Chinese Military and "Dual-Use" Satellites

The use of Chinese ocean reconnaissance satellites to attempt to find Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 prompted me to inquire about the capabilities of China's reconnaissance satellites. Such satellites are not specifically equipped to find crashed aircraft.  

China has steadily been developing and deploying a wide range of military-intelligence satellites and "dual-use" military-civilian use satellites. As will be indicated below the Chinese military (Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)) use satellites for:

- reconnaissance of sea (including submarines) and land "targets" including collection of all types of intelligence on China's potential or actual adversaries, 

- for anti-satellite and perhaps satellite repair purposes

- global positioning for military operations including ballistic and cruise missile guidance

- more specifically missile targeting of large US warships (see ISSSP article below) and US submarines 

- electronic (including signals) intelligence (ELINT) for military and counter-terrorism uses (the latter in support of the Ministry of State Security (MSS)).

"Dual-use" military-civilian use satellites very as to the proportion of military and civilian uses. Some satellites might be authentically dual use while other may be primarily or wholly military-intelligence use under the cover of civilian company ownership. Below are descriptions and links of some Chinese military and dual-use satellites.

Connect with a later March 23, 2014 sighting by Chinese dual-use satellite (Gaofeng-1) of possible MH370 debris http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/03/mh370-australian-and-othe-aircraft.html 

After the glove-puppet histrionics of this 2019 Youtube above it is most useful to view it 2 minutes 20 seconds in.  China fields many reconnaissance "spy" satellite systems, including Shijiuns, Shiyans, Yaogans and  Ziyuans, The BeiDou or Beidou Navigation Satellite System (above) is also very military related. I've bolded the names of satellites for easier reference.
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The Chinese satellites can utilize their  ELINT sensors, Synthetic Aperture Radars (SARs) or electro-optical (EO) imaging sensors to detect submarines (submerged, snorkeling "snorting" or surfaced) - however their capabilities are unknown. If Chinese satellites become very efficient at detecting snorting Australian submarines (from the snorkel or near surface wake) these submarines may quickly become obsolete. Snorting-obsolescence is something for Australia's SEA 1000 decision makers to consider. Link with http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2012/08/satellite-detection-of-submarines.html  

The 2049 Project in February 2014 produced the following commentary and list concerning reconnaissance satellites - http://www.project2049.net/documents/Chinas_Evolving_Reconnaissance_Strike_Capabilities_Easton.pdf

:

Satellite Platforms. To make up for its airborne platform deficiencies, the PLA has launched a large number of satellites that are capable of supporting theater missile operations with maritime reconnaissance data. These include electro-optical (EO) satellites for digital imagery in the visual and near infrared spectrum; synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites for nighttime, all-weather imagery; and electronic intelligence
(ELINT) satellites for locating and identifying ships by their electronic emissions. In 2012 alone, the PLA launched 11 new remote sensing satellites. It also launched three communications satellites and one relay satellite for beyond visual line of sight contact with ground stations. More recently, China launched its third series of naval ocean surveillance system (NOSS) satellites in September 2013.28 This underscores the key
role space-based ISR plays in supporting the PLA’s strike capabilities.29

Name Launch           Date                   Satellite Type 
Yaogan 9 (A,B,C)      Mar. 5, 2010       Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) 
Yaogan 10                 Aug. 10, 2010      Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery 
Tian Hui 1A               Aug. 24, 2010      Military mapping satellite 
Yaogan 11                 Sep. 22, 2010      Electro-optical (EO) imagery 
Shi Jian 11-03            July 6, 2011         Unknown, possible early warning satellite 
Shi Jian 11-02            July 29, 2011       Unknown, possible early warning satellite 
Hai Yang 2A              Aug. 15, 2011      Dual-use ocean monitoring satellite 
Yaogan 12                 Nov. 9, 2011        Electro-optical (EO) imagery 
Shi Yan 4                   Nov. 20, 2011      Earth terrain mapping satellite 
Yaogan 13                 Nov. 30, 2011      Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery 
Zi Yuan 1C                Dec. 22, 2011       EO or SAR imagery satellite 
Zi Yuan 3A                Jan. 9, 2012          Dual-use mapping satellite 
Feng Yun 2F              Jan. 13, 2012        Meteorological satellite 
Tian Hui 1B                May 6, 2012         Military mapping satellite 
Yaogan 14                 May 10, 2012       Electro-optical (EO) imagery 
Yaogan 15                 May 29, 2012       Electro-optical (EO) imagery 
Shi Jian 9 (A & B)     Oct. 14, 2012        Unknown military payload, possible ELINT 
Huan Jing 1C             Nov. 18, 2012       Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery 
Xin Yan 1                  Nov. 18, 2012       Unknown, possible NOSS 
Feng Niao (1 & 1A)  Nov. 18, 2012       Unknown, possible NOSS 
Yaogan 16 (A,B,C)   Nov. 25,2012        Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) 
Gao Fen 1                 Apr. 26, 2013        Electro-optical (EO) imagery 
Shi Jian 11-05           July 15, 2013         Unknown, possible early warning satellite 
Yaogan 17 (A,B,C)   Sep. 1, 2013          Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) 
Feng Yun 3C             Sep. 23, 2013        Meteorological satellite 
Kuai Zhou                 Sep. 25, 2013         Rapid reaction imagery satellite 
Yaogan 18                Oct. 29, 2013         Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery 
Yaogan 19                Nov. 20, 2013        Electro-optical (EO) imagery 
Sources: Gunter’s Space Page, Space Daily, Project 2049 Institute  

Professor S. Chandrashekar and Professor Soma Perumal of International Strategic & Security Studies Programme (ISSSP), National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) Bangalore, India, have written China’s Constellation of Yaogan Satellites & the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile – An Update (December 2013) http://isssp.in/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Yaogan-and-ASBM-December-2013-Update.pdf

The Executive Summary (pp. ii-iii) is very informative – indicating the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile of some of  China’s reconnaissance satellites. By their estimated resolutions the anti-submarine potential of the imaging satellites can be very roughly estimated. Executive Summary reads: 

"With the recent launch of the Yaogan 19 satellite China has in place an advanced space capability to identify, locate and track an Aircraft Carrier Group (ACG) on the high seas. This space capability is an important component of an Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) System that China has set up.

