November 30, 2022

US 2022 China Military Power Report out today: Submarines

The Pentagon’s 2022 China Military Power Report was released today, Nov 29, 2022 (Nov 30 Australian time).

It carries the full name "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China". This Congressionally-mandated report serves as an authoritative assessment of the US DoD's pacing challenge and charts the current course of the PRC's military and security strategy.

This follows the DoD’s release of its unclassified National Defense Strategy in October 2022, which "identified the PRC as the most consequential and systemic challenge to U.S. national security and a free and open international system." 

The full 196 page .PDF "2022 China Military Power Report" is HERE.

Major mentions of submarines in it include:

Page XIII - "As the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage, the PRC is increasing its shipbuilding capacity and capability for all naval classes: submarines, warships, and auxiliary and amphibious ships. China also has developed underwater systems, publicly revealing a long-range system in 2019 [More on that long range system(s) here and here].

Page 52 – “Submarines. The PLAN has placed a high priority on modernizing its submarine force, but its force structure continues to grow modestly as it works to mature its force, integrate new technologies, and expand its shipyards.

The PLAN currently operates six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 44 diesel-powered/air-independent powered attack submarines (SS/SSP)

The PLAN will likely maintain between 65 and 70 submarines through the 2020s, replacing older units with more capable units on a near one-to-one basis.

The PRC continues to increase its inventory of conventional submarines capable of firing advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, the PLAN purchased 12 Russian-built KILO class SS units, eight of which are capable of launching ASCMs. China’s shipyards have delivered 13 SONG class SS units (Type 039) and 17 YUAN class diesel-electric air-independent propulsion attack submarine (SSP) (Type 039A/B). The PRC is expected to produce a total of 25 or more YUAN class submarines by

Page 53 – “2025. In late 2021, the PLAN retired the first two KILO class submarines purchased from Russia in the 1990s. Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed twelve nuclear submarines – two SHANG I class SSNs (Type 093), four SHANG II class SSNs (Type 093A), and six JIN class SSBNs (Type 094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) (7,200KM), the PLAN’s six operational JIN class SSBNs represent the PRC’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. By the mid-2020s, China will likely build the SHANG class (Type 093B) guided-missile nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSGN). This new SHANG class variant will enhance the PLAN’s anti-surface warfare capability and could provide a clandestine land-attack option if equipped with land-attack cruise missiles (LACM). The PLAN is also improving its antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities through the development of its surface combatants and special mission aircraft, but it continues to lack a robust deep-water ASW capability. By prioritizing the acquisition of ASW capable surface combatants, acoustic surveillance ships, and fixed and rotary wing ASW capable aircraft, the PLAN is significantly improving its ASW capabilities. However, it will still require several years of training and systems integration for the PLAN to develop a robust offensive deep water ASW capability.

Page 54 - Eight of the PLAN’s 10 KILO class SSs are equipped with the Russian built SS-N-27b [Kalibr] ASCM (120NM, 220KM). The PRC’s SONG class SS, YUAN class SSP, and SHANG class SSN field the PLAN’s newest domestic submarine launched YJ-18 and its variants, which constitute an improvement over the SS-N-27b ASCM… As the PLAN continues to transition into a global multi-mission force, the addition of landattack capabilities to its modern array of anti-surface and anti-air capabilities is a logical next step. 

In the coming years, the PLAN will probably field LACMs on its newer cruisers and destroyers and developmental SHANG class Type 093B SSGN. The PLAN could also retrofit its older surface combatants and submarines with land-attack capabilities as well. The addition of land-attack capabilities to the PLAN’s surface combatants and submarines would provide the PLA with flexible long-range strike options. This would allow the PRC to hold land targets at risk beyond the Indo-Pacific region. 

Page 94 – “The PRC is conducting continuous at-sea deterrence patrols with its six JIN-class (Type 094) submarines (SSBNs), which are equipped to carry up to 12 JL-2 or JL-3 SLBMs.”

