The following is my first guess-timate that an Australian future nuclear submarine will less likely to be based on a US design (like the Virginia-class SSN).
The US Contribution - whole Virginias (less likely)
Out to 2043 the US is committed to building around 2 Virginia SSNs per year. The US is also commencing 1 of 12 Columbia class SSBNs per year (as of last year, 2020) all for the USN. On the whole the US wants to build SSNs and SSBNs for the USN as quickly as possible to keep up with Chinese and Russian builds.
The US is unlikely to allow US built Virginias to be supplied to Australia and even less likely to permit Australian built Virginias. This is for long established US commercial competition and US government security reasons. Security reasons because US SSNs are much more advanced than UK SSN or other country SSNs. The US does not want to risk, or surrender, this lead even to close "friendly ally" Australia.
US President Biden, on September 15, 2021, only vaguely indicated specific US action:
"Our governments [which includes the UK Government] will now launch an 18-month consultation period to determine every element of this program - from workforce, to training requirements, to production timelines, to safeguards and nonproliferation measures, and to nuclear stewardship and safety - to ensure full compliance with each of our nation’s commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."
This, on the face of it, vague commitment of specific US action may, in tangible terms, mean several things:
The US has been already providing its nuclear submarine Combat (Tactical Control) System (known as the AN/BYG-1) to the Collins class. "The AN/BYG-1 is installed on the U.S. Navy’s Los Angeles, Seawolf, Virginia, SSGN, SSBN and the upcoming Columbia SSBN class, as well as on the Royal Australian Navy’s Collins-class submarines." The US will almost certainly continue to provide that system for Aus future nuke subs. A combat system consists of sensors, computer hardware and software (for data fusion and targeting) and weapons (likely to remain the US Mark 48 torpedoes, US Harpoon ASMs and (new for the Aus subs) US Tomahawk ASM/Land Attack missiles.
Australia and the US have also been cooperating on several longer range and/or hypersonic missile projects (future nuclear tipped missiles possible).
The Tomahawks can be fired horizontally through US and UK torpedo tubes. In the Virginia Block IIIs and IVs there are also 2 vertical launch Virginia Payload Tubes (VPTs) with 6 x Tomahawks in each (for a total of 12 vertically fired Tomahawks or a number of newer missiles).
The US may be unwilling to offer its latest, highest tech, submarines to Australia. These would be:
- the much larger more expensive Virginia Block Vs (with likely provision for 28 to 36 vertically and horizontally fired Tomahawk ASM/Land Attack missiles)
and
- the US SSN(X). Likely much more expensive than Block Vs and of course higher tech. If the USN Submarine Service has its way SSN(Xs) are like to be a development of the ASW specialized Seawolfs.
The US would also need to provide permission for Australia to use US designed reactors (which use 90+% weapons' grade HEU) which are, in modified form, also used in UK nuclear subs.
On Monday UK Astute Mark 2s (more likely).
21 comments:
Hi Pete,
The Australian Future Submarine program initially ruled out any Military Off The Self (MOTS) consideration because of range requirement of at least 9000 NM. Transit to and from the SCS plus 5 weeks on station drove the original Collins spec. There are no conventional submarine that has this range. A SSN removes this major hurdle. Nuclear propulsion means a MOTS option should be back on the table.
Australia as you noted is already using US combat systems and weapons. The path forward should be relatively clear except on how the government can carve out enough local work and jobs to satisfy the Australian public while being able to actually deliver on time and on budget.
I think a phase approach would be the most practical in terms of project management and program delivery. If 8 boats are needed, I would lease the first 2 boats. build the next 3 based on existing design and the remaining 3 to incorporate some features from the SSN(X) program should those technology be made available to Australia. Such an approach would buy time, mitigate program risk and facilitate transition to an incredible complex industry.
The key question is how much local work can Australia deliver without sinking the program through incompetence.
Brumby
Hello, I'm new here. I have one question:
Why did the Japanese abandon the AIP technology for their new subs? Understand why they abandon Stirling engines. They have many limitations. But why didn't they chose fuel cells? How does a Japanese submarine with a ton of LIB compare to a German sub with FC + LIB? I really doubt LIB have the energy density to operate as long underwater.
This is a bit off topic, sorry, but I really didn't find an answer.
Indeed its all about time, and procuring training submarines at this point in time is vital.
