Largest diagram of Virginia SSN. Click to expand. Note the 12 vertical launch tubes near the bow will be replaced with Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT) at the mid-section for various uses (28 missiles, divers, autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). Also see huge diagram.
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If Australia is considering paying $2 to 3 Billion per Soryu or for other 3,000+ tonne conventional diesel electric competitors then Virginia (nuclear propelled attack submarines) SSNs should also be an option.
However I think the political considerations make SSNs a remote buy. There would need to be a major threat, amounting to a strategic need, for SSNs. Domestic opposition is, at present, too great. There is too much opposition at the political left and even the center in Australia.
When the US raised in February 2012 selling or leasing Virgina SSNs to Australia Australian concerns may have also been:
- the complete infrastructure, basing costs and other issues seemed too expensive financially and politically. For example any nuclear submarine facilities could be nowhere near the current Fleet Base East which is in Sydney. Public opposition and separation safety standards may have meant a whole new base would need to be built on Australia's east coast.
When the US raised in February 2012 selling or leasing Virgina SSNs to Australia Australian concerns may have also been:
- the complete infrastructure, basing costs and other issues seemed too expensive financially and politically. For example any nuclear submarine facilities could be nowhere near the current Fleet Base East which is in Sydney. Public opposition and separation safety standards may have meant a whole new base would need to be built on Australia's east coast.
Note that Australia moved its submarine base from Sydney Harbour Fleet Base East, specifically HMAS Platypus (for subs) in the 1980s to Fleet Base West HMAS Stirling, Western Australia. There were several reasons for Australia's decision including the desire to host nuclear submarines of Australia's allies away from a major city. Implicitly Fleet Base West also offered the option of being the base for Australian nuclear submarines.
- the degree of US sincerity that it was a real offer may not have convinced Australia. Australia would have had to rely on much US influence in placating Australia's neighbours.
- the crew number requirements of a Virginia are daunting. Crew may be 115-135 or even around 250+ if there are alternating Blue-Gold crews (2 x 115 to 135). This means the Australian submarine service, as it is, would not have the money to pay, train and maintain such large crews. Decades of training in reactor maintenance and safety are required. SSNs mean an extra national effort would be needed - hence the strategic threat would need to be major.
Australia and the US would also be concerned about igniting a nuclear propelled arms race in the wider region (eg. from such nuclear knowledgeable countries as Japan and South Korea). There might also be increased acceleration in the current SSN building programs in India and China.
- Australia's near neighbour Indonesia can also increasingly afford nuclear technology (with Indonesia's GDP now passing Australia's by some measures). So Australia didn't/doesn't not want an arms race so close to home.
- the degree of US sincerity that it was a real offer may not have convinced Australia. Australia would have had to rely on much US influence in placating Australia's neighbours.
- the crew number requirements of a Virginia are daunting. Crew may be 115-135 or even around 250+ if there are alternating Blue-Gold crews (2 x 115 to 135). This means the Australian submarine service, as it is, would not have the money to pay, train and maintain such large crews. Decades of training in reactor maintenance and safety are required. SSNs mean an extra national effort would be needed - hence the strategic threat would need to be major.
Australia and the US would also be concerned about igniting a nuclear propelled arms race in the wider region (eg. from such nuclear knowledgeable countries as Japan and South Korea). There might also be increased acceleration in the current SSN building programs in India and China.
- Australia's near neighbour Indonesia can also increasingly afford nuclear technology (with Indonesia's GDP now passing Australia's by some measures). So Australia didn't/doesn't not want an arms race so close to home.
Accepting Australia's current budgetary worries, but leaving some room for escalation to SSNs, my ideal Australian submarine buying plan would be a low-then-high mix:
- 6 medium-large size SSKs 2,500-3,000 tonne within next 10-15 years (each less than $2 Billion). With crews of around 45 so at
least 4 could be crewed at any one time. The future TKMS built Israeli AIP Dolphin 3s and Dutch Walrus replacements (for which Sweden, France and TKMS are competing) will likely be of this displacement. Much work on this submarine size has been underway for a decade, so Australia would not again be building a unique "orphan" SSK.
