Submarine decision "Coming Soon" maybe 8 to 15 April 2016

Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull looking a bit tired as his Government is doing less well. But there may be an early submarine decision. (Photo courtesy Andrew Meares, Australian Financial Review)

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COMMENT

The political problems of the of the Turnbull Government may result in an early Election with the likelihood of haste and some confusion in the submarine decision.

In the political environment of the Australian Election Campaign Prime Minister Turnbull is attempting to gain political capital by flagging the likelihood of an early Future Submarine decision. This decision may be on:

-  which of the three contenders has won, and

-  may indicate how many submarines (if any) are built overseas and how many in Australia. The proportion of work in Australia and $Billions to be spent is the most politically high profile issue.

Turnbull may not specify which Australian States will get most of the submarine work, rather he is more likely to say all will do work.

It is Industry Minister, Christopher Pyne who, coming from South Australia, who will say (or imply) that most submarine work will be in the key State of South Australia. It is in South Australia that  Turnbull's Coalition Government may lose many House and Senate seats to Labor, the Greens and to the submarine fixated Xenophon Team.

ANNOUNCEMENT WHEN?

There are many influential variables. But I am guessing Turnbull might announce submarine decisions on Friday, 15 April 2016 (this of course is assuming Japan wins) because:

-  that day is the beginning of a visit by Soryu submarine JS Hakuryu, to Sydney on 15 April. 

-  there is also no distraction of Parliament sitting on 15 April.

-  Friday is a traditional day to make major announcements, as detail can be supplied to the weekend newspapers published the next day.

-  the "achievement" of making the submarine decision that "helps workers" would occur as a "good news story" just before Federal Parliament sits, on Monday 18 April, to effectively decide if the 2 July (double dissolution) Election should be held  

-  if Japan doesn't win things are more complicated. Then Turnbull needs to be courteous to prevent loss of face (to him and Japan), making the announcement at least a week before 15 April - hence on 8 April or after the Japanese submarine leaves Sydney 26 April) hence 29 April or later.

As the submarines is a major policy decision Turnbull would tend to follow the conventional of not making the decision during the caretaker period after Parliament is dissolved just prior to the Election (about 5 weeks before any Election) with possible election dates 2 July onwards through to as late as October 2016.

It must be realised that Turnbull has been making policy decisions in an erratic way - as he goes along. So the above predictions are only Guesstimates.

ARTICLE

AAP via Australia’s Channel 9 News reports, April 5, 2016, http://www.9news.com.au/national/2016/04/05/12/31/submarine-decision-coming-soon-turnbull

"Submarine decision coming soon: Turnbull

Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull says a decision on Australia's biggest ever defence contract will be made shortly.

...Industry Minister Christopher Pyne on Monday suggested the winner would be announced before the election, which could be held on July 2 [2016] if Mr Turnbull opts for a double-dissolution.

Mr Turnbull told reporters on Tuesday in Sydney..."Announcements about that will be made shortly," he said.

Opposition Leader Bill Shorten told reporters in Perth the government needed to fulfil its 2013 election promise to build 12 submarines in Australia. "Our test is straightforward for submarines - build them here, maintain them here, sustain them here," he said..." [see WHOLE AAP-9News ARTICLE]

Pete

Chinese and Japanese SeaWeb Systems

The Urashima "Platform" or LDUUV under development by the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC). The Urashima Platform is 10 meters long and weighs just over 7,250 kg. There may be a dual-use version being developed by the Japanese Navy

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Japan's MHI Undersea Navigating Mine Hunting UUV (S-10, TYPE 1) used with the JMSDF HIRASHIMA Type minesweeper. Perhaps this UUV can also operate with an Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV)

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At https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=19245896&postID=3474881908092116258 S and Josh made some interesting comments in early April 2016.

S pointed out that the Japanese Ministry of Defense is conducting research on two kinds of Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV). 