I am a tad disappointed that you settled on the "Numbat Class", quite frankly. I would have thought you would have paid tribute the the person that precipitated the need for such craft. The 'Jinping Class" would have brought cheers from both Labor and the CCP. That way Labor couldn't back out of it.
It would be very annoying if Oz built Astute with VLS. Just sayin'. :)
In the time frame, we are talking about, I am sure it will not be Harpoon, but LRASM. Harpoon even today is already quite long in the tooth: it is not stealthy. US is already using NSM as a bridge.
KQN
Hi Pete,
Unrelated to the topic, but some updates from the recently concluded first in-person summit of QUAD (US, India, Australia, Japan) leaders that you might find interesting...
The official release of the Joint Statement can be found here:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing...2021/09/24/joint-statement-from-quad-leaders/
And the subsequent fact sheet here:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing...es/2021/09/24/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-summit/
Beyond the now oft-repeated statement of "Maintaining a Free & Open Indo-Pacific", there seems to be so much more being firmed up on the geo-economic side of things (which can be argued is the source of China's newfound might and cornerstone of its hegemony ambitions).
What follows in purely just my own opinion/analysis, in between important quotes from the above two releases.
Firstly, there seems to be an effort to edge out the poorly-performing Chinese vaccines from the Indo-Pacific region, with the QUAD pledging to donate over 1.2 billion vaccines - mostly manufactured in India.
Moving to the more interesting topics which will outlast the pandemic, specifically under the "Critical & Emerging Technologies" domain:
"We have established cooperation on critical and emerging technologies, to ensure the way in which technology is designed, developed, governed, and used is shaped by our shared values and respect for universal human rights."
Everything flows from that above line from the Joint Statement, carefully crafted to exclude China without naming it. The most critical elements seem to be an effort to not let China set the standards for the new & emerging techs that will shape global economy for decades to come. Such as:
"In partnership with industry, we are advancing the deployment of secure, open, and transparent 5G and beyond-5G networks, and working with a range of partners to foster innovation and promote trustworthy vendors and approaches such as Open-RAN."
"With respect to the development of technical standards, we will establish sector-specific contact groups to promote an open, inclusive, private-sector-led, multi-stakeholder, and consensus-based approach. We will also coordinate and cooperate in multilateral standardization organizations such as the International Telecommunication Union."
"We are mapping the supply chain of critical technologies and materials, including semiconductors, and affirm our positive commitment to resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains of critical technologies, recognizing the importance of government support measures and policies that are transparent and market-oriented."
"We are also launching today Quad Principles on Technology Design, Development, Governance, and Use that we hope will guide not only the region but the world towards responsible, open, high-standards innovation."
The Trump-era policy of excluding China from global 5G networks seems to be carried forward, among so much more.
Continued...
Continued from above...
Further points from the Fact Sheet that expand on the above quotes:
> Establish Technical Standards Contact Groups: The Quad will establish contact groups on Advanced Communications and Artificial Intelligence focusing on standards-development activities as well as foundational pre-standardization research.
> Launch a Semiconductor Supply Chain Initiative: Quad partners will launch a joint initiative to map capacity, identify vulnerabilities, and bolster supply-chain security for semiconductors and their vital components. This initiative will help ensure Quad partners support a diverse and competitive market that produces the secure critical technologies essential for digital economies globally.
> Support 5G Deployment and Diversification: To support the critical role of Quad governments in fostering and promoting a diverse, resilient, and secure telecommunications ecosystem, the Quad has launched a Track 1.5 industry dialogue on Open RAN deployment and adoption, coordinated by the Open RAN Policy Coalition. Quad partners will jointly facilitate enabling environments for 5G diversification, including with efforts related to testing and test facilities.
On that last point - it's purely my opinion that it will probably also have to include laying of new submarine communication cables, and maintaining & protecting them from hostile action. To quote from a Capgemini article on the topic:
"Submarine communications cables carry over 90 percent of data traffic between continents. They are the core of the internet backbone. Even if 5G meets its most optimistic latency and bandwidth goals, it will mean nothing if the backbone capacity isn’t there to move data globally. You can’t receive a 5G signal across the Atlantic no matter how much you wave your phone in the air. This is why there has been a surge in submarine comms cable projects over the past decade, one that has gone almost unnoticed amid the 5G buzz."
