Crumbling US-SK and Japan-SK Alliance Debate Continues

Following this and this article Anonymous has provided the following text and footnotes

As the Korean War remains a ceasefire, such as status of United States Forces Korea (USFK) or US-SK exercise is more suitable than RIMPAC in discussion on US and SK alliance.

On October 20, 2018, the US announced suspension of Vigilant Ace that was to occur December 2018 (a large-scale exercise designed to enhance the interoperability of the US and SK Air Forces through combined and joint combat training) [1, 2].

On November 26 2018, US Ambassador to SK, Harry Harris, threatened that if SK disturbed the denuclearization of NK process, the US would withdraw the alliance with SK [3].

On July 30, 2019, the US State of Secretary, Michael Pompeo said, in exchange for denuclearization of NK, the US would provide a new set of security arrangements amounting to a withdrawal from the alliance with SK) [4].

On June 2^nd-3^rd 2019, the relocation of the US-SK Combined Forces Command (CFC) Headquarters from Seoul, transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) of Korean forces from US to Seoul and denial of restore of suspended U.S.-South Korea military drills were announced. It suggested future withdrawal of possible US-SK alliance [5, 6].

[1] https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/us-announces-suspension-of-vigilant-ace-2018-exercise-with-south-korea/, by Ankit Panda, THE DIPLOMAT paysite, October 20, 2018. The US Announces Suspension of Vigilant Ace 2018 Exercise With South Korea.

[2] https://business.nikkei.com/atcl/report/15/226331/120600206/?P=4 , T Suzuoki, Dec/07/2018, Nikkei Business. According to Japanese experts, US personnel said “We do not fight together with SK military anymore. Then, joint exercise is meaningless.”

[3] , Nov 28, 2018. On November 26, the testimony of the grand prize of the 2018 Korean Unification Contribution Award was revealed. (snip) It (=Ambassador’s speech) is interpreted as the point that there should be no lifting of sanctions and inter-Korean dialogue without denuclearization. Ambassador Harris said, “I will tell you one last time.” “Our (ROK) alliance is firmly maintained, We shouldn't take this for granted. ”(snip)

[4] https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-with-buck-sexton-of-iheartmedia/ Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary Of State, Sheraton Maria Isabel Hotel, Mexico City, Mexico, July 22, 2019. MICHAEL R. POMPEO: In exchange for that (=denuclearization of NK), President Trump’s been very clear: We’re prepared to provide a set of security arrangements that gives them comfort that if they disband their nuclear program, that the United States won’t attack them in the absence of that; and second, a brighter future for the North Korean people. That’s the outlines of the agreement that Chairman Kim and President Trump have made. We now need the North Korean negotiators to begin to build out on those principles that the two leaders have set forward.

Explanation ( https://www.dailyshincho.jp/article/2019/07300559/?all=1&page=3 , by T Suzuoki, DAILY SHINCH, July 30, 2019  “A security arrangements that gives them comfort “ is a commitment of non-attack by USA suggesting withdrawal of US-SK alliance.

[5] https://m.koreatimes.co.kr/pages/article.asp?newsIdx=269982

They (SK Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo and acting US Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan on Jun/03/2019) agreed to relocate CFC, now at the U.S. Forces Korea's Yongsan Garrison base in Seoul, to the US Camp Humpheys in Pyeongtaek, citing operational efficiency.(snip)

At the US SK Defense Ministers' meeting, Shanahan and Jeong agreed on the early transfer of wartime OPCON of Korean forces to Seoul, and the relocation of the South Korea-U.S. CFC to Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, as opposed to the SK Defense Ministry compound in Yongsan, Seoul, which was discussed in 2018.(snip)

Explanations ( https://www.dailyshincho.jp/article/2019/06071730/?all=1 , by T Suzuoki, DAILY SHINCH, July 7, 2019): "Unlike NATO Treaty (chapter 5), there is not clause of automatic intervention in the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of [South] Korea. Relocation of CFC reduces possibilities of military conflict between US and NK where intervention by US military needs time-consuming approval by President or Congress. Relocation of CFC to means withdrawal of key military intervention of US Army and cursory support by Navy and Air Force in emergency. The early transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) of Korean Forces from US to Seoul suggests reduction of USFK, because, in US law, small number of US military can be under the foreign commander."

