack early on (say by satellite infrared detection or signals traffic analysis) - the enemy may be able to launch and complete a second strike even before the UK cruise missiles have hit their targets.

The risk exists that UK cruise would arrive too late, destroying, the enemy's now empty missile silos and truck/train mobile launchers. The enemy (particularly an efficient Russia or China with S-400 SAMs) may also have shot down a significant number of UK cruise.

Trident also permits rapid multiplication of a nuclear warheads by producing theoretically up to 12 MIRVs (or a mix of MIRVs and decoys) per Trident missile. While cruise's are very stealthy they can't split into MIRVs.

Another problem with cruise is the inherent ambiguity of that missile mode with both nuclear and conventional traditions. The enemy may not know whether a UK cruise missile attack consists of all nuclear, some non-nuclear WMD, all conventionally armed warheads or a mixture. An enemy may therefore cover all UK cruise possibilities with a nuclear response against UK targets.

An untrustworthy future Iran may also work on a nuclear missile use them or lose them basis due to Iran's likely relatively small number of ballistic missiles within the next two decades. Hence any US, UK, Israeli, or French concept that conventional weapons are "safer" when used against a nuclear state may all go horribly wrong and lead to nuclear retaliation by that state (especially a newly nuclear armed state that has only "narrow" nuclear options). 

 The deterrent "benefit" of nuclear MAD also becomes more complex if conventional, or non-nuclear WMD's make uncertain the 'comfortable certainties' of nuclear MAD.

I agree that the option of installing four Trident missiles tubes in perhaps four  modified Astute SSN's may avoid the vast development costs and inevitable time delay of building four new (single role) Trident/cruise SSBN's. See http://navy-matters.beedall.com/astute.htm (scrolling 3/4s down):