Huge Problem Nuclear Qualifying RAN: Report

Australia’s Nautilus Institute has produced a very up to date “Peace and Security Special Report”:

Titled “AUSTRALIA’S FUTURE SUBMARINES: AN EXPLAINER”

By Allan Behm, Rear Admiral Peter Briggs (Retired) and Commodore Paul Greenfield (Retired)

Dated November 16, 2022

At https://mailchi.mp/nautilus/napsnet-special-reportaustralias-future-submarinesan-explainer?e=1a4f758957

Its 33 pages contain a wealth of knowledge, that former senior naval officers are best placed to provide, about Australia’s submarine needs.

At the moment I’m focusing on the main section on nuclear propulsion, which states in part:

“Nuclear reactors also radically change the power available to submarines, their endurance underwater, the transit times and time on station, as well as the “hotel” services available to submarines and their crews. Combat system capability, habitability, air quality, water availability and general amenity are much enhanced. There is much to be said for nuclear propulsion, especially when the submarine’s survivability and that of its crew is taken into account. The cost multiplier, however, may not match the force multiplier effects.

Nuclear propulsion would also raise a host of new and imponderable issues for Australian industry, and for the RAN’s ability to support the submarine. Lacking a nuclear industry—and thus the education and associated skills streams that support such an industry—Australia would necessarily have to develop the education, infrastructure and industrial support needed to maintain the capability as part of the cost of that program. It would be important that Australia develop a sovereign capability in all these areas, as the availability of third parties in a time of tension is moot.

At present, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has no nuclear qualified personnel. The nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and the ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in service with the USN and the Royal Navy require between 40 and 50 crew members qualified at varying levels of nuclear expertise per boat, with considerable numbers of similar personnel in the logistics and support functions ashore. Maintaining the pipeline of nuclear-trained personnel in the US or the UK will be costly—approximately $1 million per person per year. Establishing and maintaining a similar pipeline in Australia will not be significantly less expensive.

In June 2022, the US House of Representatives introduced legislation that would assist the RAN to train its future submarine operators in the US: the Australia-US Submarine Officer Pipeline Act will permit at least two Australians to train in the US each year.[15] This is an important, but ultimately token, effort. The pipeline will need to be as wide as it is long to remediate the shortfall in the RAN’s skill base.

It is important to recall that the UK and USA established their SSN capabilities in the circumstances of the Cold War, drawing upon a large force of conventionally powered submarines and steam powered surface ships. This situation assisted in providing the essential manpower and skills base. Nonetheless, the task was a serious challenge for each navy.

Australia has none of these resources and will have to draw heavily on the supplier navy’s training system and seagoing submarine force to train its personnel. The availability of the necessary level of support would be a major risk for an Australian SSN program, and one that needs early resolution.

Equally importantly, the numbers and skillsets in an SSN crew are significantly different to that of a Collins crew. The training program would entail converting existing RAN submarine personnel and a substantial initial training program. Both would require long periods of training and overseas service to gain the necessary experience. Until Australia’s SSN force reached sufficient operational submarines to undertake the at sea training of trainees (say, at least six SSN) most of this training would have to be conducted overseas - and it would take about 20 years to deliver this number of SSNs after initiating the program.

At this point, RAN schools and a nuclear engineering faculty established within a selected Australian tertiary institution could finally begin to take over this task. But in the absence of any nuclear power generation industry in Australia, the cost of establishing and operating this training infrastructure would be borne by the SSN program.

The problem is enormous.”