[6] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-southkorea/acting-pentagon-chief-says-no-need-to-restore-suspended-us-south-korea-military-drills-idUSKCN1T30BT , by Idrees Ali, AFP, June 2, 2019. SEOUL (Reuters) - Acting US Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan said on Sunday that for now it was not necessary to resume major joint military exercises with South Korea that were suspended in the last year to support diplomatic efforts with North Korea.

Anonymous

India's S-5 SSBN Model Undraped

Submarine Matters has kept abreast of Indian SSBN developments over the years. Most recently at Update on India's SSBN and SLBM Evolution of January 21, 2019, which in part reported:

"The K-5 and K-6 [SLBMs] are reportedly planned for follow-on SSBNs, displacing more than twice that of the Arihant class.

“The 13,500 ton SSBNs of the so-called S-5 class are to carry twelve of the 5000 km range K-5 – development of which started in 2015, with no tests done to date – or a similar number of the 6000 km range K-6” which is to have MIRVs. The longer-ranged K-5 could replace the K-4 on the Arihant class to enhance its effectiveness and flexibility.

“the Arihant class is a relatively modest vessel by the high standards set by the five larger nuclear powers which operate much more potent vessels.

“In fact, it might have been expected for India to develop an SSN – like the Akula class submarine currently leased as the INS Chakra. By opting for an SSBN, it is clear India allocated priority to the Arihant project with plans for six SSNs being left for the future.”"

Diagram of  Provisional India's S-5 Next Generation SSBN. The distinctive hump seems to owe much to Russia's Delta class SSBNs. (Diagram courtesy S I Sutton at Covert Shores, September 2, 2019)

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H I Sutton at Covert Shores, September 2, 2019 has published a most interesting article Indian Next Generation S-5 SSBN revealed which states in part:

"Indian Vice President Shri M. Venkaiah Naidu tweeted photos from his August 28 [2019] visit to the Naval Science & Technological Laboratory (NSTL) to celebrate its Golden Jubilee. NSTL is part of DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organization) in Vizag, Andhra Pradesh. 

A yellow hydrodynamic test model of a submarine, partially visible in one of the photos may provide new insights into India's next generation ballistic missile submarine program, the S-5 Class. The S-5 class is expected to enter service before 2030s and will likely carry the new K-6 SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile) which is also under development.

... The new design will be a larger boat with 12 or 16 launch tubes for the new K-6 intercontinental ballistic missile, which is expected to have a range in the order of 3,200 nautical miles, about twice that of the current K-4 missile....”

Read the FULL EXCELLENT REPORT by H I Suttom of Covert Shores including photos of the provisional S-5 yellow submarin model.

Report South Korea Wants to Break from US alliance!

Following Anonymous’s comments in Revolutionary Change in the US Alliance in Northeast Asia Coming of September 4, 2019 Anonymous has provided further comments below:

“As South Korea’s (SK) missile defense system depends on Japanese reconnaissance satellites, withdrawal by SK from the SK-Japan intelligence sharing General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) is nonsensical [1, 2] but is reasonably understandable in the context of elimination of US and SK alliance [3].

[1] https://www.sankei.com/west/news/170926/wst1709260006-n1.html  (Japanese)

Surprisingly, SK will not have a reconnaissance satellite capable of detecting a North Korean (NK) missile launch until 2023. [This is noting THAAD’s long range radar for missile detection is part of a US (not) South Korean system]. Neglecting military common sense, SK asked Israel, France and Germany for rental of the reconnaissance satellite in 2017 (August or September), and they soon refused.

