MHI and KHI not at Australia's Future Submarine Summit, Adelaide, March 24-26, 2015

Australia's Future Submarine Summit is being held in Adelaide, South Australia on March 24-26, 2015. There are many Australian politicians, military officers and officials due to speak as well as foreign industry representatives.  

The content carried in an article of March 22, 2015 from the Reuters Tokyo office has been reproduced in the Australia media. The Reuters article reported: “The no-show by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries [MHI] and Kawasaki Heavy Industries [KHI] at an event called Australia's Future Submarine Summit, held amid intensifying competition for the deal, exposes a potential weak link in Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's more muscular security agenda: Japan Inc.”

It is significant that two retired Japanese Vice Admirals, Masao Kobayashi and Yoji Koda (details of each below) are attending the Summit and are due to speak on March 26, 2015 - both are advisers to Japan's National Security Council. Some Australian newspapers (such as the Herald Sun drawing on The Adelaide Advertiser) did mention the Japanese Admiral’s attending. 

Perhaps officers from the Japanese Consulate, Adelaide and Japanese Embassy, Australia will also attend? The presence of the retired Japanese admirals who still advise the Japanese Government clearly indicates that Japanese bilateral relationship-alliance with Australia is Japan’s main submarine sale strength. Japan's approach at present seems to rely less on commercial approaches given the absence of MHI and KHI. This is in contrast to France and Germany’s more commercial approach – though German government representatives will also be present in Adelaide.

BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF THE RETIRED JAPANESE ADMIRALS

 Vice Admiral Masao KOBAYASHI, JMSDF (Retd) photo (above) courtesy Sub Summit

Maseo is now an adviser to Japan's National Security Council. Biodata: "Masao graduated from the Japanese Defense Academy in 1973 and commenced a career in the JMSDF submarine service. He had held many posts in the submarine force. Shore billets included Submarine Branch Head in the Ship Systems Section in the Maritime Staff Office and Operations Officer in the Fleet Submarine Force. He has commanded TAKASHIO SS-571, (Uzushio class), and has been the Commander of Submarine Division Two. In 2001/2 he was the Commander of Submarine Flotilla One, and was Coordinator of Exercise at sea for Pacific Reach 2002. Masao’s last post was as Commander of the Fleet Submarine Force. He retired from the MSDF in 2009. Vice Admiral KOBAYASHI served with distinction in the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and is well regarded as an authourity in the submariner community." See Kobayashi's comments on submarines to the Japanese press - reported January 18, 2015.

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Vice Admiral Yoji KODA, JMSDF (Retd) - photo (above) courtesy Sub Summit

Yoji is Maseo is also an adviser to Japan's National Security Council. Biodata: "Yoji is a graduate of the Japanese Defense Academy in 1972, the JMSDF Staff College, and the US Naval War College. As a Surface Warfare Officer, he has commanded JS SAWAYUKI (DD-125), Flotilla Three and Fleet Escort Force at sea. Yoji’s shore duties include tours as Director General (DG) for Plans and Operations, Maritime Staff and Director-General of the Joint Staff. He retired from the JMSDF as Commander in Chief, Self-Defense Fleet, in 2008. Following retirement from active duty, he was invited to join the Asia-Center, Harvard University as a research fellow researching the US-Japan Alliance and the Chinese Navy during 2009/11. Yoji is a prolific writer on maritime and strategic subjects in both Japanese and English, and his most recent articles include “A new Carrier Race [large PDF file]” and “The Russo-Japanese War” published by the US Naval War College. He contributed to “Refighting the Pacific War (an Alternative History of World War II)” published by the US Naval Institute in 2011. He is currently an advisor to National Security Agency. Vice Admiral Koda served with distinction in the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and his body of academic subject matter speaks for itself."

Admiral Koda, in late March 2015, raised the possibility that most of Australia's possible Soryus might be built in Australia. However there has been little or no discernable support in the Japanese government, military, MHI or KHI for this approach.

