US Reaper Variants for India, including SeaGuardians.

Gessler, on June 24, 2023, provided very interesting comments on the following: 

It seems India is going ahead with the purchase of 31 x MQ-9B Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) variants from the US. The largest operator would be the Indian Navy with 15 x SeaGuardian (aka Mariner) variants. Two SeaGuardians had already been leased to the Indian Navy since November 2020 for operational testing. 

The Indian Army Aviation corps and the Air Force will each operate 8 of the SkyGuardian Reaper variant.

Note that these figures are as approved by the Indian MoD's Defence Acquisitions Council (DAC). The final deal may or may not undergo some changes once the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) goes through it before releasing finances. 

I'd say the SeaGuardians will be a huge step to give the Indian Navy truly persistent ISR capabilities across the Indian Ocean region. The MQ-9B, like India's P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, should be capable of fully networking with partner assets in the region. The SeaGuardian should also be capable of:

-  ASW roles such as deploying sonobuoys around a contact shared by the P-8I,
-  helping to prevent armed incursions by sea from Pakistani terrorists (seen in the 2008 Mumbai attacks) and
-  oversight and armed protection of Indian tankers and other ships transitting the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal.

I've just read the very wide ranging Joint Statement from the White House written following Indian Prime Minister Modi's June 2023 visit to Washington. It seems the program also includes a domestic assembly/production clause which means all of the MQ-9B Reaper UAV variants may not come from the US and instead some might be assembled locally in India, with a degree of domestic industrial contribution.

There's also mention, in the Joint Statement, of building a Comprehensive Global MRO (Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul) facility in the country. This means not only the Indian-operated UAVs but also those operated by other Indo-Pacific partners in the area may head there for servicing their UAV fleets instead of going all the way to the continental United States. It's not known if the MRO facility includes services only for the MQ-9B or for other UAV types as well. 

It serves to know that an MRO facility meant for P-8I surveillance aircraft is already up and running in the India. 

There's also programs being implemented for expanding the size and scope, in India, of Ship Repair agreements for US Navy assets deployed in the region. 

Gessler
June 24, 2023

+++++++++++++++++++++++++

In the Defense Updates January 2021 video, here and above, the MQ-9B SeaGuardian's ASW capabilities and the P-8's roles are described.
---

A. Mixture of Pressure Hull Materials Failed Titan?

Diagram of Titan's pressure hull/chamber courtesy Washington Post.
--- 

One path (A) of thinking about Titan's implosion (into bits) is that it happened instantly, before it hit the seafloor. This is discussed below. Another path of thinking is Titan imploded following a distortion of hitting the seafloor. Either way this may have resulted in the one loud sound picked up be the US Navy.

It could be that at each end of Titan's pressure hull/chamber, the Titanium hemispheres you can see above, were  generally able to withstand pressure down to 4,000 meters. 

1.  Except for the Titanium front hemisphere's porthole (of glass or plastic?) which was only rated as being safe to "1,300 meters" - quite a physical gamble even before the first of Titan's several dives to around 4,000 meters.

Usual materials for a pressure hull are Steel Alloys and more rarely Titanium which are suitable because they are partly malleable/flexible, so able to slightly contract, under pressure of water, as a sub  descends and slightly expand to their original shape as the sub returns to the surface. 

Submarines using steel in particular, have been tested for over 100 years, with each submarine undergoing hundreds of contraction and expansion cycles. This simply didn't happen to Titan's mix of pressure hull materials. Titan's pressure hull weaknesses may have accumulated over its few previous cycles.

2.  As well as the porthole the major weakness of Titan was the mid-section cylinder of around 130mm of carbon fiber, basically a type of plastic. Unlike steel or Titanium, carbon fiber for submarines/submersibles only has a short track record. Titan's carbon fiber was little tested, therefore little understood. It was inflexible hence tending to crack or tear rather than shrinking slowly (like metals).

3.  The use of two radically different materials (Titanium and Carbon Fiber) in the one pressure hull may, in itself, have led to differing, incompatible, rates of contraction and expansion, leading to ultimate destruction.

4.  Another fault, if the diagram above is accurate, are relatively sharp inward-facing "corners" of the pressure hull where the Titanium hemispheres meet the edges of the carbon fiber cylinder. Corners should be avoided where pressure is concerned (even outward facing corners of the Comet airliners' square windows 60 years ago caused metal fatigue under pressure in another direction, leading to destruction).   

So the inward facing corners of the pressure hull may have caused metal and carbon fatigue and/or a "spike" (also in relation to 3.) of highly pressurized water between those two materials.   

See my subsequent alternate theory of June 29, 2023 "B. Collision With Seafloor Destroyed Titan?"

US IUSS Sensors Precisely Knew Titan’s Implosion Location

It is no surprise part of the tragedy reported today: 

“After the [Titan submersible] was reported missing, the U.S. Navy went back and analyzed its acoustic data and found an anomaly [a very loud sound] that was “consistent with an implosion or explosion in the general vicinity of where the Titan submersible was operating when communications were lost,” a senior Navy official told The Associated Press on Thursday. 

