Update on India's SSBN and SLBM Evolution

(Diagram courtesy India's DRDO, H I Sutton and The Diplomat.)

Submarine Matters has periodically provided updates on India's SSBNs and SLBMs since 2009.

India’s Financial Express published an excellent article “INS Arihant: The ballistic missile submarine is giving India’s nuclear triad a lethal edge” of January 2, 2019 by Dr. Sanjay Badri-Maharaj

who neatly combines many issues of India’s evolving SSBNs and SLBMs. The following is drawn from the article with direct quotes (where indicated) with bolding by Pete.

On November 5, 2018, INS Arihant completed its first deterrence patrol.

India efforts have been concentrated on developing two SLBMs:

-  the 750 km range K-15 (see diagram above) which underwent at least 12 development trials from a submerged pontoon. On  November 25, 2015, an unarmed K-15 was purportedly fired from the INS Arihant. The K15’s limited range makes it very much an interim system. Twelve can be carried by the Arihant. “It should be stated that this has not yet been confirmed by Indian officials and no photographs have emerged of such a launch from the Arihant.”

-  the 3500km range K-4 to be deployed aboard the Arihant class SSBNs. The K-4 was first tested on March 24, 2014 from a submerged pontoon and then on March 7, 2016. Thereafter it was reportedly tested from the INS Arihant itself on March 31, 2016. “It would be surprising if such a major development were not highlighted in some way but in any event, development of the K-4 is clearly well in progress.” Four K-4s are to arm the Arihant class and the K-4 is very similar to the Agni-IIIs in dimensions and performance. “The K-4 has some way to go before it can be inducted into service, however, once it does, the INS Arihant and its sisters will have a much more viable weapon at their disposal, though the limited number of missiles carried will be a distinct drawback. It is anticipated that from the INS Arighat onwards, the number of K-4 missiles will increase to eight per vessel, making the SSBNs far more effective and flexible.

The K-5 and K-6 are reportedly planned for follow-on SSBNs, displacing more than twice that of the Arihant class.

“The 13,500 ton SSBNs of the so-called S-5 class are to carry twelve of the 5000 km range K-5 – development of which started in 2015, with no tests done to date – or a similar number of the 6000 km range K-6” which is to have MIRVs. The longer-ranged K-5 could replace the K-4 on the Arihant class to enhance its effectiveness and flexibility.

“the Arihant class is a relatively modest vessel by the high standards set by the five larger nuclear powers which operate much more potent vessels.

“In fact, it might have been expected for India to develop an SSN – like the Akula class submarine currently leased as the INS Chakra. By opting for an SSBN, it is clear India allocated priority to the Arihant project with plans for six SSNs being left for the future.”

[Pete Comment: the SSBN first sequence was like France's which first had Redoubtable SSBNs in commission from 1971 and then Rubis SSNs from 1983.]

“However, while the INS Arihant does mark an important step forward for India’s nuclear triad, care should be taken not to assume that this leg of the triad is either complete or totally credible. Until the K-4 is operational, the INS Arihant has next to no deterrent capability vs China. In addition, additional SSBNs are needed to allow for continuous patrols. These two necessary steps will take time to come to fruition.”

Dr. Sanjay Badri-Maharaj is an Independent Defence Analyst and Security Consultant. He is also the author of Indian Nuclear Strategy: Confronting the Potential Threat from both China and Pakistan.

SEE THE WHOLE DR. BADRI-MAHARAJ ARTICLE

India's evolving SLBMs - the K-4 and K-15 (Diagram courtesy Indian Defense News).

Risk of Arrest of Those Helping Taiwan's Submarine Program

On January 14, 2019, Hua Chunying (above) China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson issued an Answer ("A:") in response to "Q:" below.  A: may be a warning to countries, "enterprises"/companies and contractors assisting Taiwan's future submarine program. 

Q: It is reported that the US has agreed to allow some military enterprises to export their technology to support Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS) program. Many US, European, Japanese and Indian companies have expressed their willingness to participate in the program. What is your comment?

A: China firmly opposes arms sales to Taiwan by any country and military links in any form between any country and Taiwan. This position is consistent and clear. We urge the US and other relevant countries to keep in mind the sensitivity and graveness of this issue, earnestly abide by the one-China principle, not to permit relevant enterprises from participating in Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS) program in any form...