Pete

Suspected Russian submarine snagging a Scottish trawler net

The "Butt of Lewis" Lewis Point, Outer Hebrides, Scotland at the top of the map. The "Butt"/Point is  the closest point where a suspected encounter with a Russian submarine occurred. On the right is the UK (Scottish) mainland.

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Faslane Naval Base is in Gare Loch. A Russian submarine may regularly stay on station around 50km or more out to sea.

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Several UK media outlets have carried a mid-March 2015 report that a submarine snagged on a large net almost dragged a UK (Scottish) trawler under. The reported encounter occurred near the "Butt of Lewis" Lewis Point, Outer Hebrides, Scotland. 

If it was a Russian submarine it was probably a Russian attack submarine (Kilo SSK or Akula SSN) submarine from the Russian Northern or Baltic Fleets. Russian SSBNs would steer clear of northern Scotland where the encounter occurred.

One of the Russian Kilos or Akulas submarines was probably travelling to or from its regular surveillance area where UK (and perhaps US) submarines enter and leave the Faslane Naval Base (HMNB Clyde) 40 km northwest of Glasgow, Scotland. The Russian submarines would ideally wish to follow UK/US submarines leaving Faslane and also intercept UK telecommunications.

Submarine-Trawler Incidents Have a Long History

The revelation of a possible Russian submarine encounter follows more than 100 years of submarines accidentally damaging or wrecking trawlers through net snags and also collisions.

In 2005 the Guardian reported: "Large submarines have also been caught in fishing nets, but usually, the trawlers come off worse. In 1990, four fishermen died when their trawler was dragged under by a British submarine on a training exercise off the west coast of Scotland. A few weeks later, an American submarine ploughed into the nets of a trawler from Northern Ireland, making the vessel heave before ripping the net from its winches."

Submarine collisions destroying small ships also occur. In February 2001, while conducting an emergency main ballast tank blow off the coast of Oahu USS Greeneville struck and sank the 191-foot (58 m) Japanese fishery high school training ship Ehime Maru.

Pete

Sweden announces pending order for two A26 submarines

Japan, France and Germany are the last three contenders for Australia's future submarine (SEA 1000) competion. The specifications of Swedens A26 (above) have not been made public. The A26 figures may be accurate with suppoting information of a displacement around 2,000 tons. (Diagram courtesy The Australian)

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COMMENT

Good news from Sweden of (pending) production orders for two A26 middle size conventional submarines for Sweden’s submarine assembly line. Australia-Sweden submarine relations have been under stain over the last few weeks due to another of Abbott’s undiplomatic statements – that Sweden cannot build modern submarines. This was in the context of Australia's removal, in February 2015, of Sweden as a contender in Australia’s submarine competition.

Swedish made submarines are not at all out of date. What may have concerned the Australian government more was Saab's (perhaps too strongly) politically insistent campaign alongside South Australian interests for "build in Australia". This may have been understandably prompted by Sweden's deep experience of building the Collins in Australia. Whatever the merits of the Collins build the Collins experience causes caution in politicians. Politicians, most of the public and fair-minded people are almost all outside of the professional inner circle and other interested parties who see/saw virtually no problems with the Collins build.

Under the, perhaps already decided "one horse race" called the “competitive evaluation process” DCNS’s position is not secure either. If Japan dropped out, for whatever reasons and/or the Australian Coalition Government fell, the possibility of returning Sweden to the selection process migh be more favourable.  

Anyway Sweden has made a positive announcement below, which should reassure potential customers that Saab-Kockums are a going submarine concern. I’m wondering whether there will be further announcements on 2 to 3 additional A26s for a total of 4 or 5 A26s to replace the 5  submarines currently in Sweden's submarine service ("flotilla"). An added concern is the emerging Russian threat in the Baltic Sea. Sweden might also wish to build 2 to 4 replacement submarines for the Netherlands although the Netherlands has not yet released details of what it wants. In that regard please connect with http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/02/sweden-and-netherlands-replacement.html of February 19, 2015.

ARTICLE

Marine Technology News, March 18, 2015 reports http://www.marinetechnologynews.com/news/sweden-orders-submarines-510865 :

"Sweden Orders New Submarines

By Aiswarya Lakshmi [and Saab, Peter Hultqvist, Sweden?]