From here: https://www.capgemini.com/dk-en/2019/12/five-new-ways-to-think-about-5g-a-sea-change/
Coming back to the standpoints being adopted by the QUAD nations, there are also elements designed to counter the Chinese Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) via QUAD Infrastructure initiatives, but looks like the focus is on Tech right now & for the immediate future, and creating China-independent supply chains. I always thought QUAD would progress toward a larger geo-economic containment of China, designed to seek isolation of (and insulation from), the Communist government, and is not simply a Maritime security grouping. The moves are in that direction. I can't help but see some elements of the infamous "Rockefeller Trilateral" Commission between US, Europe & Japan formed in the 70s...except now its Quadrilateral, and led by Governments rather than private individuals.
Another point of note in the joint statement is that India (by extension of it being a 'joint statement') seems to have adopted the policy of demanding complete de-nuclearization of North Korea. I'm not entirely aware of what the Indian stand was before this - but its interesting nonetheless, considering both India & DPRK are Nuclear states that are non-signatory to the NPT. Though India enjoys most of the benefits of being a signatory, courtesy the '123 Agreement' of 2005 aka the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, plus all the benefits of being a Nuclear Suppliers Group member despite again being a non-member (thanks to Chinese policy).
The statement in question:
"We reaffirm our commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, and also confirm the necessity of immediate resolution of the issue of Japanese abductees. We urge North Korea to abide by its UN obligations, refrain from provocations. We also call on North Korea to engage in substantive dialogue."
Would love to here your opinions and/or analysis on this overall subject of QUAD v/s China.
Cheers
https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/why-india-is-leasing-a-second-nuclear-powered-attack-submarine-from-russia-1849277-2021-09-04
The Akula SSN 'Bratsk' is already being refitted for Indian Navy's use with delivery slated for 2025. Looks like these boats can sprint upto 33 kn
I don't know how serious this might be. Looks like INS Chakra 4 is possibly in the works as Admiral Karambir Singh has spoken to his Russian counterparts owing to delays in India Projects 75I and 75A. Putin in Delhi in 12/2021 might seal the deal with PM Modi (with the S-400s also arriving at the same time besides 21 extra upgraded MiG-29s being ordered)
https://www.arms-expo.ru/news/armed-forces/dve-apl-dostavyat-s-tof-v-severodvinsk-dlya-modernizatsii/
If I was a betting man then Akula SSN Samara could also be joining the IN Fleet possibly with Bratsk going to the Eastern fleet and Samara to the Western Fleet. As of now Samara is destined to rejoin Russian Pacific fleet...though I think similar to the Gregorovich class frigates, it is possible it gets sent off to the IN.
Hi Pete,
I've put a little thought into this topic, and reckon you might be right in a split buy. There are a multitude of issues to take into account, including:
1. ASC is currently too small for SSN hull production and the current build hall will be used for Collins class LOTE till 2030. A new SSNN construction hall, with more advanced faculties is definitely needed for Aus SSN production - this will take at least a few of years.
Note that Australia is known to be the most expensive country in the world to build ships, so that has to be factored in pricing differences, likely a Virginia sub that cost US$2 billion to build in Groton would easily cost US$3 billion in Aus.
2. Both the future SSN(X) and SSN(R) designs call for big boats - the USN wants 'Seawolf'style ruler-of-the-undersea type, while the RN wants to use the large RR PWR2 reactor that powers the Dreadnought-class. These might not suit Australia - and will likely too expensive.
3. I've read that Virginia-class is supposed to shift to 3/year production in 2025, but have not found an official report. 10 Virginia Block V are all programmed for build - three have started construction. Virginia Block VI/VII have not been officially confirmed, so as it stands, Virginia production will end with the last hull laid down in 2025 unless more Block V (or Block VI) are ordered.
There are a multitude of options Australia could exercise in 18 months from now, what I consider probable is:
1. The UK helps Australia develop an SSN production facility at ASC, online by 2025.
2. Australia purchases 4 Virginia class from the US, without Block 5 VPM, the boats should be below US$2 billion each (not including Aus-specific mods) - production starts in 2025, first boat delivered in 2030.
3. Australia purchases license to build 4-6 Numbat class (I prefer the name Dropbear) at ASC, first boat laid down 2025/2026, delivery early 2030s. Once production ends in the late 2030s the yard can then be used for updates and scheduled service.