The official spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive acoustic detection system. 

The Navy passed on that information to the Coast Guard, which continued its search because the Navy did not consider the data to be definitive." 

The “sensitive acoustic detection system” is called the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) (some details below). The many sensors of IUSS, some relatively close to the Titan implosion and many more distant in the Atlantic Ocean, would have very accurately triangulated the precise location (rather than “the general vicinity”) and time of Titan's implosion off the US/Canadian coast. 

A major and understandable concern of the IUSS organization, which is part of US Naval Intelligence, ultimately relying on the NSA, was that the covert sources and methods to process the large amount of Titan implosion data not become a major public issue.

The main job of acutely precise IUSS sensors in the Atlantic Ocean are to detect and track the very small sounds made by Russian nuclear submarines. Undersea implosions are relatively easily heard compared to submarine movements. 

It took the availability of an overt source/sensor (a rare, very deep diving, remotely operated vehicle (ROV) to find fragments of Titan on the seafloor) to make it a public fact that the fate of Titan was now known. It was also out of concern for the next of kin that they shouldn't be told out of nowhere "secret sources, that we can't talk about, indicate your loved ones are dead..."

Some Details of IUSS

On June 20, 2023 I wrote of the importance of “fixed undersea sensors” to hear sounds made by Titan. These sensors principally mean ordinarily Top Secret seafloor microphones. In reference to Titan the microphones precisely locating the implosion are strung along:

1.  the Atlantic coast of the North American continent (including Canada)

2.  from northern Canada, to Greenland, to Iceland and then on to northern UK

3.  other relevant microphones protect the US nuclear submarine test ranges in the Bahamas, Caribbean Sea.

The location and large number of these microphones make triangulation of the implosion more precise.

These microphone arrays are operated by US, Canadian and UK naval personnel as part of the worldwide Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) network.

From time to time these microphone arrays (a niche type of signals intelligence) become a semi-public issue, like now. Then the existence of IUSS quite literally submerges, being quickly forgotten by the public. 

For much more about IUSS see this Submarine Matters article of May 17, 2022. 

India's Arihant-class SSBN Progress

Submarine Matters has been covering India’s first SSBN, INS Arihant’s progress since Arihant's launch on July 26, 2009 at Shipbuilding Centre (SBC) Visakhapatnam (aka Vizag) on India’s eastern coast. SBC Vizag builds India’s SSBNs and will be building its future SSNs. 

Arihant’s reactor went critical on August 10, 2013. Arihant is the lead submarine of the Arihant-class of four small SSBNs.    

Ghalib Kabir wrote the information below on June 20, 2023: 

The Indian Naval establishment has crossed a milestone in its N-Sub program with INS Arihant entering into its first refuel and deep maintenance cycle in November 2022. 

American nuclear reactor specialist, Peter Lobner, has produced a huge Marine Nuclear Power 2018 study. See page 152 of one of his 100+MB PDF documents) which reports Arihant's reactor:

-  [separately designated] Compact Light-water reactor (CLWR-B1)  

-  is rated at 82.5 MWt

-  with maximum propulsion power of 11.9 MW (aka 11.9 MWe) being about 16,000 shp. 

-  this HEU reactor is “about 30% U-235” [not 40% U-235 mentioned in other sources]

-  with a core in “13 fuel assemblies with each assembly having 348 fuel pins”.

Arihant’s 2 year deep maintenance and refueling program would give the Indian Navy first hand experience with spent fuel extraction, then nuclear fuel reloads and  subsequent reprocessing of the extracted fuel.

Above is an overhead photo of INS Arihant in dry dock at SBC Vizag for deep maintenance/refueling. It has been there since November 2022 and probably remains there. (Photo & captions courtesy Damien Symon @detresfa_   https://twitter.com/detresfa_/status/1612808236469727233 )
---

[Submarine building and reactor development experience was partly gained by 600 Indian technicians being trained in Russia, with their families for a long-term stay, page 154, Lobner].

It is critical now that operational expertise is extending to maintaining and refueling nuclear submarines locally in India.

Even from above it is obvious Indian designers benefitted from the Russian Kilo SSK design. This is clearly visible in the forward arrangement of Arihant, resembling an enlarged Kilo (not to mention the Russian 'show me' based learnings too).

The 7 bladed high-skew propeller is also visible. The missile silo section is covered....I hope the K series missile silos are being swapped out from the current K-15 SLBMs to the longer range K-4 MRBM/IRBMs (the K-4s are apparently in production phase). 

Ghalib Kabir
June 20, 2023

"Titan" Submersible: Likely 30% Survival Chance

See Live Updates of the search for Titan.

The chances that the missing Titan deep sea submersible will resurface successfully are probably only 30%. This is partly based on educated guesswork concerning the tragic "lost with all hands" fates of missing, then found on the seafloor, submarines ARA San Juan in 2017 and KRI Nanggala in 2021.

