White House Spokeswoman on Trump's Special Gifts

Language Warning - White House Spokeswoman speaks bluntly about Trump's special gifts:
at https://youtu.be/dpIkl2QnJeI and also below.

Canadian Submarine Choices (SSNs-Dartmouth) - Part Three

Following Canada's purchase of 3 Oberon SSKs in the 1960s in the 1980s Canada explored the purchase of 10 nuclear propelled attack submarines (SSNs).  Many issues surrounding the "Canada-class" SSN rejection are covered here so I won't restate these issues. Instead I'll discuss other issues, such as:

-  increasing the Canadian submarine force from 3 inexpensive Oberon SSKs to be replaced by 10 very expensive SSNs always looked like an extravagant submarine service ask.

-  why more than triple the submarine force? Was the naval budget going to triple or would major  surface ship and some army and airforce items by halved? Subs need to operate in secret and cannot provide the overt show of force provided by surface ships.

-  the US would have been aware that the Canadian Navy was vastly underestimating the costs of purchasing, operating and facility-supporting an SSN force. Canadian politicians and the public would only learn the full costs when it was too late. 

-  Canadian SSKs were more useful strategically and tactically in complimenting USN specialties than a Canadian SSN navy impoverished by nuclear submarine ownership.

-  Facilities? Basing SSNs within the harbour of Greater Halifax (a city of 400,000) has long occurred in the Dartmouth district of  Halifax. This is at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Shearwater nuclear submarine dock. Bill Casey, former Cumberland-Colchester Canadian Member of Parliament, on August 7, 2020, said Shearwater hosts nuclear subs from Britain, U.S. and France” 

-  Wikipedia advises: "Shearwater Jetty - docks and shore-based infrastructure largely supports the fleet operations of Maritime Forces Atlantic...as well as providing secure docking facilities (isolated from downtown Halifax) for visiting NATO warships including nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers."

-  Temporary docking of US, UK and French SSNs at Shearwater, Dartmouth, Halifax implies some interactive SSN training and operations with Canada's SSKs (were Oberons, now Victoria-class). This reduces a need for Canada to have its own SSNs.

-  Was Canada aware that US, UK and French SSNs justified much of their high cost by protecting those countries' SSBNs (eg. conducting sweeps of the approaches to SSBN bases)? Perhaps the US suspected Canadian SSNs would be the thin end of the wedge to Canada building an SSBN force.

-  When Canada entertained the idea of building all or some SSNs in Canada was Canada aware that no nuclear country had tranferred a whole how-to-build an SSN package to a non-nuclear country. In the 1980s Canada was considering the UK's Trafalgar-class SSN and French Rubis-class SSN. The Trafalgar used a US reactor design which was non-transferable to third countries. While the Rubis was all French technology it was too loud, slow, small, crowded and only carried 14 heavyweight shots (eg. torpedoes) compared to Canada's Oberons which carried 20 torpedoes. 

-  If the US (on national security grounds) was not going to supply SSNs to Canada was Canada aware that the Monroe Doctrine still existed/exists? The US would want to prevent the UK or France providing nuclear (reactor) military equipment to Canada which after all was a "Western Hemisphere country" in US eyes. Most people are accustomed to consider the US the self-appointed protector against leftwing or greater European influences in Latin America (eg. in Panama and Venezuela, Brazil etc) and the Caribbean (Cuba always, and Grenada in the 1980s). 

But people forget that the US sees itself as defender of Canada as well, via NATO, NORAD and more unilateral US policies.  

Many of the above issues also apply to Australia in a recurring and often poorly informed debate that Australia should have SSNs - all that subsequently changed with AUKUS in 2021.

Pete

Canadian Submarine Choices (Oberons) - Part Two

Following Part One between 1957-1960 Canada decided to buy its own submarines. Canada chose Britain's Oberon-class for a number of reasons including:
-  the Oberons were the latest class Britain were building and offering in the late 1950s
-  Britain's Royal Navy (RN) had been training Canadian submariners on the 3 Amphion/A-class
   submarines at 6th Division (Halifax) since 1954. The A-class in many technical and operational
   ways evolved into the larger Porpoise-class and then Oberon class. Perhaps the main reasons the
   Porpoise/Oberons were 600 tons heavier than the A-class were thicker pressure hulls/deeper diving,
   greater battery tonnage/longer submerged, larger sonars, 8 more crew and more food for longer
   missions/endurance. 