1.  A Large Displacement UUV (LDUUV) "for continuous warning and surveillance of threat and for long range delivery of underwater equipment" [Pete located Urashima Platform or LDUUV being developed by the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC). The Urashima Platform is 10 meters long and weighs just over 7,250 kg. There may be a dual-use version used by the Japanese Navy (JMSDF)] and

2.  "mine detecting system which is used in combination with Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV)." [Pete did a bit of research and located MHI’s Undersea Navigating Mine Hunting System (S-10,TYPE 1)

"Details are not known, but there are various technical challenges remained for both UUVs."

The shallowness and landforms of the East China and Yellow Seas would confuse hydrophone (SOSUS) portions of China's (future or developing?) SeaWeb (sensor, database and weapon) system so China would need additional sensor types.

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Josh made some interesting points:

It seems clear that the PRC is deploying some kind of bottom based detection system. This may take the form of hydrophones, but its important to note that sonar conditions in this area, particularly in the shallower East and Yellow seas, would not allow a SOSUS-like system to work - the deep sound channels allowing for long range detection are not present. Passive acoustic detection would have to be much more localized. Other sensors might be deployed alongside or in place of hydrophones - ASW induction loops would be perfectly viable in most of the yellow see for instance. Magnetic sensors would also be workable at such shallow depths.

That said, there are problems that would likely challenge such a system.

1.  Probably the biggest problem, target classification in such heavily congested waters would be problematic. Nuclear plant noise would be fairly unique to an opponent SSN, but other noise sources would not be SSN specific or even sub specific, particular if the sensor involved was not acoustic or not cross referenced with other sensors (acoustic, radar, visual) that could help reject friendly or neutral shipping, submerged or not (assuming someone didn't do something snarky like intentionally simulate emissions of neutral shipping).

2.  The USN is known to have decoys [some older ones] and torpedo target simulators. They come in various sizes from external counter measures tubes (6"), trash disposal unit (9"), and full up heavy weight torpedo size. The larger models in addition to simulating passive sub noises and responding to active pings with an appropriate counter ping also generate a magnetic field to activate MAD sensors.

3.  The [seas near China] area involved is a double edged sword to the PLAN [Chinese Navy]: While it is their back yard and readily accessible to their units and even land based weapons, they are late comers to the party: the USN staked out that turf long ago. It is is likely that many operations laying sensors or cables are under some form of observation at this point, either by MPAs, SSNs, or the likely emplacement of the USN's own sensors on the sea floor. The USN first deployed such sensors half a century ago; it stands to reason that some kind of detection system has been in place. It may be the PLANs back yard, but to a certain extent the USN has a home field advantage. In addition to the USN's long time presence in the area, the US can train and test systems in sonar calibration ranges off its west coast and in the Caribbean out of range of any opponent navy; the PLAN is bottled up and has to test, train, and deploy with the constant threat of observation.

4.  While a land based rocket propelled torpedo weapon may by physically possible [is with the ASROC system used by Western navies and Russia and China], the targeting challenges associated with using it based solely on seabed emplaced sensor data make it unlikely to be extremely useful without some additional targeting information from some other platform. The tracks of such sensor are likely not weapon delivery grade to begin with, on top of all the complications mentioned above.

This isn't to discount the utility or wide spread use of a detection system or missile delivered ASW torpedo or nuclear depth bomb (particularly if an area was off limits to friendly subs and made a 'free fire' zone for all submerged targets). This is just to note some of the complications such a system would have to face (and its presumed USN counterpart).

Josh, S and Pete

The long tradition of fixed ASW sensor and destruction arrays

Fixed anti-submarine detection and seamine systems have a long history.

 The UK Royal Navy (RN) successfully developed a hydrophone system and "indicator loop" magnetic anomaly technology during WWI. By 1918 it was an effecient system defending the RN Grand Fleet's base at Scapa Flow. Recorded here - the German submarine UB-116 was detected by hydrophones on 28 October 1918 attempting to enter the base. Two hours later UB-116 was detected by a magnetic anomaly system defending the base. Unfortunately for UB-116 that system was interlaced with a remotely controlled minefield which was exploded by electical impulse from alert on-shore RN personnel - thereby destroying UB-116. 