The specs of Titan and details of its disappearance here. 

Reasons for Titan’s disappearance in what should have been an 8 hour dive over the long sunken RMS Titanic might be:

-  Any deformation of Titan's pressure hull, which must be perfectly spherical, would cause a complete, fatal, implosion in the deepest stages of Titan's dive.

-  Titan snagging on part of Titanic if it got too close to Titanic (hopefully that might be a temporary snag).

-  Loss of neutral buoyancy causing a downward collision with Titanic, or with the seafloor rupturing Titan's pressure hull.

-  Titan sinking way below its 4,000 meter operating depth causing its pressure hull to rupture.

-  A sudden downward current of cold water could make Titan sink too deeply.

-  Rapid loss of oxygen for the crew causing asphyxiation or gradual loss of oxygen content causing crew to fall asleep. 

Failure of the electrical system or batteries (especially if they were Lithium-ion Batterie) causing fire or a release of poison gas asphyxiating crew.

Other systems going wrong.

Titan ideally should have:

- a working audible “pinger” allowing passive sonars (on vessels (including the “Mother” surface ship) on sonobuoys or on fixed undersea sensors) to hear Titan. Apparently Titan failed to "ping" at the usual times, thereby raising the alarm that it was missing.

- two or three redundant low frequency communications devices.

- an emergency buoy released with a 5,000 meter long thin communications  line to reach the surface and then release distress radio GPS location signals and/or flares and/or permitting two way communications.

Hopefully my 70% “lost with all hands” prediction is wrong and Titan’s 30% chance of successfully resurfacing in the next 40 hours (while air and power hold out) comes true.

Australian Intelligence DGs Discuss AUKUS, etc.

On May 16, 2023 I wrote ASIO and AUKUS Submarine Security - Further Comments. 

Now Sarah Basford Canales for the Canberra Times, has written an excellent article dated June 15, 2023. Much of the podcast in it below is interesting: 

"ASIO boss Mike Burgess reveals foreign spies seeking to disrupt AUKUS, hunt for secrets"

"By Sarah Basford Canales

Updated June 15 2023 - 

Foreign spies are looking to get their hands on information relating to Australia's most secretive projects, including the AUKUS program, top spies have revealed.

 

The director-generals [DGs] of ASIO and the Office of National Intelligence, Mike Burgess and Andrew Shearer, have revealed efforts are already under way by adversaries to disrupt the trilateral technology-sharing deal between Australia, the US and the UK through disinformation and manipulation of opinion. 

 

"This is happening. It's real," Mr Shearer said.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced the decades-long nuclear-powered submarine program in March, alongside US President Joe Biden and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak.

 

The estimated $368 billion program will allow Australia to become just the seventh country to have access to nuclear-powered propulsion technology after the US, the UK, France, China, Russia and India.

 

Speaking on [an ANU] National Security College podcast released [June 15, 2023], the two heads said the role of intelligence agencies was to thwart efforts seeking to undermine the deal.

 

Mr Burgess said ASIO had been originally formed [in 1949] in response to US and UK intelligence reports informing Australia it had been "penetrated with Soviet spies" and could not be trusted with secrets.

 

"Seventy-four years later, our allies, our mates, are sharing with us some of their most sensitive technology," he said.

 

"They trust us to protect those secrets. We know that to be true and as Andrew [Shearer] said, people are already coming after those [AUKUS] secrets and looking to interfere with this."

Mr Shearer, a former national security adviser to Tony Abbott, said it was the second pillar of AUKUS in particular that needed to be well-guarded.

Pillar two aims to give the three nations a technological edge to counter China.

"Another area where intelligence is working incredibly hard in concert with Defence and the wider government team [is] to make sure that we maximise the benefits of the partnership," Mr Shearer said. 

"And that obviously involves a whole lot of opportunities around the nuclear-powered submarine program but it also involves the new technologies that are being developed under pillar two of AUKUS, which goes to areas like hypersonics, quantum applications, sensing robotics, and so forth, just incredible opportunities for us." 

The ASIO head said Australia's open justice system and transparency could sometimes mean the agencies were at a disadvantage from adversaries seeking to "have a crack".

But Mr Burgess said his decision to take some of ASIO's work out from the shadows would make the country more secure.

"There's no point having this stuff if we're just putting it in a filing cabinet for government to read," he said.

"The reason why I started the threat assessment is I think I have to explain to the people of Australia the threats we face.

"There's no point just having a view of it and, of course, we could just have a view and take our own action and do all that quietly.

"But I think it's important, not to alarm them, but just to help them understand the world in which we live." 

 

Sarah Basford Canales Politics and public sector reporter

I'm a federal politics and public sector reporter with an interest in national security, integrity and regulation. Contact me with general tips and thoughts at sarah.basfordcanales@canberratimes.com.au or confidential tips to sbasfordcanales@protonmail.com