Sweden is to buy two new submarines from constructors Saab Kockums. The A26 subs are to be delivered by 2022 and will cost up to SEK 8.2 billion ($945 million).

"This is the biggest single decision when it comes to economic investments that we will make during this parliament. The decision, to be formally made by the cabinet on Thursday, is to ensure Swedish submarine capability past 2030", stated Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist.

"These are the next generation of submarine. These submarines will be very hi-tech", he added.

The government will on Thursday authorize the armed forces to order two submarines, defense ministry spokeswoman Marinette Nyh Radebo said.

The Swedish government is increasing its defense spending over the coming years, citing a worsening security situation, particularly Russian activity in and around the Baltic Sea.

Defence and security company Saab welcomes the Swedish Minister of Defence, Peter Hultqvist’s, announcement to invest in two submarines of the next generation, A26.

[Acquistions are a multi-stage process, hence not finally signed yet.]

Saab has not received any order on production of the new submarine but Saab looks forward to the discussions, which will lead to an agreement and order for A26. This will be a part of an earlier signed Letter of Intent. 

Saab and FMV (The Swedish Defence Material Administration) signed a Letter of Intent in June 2014 regarding the Swedish Armed Forces’ underwater capability for the period 2015-2024. The Letter of Intent comprises support, development, design and production of submarines and other underwater systems, corresponding to potential orders of approximately SEK 11.2 billion [US$1.3 Billion], provided that necessary decisions are made." ENDS

Pete

Abbott's February 2015 Submarine Promise Juggling Again Controversial

Australian Prime Minister Abbott's juggling of promises on the new submarine selection has again become controversial. Most of this controversy is old however what is new is:

- the lack of communication and joint decision-making between Abbott and his Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop (and presumably with her Department (DFAT)).

- that the Australian "Cabinet's top secret National Security Committee (NSC) met in October [2014] and supported a move that would allow the bulk of Australia's submarine fleet to be built offshore."

Abbott has made two conflicting promises:  :

1.  in 2013 - mid 2014 to South Australia that 12 new submarines would be built in South Australia, and

2. Abbott's request-promise in mid 2014 with Japanese Prime Minister Abe that Australia wishes to buy 6-12 new submarines from Japan (and built in Japan).

When Abbott's position as Prime Minister is threatened (as in February 2015) he quickly needs to juggle Promises 1 and 2. This juggling may occur again.

On March 16, 2015 Australia's ABC aired a 4 Corners program called "House of Cards" (video and transcript here) that recalled Abbott's juggling of Promises 1 and 2. See shorter report of ABC program (below). This juggling occurred on February 8-10, 2015 when Abbott told Liberal-National Party Coalition politicians that he would allow ASC to participate in an "open tender". This appeared to be a decision moving in the direction of Promise 1, as it would make it possible for Germany, France and Sweden to win and then "build in Australia".

By February 10, 2015 Abbott had apparently forgotten the "open tender" promise and had replaced it (or returned it) to "competitive evaluation proces" generally assumed to mean ASC could play a small part of "build in Japan". "Despite press speculation at the time, the [Australia's National Security Committee (NSC)] did not make any final decision to build the submarines in Japan." However it was assumed by many in the Federal Government and the South Australian Government that the build would occur in Japan (see article below).

This is a March 17, 2015 ABC article about the submarine issues that were brought to the surface in "House of Cards" (March 16, 2015) http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-17/tony-abbott-changed-submarine-tender-policy-leadership-spill/6324620 : 

"Tony Abbott changed submarine tender policy overnight when faced with leadership spill

Four Corners 

By Marian Wilkinson, Karen Michelmore and Mario Christodoulou

PHOTO: One of Australia's current fleet of Collins class submarines, patrolling ocean waters. (courtesy Defence Department)

Prime Minister Tony Abbott took less than 24 hours to agree to re-examine the Government's policy on the $20 billion future submarine project, in an effort to shore up votes against a leadership spill last month.