-  Britain itself  (RN and Vickers) had a well developed secondment-training systen for British
   Empire/Commonwealth submariners on RN submarines, particularly if the Royal Canadian Navy
  (RCN) and Royal Australian Navy (RAN) were going to buy Oberons.

-  the A-class to Porpoise/Oberon evolution had identified and resolved most technical problems
   before they were bought by customer navies (something that couldn't happen for the RCN's later
   Victoria/Upholders or the RAN's Collins and maybe future Attack class). The evolution meant
   Oberon development costs were low. 

-  purchase and support (spare parts, upgrades etc) costs were also low because the RN itself bought
   them in quantity (13 and later 2 more) and had a long term commitment to operate them. Also costs
   were shared between the RAN (buying 6), Brazilian Navy (3) and Chilean Navy (2). The RCN
   bought only 3, which was inadequate for continuous operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific
   Oceans. So permanent basing only seemed to a occur at Halifax, serving the Atlantic Ocean. 

Canada's complete operational Oberon flotilla probably at Halifax naval base (Photo courtesy Corvus Publishing Group Ltd./Canada's Navy via http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/canada/postwar/oberon/ )

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Canada’s 3 Oberons: Ojibwa, Onondaga and Okanagan (all in above photo) entered service in 1965, 1967 and 1968 respectively. Their main function were service as "clockwork mice", submarines used to train RCN and USN surface vessels in anti-submarine warfare (ASW). "Clockwork mice" is a derogatory term for boring (for submariners) ASW training operations where the submarine is instructed to be "noisy" in order to be quickly/easily detected by surface forces. Also USN nuclear (SSN) and conventional (SSK) attack submarines would have exercised with Canada’s Oberons. The US operated its last Tench-class SSK until 1975 and last Barbel-class SSK until 1990. 

From 1979 the RCN upgraded its 3 Oberons with new sonars, periscopes, communications, fire-control systems and torpedo tubes capable of firing the still used US Mk 48 torpedo. This would allow the 3 to be deployed by NATO in the North Atlantic to monitor, and if necessary destroy, Soviet submarines. Canada acquired 2 more Oberons (in 1989 Olympus and in 1992 Osiris) for stationary training and spare parts cannibalisation respectively. 

From what I've read no Canadian Oberons were based in Canada's Pacific Ocean environment. One reason for this could have been Canada did not want to provide submarines for the US war in Vietnam. Reading between the lines the RAN's Oberons may have been used for Special Forces dropoffs and pickups in North Vietnam (through to 1972). See my two secret missions articles written in 2013 here and here.

Tomorrow Part Three - Canada tosses up buying SSNs to replace the Oberons. Next week I'll also do Parts Four and Five.

Pete

Canadian Submarine Choices - Part One

Over the next three days I'll write about the Canadian submarine environment and choices.

Up until 1960's Canadians who wished to be submariners would need to be part of the UK Royal Navy (RN), be seconded to the RN, or at least trained by the 6th Division (more later). This applied more to Canada's easterly (Atlantic Ocean) environment rather than west, the Pacific Ocean. I haven't ever heard of Canadian submariners historically seconded to the US Navy (USN) although there may now be seconded Canadian observers/intelligence analysts for some inter-service functions.

Throughout World War One, interwar and Two Canadians interested in submarines were fully integrated into the RN. In 1954 perhaps as a training encouragement for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) to form a submarine service the UK Government based a submarine "Division" (grand title for flotilla) in Canada. This was the RN's 6th Submarine Division based at Canada's main east coast (hence Atlantic) naval base at Halifax. 