[see a list of all Yaogan satellites http://www.n2yo.com/satellites/?c=36 then, within that site, click on hyperlinks for each Yaogan satellite to get an animation of the real-time flight of each satellite - eg.  YAOGAN 17A http://www.n2yo.com/satellite/?s=39239 listed as an “intelligence gathering” satellite.]

The current 19 satellite constellation consists of ELINT [Electronic Intelligence] satellites, satellites carrying Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) sensors as well as satellites carrying optical imaging sensors.

Based on the orbit characteristics, their local time of equatorial crossing and other related parameters, these satellites can be grouped into different categories that perform the various functions for identifying, locating and tracking the ACG.

Yaogan 9 (Yaogan 9A, 9B, 9C), Yaogan (16A, 16B, 16C) and Yaogan 17 (17A, 17B, 17C) are the three clusters that are equipped with ELINT sensors that provide broad area surveillance over the Oceans. With a coverage radius of about 3500 Km, they provide the first coarse fix for identifying and locating an ACG in the Pacific Ocean.

Yaogan 13, Yaogan 10, Yaogan 18 and Yaogan 14 are the satellites carrying a SAR sensor. resolution of 1 to 3 m , they provide all weather as well as day and night imaging capabilities over the regions of interest.[perhaps able to detect a submarine's snorkel, periscope, wake and of course, surfaced shape]

Yaogan 11, Yaogan 4, Yaogan 2 and Yaogan 7 constitute the high resolution optical satellites in the current constellation. The sensors they carry may have resolutions of between 1 to 3 m. [perhaps able to detect a submarine's snorkel, periscope and of course, surfaced shape]

Yaogan 19 and Yaogan 15 optical imaging satellites with medium resolution (5 to 10 m) capabilities. [perhaps able to detect a submarine's surfaced shape]

The Yaogan 12 which replaced the Yaogan 5 has the orbital characteristics of a SAR mission. Yaogan 18 SAR satellite. Having two satellites spaced so close to each other makes it unlikely that it is a SAR mission. Most probably this is a high resolution optical imaging satellite that complements the broad area coverage provided by the 1200 km orbit of the Yaogan 15 and Yaogan 19 satellites.

This seems to be an important component of a larger Chinese Access and Area Denial Strategy focused around a conflict over Taiwan..." see WHOLE PAPER 

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Notes on satellites other than the Yaogan series are  http://claudelafleur.qc.ca/Scfam-reconnaissance.html#2014 :

-  SY-7 / Shi Yan 7, launched July 19, 2013 Orbit 666 km x 673 km x 98.1 with an anti-satellite and/or satellite maintenance mission: Shiyan-7 has a system for testing a manipulator arm to capture other space objects http://claudelafleur.qc.ca/Spacecrafts-2013.html#SY-7 About Chinese anti-satellite efforts generally see http://www.dailytech.com/Govt+Report+Warns+of+Chinese+Plans+to+Cripple+US+Space+Defenses/article23314.htm

-  ZY-3 / Zi Yuan III launched January 9, 2012 Orbit: 498 km x 506 km x 97.5° Ziyuan III is probably a 2,650-kg military photo surveillance satellite. It is reported that it is carrying an electro-optical imaging payload comprising three pointing forward, down and aft. The ground-facing camera has a resolution of 2.5 metres. The spacecraft also features an infrared spectrometer. According to Chinese press, Ziyuan II is a high-resolution remote-sensing satellite for civilian use” http://claudelafleur.qc.ca/Spacecrafts-2012.html#Ziyuan-III

-  ZY-1 02C / Zi Yuan I-02C launched December 22, 2011 Orbit: 770 km Mission: Ziyuan I-02C is probably a high-resolution military photo surveillance satellite. http://claudelafleur.qc.ca/Spacecrafts-2011.html#ZiyuanI-02C

-  SJ-6/4A / Shi Jian 6/4A and SJ-6/4B / Shi Jiun 6/4B  both launched October 6, 2010 588 km x 604 km x 97.8° Mission: Officially, the Shijian VI-04 group are designed to probe space environment But Shijian satellites are believed to have some kind of military surveillance role. They may also test technology demonstration and space research experiments. http://claudelafleur.qc.ca/Spacecrafts-2010.html#SJ-6/4A

-  The Beidou Navigation Satellite System is very Chinese military related. It consists of a limited test system that has been operating since 2000, and a full-scale global navigation system currently under construction. The full-scale global navigation system, officially called the BeiDou Satellite Navigation System (BDS) and also known as COMPASS or BeiDou-2, will be a global satellite navigation system consisting of 35 satellites. It became operational in China in December 2011, with 10 satellites in use, and began offering services to customers in the Asia-Pacific region in December 2012. It is planned to begin serving global customers upon its completion in 2020.
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Pete

The HDW 218SG - 2,000-4,000 tonne submarine [proved to be 2,000-2,200 tonnes]

Diagram of HDW 216 arrangement. A 2,000 to 4,000 tonne HDW 218SG submarine (same as or smaller than a HDW 216) would have long range for Asia-Pacific conditions. The design would include greater diesel and battery capacity, AIP and possibly a vertical multi-purpose lock (VMPL) permitting vertical launch capabilities. A horizontal lock, in place of 2 torpedo tubes, might provide be an alternative to a VMPL.