The ABC's Four Corners program can reveal that Cabinet's top secret National Security Committee (NSC) met in October last year and supported a move that would allow the bulk of Australia's submarine fleet to be built offshore.

The sensitive decision was not announced at the time, although a press release had been drawn up for then defence minister David Johnston.

In February, the weekend before the spill motion, South Australian senator Sean Edwards told Mr Abbott his vote would depend on whether local shipbuilders, including the Australian Submarine Corporation [ASC], would be given the opportunity to participate in a tender for the contract.

"He rang me at 6.30 on Saturday night and I heard from him at ten past three the following Sunday, the next day," Senator Edwards told Four Corners.

"He said he'd had a discussion with the defence minister and they'd come to a position on this, which obviously I was seeking."

Policy change not discussed with Bishop

Mr Abbott did not raise the submarine discussions that weekend with Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, a spokeswoman for Ms Bishop told the program.

This was despite Ms Bishop being a member of the NSC.

Mr Abbott's agreement with Senator Edwards again revisited the previous outcome of the October NSC meeting, which had broken an election promise to construct the submarines in South Australia.

Details of the highly confidential October [2014] NSC meeting were based on accounts from sources closely involved in the submarine project.

Despite press speculation at the time, the NSC did not make any final decision to build the submarines in Japan.

However, it did decide to open the way for their construction overseas because of time and cost constraints.

South Australia's Minister for Defence Industries, Martin Hamilton-Smith, told [ABC's 4 Corners] his State Government "kept receiving feedback ... that the Japan option was very much the option".

"In fact, I was told we may as well give up," Mr Hamilton-Smith said.

Following the leadership spill, Mr Abbott reconvened the NSC and Defence Minister Kevin Andrews announced on February 20 that the Future Submarines Project would involve a "competitive evaluation process".

Under that process, the Minister said the Defence Department would seek proposals from partners that included "options for design and build" of the submarines "overseas, in Australia and/or a hybrid approach" ENDS

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COMMENT

In my article of September 8, 2014 "Australia's Future Sub Likely to be Japan's Soryu, outsider is Germany" I indicated that it was likely Abbott had decided on buying Soryus built in Japan. I felt then and feel now that a foreign build is advisable. In that article I also raised some risks of Australia being Japan's first major defence customer as well as the Soryu's short range compared to what Australia wants.

The US may have put pressure on Japan and Australia to rush a Soryu deal but many details and issues (including substantial Australian participation) need to be ironed out first.   

Pete

Australian Defence Department's requirements for Submarine Bidders

Defence Minister Kevin Andrews successfully asserting himself. Graphics courtesy julian winter.

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Andrews finding it is better to publish strategy papers than respond to media scrums. Photo courtesy Adelaide Advertiser.

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The high level of controversy regarding Australia's future submarine selection has died down over  the past three weeks due to what I see as:

- Prime Minister Abbott's position is now less threatened. He has not needed to reiterate his "build in Japan" preference. Abbott has also withdrawn himself from other submarine comments and public appearances.

- the removal of Sweden's Saab-Kockums from the submarine competition. Saab's business model appeared to be very much "build in Australia" - a campaign Saab was understandably running in  Adelaide ship building circles. "Build in Australia" was facilitated by Saab having no functioning production line for new submarines in Sweden. In terms of production line the Archer class (RSS Swordsman) was re-launched in 2010 leaving a gap until a build date for the A26s becomes public. Potential customers would be reassured when Saab-Kockums's A26 production plans become known. [Stop Press - since I wrote these A26 comments 24 hours ago - Sweden has published a decision Sweden Orders [A26s] "Sweden is to buy two new submarines from constructors Saab Kockums. The A26 subs are to be delivered by 2022 and will cost up to SEK 8.2 billion ($945 million)" ]

- perhaps the main debate reducer was new Defence Minister Kevin Andrews decision to be  assertive and his issuing of the Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program (see  below).

The submarine controversy will of course resurface in acrimony but it is quiet at present. Submarine problems effecting relations with Japan will recur when Abbott's popularity in his Party and in public again slides. Doubts about Andrews may start again once the cost overruns and lateness of the Air War Destroyer and other defence embarrassments again hit the news.

