Australian "Pratt then allegedly shar[ing] the information about submarines"is also a gift to those in the USN and Congress who argue Australia is a potentially weak link in the protect US submarine secrets chain.
11 comments:
Anonymous
said...
A further concern about UK SSN AUKUS is the US ItAR rules. US Congress ITAR approval is required for export of US SSN reactor IP and technology to Australia. This is true for both RAN Virginias and SSN AUKUS. Unless a successful ITAR vote gets through Congress soon (looking more and more difficult) BAE SSN AUKUS is just as dead as RAN Virginias.
Yes International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) is a United States regulatory regime to restrict and control the export of defense and military related technologies to safeguard U.S. national security and further U.S. foreign policy objectives. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Traffic_in_Arms_Regulations
In addition to Congress several US bodies would need to formally and/or informally agree with the export of submarine tech secrets to Australia. Bodies in no particular order include the US State Department, DoD, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy (for the reactor including HEU), the USN, arms/component manufacturers, the FBI and the White House.
This long list means the nuclear subs for Australia ITAR process might be taking months, even years. It may be blocked if another President replaces Biden before the ITAR process is completed. This is especially if Trump returns to power as he has a transactional "Lets make a new deal on my terms" attitude to Treaties, even those with America's long term loyal allies.
Trump's attitude to Putin/Russia has been demonstrably warmer than to US allies, this is even after Russia inavaded Crimea.
Trump and Putin enjoy the mutual respect of strongmen. This is illustrated when Trump was President in 2018 https://youtu.be/-ZJYAcFeoSM?si=1NDnpBodkueVEwRs . In that address to the international press Trump sees Putin's word as more credible than the findings of US institutions.
If/once Trump is inaugurated on January 20, 2025 US backing (and US led NATO and Australian backing) for Ukraine will probably dissolve rapidly. Ukraine will suffer Putin's tender mercies.
ITAR is more problematic The list can be upgraded..retroacrively..to stop sometimes competition in tha name of « us interest « Ref: Blackshaheen is a SCALP for the UAE,Egypt (2 years délays for ITAR free..!) This is the main reason of the high cost of Fr weapons
Hi Pete Itar list is not only complex..but also "flexible" and "retroactive" in the name of US interest (OK) but sometimes purely for commercial reason (never admitted) SCALP missiles could not be exported for 2 years in the EAU or Egypt (big US weapons customer and US mil aid recipient..)The Black Shaheen is the ITAR free version All majors Fr plateforms (jet, helo, sub , satellte , radars , sonar ..) are ITAR free This add cost, quite a bit, but ensure a very deep independant supply chain.This is a major "marketing" difference
If you haven't seen it I recommend this refreshingly frank assessment of the implications of Australia - US military cooperation in light of AUKUS from USSC at Sydney Uni.
It includes discussion of the nuclear deterrent under some realistic scenarios.
Section 3 Para 3 looks at the possible future role of AUKUS SSNs. https://www.ussc.edu.au/key-questions-for-us-australia-extended-deterrence-and-escalation-management-consultations
Yes France also exports a wide range of weapon systems and components with the French President saying the sale is approved.
This contrasts with the extended multi-stage, multi-year, US processes - with the risk that an agreed deal may be cancelled by the US on moral grounds if the recipient government conducts itself in ways the US doesn't like.
Still for a country in Australia's position massive arms purchases from the US buys the Promise of US protection, which has occurred since 1942, even against major "enemies". In contrast France (however much it says its an Indo-Pacific power) simply cannot offer that level of protection.
Hi Pete (from the Fr Ano.) Completely agree with your comment on the Aus situation vs the Fr in the Indo Pa My comment was general and notspecific History shows that alliances and even more eternal comitments are fragile At the end of the day you might be alone..Armenia just find out Having at least you own or multi independant sources is an insurance policy..that was my point
For locating this very interesting paper "Full knowledge and concurrence: Key questions for US-Australia extended deterrence and escalation management consultations" by Kelsey Hartigan
of 21 August 2023
at https://www.ussc.edu.au/key-questions-for-us-australia-extended-deterrence-and-escalation-management-consultations
The key part in Section 3 Para 3 is:
"As Australia brings online additional capabilities, such as its conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered attack submarines [AUKUS SSNs], Washington and Canberra need to have frank discussions about what mission those capabilities will support, and how the alliance would manage an incident in the future. For instance, will Australian attack submarines be chasing Chinese ballistic missile submarines, a common mission for the type of subs Australia will acquire through the AUKUS partnership? Or will they be assigned different or complementary roles? How is the alliance preparing for these kinds of expanded missions in the future?"