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Note - the predictions in this 2013 article proved to be wrong (it happens!). When Singapore's Type 218SG was launched on February 18, 2019 its weight proved to be 2,000 tonnes (surfaced) and 2,200 tonnes (submerged) with no reported unusual innovations (like a VMPL).

This article follows on from earlier article http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/12/singapore-buying-two-hdw-218sg.html announcing Singapore's December 2, 2013, decision to buy two HDW 218SG subs. The HDW 218SG might be a 3000 to 4,000 tonne submarine - for the following reasons:

• HDW is increasingly reliant on its Asia-Pacific customer base. Asia-Pacific customers need longer range submarines and other features such as land attack missile capability. In terms of size this signifies a evolution from below 2,000 tonne HDW 212/214 subs built mainly for European (Baltic, Arctic Ocean, North Atlantic) conditions to a 2,000+ tonne design (see below) for Asia-Pacific (Indian and Pacific Oceans) conditions.

• TKMS-Kockums already has experience in helping to design considerably larger than the European size. That experience is in building the 3,000 tonne Collins Class. TKMS bought Kockums not only to remove Kockums as a competitor to HDW but to utilise Kockums' experience, workforce, technology and design information - including the process of building a  larger submarine.

• HDW is developing the 2,000+ to 4,000 tonne, 218 (Asia-Pacific) design not only for Singaporean but for the Australian, Canadian and Indian markets. 

• The 218SG build schedule (for launch around 2019 - 2021) coincides with South Korea's building schedule (from 2018) for its planned 3,000 tonne submarine the KSS-III (D-3000). South Korean subs to date have heavily relied on HDW 209  (KSS-I) and HDW 214 (KSS-II) designs. This pattern suggests that the 3,000 KSS-III will also be supported by HDW design work despite South Korea's claims of a wholly "indigenous" KSS-III design.

• A 2,000 to 4,000 tonne submarine could incorporate heavier battery, increased diesel oil and large  AIP capacity for increased Asia-Pacific range requirements.  Advice here is "the 218SG will have 240-320kw PEM fuel cell AIP (offering 22-30 days at 5 kts)".  Heavier batteries can also allow longer range submerged operation with higher discretion (non-snorkel use) rates against (mainly) Chinese sensor platforms. 

• A 2,000 to 4,000 tonne submarine would also have the range to permit Singaporean use of refuelling-replenishment bases belonging to its US and Australian allies. Such bases include Diego Garcia, Guam, Pearl Harbor and Rockingham (Australia).

Conclusions

The HDW 218SG is most probably designed for long-range Asia-Pacific conditions, all requiring a 2,000 - 4,000 tonne displacement. SG signifies a subset of HDW 218 customized for Singaporean conditions - including air-conditioning for tropical weather, hull-anechoic coating optimized for warmer sea use and a Singaporean-specialized combat system. The HDW 218SG probably represents HDW's latest export submarine design for launch around 2018 and first delivery around 2020.

The designation 218 (neither 214 nor 216) provides uncertainty over the 218's features and weight. This uncertainty provides advantages for Singapore's national security and commercial-competitive secrecy for HDW. HDW would also wish to avoid any mid-build headlines like those experienced by Navantia over the S-80 - see the S-80's weight problems at http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2012/06/australias-future-submarine-selection-s.html .

By not specifying the 218's weight this also permits flexibility in balancing desirable features, within Singapore's expected tonnage parametres, without politicized assumptions. Development of a 218SG somewhere in the 2,000 - 4,000 weight range also may have implications for HDW's likely tendering for Australia's future submarine SEA 1000 project.

Pete

SEA 1000 Continued - Maybe no VLS and no LockMart



So many choices for Vertical Launch Systems (VLS) or broader term Vertical Multi-Purpose Locks (VMPL). Nice to have - adding strategic and tactical flexibility - but very heavy and expensive for a diesel-electric submarine limited to 4,500 tonnes (submerged).

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The following is MHalblaub's comment of "Australian SEA 1000 future submaine - an S-80 development or HDW 216?" of November 30, 2013 at http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/11/australian-sea-1000-future-submaine-s.html

"Dear Pete,

our view coincide that SEA 1000 is a very ambitious project. Just like the F-35. Ambitious defence projects tend to be delayed and more expensive than expected. In my opinion both projects are far too ambitious.

That any submarine has to use a Lockheed Martin SUBIC combat system will not enhance the development time. The decision to use this combat system is not based on requirements. In my opinion it is only based on cronyism because nobody tried to ask if Australia could get better insight in another system.

A vertical launch system (VLS) is nice to have in case of a real big submarine like the Vertical Multi-Purpose Lock (VMPL) on planed Type 216. You said many missiles could be fired at once from one submarine. My argument is that for one big SEA 1000 submarine at a cost of A$3 billion each Australia could buy 4 small submarines instead with capability to fire even more missiles at once.

For a "piggyback" submarine a VMPL is also unnecessary. A26 or 210mod are planned with a big “torpedo” tube for special purpose. http://www.thyssenkrupp-marinesystems.com/en/hdw-class-210mod.html A smaller submarine can get closer to the shore and the "piggyback" sub doesn’t have to be big.

You have the fear an "interim" sub could become a permanent fix. My fear is that without an interim solution Australia will have no operational submarine in the future. A big submarine even with support by DCNS or HDW and interference by ASC will not be ready before 2030. Navantia is troubled to get the S-80 working. A sole Australian submarine solution might be ready in 2040 (IOC). A small “Off The Shelf” (OTS) solution could be built fast in case no big changes were made to sonar system, command and control system, torpedoes …

I also doubt the claim it would be uneconomic to operate two types of submarines at once. At the moment RAN operates one very uneconomic type of submarine. Does RAN also operate just one type of surface ships because this is more economic? Do you think the F-35 will be the only fighter aircraft for RAAF?