The 6th division consisted of 3 Amphion shortened to "A" class submarines. The A class had first appeared late in the WWII UK. Most A-class were heavily modified postwar incorporating improvements of the very advanced captured German Type XXI submarines. The A-class at Halifax had  improvements which included streamlining, much increased battery capacity and usually no deck armament - all promoting longer submerged endurance at higher speed. One of the A class at Halifax was HMS Auriga (P419) Wikipedia implies Auriga was not improved as it mentions deck armament (20mm and 4-inch). In contrast rnsubs (below) shows Auriga with its subsequent and extensive postwar streamlining, with no deck armament.

HMS Auriga (P419) of the A-class, streamlined and no deck guns (Photo courtesy rnsubs)

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6th Division (Halifax)'s function included RN power projection, cooperation with the USN in anti-Soviet Navy operations, training Canadian submariners and sending a strong signal to Canada that Britain expected Canada to eventually buy British submarines for a RCN submarine unit. "Buy British" had strategic and economic benefits for the UK.

Between 1957-1960 Canada decided to buy submarines, but not necessarily British. Purchase of expensive US built Barbel-class submarines was, for a short time, entertained. The high Barbel price could be explained by high development costs being amortised into only 3 Barbels bought by the USN. US purchase of only 3 was explicable by the US and especially Rickover's intention (which the RCN would be aware of) of all nuclear propelled submarines in future. The RCN were aware of the risks of buying Barbels that would become "orphan subs" unsupported by the USN in terms of upgrades and spare parts. 

The most obvious cheaper, safer, choice, a choice promoted by decades of RN "grooming" was buying the UK Oberon. Oberons, their very similar predessors the Porpoises (and before them the A-class) were bought and used in substantial numbers by the RN. Oberons, larger in size and crew, were better suited than the A-class to Canada's long-range transoceanic operations. Technical and strategic problems in the A-Porpoise-Oberon evolution were safely worked out and paid for by the British. This was a happy acquisitions and political situation for the RCN. This situation was also enjoyed in very similar ways by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) which hosted a RN submarine flotilla in Sydney (1949-1969). 

Tomorrow - Part Two.

Pete

US Sharply Increases South China Sea Activities Pre-Election

Its not all China's fault. The sharp increase of US July activities has much to do with November 3rd.

Of course it takes 2 sides for a confrontation.

See https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3095817/sharp-increase-us-surveillance-south-china-sea-observed-july

and

https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/the-us-new-cold-war-battle-cry-in-the-south-china-sea/

Stealthy Aircraft & Submarines of Long-Term Effectiveness

In response to Brumby's thought provoking August 1, 2020 comments:

Overall China, Russia, US (to an extent Australia) would have a complex game-plans to overcome anti-stealth defences. 

Many radars could detect F-35s, F-22s or B-2s, but only when these aircraft are several kms away.

That is if the radars haven't been jammed. Notably Australia has purchased US made Boeing EA-18G Growlers to jam Chinese or others' radars, permitting Australia's new F-35As or medium sized conventional missiles to hit the radars or other initial targets. As Brumby said on July 30 "the Growler with its AN/ALQ-99 can jam [Russian or Chinese] S-400 sensors from a distance of 400 km operating at 30,000 feet. Advances are also being made when the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) rolls out. The [Australian Airforce] has been making wise bets."

China, Russia and the US are best placed to reduce jamming vulnerability and spot stealth aircraft early by using widely distributed radars (on ground, ship, aircraft, UAV and LEO satellite (?) platforms). Multiple and widely distributed radars are also harder to successfully wipe-out with dedicated anti-radiation missiles or multi-mission cruise missiles programed for anti-radar.

The initial strike may be with multi-mission long range, stealthy cruise missiles.  See:  

"AGM-158B JASSM-ER orders would keep the production line going into the late 2020s, and possibly beyond. Customers include the USA, Australia, Finland, the Netherlands, and Poland."

The Chinese are indeed producing J-20s [as well as FC-31s] and the Russians SU-57s at great cost because they consider  stealth aircraft will be viable weapons systems for many years.

This is akin to continuous production and development of submarines - being stealth assets of
long-term effectiveness, with no countermeasures in the medium term to render them obsolete.