I suspect from "will Australian attack submarines be chasing Chinese ballistic missile submarines" the author has been reading Submarine Matters, eg. points 1. 2. and 3. in https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2023/08/australias-aukus-ssns-will-be-for.html
I'm wondering whether Australia and the US have been discussing many things the author recommends - but these discussions need to occur in great secrecy.
“ Still for a country in Australia's position massive arms purchases from the US buys the Promise of US protection, which has occurred since 1942, even against major "enemies". In contrast France (however much it says its an Indo-Pacific power) simply cannot offer that level of protection.”
I have been reading Sam Roggaveen’s book “The Echidna Strategy” on Australian defense in what may be the China century. He shares French Anonymous’ view that the USA remaining to defend Australia is not as certain as we assume. I recommend reading it.
Roggaveen is not a “China dove” (in his own words) and thinks Chinese militarism is real. He also agrees there is great value to Australia in the US alliance as long as UsA sticks around in the western Pacific. However he feels that if it becomes really costly for the USA to remain, they might depart based on their lack of vital interests here. We only have to consider Australia’s position if Trump or similar takes office after 2024 to appreciate the risks.
Australia's options to meet any China threat are not easy and won't be quick. Imagine a world in the 2040s with a China that has already taken Taiwan - freeing up one third of China's defence forces to take on more distant overseas operations. By then maybe South Korea and Japan are nuclear armed.
Australia's options may include:
1. Stepped up Australian Armed Neutrality? with Conventional weapons including submarine land attack missiles?
or
2. Finlandisation of Australia (with just a small defence force) with Australia agreeing with China not to go to war against China.
or
3(a) What I have been exploring on this blog - a nuclear armed Australia with Australian SSNs/SSGNs being the main land attack missile platforms as a deterrent against China and even Russia? As Australia plans to acquire US Virginias and/or UK and US designed SSN-AUKUSes Australian nuclear weapons ownership would need to be approved by the US and possibly UK. Australian nuclear missiles might built in the US in an arragement like the current US "nuclear [weapons] sharing" system with several NATO countries https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_sharing
or
3(b) Australia could build its own nuclear weapons, probably with low-key help from Israel and/or France.
11 comments:
A further concern about UK SSN AUKUS is the US ItAR rules. US Congress ITAR approval is required for export of US SSN reactor IP and technology to Australia. This is true for both RAN Virginias and SSN AUKUS. Unless a successful ITAR vote gets through Congress soon (looking more and more difficult) BAE SSN AUKUS is just as dead as RAN Virginias.
Hi Anonymous at 10/08/2023 11:47 AM
Yes International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) is a United States regulatory regime to restrict and control the export of defense and military related technologies to safeguard U.S. national security and further U.S. foreign policy objectives. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Traffic_in_Arms_Regulations
In addition to Congress several US bodies would need to formally and/or informally agree with the export of submarine tech secrets to Australia. Bodies in no particular order include the US State Department, DoD, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy (for the reactor including HEU), the USN, arms/component manufacturers, the FBI and the White House.
This long list means the nuclear subs for Australia ITAR process might be taking months, even years. It may be blocked if another President replaces Biden before the ITAR process is completed. This is especially if Trump returns to power as he has a transactional "Lets make a new deal on my terms" attitude to Treaties, even those with America's long term loyal allies.
Regards Pete
Trump's attitude to Putin/Russia has been demonstrably warmer than to US allies, this is even after Russia inavaded Crimea.
Trump and Putin enjoy the mutual respect of strongmen. This is illustrated when Trump was President in 2018 https://youtu.be/-ZJYAcFeoSM?si=1NDnpBodkueVEwRs . In that address to the international press Trump sees Putin's word as more credible than the findings of US institutions.
If/once Trump is inaugurated on January 20, 2025 US backing (and US led NATO and Australian backing) for Ukraine will probably dissolve rapidly. Ukraine will suffer Putin's tender mercies.
ITAR is more problematic
The list can be upgraded..retroacrively..to stop sometimes competition in tha name of « us interest «
Ref: Blackshaheen is a SCALP for the UAE,Egypt (2 years délays
for ITAR free..!)
This is the main reason of the high cost of Fr weapons
Hi Pete
Itar list is not only complex..but also "flexible" and "retroactive" in the name of US interest (OK) but sometimes purely for commercial reason (never admitted)
SCALP missiles could not be exported for 2 years in the EAU or Egypt (big US weapons customer and US mil aid recipient..)The Black Shaheen is the ITAR free version
All majors Fr plateforms (jet, helo, sub , satellte , radars , sonar ..) are ITAR free
This add cost, quite a bit, but ensure a very deep independant supply chain.This is a major "marketing" difference
Pete
If you haven't seen it I recommend this refreshingly frank assessment of the implications of Australia - US military cooperation in light of AUKUS from USSC at Sydney Uni.