Even with SEA 1000 RAN will operate two types at once for a while. I expect it will be a very unreliable Collins-class with incredible maintenance costs and a troubled SEA 1000 program with many delays.

What about politics? Do you think Australia could use an US built nuclear submarine for any mission without restrictions from Washington? Maybe the best solution would be two or three Virginia-class submarines and a fleet of “cheap” small submarines.

Missile systems:
The seeker system of a Popeye missile was build to hit land targets while the Harpoon was initially built against ships. Therefore I think Israel did use Popeye missiles with a 50 % bigger and better suited warhead.

Regards,
MHalblaub

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Pete's Response 

Hi MHalblaub

Not only is SEA 1000's plans to develop an Australia only SSK ambitious, expensive and highly risky but Australia's planned future purchase of 100 Lockheed Martin F-35s from around 2016 would frustrate and delay any major expenditure on the SEA 1000 project.

The purchase of a Lockheed Martin submarine combat system may indeed add risk to the SEA 1000 project given Lockheed Martin has established a convincing reputation for over-time and over-budget. The extent of Lockheed Martin's political, hence market, power in the US conquers mere considerations of cost and efficiency.

A Vertical Multi-Purpose Lock (VMPL) (of course with VLS capabilities) may indeed be a heavy luxury that may not bring sufficient benefits. Tomahawks fired from 6 standard horizontal tubes could be achieved quickly.

On mini piggy back subs and diver exit I noticed "The Collins class boats are also capable of supporting special forces teams. In 2005, Collins was fitted with various modifications to support special forces, including exterior shelters for inflatable boats. [HMAS] Dechaineux was modified in 2006, and the other submarines will receive the hatches during their full cycle docking." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins-class_submarine#Armament

To avoid what I still see overly problematic options of an interim sub or two SSK designs operating simultaneously the only solution might be to buy a large existing design Off The Shelf. This could be from the most experienced exporters-indigenous build supporters which are DCNS and HDW. In comparison Navantia with its currently troubled S-80 design has comparatively little submarine building experience and no independent sub export or indigenous sub build support experience.

Unfortunately Navantia's problems in themselves might form a sufficient recipe for Navantia's selection by Australia. Our acquisition trend is frequently weighted in favour of choosing under-developed, hence problematic designs like the F-111, then the Collins and now Australia believes itself committed to 100 troubled F-35s.

A DCNS (SSK or SSK transition to SSN) will be considered in following articles as will the Japanese Soryu Class .

Mission restrictions may well be a problem from choosing a US (SSN) or Japanese (SSK) design. But then again the political and strategic advantages of choosing a design from an Asia-Pacific ally like the US and Japan must be factored in.

Regarding Israel's recent use of possible a Harpoon land attack or Popeye missile the issue becomes even more clouded with:

"The Harpoon Block II adds GPS guidance, improved processing that helps it distinguish targets amidst near-shore “clutter,” and land attack features. Harpoon competes with Israel’s own ship-borne Gabriel 3 anti-ship missile ; Israel’s Navy operates both types," http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/israel-requests-642m-in-missiles-fuel-03682/

Regards

Pete

Australian SEA 1000 future submaine - an S-80 development or HDW 216?

 A rough sketch of the Navantia S-80 submarine. This sub is still being built-developed and might be launched in 2015.

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Concerning my article of November 22, 2013, "Ongoing debate on Australia's SEA 1000 future submarine requirements." http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/11/ongoing-debate-on-australias-sea-1000.html MHalblaub commented:

"Hi Pete,

do you think the US are unreliable allies? That was my thought reading RAN has to shadow a fast going nuclear powered submarine (SNN) for a week. I doubt that there will be within the next 10 years any technique for a conventional submarine to maintain submerged about 20 knots for more than 24 hours. Therefore the only solution would be a SNN, to wait or to trust the US.

I am well aware that the small HDW 210mod falls short of the SEA 1000 requirements. In my eyes these requirements are the wet dreams of some Admirals.

A greater range would be useful. A bigger weapons load is nice to have. The 8+ VLS are also a nice to have but they could also be tube launched. Btw Popeyes in action: http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_07_14/Israel-hits-Syria-to-destroy-Russian-made-Yakhont-anti-ship-missiles-3943/

The British Astute-class submarines can also fire Tomahawks without an US combat system.

The problem for Royal Australian Navy will be the gap between Collins-class retirement and entry into service of SEA 1000 submarines. Australia can throw a lot of money after the Collins-class to keep them running until 2030. Today the price for one HDW Type 210 is about the costs Australia needs to maintain Collins-class for one year. The maintenance costs for Collins-class will awfully rise in the future.

My advice would be to order as soon as possible 6 Type 210mod/A 26 to fill this gap. 5 submarines should be built in Australia. That will give Australia time and knowledge to design a proper submarine. This interim solution would also save a lot of money and add capabilities.

Australia should not try to reinvent wheels that already exist in far better quality. E.g. engines, AIP, combat system, … That will lead to a troubled and outdated son of Collins – just like the father.

Regards,
MHalblaub
(I tried two times to log me in …)

AIP: Direct Methanol Fuel Cell: http://www.sfc-defense.com/products

November 22, 2013"

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Pete's Comments

My response is that I think the US are reliable allies that provide Australia with security benefits in peacetime and would be an essential ally if Australia faced an enemy too big for Australia to handle alone.

You are right that no non-nuclear propulsion would allow an Australian submarine to shadow a fast moving SSN for a week. And yes the only options are for an Australian SSN or reliance on US SSNs to do fast moving shadowing.

It is true the SEA 1000 requirements are very ambitious. They would require a unique, new, very large diesel-electric submarine (SSK) or an SSN.