- 4 Virginia SSNs (or the US follow-on SSN at that time) at some point in future,
and based on strategic threats
Note - A little over a month after I published Australian Nuclear Submarine Option - Virginia SSNs an article in the Australian Financial Review, March 23, 2015 "Nuclear submarine option pushed by industry" also raised the (or my?) idea of buying 6 conventional submarines first then perhaps a number of nuclear submarines sometime later. Fair is fair given my partial use of an AFR article below :-)
Note - A little over a month after I published Australian Nuclear Submarine Option - Virginia SSNs an article in the Australian Financial Review, March 23, 2015 "Nuclear submarine option pushed by industry" also raised the (or my?) idea of buying 6 conventional submarines first then perhaps a number of nuclear submarines sometime later. Fair is fair given my partial use of an AFR article below :-)
In terms of possible threat - China is likely to be pragmatic over an Australian purchase of future (conventional) submarine even if that submarine is likely to be superior to any Chinese conventional submarine. China would recognize that such an Australian SSK will be a second rate submarine compared to China's increasing numbers of SSNs. China would be much more concerned if Australia bought superior submarines, that is SSNs from the US, UK or France.
The SSN option was raised by the US Ambassador to Australia in early 2012.
ARTICLE
To read the whole article see the Australian Financial Review (AFR) of February 22, 2012 http://www.afr.com/p/national/us_floats_nuclear_subs_option_uPMgRrev3KjNwBLfFxpdeO
"US floats nuclear subs option - 22 Feb 2012 [following written by John Kerin]
The United States has indicated for the first time it would be willing to lease or sell a nuclear submarine to Australia in a move that will inflame tensions with China and force the Coalition to declare its policy on bolstering regional defence.
US Ambassador to Australia Jeffrey Bleich told The Australian Financial Review yesterday that whichever option Canberra pursued as a replacement for its Collins class submarines, Washington viewed Australia’s subs program as crucial to security in the Asia-Pacific region.
“Decisions about the design of the Australian submarine are up to Australia’s leaders, including whether they pursue diesel power or nuclear power,” Mr Bleich said. “Whatever they decide the US is willing to help.’’
His comments suggest the US would be open to discussing nuclear submarine technologies with Australia at a time of severe budget constraints here and in the US, despite Defence Minister Stephen Smith restating Labor’s opposition to any nuclear submarine purchase. But Australian sources maintain they have been told by opposition figures that Coalition leader Tony Abbott will consider the nuclear option if he wins an election due in 2013.
Opposition defence spokesman David Johnston has gone as far as saying the Coalition would support Labor if it sought to examine the nuclear submarine option. Neither Mr Abbott’s office nor Mr Johnston were prepared to comment on Mr Bleich’s intervention last night
But leading defence analysts, including former Liberal minister Peter Reith, have urged both sides of politics to consider nuclear subs.
A senior Defence source said Australia would probably be able to buy a 7500 tonne Virginia Class submarine for around $2.5 billion, but because it would come off a mature production line its price would reduce over time.
Labor has been considering the purchase of 12 conventional submarines to replace the Collins, with an Australian designed and built option costing up to $36 billion, or $3 billion each."
To read the whole article see the Australian Financial Review http://www.afr.com/p/national/us_floats_nuclear_subs_option_uPMgRrev3KjNwBLfFxpdeO
See http://navyleague.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/nuclear-powered-submarine-paper-nov-2010.pdf This is a more learned discussion of the cost and benefits of nuclear submarines for Australia. Title is NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES FOR AUSTRALIA November 2010, carried by The Navy League of Australia. It is based on a presentation of “Three members of the Navy League of Australia, Rear Admiral Andrew Robertson AO DSC RAN (Retd.), Rear Admiral David Holthouse AO RAN (Retd.) and Rear Admiral Chris Wood RN (Retd.) gave a presentation in late November 2010 on Nuclear Powered Submarines to the Nuclear Engineering Panel of Engineers Australia (Sydney Branch).” http://navyleague.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/nuclear-powered-submarine-paper-nov-2010.pdf (pages 1 then 9 to 17 may be the most relevant).
ANU’s Stephan Fruehling wrote in ASPI Strategist a most interesting
article on this: Nuclear propulsion and the future of Australia’s submarine force of
March 11, 2016
Pete