Its highly unlikely that Australia split the SSN build/buy between Virginia & Astute but I do not see this as likely - primarily as they have a different weapons system and sensor fit, so operating two training/supply chains seems a bit to convoluted, and 'modding' an Astute with Virginia ship systems is just too costly.
As mentioned before HEU power plants no longer need refueling (unlike the French LEU, which is now ten years between refueling), so it is possible a 'sealed' PWR is sold to Australia, with provision for annual inspections, and disposal with the USN's Ship/Submarine Recycling Program in Puget Sound.
Note: I reckon French protestations will soon die down, as they realize they now have an opportunity to export LEU technologies to India...
For weekend viewing, head to YouTube and search 'submarine live under the waves' for the new UK channel 5 series on the last four months of HMS Trenchant's service, and this should scuttle those clamoring for the RAN to 'loan' old US and RN boats.
@GhalibKabir
I wonder what could be the compulsion:
1) Carrier Group escort? Now that the 2nd carrier (INS Vikrant) is in the water and will form a Battle Group around it by around ~2025?
2) Need for accelerated crew training on multiple boats in anticipation of multiple classes of Indian-built nuclear submarines coming online simultaneously in late-20s/throughout next decade (larger SSBN & Alpha SSN)?
Thanks Shawn C
Your Sep 26, 2021, 6:18:00 PM
Re "Your For weekend viewing, head to YouTube and search 'submarine live under the waves' for the new UK channel 5 series on the last four months of HMS Trenchant's service, and this should scuttle those clamoring for the RAN to 'loan' old US and RN boats."
I think I've found the youtube(s) in question - beginning https://youtu.be/WBDHsF6frhU
Cheers
Pete
Hi again Shawn C.
Thanks for all the details in your Sep 26, 2021, 6:09:00 PM above.
I'll drawn on those details in coming days.
Note at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2021/09/initial-guess-timates-aus-numbat-class.html I've dropped mention of "Numbat" as a bit too flippant. The article title is now:
"Aus Nuke Subs Less Likely to Use US Design"
So we're back to "Aus Nuke Sub" or "Aus SSN".
Cheers
Pete
It does not take long.
Two of Japan's prime minister hopefuls declare they would be looking at nuclear propelled submarines. I doubt it is near term politically doable in Japan.
Then ROK cannot be too far behind.
Once you open the pandora box, it is very hard to close it.
KQN
Just to tamper any future hopes on 6G, China owns 40% of the IP on 6G as we speak. That is the reality.
KQN
Some Australian SSN Observations
Just how ‘brave’ is Australia’s federal government? By first delaying, then finally walking away from the 2007 plan for a future submarine force of twelve super-sized diesel electric SSKs, Australia has set aside its goal of doubling the number of annual sea days and boats it can deploy and ruled out any continuous build of RAN submarines.
The decision seems to have ducked the issue of RAN submarine crew shortages and down played any risk of keeping Collins class boats in service well after their original out of service date. The decision to go with naval nuclear propulsion has reduced the prospects of exporting submarines to third parties from a pipe dream to an impossibility.
Of much greater concern, it will take thirty years of almost miraculous program management discipline to shield the nascent Australian SSN project from program extinction events that have hammered earlier RAN projects, notably the gold plating of customer requirements; the adoption of immature design features; and commitment to implausible industrial participation policies.
At the next election, many Australian tax payers will be reminded of the abortive Seasprite project, the financial sinkhole caused by the original Collins class systems architecture and the recent Shortfin Barracuda morass. If the Australian SSN project is run off the rails by well meaning meddlers, it will go to the top of that infamous list. All the aforementioned projects were based on bespoke designs chosen over MOTS alternatives in the face of sound advice from those found guilty, at the time, of non-preferred thinking.
If Australia does pursue a bespoke SSN design, its navy’s submariners will likely not get a viable, sustainable SSN force for twenty years, if ever. With the French, Brazilian and Indian SSN programs out of AUKUS’ scope, Australia needs to choose either the USN Virginia or the RN Astute class as its first SSNs.
But how to choose? Crew numbers (Astute’s compliment is ‘98’ vs Virginia’s ‘135’), national shipbuilding priorities and industrial participation benefits favour an Astute pathway. Logistic support, economies of scale and land attack capacity favour a Virginia pathway. There being no real ‘market’ for SSNs, the price Australia will be charged for its eight SSNs will likely come down to how much the US and the UK want to win the business.