By 1941 the RN had deployed magnetic anomaly and hydrophone systems to defend strategic harbours all over the British Empire (see this long list) including several Australian harbours. The RN also shared all this technology with the US Navy to defend many US harbours (also on list) during WWII. The US then developed the much more extensive Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) since against the Soviet Navy from around 1950. The UK and presumably Empire/Commonwealth countries benefitted from SOSUS networks. 

China with land wars and/or Mao to cope with for decades was a latecomer - likely having magnetic anomally and SOSUS networks since the 1990s. China had "Passive bottom arrays protect harbor entrances, extending out to sea about 20-30 nm" by 1997. 

Now Chinese SEAWEB (Chinese sensors of all types on all platforms orientated to sea targets). Chinese SeaWeb is quicker reacting due to increased computer processing power and data storage capacity. China's NSA provides the essential network backbone. Such capacity makes Chinese SeaWeb better able to store and recognise the sonic (and other signatures) of foreign submarines. For example it is important to be able to distinguish between similar submarines such as Chinese, Vietnamese and Russian versions of the Kilo SSK. Once a Western (including Japanese) submarine is detected China is moving toward the ability to positively identify the nationality of a submarine or even identify an individual sub by its sonar signature or other signatures (including the submarine motion habits-routines of particular Captains).

US-Western, Russian and Chinese SEAWEBs may encompass.

Non-acoustic (active or passive sonar) sensors may include:

-  magnetic anomaly
-  water pressure
-  non-natural water anomaly
-  IR light
-  visible light (underwater CCTV)
-  lasers-LIDAR
-  light emitting diodes (LED) bouncing light off the submarine hull
-  anti-submarine nets or lines
-  water temperature (from engine and hull heat)
-  unnatural chemical levels from AIP (sniffers) 
-  unnatural radiation
-  electronic emissions including sigint.

Weaponisation

In a wartime situation China's SeaWeb would be transformed from just an intelligence tool to being the trigger for various types of anti-submarine weapons. 

Around 30 seconds after detection a submarine could be detroyed by mines that are intergrated with these seafloor arrays including mines that float upward from the seafloor and/or mines that are rocket powered. 

Around 2 minutes after detection a torpedo carried by missile might destroy the submarine. The weapon to destroy the detected submarine could be an Anti-Submarine Rocket (ASROC). ASROCs have existed for decades. They can carry Common Very Light Weight Torpedo (CVLWT) which may weigh less than 100kg. Multiple CVLWT could be launched with the onboard "intelligence" to strike particularly vulnerable parts of the sub.

China has been steadily developing Anti-Submarine missiles with: 

-  a rocket engine, such as the CY-1 (supersonic flight out to 20km) 
-  or jet engines. The CY-2 uses a C-802 missile for subsonic flight out to 55 km. 

At the upper end of the anti-submarine spectrum China's DF-21D "carrier killer" ballistic missiles could deploy one or more light weight torpedos or depth bombs with conventional or nuclear warheads against high value submarine targets.   

Response

As Bryan Clark indicated in May 2015 a logical response to this greater sensitivity and lethality of anti-submarines sensors is increased use of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs). This saves manned submarines from harm or capture. UUVs can be launched and serviced by manned submarines. The relatively small size of UUVs makes them harder for undersea sensors to detect. Manned submarines can also install recharging and data download depots on the seafloor (one depot is called OceanWorks "sub-sea dock").

Types of UUVs

UUVs with sufficient range for a 100 km (round trip) reconnaisance mission, towards an opponents coast, might be the size and weight of a Mark 48 heavyweight torpedo. Hence launchable from current 533mm torpedo tubes. Such ranges are possible because UUVs do not have to move quickly (against higher water resistance) to perform a mission. Their propulsion would ideally be different from a Mark 48's. 

Shorter range missions could be performed by lightweight torpedo sized UUVs - including the Bluefin range of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs). These can also be launched in 533mm torpedo tube fitting containers. 