It includes discussion of the nuclear deterrent under some realistic scenarios.
Section 3 Para 3 looks at the possible future role of AUKUS SSNs.
https://www.ussc.edu.au/key-questions-for-us-australia-extended-deterrence-and-escalation-management-consultations
Hi French Anonymous at 10/08/2023 11:22 PM
Thanks for your comment.
Yes France also exports a wide range of weapon systems and components with the French President saying the sale is approved.
This contrasts with the extended multi-stage, multi-year, US processes - with the risk that an agreed deal may be cancelled by the US on moral grounds if the recipient government conducts itself in ways the US doesn't like.
Still for a country in Australia's position massive arms purchases from the US buys the Promise of US protection, which has occurred since 1942, even against major "enemies".
In contrast France (however much it says its an Indo-Pacific power) simply cannot offer that level of protection.
Regards Pete
Hi Pete (from the Fr Ano.)
Completely agree with your comment on the Aus situation vs the Fr in the Indo Pa
My comment was general and notspecific
History shows that alliances and even more eternal comitments are fragile
At the end of the day you might be alone..Armenia just find out
Having at least you own or multi independant sources is an insurance policy..that was my point
Thanks Anonymous at 10/10/2023 11:47 AM
For locating this very interesting paper "Full knowledge and concurrence: Key questions for US-Australia extended deterrence and escalation management consultations" by Kelsey Hartigan
of 21 August 2023
at https://www.ussc.edu.au/key-questions-for-us-australia-extended-deterrence-and-escalation-management-consultations
The key part in Section 3 Para 3 is:
"As Australia brings online additional capabilities, such as its conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered attack submarines [AUKUS SSNs], Washington and Canberra need to have frank discussions about what mission those capabilities will support, and how the alliance would manage an incident in the future. For instance, will Australian attack submarines be chasing Chinese ballistic missile submarines, a common mission for the type of subs Australia will acquire through the AUKUS partnership? Or will they be assigned different or complementary roles? How is the alliance preparing for these kinds of expanded missions in the future?"
I suspect from "will Australian attack submarines be chasing Chinese ballistic missile submarines" the author has been reading Submarine Matters, eg. points 1. 2. and 3. in https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2023/08/australias-aukus-ssns-will-be-for.html
I'm wondering whether Australia and the US have been discussing many things the author recommends - but these discussions need to occur in great secrecy.
Regards Pete
Pete
“ Still for a country in Australia's position massive arms purchases from the US buys the Promise of US protection, which has occurred since 1942, even against major "enemies".
In contrast France (however much it says its an Indo-Pacific power) simply cannot offer that level of protection.”
I have been reading Sam Roggaveen’s book “The Echidna Strategy” on Australian defense in what may be the China century. He shares French Anonymous’ view that the USA remaining to defend Australia is not as certain as we assume. I recommend reading it.
Roggaveen is not a “China dove” (in his own words) and thinks Chinese militarism is real. He also agrees there is great value to Australia in the US alliance as long as UsA sticks around in the western Pacific. However he feels that if it becomes really costly for the USA to remain, they might depart based on their lack of vital interests here. We only have to consider Australia’s position if Trump or similar takes office after 2024 to appreciate the risks.
Hi Anonymous at 10/11/2023 7:30 PM
Australia's options to meet any China threat are not easy and won't be quick. Imagine a world in the 2040s with a China that has already taken Taiwan - freeing up one third of China's defence forces to take on more distant overseas operations. By then maybe South Korea and Japan are nuclear armed.
Australia's options may include:
1. Stepped up Australian Armed Neutrality? with Conventional weapons including submarine land attack missiles?
or
2. Finlandisation of Australia (with just a small defence force) with Australia agreeing with China not to go to war against China.
or
3(a) What I have been exploring on this blog - a nuclear armed Australia with Australian SSNs/SSGNs being the main land attack missile platforms as a deterrent against China and even Russia? As Australia plans to acquire US Virginias and/or UK and US designed SSN-AUKUSes Australian nuclear weapons ownership would need to be approved by the US and possibly UK. Australian nuclear missiles might built in the US in an arragement like the current US "nuclear [weapons] sharing" system with several NATO countries https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_sharing
or
3(b) Australia could build its own nuclear weapons, probably with low-key help from Israel and/or France.
Regards Pete
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