Bureaucratus Lex, September 26 2021
More Australian SSN Observations
From the US point of view, keeping the UK in the game as a nuclear submarine operator and encouraging Australia to join it may be a naval strategy priority of the Biden administration. Yet Electric Boat and Newport News are already near their full capacity up to the end of the Columbia SSBN program, twenty years from now.
Neither of these two US nuclear capable yards are export oriented. To them, selling a few subs to that feller down under could be seen as an unwanted distraction, rather than as a business opportunity. The USN does not gap its capabilities, so there will probably be no ‘family hold back’ policy to create SSN construction gaps in the US production line for Australian SSNs - regardless of US export earnings considerations.
As parochial sentiment in the US Congress makes a USN buy of warships from a foreign yard next to impossible, US industrial offsets for an Australian SSN buy may be comparatively limited. The SSNs the US is most likely to offer to the RAN are 25 year old Los Angeles class boats or 17 year old early build Virginia boats, the later of which the US combat commands cannot spare. Taking the former risks their inexorable decline into floating money pits.
From the UK point of view, selling its SSN platforms to the RAN may stave off an existential crisis for the UK nuclear submarine industry as it faces the expected RN order gap between the fourth Dreadnaught class SSBN in the early 2030s and the first ‘Successor’ class SSN in the early 2040s.
As the RN is well accustomed to gapping key capabilities (eg. naval fixed wing aviation) even delaying RN service entry of the UK’s sixth and seventh Astute class SSNs should be negotiable. The UK Department for International Trade, the high profile UK National Shipbuilding Office and UK Treasury can each be expected to throw their support behind any reasonable plan that keeps Barrow busy, earns a lorry load of export dollars and allows a short term transfer of recurrent SSN operating costs from the RN to another allied navy.
To ensure that a UK rather than a US designed boat forms the basis of the Australian SSN force, Boris Johnson is able (and very motivated) to close the deal by placing serious offset orders for RN ships and equipment with Australian shipyards. Australia is in a much stronger bargaining position with the UK than with the US. So long as no Scottish frigates (T26, T31 and T32) are cancelled, everything up to the Queen’s second best tiara will likely be on the negotiating table.
Bureaucratus Lex, September 27 2021
Other Australian SSN Observations
Following on from my earlier remarks - Given the Australian submarine construction options that appear to be on and off the table, all AUKUS partners should be expected to back a deal that gives Australia UK designed submarines, especially if the Lockheed Martin Australia (LMA) combat systems and US weapons planned for the cancelled Shortfin Barracuda project go ahead.
What other deal would give the RAN a top flight UK sourced SSN without Australia having to wait decades for delivery. It also checks the box to develop and sustain Australia’s naval shipbuilding capabilities, see the mock-up of a future press article, below:
Prime Ministers Announce New AUKUS Submarine Agreement
Osborne, South Australia, December 7, 2022
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson have announced today that the United Kingdom (UK) has agreed to the early delivery of its latest nuclear powered submarines to Australia.
In accordance with the AUKUS treaty announced by President Joe Biden and the two Prime Ministers last September, the UK has agreed to an Australian government request to lease HMS Agamemnon, one of the Royal Navy’s (RN) proven Astute class nuclear powered submarines (SSNs). In late 2023, on its completion by BAE Systems at Barrow in the UK, HMS Agamemnon will be commissioned into the Royal Australian Navy (RAN).
President Biden has welcomed this agreement between Australia and the UK, commenting earlier that it is in the national interest of all the AUKUS partners to maintain a greater submarine presence in the critical Indo-Pacific region. The US will maintain its current level of industrial participation in Australia’s new submarine program.
If HMAS Agamemnon performs as expected during its first two years of Australian service, it will be followed into the RAN by HMAS Agincourt in late 2026. Under contractual safeguards incorporated in the agreement, Australia may return unmodified Astute class submarines built in the UK for cause at any time.
If both of the leased Astute class submarines continue to meet Australian expectations, six more Astutes will be built at Osborne. Their aft hull sections, containing the Rolls Royce nuclear reactor and turbines, will be supplied by the UK.