BACKGROUND

It was reported January 15, 2019 “Six companies two from Europe, two from the US, one each from India and Japan have submitted design proposals for the submarines...The designs would come up for approval by Taiwanese government in March [2019].”

COMMENT

Noting Taiwan's Submarine Project: Confirmed and Unconfirmed Details of October 2, 2018. China might sanction countries, companies and contractors involved in assiting Taiwan's future submarine program.

But, like China's response ("More than a dozen Canadians have been detained") to Canada's arrest of a senior Chinese Huawei executive ,  (Meng Wanzhou).

China may use a two track response of:

-  merely criticizing the US, while

-  arresting nationals from other countries helping Taiwan develop a submarine.

Pete

Candidates for the Kalibr-M Western Europe Buster

Following articles of January 9 and 10, 2019 on Russia's plan to build 4,500 km range, 1 tonne nuclear capable warhead, sea launched Kalibr-M cruise missiles. It is the nature of medium sized missiles that if they can be sea launched then versions can be air or ground launched. Russia (Putin) is pressing for US retention of the INF Treaty mainly to prevent the return of gound launched intermediate-ranged ballistic and cruise missiles to the Russia-NATO European theater. 

As the shape of Kalibr-M isn't known I have selected 2 possible candidates.

1.  A larger than existing evolution of Russia's Kalibr cruise missile (photo above), mainly subsonic, mainly turbojet. For convenience this could be a upscale of the Kalibr's 533mm to a 650mm horizontal torpedo tube launched with a float-up mode. Keeping down to 650mm would allow Russian Kilo and all nuclear propelled submarines to mount it with less modification.

If a missile of even larger diameter were necessary Russia would need to more heavily modify its submarines with 650+mm horizontal torpedo tubes or even vertical or diagonal launch tubes. Vertical and diagonal being more suited to Akula, Oscar, Yasen or some tubes in Borei/Borey class subs.

The increase in range from Kalibr's 2,500 km range to over 4,000 km could allow Russia from Arctic Ocean and Black Sea launch points to hit much more of Western Europe (out to the UK and Spain etc). Also a ground launched version could launch from actual Russian territory with less need for forward basing in Belarus. 

To attain a 4,500 km range it may have just a one stage booster rocket that drops off when propulsion moves to the turbojet. If a nuclear warhead is desired it doesn't need to have a 1 tonne warhead because thermonuclear warheads can be just 100 kg or even smaller. 

This would fall short of Putin, INF breaking, terror weapon propaganda value. If relying on a subsonic turbojet it would have a very long, slow flight, making it easier to detect and shoot down, particularly if it transits over or into modern NATO air defences. 

2.  The multi-named P-750 (NATO: SS-NX-24 SCORPION) Meteorit-M (for Maritime-sea launch) 3М25 would look something like the air-launched version in the (photo above  - courtesy Wiki). It looks like an unmanned rocket-jet (like the 1950s US Regulus II or a ramjet SLAM missile) rather than a convenient torpedo or vertical cylinder shape for submarine launch. See Wiki https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kh-80

SS-NX-24 was an unfinished project authorised in mid-1970s, part-developed in 1980s, but terminated due to strategic arms limitation treaties (including the INF) and lack of Soviet money by the late 1980s.

Kalibr-M, improvement of the SS-NX-24, specs could include:

Weight            6,380 kg 

Length            12.8 m 3M25A (12.5 m 3M25)

Diameter         0.9 m

Warhead         various HE, nuclear (200kt to < 6Mt)

Warhead         up to 1,000 kg (1 tonne)

Engine            liquid or solid rocket or ramjet, or very fast turbojet

Wingspan       5.1 m!

The SS-NX-24 was tested on a "Yankee Sidecar" modified from normal SSBN (Project 667M Andromeda class aka "Yankee SSGN"). This SSGN was a single-ship class carrying the number K-420. K-420 appeared in 1983, carrying 12 SS-NX-24 nuclear-tipped cruise missiles instead of the original ballistic missiles. The SS-NX-24 was an experimental cruise missile, with a supersonic flight regime and twin nuclear warheads. It was meant as a tri-service strategic weapon, and thus would have filled a rather different role than the anti-ship Oscar-class SSGNs. In the end, the missile was not adopted,

CONCLUSION

Significantly No. 2's (SS-NX-24) a high-supersonic, rocket, ramjet or advanced turbojet speed, may satisfy Putin's INF breaking terror weapon criteria. It provides an uncertain middle ground on the way to faster, nuclear-certain, Russian ballistic missiles.