The value of a VLS is its flexibility eg. for: a divers wet-dry chamber; a hatch for a mini "piggyback" sub; and to fire cruise or small ballistic missiles. For missile firing the main value of a VLS is the low indiscretion factor - meaning the sub can fire all (say) 8 missiles very quickly - reducing that chance that the sub will be detected while firing. Using horizontal tubes probably involves "slow time" reloads of missiles or of follow-up torpedos.

Regarding http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_07_14/Israel-hits-Syria-to-destroy-Russian-made-Yakhont-anti-ship-missiles-3943/ its quite possible Popeyes were not used. The target was in range of Israel's Harpoon SLCMs. It would therefore have been unnecessary for Israel to use its (perhaps) 1,500 km range Popeye SLCMs and there would have been a risk a malfunctioning Popeye would crash and then its technical secrets might be revealed. If the Popeye SLCMs have a 1,500 km range (see http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/israel-submarine-capabilities/) its more likely they would be used for targets deep inland like Tehran or even Riyadh.

Yes its true the British Astute class SSN is a possibility. However any purchase of a French or UK SSN has the disadvantage that their maintenance-repair bases are around 20,000 km away in Northern Europe or effectively further if the Suez Canal is blocked in wartime. Meanwhile the US provides some SSN maintenance facilities much closer in Diego Garcia, Guam and certainly Pearl Harbour.

The Royal Australian Navy would be very aware that an "interim" sub choice might become permanent. The fixed costs of any sub choice are high - therefore making interim highly uneconomic as would running two different sub types simultaneously.

In any case the HDW 210 is basically the smallest of the HDW range (with the even smaller HDW 206 being phased out). This makes the HDW 210 the least likely HDW Australia might buy. The bigger the better in terms of range and endurance - making a very large version of the HDW 212-214 basically a HDW 800 Dolphin+ the most likely buy from HDW.

An HDW Dolphin+ is on the way to an even larger (but technically and financially high risk)  HDW 216 in response to SEA 1000 requirements. It needs to be remembered though that the US (Lockheed Martin) may well not make its highly developed combat system available to HDW. Against this HDW is probably the world's most experienced and productive builder of conventional diesel-electric subs.

In contrast I understand Lockheed Martin is placing its combat system into the Spanish Navantia S-80. It is significant that Australia might have confidence in dealing with Navantia in submarine development because I believe Australia has a positive relationship with Navantia in the current Canberra LHD and Hobart AWD projects. Against this Navantia has never independently built and then launched an operational submarine. Navantia has also had no independent experience building subs for export or assisting a customer to build a sub

Possibly I'm overrating the importance of the Lockheed Martin SUBICs combat system in the SEA 1000 submarine selection - see http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/193/SEA-1000-COMBAT-SYSTEMS-SELECTION-FOR-SEA-1000 .

While Kockums submarine division's future is in doubt Australia developing an A26 or any other Kockums design is unlikely.

Definitely "Australia should not try to reinvent wheels" and should avoid a repeat of the Collins experience.

I also have had problems logging-in or commenting on some blogger-blogspot sites - probably some technical problem involving blogger-blogspot or even of its Google owner.

Regards

Pete

Ongoing debate on Australia's SEA 1000 future submarine requirements.



The HDW Type 210mod "Ula Class" submarine specifically built for Norwegian conditions, with a submerged displacement of 1,150 tons.



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For the latest on Australia's future submarine issue see June 11, 2014’s Australia's Future Submarine - Swedish vs German Claims http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/06/australias-future-submarine-swedish-vs.html . 



For my preceding post "Australian SEA 1000 Future Submarine, shipbuilding-budgeting issues"   http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/11/australian-naval-shipbuilding-and.html Anonymous has commented as follows:

"Anonymous said...

So what is the military issue behind a bigger son of Collins-class?

Range of a Collins-class submarine today is reached by even smaller submarines like Type210mod or A26. To gather intelligence a small submarine is better suited and a diesel-electric submarine is even quieter than a large Virginia-class submarine.

What about crew size? A Virginia-class submarine is manned with about 130 men. A modern Type210mod needs just 15 men (21 for 3-watch). Therefore 3 crews of Virginias 26 small submarines could be manned. For price of one Virginia class submarine Australia could get at least 4 Type210. For A$30billion Australia could buy more than 40 Type210mod.

This submarine could be built in Australia. The advantage of building a steady stream of small submarines is to include improvements in the next batch and to keep the knowledge alive how to build them.

Just 3 operational submarines are easier to track and even very fast submarines can’t be everywhere at once. Also a fast submarine is very noisy. A trip around Australia is roughly 7,000 nm. For each submarine 2,300 nm to patrol. With 26 submarines the area is less than 300 nm. With just 3 operational submarines it is very hard to lose one with a crew of over 100 men.

US combat System due to US weapons? What a nonsense! South Korea ChangBogo-class (Type 209) can fire Harpoon missiles. If Raytheon dislikes selling some Tomahawks Australia could just ask Israel about some Popeyes. Israel operates Popeyes on Dolphin-class submarines (Type 209).

Oh, more range. What about submarine tenders? Even the US Navy has a few.

Going big will result in too few submarines. Going to Virginia will add a capability already existing in the Pacific and Indian Ocean. After 6 or 12 small submarines Australia can still switch to a larger submarine type but then with better knowledge.

November 22, 2013

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On this current post I am responding with:

Hi Anonymous

The HDW 210mod and all existing SSKs (including the current sized S-80) fall far short of Australian SEA 1000 (future submarine) requirements.

The SEA 1000 submarine needs range, endurance, speed, multi-mission capabilities and weapons load far above existing SSKs.

If you compare the totality of HDW 209, 210mod ("Ula"), 212 or 214's published capabilities with Collins http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins-class_submarine you'll see the difference.