Near static missions can be performed by Wave Gliders and static pods have been used by superpowers since Operation Ivy Bells.

It does not necessarily follow that UUVs larger than heavyweight torpedos are necessary. These "large diameter" or "large displacement" LDUUVs may the latest "must have" according to some American corporations but electronics are increasing in capabilities while shrinking into smaller packages. 

There are always tradeoffs between weapon system choices. Rather than Bryan Clark's suggestion that a very large LDUUV launches several CVLWTs a very long range (even if slow moving) heavyweight torpedo would also make sense. Such a torpedo could pass over the undersea sensor danger zone and hit ships/subs in harbour or leaving harbour. 

Pete

Japan's First Ship-Sub FONOP in South China Sea starts April 3 - 6, 2016

Japan's older class JS Oyashio (SS-511) training submarine has no AIP but relies on lead-acid batteries. The Oyashio class preceded the better known Soryu class. This will be the first Japanese submarine visit to the Philippines in 15 years. Behind Oyashio can be seen 
destroyer JS Ariake (DD-109). (Photo courtesy Agency France Press-JIJI via Japan Times).

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This submarine and the two Japanese destroyers (below) will be at the Philippine naval and commercial port of Subic Bay for a three-day port visit, from Sunday April 3 to April 6. The two destroyers, but not submarine Oyashio, will then sail on to Cam Ranh Bay Naval Base, Vietnam. This can be considered a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP). This is because the two destroyers will cross the large zone in the South China Sea defined by China's self-proclaimed Nine-dash-line (see maps below). 

Japan is providing increasing aid to the Philippines (including small observation aircraft and in future small patrol boats) and plans to give aid to Vietnam (if requested by Vietnam).

Japan probably sails naval ships across the South China Sea more frequently but this early April 2016 movement is quite widely publicised - so it may prompt a Chinese reaction, perhaps in several days.

 Visiting Subic Bay, Philippines, April 2016, then visiting Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, later in April 2016 is JS Setogiri (DD-156) (an Asagiri-class destroyer), Commissioned 1990, 5,000 tons full load of the Asagiri class. Upfront behind the gun is a Mk.16 (Type 74) ASROC anti-submarine rocket octuple launcher (this carries 8 rockets, each with a lightweight torpedo). Amidships are 2 x  quadruple Harpoon launchers. One MHI built SH-60J(K) anti-sub helicopter.

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JS Ariake (DD-109) a Murasame-class destroyer, above is visiting Subic Bay, Philippines, April 2016 then visiting Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, later in April 2016.
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Note Subic Bay is at Luzon, the large northern island of the Philippines.
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China has, by itself, decided to claim most of the South China Sea within its artificial "Nine dash line" (Map above) (Map courtesy GeoGarage).

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CHINA'S RESPONSE SO FAR

In answer to “It is reported that Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force plans to send a submarine to the Philippines along with two warships that will then sail on to Vietnam. What is China's comment on that?”  The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs March 7, 2016 Press Conference spokesmen answered: 

“It needs pointing out that cooperation among relevant countries should be conducive to regional peace and stability instead of targeting a third party, still less harming the sovereignty and security interests of other countries. Japan once illegally occupied China's islands in the South China Sea during WWII. We are on high alert against Japan's attempt to return to the South China Sea through military means.”

The Chinese Foreign Ministry may again complain at Press Conferences on April 6, 7, 8, 2016. Watch this space.

Please connect with:

Submarine Matters reported previously on this FONOP at Japan's Navy and Aid Becomes More Active in the South China Sea, March 8, 2016.

As reported in Submarine Matters the article Subic Bay, Philippines, Still Important to US Navy, November 12, 2015 many US ships and submarines visit Subic and Manila Bays each year.

Pete

Trump's Woeful Ignorance of the US' Key Defense the Nuclear Triad

In mid 2016 Trump has revealed his woeful ignorance of key US strategic concepts including the 60 year old Nuclear Triad. See particularly 1 minute 20 seconds in.

