January 18, 2019

Risk of Arrest of Those Helping Taiwan's Submarine Program


On January 14, 2019, Hua Chunying (above) China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson issued an Answer ("A:") in response to "Q:" below.  A: may be a warning to countries, "enterprises"/companies and contractors assisting Taiwan's future submarine program. 

Q: It is reported that the US has agreed to allow some military enterprises to export their technology to support Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS) program. Many US, European, Japanese and Indian companies have expressed their willingness to participate in the program. What is your comment?

A: China firmly opposes arms sales to Taiwan by any country and military links in any form between any country and Taiwan. This position is consistent and clear. We urge the US and other relevant countries to keep in mind the sensitivity and graveness of this issue, earnestly abide by the one-China principle, not to permit relevant enterprises from participating in Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS) program in any form...

BACKGROUND

It was reported January 15, 2019 “Six companies two from Europe, two from the US, one each from India and Japan have submitted design proposals for the submarines...The designs would come up for approval by Taiwanese government in March [2019].”

COMMENT

Noting Taiwan's Submarine Project: Confirmed and Unconfirmed Details of October 2, 2018. China might sanction countries, companies and contractors involved in assiting Taiwan's future submarine program.

But, like China's response ("More than a dozen Canadians have been detained"to Canada's arrest of a senior Chinese Huawei executive ,  (Meng Wanzhou).

China may use a two track response of:

-  merely criticizing the US, while

arresting nationals from other countries helping Taiwan develop a submarine.

Pete

6 comments:

Anonymous said...

Hi Pete

Question “the Six companies two from Europe, two from the US, one each from India and Japan have submitted design proposals for the submarines” is not based on the fact.

In “The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology” of Japan, prerequisite for tranfer of submarine technology to Taiwan is approval by Japan National Security Council (NSC) [1]. NSC about this issue is not held or planned at all.

In the case of Soryu technology transfer to Australia, “The Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology” is signed [2]. Similar agreement is signed for other country, but, there is no such an agreement with Taiwan.

Retired Japanese engineers may be involved in IDS program, but it is perfectly different from technology support by KHI or MHI. They can not sell design of Japanese submarine, property of Japan without permission by Japanese government.

[1] https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press22e_000010.html
[2] https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000349.html

Regards

Pete said...

Hi Anonymous

China might be worried about retired former employees of KHI and MHI who are working as contractors for Taiwan's future submarine program.

I believe Japanese Government authorisation under the Three Principles is not required for those contractors to operate.

Regards

Pete

Anonymous said...

Additional Details on Taiwan's Indigenous Sub program can be found in this link--> https://globaltaiwan.org/2019/01/vol-4-issue-1/

Pete said...

Hi Anonymous [at 19/1/19 4:50 PM]

Thankyou very much for https://globaltaiwan.org/2019/01/vol-4-issue-1/

Especially scrolling 3/5ths down https://globaltaiwan.org/2019/01/vol-4-issue-1/

which is the article "Updates on Taiwan’s Indigenous Submarine Program" by Fu S. Mei

who is Director, Taiwan Security Analysis Center, Manhasset, New York, USA.

Regards

Pete

Anonymous said...

Hi Pete

As flank array sonar directly setting on heavy structure is desirable, single pressure hull (TKMS 212A) or complex hull (single pressure hull and double light/pressure hulls: Soryu) may be adopted and flank array sonar may be arranged on the directly.

Diesels should be detachable for maintenance.

PMSM is desirable for propulsion motor.

LFP is desirable for LIBs in safety, stability and longer cycle life.

Welding friendly HSLA-80 (proof strength 550MPa) is not so strong, but, it is enough for shallow water such as the East China Sea.

There are many challenges to design and build submarine from the scratch under the thorough interference by China.

Regards

Pete said...

Hi Anonymous [at 21/1/19 11:18 PM]

Thanks for your comments on desirable specifications for Taiwan's future submarines. The first might be commissioned around 2033.

Taiwan has a problem that even if it builds 8 future submarines, in a war with China:

- 2 or 3 Taiwanese subs in deep maintenance will be instantly destroyed by Chinese SRBMs or MRBMs (with conventional or nuclear warheads)

- the 5 or 6 surviving Taiwanese subs will have been quickly located by Chinese SOSUS which is (or will be) likely encircling Taiwan.

- by 2035 China's 50 modern SSKs (most with AIP), 10 SSNs and 100 AUV/smart torpedos will quickly destroy all Taiwanese subs.

Basically Taiwan's future conventional submarine program is a lost cause, unless US forces can massively support Taiwan.

Regards

Pete