A high proportion of the SSN billets afloat and ashore will initially be filled by experienced nuclear submariners seconded from the Royal Navy. As RAN crews acquire the new skills and qualifications required to operate nuclear submarines, they will progressively replace their RN counterparts.
For logistic and training reasons, HMAS Agamemnon will be based in the UK until suitable new Australian submarine support facilities are ready at the RAN Fleet Base West near Perth in Western Australia.
ENDS/
Bureaucratus Lex, September 28 2021
Final Australian SSN Observations
If the SSN pathway alluded to in my earlier jottings makes any kind of sense, in forty years time, as the UK prepares to de-fuel, disassemble and dispose of the eight Astute and five ‘Astute LMA’ boats it provided PWR2 reactors for, Osborne will have constructed the ‘front halves’ (including the fin and masts) of six new Astutes and, if the agreement were further extended, of sixteen UK Successor class boats under multi-phase AUKUS naval construction agreements.
Canberra will have achieved in the contractual range of 85 per cent materiel offsets for the UK-built components of every Australian SSN it buys.
As an aside: Australia’s cancellation of the Shortfin Barracuda project presents one timely benefit. By shifting major submarine outlays several years to the right, Australia gains some near term budget headroom. This could be used to grow those maritime capabilities that require much shorter lead times than does an SSN force; eg. another ten P-8As with long range strike weapons; more KC-30s; 90 meter Lurssen OP(H)s with an MH-60R hangar and a towed array instead of more 80m OPVs; and earlier deployment of key sovereign space-based assets.
Bureaucratus Lex, September 29 2021
Most folks do not know China is the only country today that manufactures all the ingredients that go into our prescription drugs, including vaccines. Even India is nowhere near. If China stops exports of those ingredients, the whole world will run out of prescription drugs very fast and very soon. I would be very worried about this. It will take more than a decade if not longer and of course lots and lots of billions to come up to the scale of China in this strategic domain.
KQN
Yet more Australian SSN Observations
If deftly executed, the nascent Australian SSN program could meet the key force capability goals set by the RAN as provisionally approved by Australia's cabinet and endorsed by the loyal opposition.
Yet I would bet an all expenses paid long weekend at a Hyatt resort that this initiative will go pear shaped.
There is little chance of Australian (or UK labour ?) parliamentarians taking the risk / wearing the blame for a highly foreseeable SSN fiasco. Therefore, in my humble opinion, Boris and Scotty have less than three years, to conjure up :
(a) a signed bilateral contract, blessed by all three AUKUS partners, for the UK and Australian future submarine construction programs to be seamlessly joined, with Australia and the UK jointly building (and separately operating) at least eight SSNs of the same design each - including a mix of Astute and their successor class, a.k.a. SSN(R);
(b) live video of an impressive looking new nuclear boat, underway in UK waters, flying the Australian ensign;
(c) a UK Treasury disclosure document showing rivers of gold flowing to the UK under a line item titled “Leasing Fees for HMS Agamemnon and HMS Agincourt from the RN to the RAN”;
(d) footage shot at Osborne (or Henderson) of Australian workers cutting metal for the fin, forward pressure hull (or the junior rates toilet block - it matters not) of Astute boat #8; and
(e) other proof of an actual (not projected) hiring surge at both Osborne and Barrow etc.
From the UK perspective - without landing a whale of an AUKUS SSN contract, UK (own use) submarine production volumes are unlikely to support even the minimum required design and production infrastructure needed to produce SSBNs.
It follows that the UK nuclear deterrent (i.e. CASD) will eventually have to be abandoned, as nobody except France (oh what delicious irony) would be prepared to sell the UK an SSBN if the UK loses its current ability to build them itself at Barrow.
RN leadership might talk Boris down from agreeing to gap Astute boats six and seven and wet-lease them (with crews and full logistic support) to the RAN until Rolls Royce and BAE can crank up the tepid production lines for PWR2 and Astute to get the eighth and subsequent Astute boats into commission.
If Boris declines to agree to an urgent loan to the RAN of Astute boats six and seven, then Australia might be just as likely to abolish its submarine service (as Denmark has done) to punish the RAN (and avoid a Collins SSK sinking after thirty two years in service), than to press on to create a viable SSN force prior to the 2040s.
Somebody pass me the popcorn, this saga is 'must-sea' viewing.
Bureaucratus Lex, October 26 2021
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