Note that SEA 1000 needs higher capabilities than even the Collins, especially for the added weapons load of 8+ Tomahawks in a VLS and an AIP capability (achieved by "usual" AIP, advanced batteries or nuclear).

Ideally an SEA 1000 should be operationally autonomous (from US SSNs) and hence capable of shadowing a fast moving SSN for at least a week.

The crew size of 135 for a Virginia being much larger than for SSKs (or the 60 for a future French Barracuda SSN) is indeed an issue.

Tomahawk is a requirement because Harpoon missiles are far too short in range for many land attack scenarios and because Tomahawk is US combat system compatible.

There are too many current uncertainties about the suspected Israeli SLCM Popeye. Popeye may include considerable "off the books" US, French and/or Indian content making it difficult for Israel to export.

Regards

Pete

Australian SEA 1000 Future Submarine, shipbuilding-budgeting issues

For the latest on Sweden's Saab perhap's buying ASC see June 11, 2014’s Australia's Future Submarine - Swedish vs German Claims http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/06/australias-future-submarine-swedish-vs.html . It is unclear whether Germany or Sweden hold the strongest intellectual property rights to the Stirling AIP.

A rough sketch of what Australia may want in its SEA 1000 future submarine project. Nuclear or diesel-electric propelled, if diesel-electric then additionally AIP or very large advanced battery capacity, multi-use vertical launch system, US combat system, US weapons including Tomahawk. Probably the not yet developed HDW 216, an enlarged DCNS Scorpene and in development Spanish S-80 are front runners with the SEA 1000 program planners. US Virginia Class, UK or French nuclear attack subs are outside chances. The chance that Swedish Kockums might be chosen (again) is reduced due to the Collins experience and TKMS-HDW.



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Australia's new centre-conservative Coalition Government has made no decision on what its project SEA 1000 future submarine will consist of.

The previous centre-left Labor Government (voted out in September 2013) indicated in White Papers and other reviews that 12 future submarines would be constructed from around 2025 to around 2035. The previous Government decided these submarines would be large (up to 4,500 tonne) and hence of unique design, diesel-electric, built in Adelaide, South Australia and that they would probably use the US combat system and US conventional weapons (including the Tomahawk cruise missile). These unique large diesel-electric may effectively be Collins Mk. IIs but not built with Kockums as a major contractor unless TKMS negotiates deals in that direction. The Labor decision was made due to several considerations including:

- economic-industry development potential for the depressed South Australia economy

- popular with Labor's trade union constituency

- Federal and State level electoral considerations ie. votes in South Australia

- ideological anti-nuclear grounds, including popularity with Labor's Green Party ally and

- technical grounds (mainly that Australia possessed no nuclear propulsion support industry, that is if we needed one at all...)

Australia's new conservative Liberal-National Coalition Government has not yet made a decision on what will be in the SEA 1000 future submarine in part because:

- the new Coalition Government has only been in power for two and a half months

- the highly complex 30+ billion dollar project deserves several long reviews

- Australia does not currently have the Defence money to fund the project

- naval shipbuilding and budgeting for Australia is currently taken up by the 2 Canberra Class Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs) and the 3 Hobart Class (Aegis) Air Warfare Destroyers (AWDs) projects under construction, and

- the issue is still unresolved under the new Government as to whether Australia may buy nuclear propelled attack submarines rather than diesel-electric

Its not necessarily set in stone that 12 subs will be built rather than 6 diesel-electric or 4 to 6 nuclear propelled. The built in Australia requirement is not a given. Industry-jobs-votes requirements in Australia may be met in other ways including offset agreements and heavy maintenance facilities constructed  in Australia including nuclear propulsion support (if needed...).

If, as is likely, 4 Virginia Class can do the job of 12 diesel-electric Collins Mk. IIs then on the crucial issue of lower overall price, a deal is possible.

A final Australian decision may take 4 years into the new Government ie 2017.

In terms of arguments favouring nuclear propelled Phil Radford a freelance writer, based in Sydney, has written the following article of May 15, 2013 in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI's) The Strategist http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-farewell-to-nuclear-submarines-for-now/

A farewell to nuclear submarines, for now

The Defence White Paper signals full-steam ahead for Australia’s most expensive defence project ever: the design and construction, in Australia, of 12 conventionally-powered submarines. With A$200m committed to funding initial designs, however, the enormity of the challenge will start to surface. Australia now has to create submarines with greater range and endurance than anything built by countries with generations of experience.

Hopefully, Canberra analysed its alternatives to the point of exhaustion. In about two years’ time, Adelaide will start to fill up with the 1,500-or-so foreign draughtsmen and engineers that RAND says Australia will have to import, just to execute the design work. And as these experienced submarine designers wrestle with the performance parameters set by government, they’ll pose one very awkward question: “Why are you asking us to design a nuclear-powered submarine without a nuclear engine?”

Currently, the government has no answer. The White Paper simply says that “consideration of a nuclear powered submarine capability [… has been] ruled out”. This reticence is mistake. As Collins Mk II rises from the drawing board, the case for purchasing nuclear-powered boats will only get stronger.

First, consider the money. The projected cost of an all-new 4,000 tonne conventional boat is estimated by ASPI to be over A$3 billion, which includes all project costs. This is approximately the same as the sail-away cost of a much larger Virginia class nuclear submarine off an established production line, and could even be more than a French or British nuclear submarine which would almost certainly sail away for less than $2 billion. Defence would still have to purchase the support systems to get the boats into Australian service, but the industrial and program costs sunk into getting a first-in-class to work would be borne by someone else.

Besides being less risky to procure, these nuclear-powered vessels would be far more powerful than conventionally-powered boats. They could arrive on station faster, stay there longer, carry more weapons, and fight more aggressively. As a deterrent, they’d be many times more formidable.