[2] https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/08/27/south-korea-is-playing-into-the-hands-of-north-korea-and-its-allies/

“South Korea is playing into the hands of North Korea and its allies”

[3] https://www.dailyshincho.jp/article/2019/08271800/?all=1&page=2

SK President Moon Jae-in made Trump lose his face by the GSOMIA withdrawal. But, SK’s GSOMIA withdrawal has not resulted in the elimination of the US and SK alliance, because the relationship between US and SK is already damaged. In fact, GSOMIA is not important in terms of defense. As SK leaks military information of US and Japan to NK, US and Japan do not communicate important information to SK. GSOMIA, therefore has only symbolic meaning of US-SK-Japan cooperation against China. With the disappearance of US and SK as common enemies of China and NK their is a movement in President Moon Jae-in’s  administration for the unification of SK and NK. A unified Korea will try to retain nuclear weapons.

SK President Moon Jae-in and his supporters believe the US and SK alliance is the biggest obstacle to unification of SK and NK, but if Moon Jae-in manifests the elimination of US and SK alliance, his government will definitely collapse by strong resistance of SK citizens and conservatives. If the US government manifests [opposes the breakup of the US-SK alliance] SK citizens and conservative politicians will give up their opposition to the alliance breakup. That’s why SK is purposely irritating the US. The main purpose of GSOMIA withdrawal is to calm NK leader Kim Jong-un, who is furious at the dishonesty of SK President Moon Jae-in.

For Trump the elimination of the US-SK alliance is an ace in his sleeve to have NK leader Kim Jong-un give up nuclear weapons. That’s why Trump hides his enthusiasm for the breakup. Trump believes US military forces in SK are a waste of money. Relations between the US and SK are very bad, but they are becoming calmer with the hope of a breakup of the US-SK alliance.

Attention should be paid to Moody's [stable] credit rating for SK, “because in the past US conducted financial sanction against SK when SK was against US.” [This is noting NK has not been assigned a credit rating by Moody’s or any other agency, presumably because NK is such a bad credit risk!]

Pete Comment

Much more corroborating evidence from many (especially US and South Korean) sources is required to support the above report's credibility.

Existing US Missile Becoming Intermediate Anti-Ship Missile like DF-21D

Josh made some valid points here and here on September 4, 2019 (in response to my article) regarding the unlikelihood of the US developing new land launched intermediate range missile systems. 

Reasons for unlikelihood include missile development costs, nuclear warhead redevelopment and production costs, pre-existence of US cruise missiles, guided bomb and ballistic missile dropping airpower and lack of allies willing to host land launched intermediate range missile systems.

On the assumption existing weapons are cheaper to further develop, hence "sell" to the US taxpayer and US government budgeters one exception might be extending the short (160 km) range of the US MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATacMS) to the now irrelevant 499 km intermediate treaty range.

The US has been studying intercontinental-global strike hypersonic weapons but they require much mere time and funds to develop than 2 intermediate range weapons that China has already developed. The US has been impressed with the hypersonic (with suspected but not yet fully demonstrated) anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) capabilities of land launched Chinese DF-21Ds and DF-26s.

These represent new types of anti-ship weapon systems that US airpower and cruise missiles cannot match for speed-range.

A Possible US (DF-21D and DF-26 like) Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile  

The most likely candidate may be a future anti-ship version of an extended range MGM-140 (ATacMS). 

Helpfully the writers of Wikipedia have already broached the subject but, significantly they did this before the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty expired on February 1, 2019. Hence their reservations about limiting ATacMS range below the treaty limit of 500 km is no longer limiting. 

Wiki reports:

"In October 2016, it was revealed that the ATacMS would be upgraded with an existing seeker to enable it to strike moving targets on land and at sea.^[18]

In March 2016, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon announced they would offer a missile to meet the U.S. Army's Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) requirement to replace the ATACMS. 

The missile will use advanced propulsion to fly faster and further, out to 310 miles (500 km) ([no longer] limited by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty),^[19] while also being thinner and sleeker, increasing loadout to two per pod, doubling the number able to be carried by M270 MLRS and M142 HIMARS launchers.^[20][21]

Lockheed and Raytheon will test-fire their submissions for the renamed Precision Strike Missile (PRSM) program in 2019, with the selected weapon planned to achieve Initial Operational Capability in 2023; the initial PRSM will only be able to hit stationary targets on land, but later versions will track moving targets on land and sea.^[22] 

If the United States withdraws from the INF Treaty [as it now has], the range of the PRSM could be increased beyond the '499 km' limitation placed upon it by the treaty.^[23]

As well as ships an ATacMS with a nuclear warhead could be used as a rapid intermediate range defense against enemy submarines and against Russia's Poseidon (Status-6)(NATO Kanyon) nuclear armed, nuclear propelled torpedo/AUV.