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Nuclear black-mailing North Korea remains dangerous. The third generation of the Kim Dynasty, in its own little fat boy thought bubble, may not quite know, or care, what nuclear war means.
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South Korea, Japan and Australia can't rely on a US nuclear umbrella as it now appears to rely on a US leadership pendulum. Trump "foreign policies" being the main risk, perhaps becoming reality. Even Putin is looking logical and reasonable, by comparison.

India, France, Britain and Israel don't rely on the US nuclear umbrella.

Pete

More on China's Future SeaWeb

If the pink submarine is a 4,500 tonne Future Australian submarine moving within 50km of the Chinese coast - things may not end well. Chinese undersea SeaWeb sensors may alert (lightweight torpedo carrying) ballistic or cruise missile batteries that a potential target sub is within range. Chinese smart and mobile seafloor mines, sown among the sensors, are another threat. The diagram is  on page 16 of American ex-submariner, Bryan Clark’s important paper The Emerging Era in Undersea Warfare, January 22, 2015.
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The Chinese have proven themselves very patient and methodical island builders in the South China Sea. Why wouldn't they methodically sow a large pattern of undersea SeaWeb sensors out to 50 km off their coast in the South China Sea. Such sensor network construction can also compensate for the suspected lower quality of Chinese submarines

SeaWebs are mainly undersea sensors, databases and anti-submarine weapon cueing networks.

As the USNS Impeccable found in 2009 the Chinese resent intelligence gathering near their shores. Impeccable was also suspected of sowing US undersea SeaWeb sensors on the approaches to China's nuclear submarine base at Yulin/Sanya on Hainan Island. 

The ocean-island geographies of the South and East China Seas are tailor-made for the growing development of China’s SeaWeb networks. Such networks may include lines of sensors from Chinese island air/naval bases (eg, Subi, Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs). See map above

Soon Scarborough Reef (or Shoal) only 140 miles (220 km) from Manila Philippines, may be added to the list of new Chinese island air/naval bases. A SeaWeb sensor line may also be strung between Scarborough and the large Chinese base island of Hainan (see red dashed line on the map below).

Harry Kazianis, writing in the Asia Times, has produced a very interesting body of articles on the China threat to Western interests in East Asia. His article “Coming soon to the South China Sea: Beijing’s best weapons of war”, March 25, 2016, in part, deals with China’s SeaWeb development:

"Sonar nets: While not an outright kinetic-style weapon, stringing together a sophisticated sonar network that could seekout US submarines – the very heart of America’s efforts to negate China’s A2/AD strategy — could provide a decisive advantage.

While there is little in English-based open source documents, Lyle Goldstein and Shannon Knight have uncovered various Chinese language open source materials that show Beijing is working on — as of at least 2014 — sonar net test sites in the East, South and Yellow Seas. It stands to reason that China has continued to work on and enhance such efforts. If Beijing were able to perfect such technology and deploy such a capability in such a manner where a new sonar net was set up in around China’s new islands in the South China Sea, such a system might make Washington very wary of deploying advanced nuclear-powered subs there in a crisis. As I explained back in 2014:

“If Beijing were to perfect such technology it could largely negate the military capabilities of America’s submarine forces, which in many respects are the foundation of the budding Air-Sea Battle operational concept [and very likely its successor, JAM-GC]. If China were able to field such a network … American subs could be pushed back beyond the range of such networks. This would impact the ability of American forces in a conflict to deliver kinetic strikes on the Chinese coast [and as well as China’s new South China Sea islands] by way of Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAMs). Considering the investment Washington is making in new versions of nuclear attack submarines, specifically a new version of the Virginia Class that includes a new payload module to carry more TLAMs, Washington would be wise to consider how to respond to Beijing’s latest move.” [see WHOLE ARTICLE BY HARRY KAZIANIS]

COMMENT

Large Australian, US or Japanese UUVs could perform and intelligence gathering tasks required near the Chinese coast. Such UUVs could be submarine, ship launched, air-dropped. They could also be  launched from friendly coasts or islands in the region. Being much smaller than subs UUVs are harder to detect. And no crews to lose.

Pete