The Royal Australian Navy might play a simple war game once the new design matures. They could invite a retired American submarine captain over and say : “Sir, to achieve a specific objective in the middle of the Pacific or Indian oceans you have a straight choice between having, under your command, one single nuclear-powered boat, or ‘X’ number of our Collins Mk.II?” Even at this distance, his ‘X’ is likely to be two or three. Expressed as an opportunity cost in dollars, the answer is horrendous.

The objections to going nuclear are clear; but as the challenges of Collins Mk.II become less opaque, the question will be: did the Government diligently and unemotionally address them?

If the over-riding justification for an Australia-built fleet is operational independence, then Government should look squarely at what the current fleet delivers. Only one third of the Collins fleet is generally seaworthy. Refitting them takes four to five times the work required on similar comparable European vessels. And upgrading them requires US help for the most complex elements—the sensors, combat system and weapons.

Australia could almost certainly sustain a fleet of nuclear boats to a higher level of operational availability than currently possible. Neither the US nor UK boats ever need refuelling. The core is closed for the lifetime of the submarine, so the additional nuclear engineering required for through-life support is modest. Establishing a first-class nuclear-boat maintenance facility in Australia would be expensive, but pales beside the gargantuan cost of re-launching the Australian Submarine Corporate (ASC) as a construction yard.

Alternatively, Australia could avoid the cost and political risk of building maintenance facilities here, and instead operate the boats on a similar cycle to the United States Navy’s Guam-based submarines. This would mean the submarines having only a small maintenance footprint here and returning to US West Coast for periodic refits, which is pretty much how the RAAF maintains its fleet of C-17 strategic transports.

In either case, you don’t need a construction yard to maintain a submarine. The activities are quite different. British nuclear boats never re-visit the Barrow yard where they are built.

Nor would the fact Australia’s boats were foreign-built boats necessarily diminish the country’s strategic independence. There’s a fundamental difference between depending on an ally to come to your aid (which, in extremis, Australia does now) and depending on your ally not to obstruct you from paying to defend yourself. That’s why the UK ultimately trusts US not to abuse its position as the supplier–owner of its Trident ballistic missiles, on which the UK’s independent deterrent relies.
Does the case against nuclear boats ultimately rest, then, on Australian jobs foregone? That flank, too, is exposed. Re-booting ASC will merely kick-start thousands of careers that will go nowhere once each design and construction phase is complete. Better, surely, to play the international defence procurement game, and trade jobs on submarines for offsets in industries where Australia can build competitive advantage—and careers with a future.

The stakes couldn’t be higher. Asia is rising and submarines will become Australia’s primary defence asset for many decades. For now, the government has passed on the one weapon that could deliver genuine independent strategic security. But like a pair of lethal mines, cost and capability are floating right in the path Australia’s home-grown subs. This won’t be the last we hear of Australia’s nuclear option.

Phil Radford is a freelance writer, based in Sydney. He specialises in naval strategy and defence procurement." 

Germans sinking Kockums Swedish sub maker?

For the latest on Sweden-Saab vs TKMS-HDW-Kockums see June 11, 2014’s Australia's Future Submarine - Swedish vs German Claims http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/06/australias-future-submarine-swedish-vs.html . It is unclear whether Germany or Sweden hold the strongest intellectual property rights to the Stirling AIP. 

For information about Singapore's December 2, 2013, decision to buy two HDW 218SG subs instead of a Kockums sub at http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/12/singapore-buying-two-hdw-218sg.html

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Very simplified artist's conception of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems' preferred product - largest sub of the HDW range, the future HDW 216. Note the rotary multi-purpose VLS behind the sail-fin.

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See information about Singapore's December 2, 2013, decision to buy two HDW 218SG subs instead of a Kockums sub at http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/12/singapore-buying-two-hdw-218sg.html and Saab Being Subsidized to Buy Back Kockums? of March 4, 2014  http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/03/saab-being-subsidized-to-buy-back.html .

The Local ("Germany's News in English") has produced this disturbing October 15, 2013 report about an internal corporate threat to the continued functioning of Kockum's Submarine division.

Whether this downgrades Kockum's continued ability to support its Singaporean-Archer Class and Australian-Collin's Class submarine customers remains to be seen.

Does this put Kockums' future submarine A26  at risk of preventing it from being a contender for Australia's large conventional SEA 1000 future submarine project?

Is Kockums' new parent company (German) ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems giving preferential treatment to its competing German HDW 212-214 and 216 submarine products? Note, concerning submarines, the ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems  website only features the HDW products.

The report in full is below http://www.thelocal.de/national/20131015-52407.html :

"Germans look to sink Swedish sub maker"

15 October 2013

"A German industrial giant is waging a campaign of "internal warfare" against one of its own firms - Sweden's flagship submarine manufacturer Kockums - putting key defence deals at risk, sources have told The Local.

German industrial conglomerate ThyssenKrupp bought Kockums in 2005 to form part of what is known as ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS), a firm which also owns German submarine maker HDW, a direct competitor of Kockums.

A source told The Local that the purchase was aimed at getting rid of Germany’s Swedish submarine rival and that TKMS was jeopardizing Swedish export deals for submarines with the Australian and Singaporean governments.

"The purchase of Kockums wasn't aimed at consolidating the naval industry and creating synergies, but at getting rid of a competitor," a source in Germany with direct knowledge of the situation told The Local.

Kockums and its predecessors have been building ships for the Swedish navy for centuries at the Karlskrona shipyard in southern Sweden that now serves as the base of the company's Swedish operations.

But according to a German naval manufacturing consultant with ties to TKMS, ThyssenKrupp is actively trying to sabotage Kockums export operations to the advantage of Germany’s HDW, a strategy he dubbed "TKMS über alles" and slammed as "suicide".