There are many points on US territory that a conventional or nuclear warhead, land based 500+ km range, anti-ship, ATacMS could be placed including:

-  east and west coast continental US
-  Alaska to block the Bering Strait and against Russia's Rybachiy SSBN and SSN Base
-  Hawaii (particularly if its range were boosted out to 5,500 km (like China's DF-26)
-  Guam to hit Chinese ships and submarines in the Yellow, East and South China Seas and Chinese
    coastal bases. 
-  Also acting as a second strike against Chinese nuclear tipped DF-21D and DF-26 use.

The MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATacMS)(Photo courtesy DEFPOST). 

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Pete

Revolutionary Change in the US Alliance in Northeast Asia Coming

Anonymous reports that now we are going to experience the most revolutionary change in US alliance relations in Northeast Asia since the Korean War. 

According to the most influential Japanese commentator on Korean matters, Takabumi Suzuoki [1], in the near future, the US and South Korean (SK) alliance will be eliminated [2]. The geopolitical structure of the "red team" (China/Russia/North Korea (NK)) vs the "blue team" (US/Japan/SK) might change to China/Russia/Unified K vs US/Japan. The current border confrontation of the red and blue teams along the 38th parallel might shift to the Sea of Japan (the New Acheson Line). 

"SK is secretly establishing a nuclear propelled submarine and is going to equip it with nuclear missiles from NK. Such a situation is a nightmare for the blue team, but it is possible."

[1] Suzuoki predicted the eventual elimination of the US-SK alliance years ago. Many predictions by Suzuoki have been realized.

[2] The SK President, Moon Jae-inn, and Trump are expecting the elimination of the SK-US alliance. The recent withdrawal of SK from the SK-Japan intelligence sharing agreement, known as "General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)" is one of the signs of the crumbling US-SK alliance.

Pete Comment

Trump's policy of bilateral talks with NK's Kim Jung-on, with minimal US confidential or publically demonstrated consultation with SK, has shaken SK.

SK's fear of growing (near-neighbour) Chinese economic and military power has led to SK efforts to strengthen relations with China. This has been at the expense of SK relations with the US.

Trade disputes between the US and SK also have increased tension. Additionally the Trump induced US-China trade dispute has impacted the SK economy and SK strategic confidence.

Anonymous and Pete

Possible Modern US Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles

So with the 500 km - 5,500 km range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty being dead since February 1-2, 2019 the US has already test-launched medium range cruise missiles from ground platforms.

But what of:

-  the perfectly good Pershing II designs and hardware that were eliminated in 1991. Can the US
   develop "Pershing IIIs" (noting some coast-based ASBMs suggestions). Maybe deploy Pershing III
   as anti-ship (on continental US coasts, Hawaii, Midway Island, Guam, Diego Garcia) and where
   relevant land attack versions (in Alaska, even Singapore?)  as an answer to China's famous
   DF-21Ds and DF-26s.

-  longer than 500 km range future versions of the US MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile
   System (ATacMS) as an answer to the likely 500+km range of Russia's Iskander-M variant of the
   (NATO SS-26 Stone), ground launched versions of Russia's new Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ALBM and
   modern variants of the Soviet SS-20.

   :  Maybe for ATacMS-ER GLBM basing in NATO central-eastern European countries.

Any other eligible intermediate-range US missiles out there?

2.  There's a whole range of modern technologies that could improve on old INF Treaty terminated
     1991 missiles. This includes:

      -  vastly more accurate guidance for DF-21D style changes of course and more accurate
         (3 meter?) CEPs,
      -  more stealth and decoy measures, 
      -  improved rocket fuels for longer range per kg propellant, 
      -  ramjets, and 
      -  lighter, stronger, composite material booster casings for longer range.

Any other ballistic missile improvement technologies?

Pete