Placing nuclear warheads on even a minority of subsonic cruise missiles may risk a nuclear response from NATO. 

However Putin may wish to intentionally raise tensions in Western Euope by re-introducing the Cold War uncertainty of nuclear armed cruise missiles. 

As the US mainland, unlike European countries, will not be under threat from nuclear cruise, Kalibr-M can help drive a wedge in already Trump damaged US-European NATO member relations. Such a wedge was present between the Reagan's US and European countries in the 1980s which was largely resolved by the INF Treaty.

Pete

Ballistic and Cruise Missiles in East Asia-West Pacific Theater

Hi KQN

Following the latest article - looks like we're keeping this dialogue to ourselves, knowing that other potential commenters in the blogosphere don't want to be woken up during their Christmas snooze...:)

Re your January 14, 2019 comment "Ground launched MRBM and IRBM are of limited value to the US given the westernmost US territory is Guam, unless one counts some of the smaller islands. I do not see South Koreans nor Japanese ever agreeing to deployments on their soils."

1980s US/USSR/Euopean/UK MRBMs and IRBMs INF Treaty

The INF Treaty on short and intermediate range missiles was very much a Reagan US - Gorbachev USSR signed agreement, concentrating on ground launched missiles in Europe not Asia. This was within a huge political-public-strategic debate in NATO countries, on such missiles endangering citizens at nuclear blast ground zero in the USSR-European satellite countries-out to Britain. 

I experienced this debate as a university student living in London in 1981. "No Cruise" "Better Red than Dead" and Campaign for [Unilateral British] Nuclear Disarmament (CND) were the slogans of most thinking, humanist, UK students. 

For the more gullible UK students a quiet 1980s Russian agent of influence operation (eg) that Britain should Unilaterally Nuclear Disarm would be followed by a Russian moral realisation of niceness, ie: not to take advantage of the West's net weakening. 

I had a pretty good argument against the assumption Russia would be nice to the disarmed, but that is a future article. 

I unfortunately had to debate against nice students often, undercutting their arguments. Fellow students from India and Pakistan were very helpful as they were big supporters of nuclear weapons development to defend their own countries. Once the US won the Cold War in 1991 the students "Better Red Than Dead" slogan was proven misguided.

East Asia-Western Pacific MRBMs and IRBMs 2010s

So the 1980s INF was long before the 2010s development of mature Chinese MRBMs and IRBMs in East Asia and Western Pacific becoming an issue. In the 1980s (in the Indian and western Pacific Oceans) only the USSR and US had fully protected, mature IRBMs-ICBMs mainly mounted on SSBNs .

In the 2010s the US development of submarine launched missiles and B1, B2, F-22 and B-52s nuclear bombers means that ground launching from Guam or elsewhere is not a high priority for the US. Ground launching has all the public-host government shortcomings of whose ground?

I don't know the status of US and South Korea nuclear capable ATACM SRBMs in South Korea - see Reuters 2017?

September 2017 South Korea ballistic missile exercise - simulating attack on North Korea.
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For the time being the deterrent against Chinese and North Korean nuclear missiles is all US including, of course, Trident II SLBMs, but also the chances of again nuclear armed Tomahawk SLCMs. 

The advantage of US submarine mounted Tomahawk MRCMs (1,000-3,000 km) are that instead of the US having to build longer range cruise missiles and mounting them on land (eg. Guam) US SSNs and SSGNs can move in close just east of China's first island chain (or within it for firing) to hit Chinese and North Korean targets.

I see South Korea's Jang Bogo class 3,000 tonne submarines KSS-IIIs as only justifying their ballistic missile carrying main mission if the SRBM-MRBM missiles have nuclear warheads (also see). This is in the next 10 years or so. 

Meanwhile Japan is restricted by its pacifism and Australia to no-nuclear-apathy - just hoping Trump will sacrifice America for their countries in any standoff edging toward, major war, risking nuclear war.

Pete

Kalibr-M a Protest Against US Withdrawing from INF Treaty

On October 20, 2018, citing Russian non-compliance, Trump announced that he was withdrawing the US from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear [Missile] Forces Treaty (INF).