The Germans' efforts to sink Sweden's submarine industry have been ongoing since at least 2011, according to the source, when TKMS CEO Hans Christoph Atzpodien denied Kockums the opportunity to bid on a project in Singapore for the construction of new submarines, despite the Swedish firm's long-standing relationship in the country.

Earlier this year, the German firm decreed that the Swedish shipbuilder officially change its corporate name to ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, scrapping the Kockums brand name that has been a part of Swedish industry since the early 1800s.

'A raging war is taking place'

In August, during a meeting in Bonn, Germany with officials from Singapore defence agency DSTA held, Atzpodien claimed that Kockums "would no longer be capable of designing and building submarines", according to the source.

"A raging war is taking place between Kockums and TKMS," he said, explaining that the Singapore deal has brought the situation into sharp relief.

Among other things, Atzpodien disparaged Kockums plans for a new A26 class of submarine, claiming the Swedish firm didn't have enough engineers to complete the project, and that it was sure to be plagued with cost overruns and delays.

"Atzpodien has systematically ejected Kockums from the discussions and has barred Kockums from Singapore," the source explained.

TKMS has also complicated Kockums' chances for new contracts in Australia, another country where the Swedish shipbuilder has a strong presence, having designed and built six Collins-class submarines in the 1990s in what was one of the largest export deals ever at the time.

But Kockums found itself left out of a 2012 initial call for proposals from Australia to replace the aging subs with an off the shelf solution, while its German-based competitor and sister company HDW was one of three European firms asked to participate.

Earlier this year, however, Australia and Sweden did ink a deal allowing for Kockums to take part in the project, dubbed SEA 1000, which calls for the building of 12 new submarines.

But in the meantime, TKMS purchased an Australian naval defence firm, Australian Marine Technologies, that "could do the same job as Kockums could have done on its own," the source said.

"TKMS has here again torpedoed all the efforts of Kockums to run this future competition because it has already created its own footprint," the source told The Local.

A Swedish saviour?

The Swedish government, as well as officials with the primary defence procurement agency, the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV), has been made aware of the situation and have become so unhappy they have asked Swedish defence contractor Saab to look into a possible purchase of Kockums, a source within the Swedish defence industry told The Local.

"Discussions are taking place right now," according to the source, who agreed that TKMS is trying to strangle Sweden's ship building industry.

"The only reason TKMS owns Kockums is to stop them from exporting," the Swedish source explained, adding that the Swedish firm "could not exist" without export contracts.

Allan Widman, a Liberal Party (Folkpartiet) MP from Malmö and the party's defence policy spokesman said he is "worried" about Kockum's future in light of the rift with TKMS.

"Submarine building capabilities are essential for our armed forces and our ability to defend ourselves," he told The Local, adding that he had heard a number of "industry rumours" about the discord between TKMS and Kockums.

Adding to his concern is the fact that two years have passed since the Swedish parliament Riksdag approved funding for the development of the A26 submarine for the Swedish navy, but nothing has happened, reportedly due to concerns over ThyssenKrupp's ownership of Kockums.

"I hope Kockums isn't prevented from doing business with other countries. It's not constructive," said Widman, adding he would welcome Swedish ownership for the Karlskrona-based shipbuilder.

"I would have no objection to private Swedish ownership of Kockums," he said when asked about the Saab deal.

However, if the Swedish and German firms can't strike a suitable deal to resolve the situation, Widman said the dispute may require a "political solution".

"This is a matter that's vital to our national security," he said, stressing that he hopes both Germany and Sweden can maintain submarine building capacity.

"In the end, however, it may require a political dialogue between Sweden and Germany to find a suitable solution."

When reached by The Local for comment on the Saab-Kockums negotiations, a Saab spokesman refused to comment.

"We don't speculate on rumours like that," the spokesman said.

A spokesperson with FMV also chose not to comment citing an "ongoing procurement".

A spokesman with Kockums in Sweden also refused to comment on the reported disunity within TKMS, while spokeswoman with TKMS in Germany said the company was "unable to comment on market rumours"."
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A comment on the above post:

"Anonymous said...
"This is a matter that's vital to our national security," --- So why Kockums was offered to a German company first time? What is the problem for Sweden to buy German submarines like Poland did?

"Earlier this year, however, Australia and Sweden did ink a deal allowing for Kockums to take part in the project, dubbed SEA 1000, which calls for the building of 12 new submarines."
This is quite wrong. The deal was Sweden donated intellectual property rights to Australia.
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-and-sweden-burying-the-hatchet/
Now Australia tries to build with these rights a new Collins-class on its own - good luck!

The Collins-class disaster was partly related to the inability of Kockums to control the project properly. TKMS owned HDW has much more knowledge with license building of submarines. It worked for South Korea. [South Korea has 9 South Korean derivatives Chang Bogo class of the HDW 209 and 3 derivatives Son Won-il class of the HDW 214]

Why should TKMS allow Kockums to design a new A26 submarine while HDW at the same time works on Type210mod? Would GM allow Opel to design quite the same type of car Holden is working on? [as the number of the HDW 210 suggest it is smaller than the HDW 212-214. Specifically the 6 existing HDW 210 mod are of the Norwegian Navy Ula Class http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Ula-Tech-Norways-Next-Submarine-Fleet-07609/ and  http://www.network54.com/Forum/211833/thread/1231528114/HDW+Introduces+Type+210mod+Submarine
]
Kockums makes fine Corvettes like the UK makes fine wings for Airbus. Great Britain will never again produce big passenger aircraft on its own.

How well of is Saab Automobile today without a big company in the background?

November 14, 2013"

Pete's Comment

In addition to preventing Kockums being competitive TKMS acquisition of Kockums provide an opportunity to officially or unofficially shift intellectual property (including A26 design information) from Kockums to HDW?

Does this have an Australian dimension concerning German-HDW access to Collins' confidential design and business details?

Pete