Page 96 – “Sea-based Platforms. The PRC likely began near-continuous at-sea deterrence patrols with its six operational JIN class SSBNs, which are equipped to carry up to 12 CSS-N-14 (JL-2) or CSS-NX-20 (JL-3) SLBMs.

The PRC’s next-generation Type 096 SSBN is probably intended to field MIRVed SLBMs judging from past developmental trends. The 096 SSBNs will likely begin construction in the early-2020s. Based on the 30-plus-year service life of the PRC’s first generation SSNs, the PRC will operate its [Type 094JIN and Type 096 SSBN fleets concurrently.

The current range limitations of the JL-2 will require the JIN to operate in areas north and east of Hawaii if the PRC seeks to target the east coast of the United States. The fielding of newer, more capable, and longer ranged SLBMs such as the JL-3 gives the PLAN the ability to target the continental United States from littoral waters allowing the PLAN to consider bastion operations to enhance the survivability of its sea-based deterrent. The South China Sea and Bohai Gulf are probably the PRC’s preferred options for employing this concept.

Page 166 – see “Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces” table, which includes submarines [heavily in China’s favour]

[As I can't convert .PDF to .html below is last year's table, courtesy Econbrowser. Until the 2022 Table is available in .html].

5 comments:

Anonymous said...

Thanks Pete, interesting. I still wonder at some of the recent Chinese SSK disposals and transfers. It makes me wonder if they are struggling to produce trained sub crews at the same rate as they are producing subs.

This link below suggests France might be offering Pump Jet propulsor technology to India for their SSN program. I don’t know how reliable this is, although I know France has been chasing the Indian sub contract.

Anonymous said...

Sorry Pete the link is below.
https://idrw.org/france-offers-pumpjet-propulsion-technology-for-indian-ssn-program/

Pete said...

Hi Anonymous @Nov 30, 2022, 7:50:00 PM

Yes its one of the big unknowns, at our overt level, about "recent Chinese SSK disposals and transfers" and whether China has sufficient trained sub crews to captain and crew their subs.

One known about the Chinese armed forces is they prize centralised Party and military Command control over unit leader initiative.

So one can expect standard Western autonomy of Captains of SSKs and SSNs in their attack roles might be suppressed in the Chinese Navy.

Also Party and Command nervousness that SSBN Captains have too much power over megatons of SLBM potential might present training-crewing limitations.

Regards Pete

Pete said...

Hi Anonymous @Nov 30, 2022, 10:18:00 PM

Thanks for https://idrw.org/france-offers-pumpjet-propulsion-technology-for-indian-ssn-program/

Its been long expected that if India accepts a France bid of 6 Scorpenes for Project-75(I) then France may offer some nuclear technology for India's future SSN Program https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_75_Alpha

But pumpjets are very sensitive SSN and SSBN quieting and propulsion equipment. As India has worked with Russia for decades in leased Russian SSNs, in designing Arihant SSBNs and in designing their reactors France would be very aware pumpjet technology passed to India might find its way to Russia.

Pumpjets are such sensitive and expensive nuclear technology that France might not rate Indian "the technology won't go to Russia" assurances very highly.

This is also in a world where French pumpjet using SSBNs and SSNs are experiensing increasing tension with Russian subs and other Russian ASW forces that could benefit from knowing the design secrets of French pumpjets.

++++++++++++++++

So, I'd say France might offer very vague low-level pumpjet technology (if any) to India at a very high price - even if that price is cross subsidised by the sale of the 6 Scorpenes.

AND/OR

France may offer pumpjet technology to India that France already knows the Russians already have

eg. the pumpjet tech on Russia's "Alrosa" Kilo sub https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_submarine_B-871#Design_and_description

Regards Pete

Anonymous said...

More on the Chinese missile tracking ship:
https://idrw.org/chinese-spy-ship-again-makes-u-turn-after-india-announced-notam/