Putin announced on November 20, 2018 that Russia was prepared to discuss INF with Washington but Russia would "retaliate" if the United States withdrew.

On January 8, 2019, Russia’s TASS News Agency, citing an unnamed source, announced Russia was developing an intermediate range (4,500 km), 1 tonne nuclear capable warhead, sea launched Kalibr missile, dubbed “Kalibr-M”.

The INF Treaty, between the US and USSR/Russia was agreed and ratified in the late 1980s. The INF aimed to eliminate all nuclear and conventional missiles with ranges from 500 km to 5,500 km. The INF was very much aimed at ground launched missiles in Europe deployed by NATO (including US forces) facing the Warsaw Pact (including Russia) in the 1980s. By May 1991, 2,692 missiles were eliminated.

Another US reason to withdraw is the need to counter the Chinese (an INF non-signatory) missile buildup covering the Pacific. This particularly means China's ground launched, ~1,500 km DF-21D "carrier killers" and < 5,500 km DF-26 "Guam killers". US officials extending back to Obama days have noted China's ability to work outside of the INF treaty.

The INF treaty did not cover sea-launched missiles. The INF Treaty's non-coverage of sea-launched missiles has always provided room for technological exploitation and political threat of an arms race. Developing new sea-launched cruise missiles provides a technology backdoor for quicker development of INF breaking ground and air launched versions. 

Developing sea-launched Kalibr-M is a Russian way to protest and exploit the US withdrawal from the INF. Kalibr-M, with the "M" for marine or sea launch, comes with INF breaking air and ground launched versions. 

In this October 22, 2018 upload Trump uses typical subtlety to frighten NATO allies on his INF withdrawal. Lets hope Trump gamed it with Putin first!

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Tomorrow, the history and likely shapes of Kalibr-M.

Pete

US B-2, B-52 and B-1 Bombers Exercising in Australia

Continued US B-2, B-1 and B-52 bomber visits, in and over Australia, are important to Australia's security, particularly against the likes of China. 

In a low key way the very isolated  Australia’s Tindal Air Force Base at Katherine, Northern Territory, Australia, occasionally hosts US B-52, B-1B, B-2 (probably at night) bombers and KC-135s on scheduled operations, exercises and emergency stops. 

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF's) Darwin Air Force Base can also host (Youtube above) US bombers, (though less frequently than Tindal) due to noise and perhaps security concerns. These bombers and refuelers are more frequently based or pass through Guam, Okinawa, Diego Garcia, Hawaii, Middle East and Afghanistan bases and mainly based on the US mainland.

A B-2 stealth bomber lands at RAAF Darwin, Australia, for Exercise Green Lightning. 2006-2012 (Photo Courtesy, Air Power Australia).

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Another facility shared by the US and Australian air forces is a bombing range south of Tindal. 

Bombers from US Andersen Air Force Base, Guam historically used the very small, uninhabited, island of Farallon de Medinilla just north of Guam as a practice target. But political, environmental sensitivities, very small size and other limitations means that US heavy bombers no longer bomb Farallon de Medinilla.

Instead bombers from Guam can use the larger, 200,000 hectare Delamere Air Weapons Range about 120 km south of Tindal. See Wiki and Australian Defence websites on Delamere.

Under the defence relations Enhanced Air Cooperation (EAC) initiative, Exercise Lightning Focus has been held from November 2017 (if not earlier). Lightning Focus may be applicable to more or all RAAF bases in Australia particularly RAAF Williamtown (near Newcastle, NSW) and Australian RAAF Amberley (near Brisbane-Ipswich) Queensland.

In early 2018 US B-52s touched down at RAAF Base Darwin to train with the RAAF as part of the Enhanced Air Cooperation initiative.

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All sorts of Australian RAAF aircraft participate in these exercises (AEW&C, air refuelers and fighter-attack, etc) 

Two B-1Bs from 37th Bomber Squadron, South Dakota, land at RAAF Amberley, Australia,
November 27, 2017. The B-1Bs are participating in RAAF led Exercise Lightning Focus. Lightning Focus is the largest international air forces exercise in Australia, held in 2017 and 2018. 
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All these US aircraft visits are important to Australia's security.

Pete