A defence novice but with years of experience in several ministries Andrews is much wedded to defining the strategy and policy environment of major policy initiatives and programs. Hence he  delegated the task of writing a major paper Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program for publication. This task probably fell to the Australia Department of Defence, the Navy and probably the Expert Panel writing the Defence White Paper 2015. It is important that the Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program is consistent with the Defence White Paper (perhaps published around September 2015).

Publishing strategy papers avoids the tendency towards "policy on the run" with many voices issuing  fragmentary and conflicting statements. Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program below was issued as a Minister for Defence Media Release. It is well worth reading in full - as every part is significant and hopefully well thought out http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/02/20/minister-for-defence-strategic-direction-of-the-future-submarine-program/ :

"Minister for Defence – Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program

20 February 2015

Today the Government announces the acquisition strategy for the Future Submarine Program. This announcement sets out further details of the competitive evaluation process that will be undertaken by the Department of Defence.

Submarines are an essential component of Australia’s naval capability and the Government will ensure that the future submarine provides the best possible capability and value for money for Australian taxpayers while maximising the involvement of Australian industry.

Submarines are the most complex, sensitive and expensive Defence capability acquisition a Government can make.

Australia’s national security and $1.6 trillion economy depend on secure sea lanes. We need the best possible submarine to protect our trade and support our maritime security.

It must be delivered in time to avoid a capability gap in the mid-2020s when the Collins Class submarine is scheduled to be retired from service. The decisions we make on the Future Submarine Program will determine what kind of capability we have to defend Australia and Australian interests into the 2040s and beyond.

The process outlined by the Government today provides a pathway for Australian industry to maximise its involvement in the program, whilst not compromising capability, cost, program schedule or risk.

The Government expects that significant work will be undertaken in Australia during the build phase of the future submarine including combat system integration, design assurance and land based testing. This will result in the creation at least 500 new high-skill jobs in Australia, the majority of which will be based in South Australia.

The Future Submarine Program is the largest Defence procurement program in Australia’s history and represents an investment in the order of $50 billion in Australia’s security. These costs will be subject to refinement through the competitive evaluation process. A significant proportion of this investment will be spent in Australia during the lifetime of the future submarine.

Successive governments have used various kinds of competitive evaluation processes for major Defence capability procurements.

As part of this competitive evaluation process, the Department of Defence will seek proposals from potential partners for:
a) Pre-concept designs based on meeting Australian capability criteria;
b) Options for design and build overseas, in Australia, and/or a hybrid approach;
c) Rough order of magnitude (ROM) costs and schedule for each option; and
d) Positions on key commercial issues, for example intellectual property rights and the ability to use and disclose technical data.

In addition to this – and on the advice of Defence – the Government has endorsed a set of key strategic requirements for our future submarines:
a) Range and endurance similar to the Collins Class submarine;
b) Sensor performance and stealth characteristics that are superior to the Collins Class submarine; and
c) The combat system and heavyweight torpedo jointly developed between the United States and Australia as the preferred combat system and main armament.

Defence advises that for Australian industry to have the best opportunity to maximise their involvement in the Future Submarine Program, it needs to work with an international partner.
Based on work completed by Defence, France, Germany, and Japan have emerged as potential international partners. All three countries have proven submarine design and build capabilities and are currently producing submarines.

France, Germany and Japan will be invited to participate in this competitive evaluation process that will assess their ability to partner with Australia to develop a Future Submarine that meets our capability requirements.

The Department of Defence will invite potential international partners to seek opportunities for Australian industry participation in the Future Submarine Program.

The competitive evaluation process will help the Government balance important considerations including capability, cost, schedule, and risk. Interoperability with our alliance partner, the United States, will also be a fundamental consideration.

The competitive evaluation process will take around ten months, after which an international partner will be selected for Australia’s Future Submarine Program. Further details about Australian industry involvement are also expected to be known at that point.

The competitive evaluation process will ensure that capability, cost, schedule, and key strategic considerations, along with Australian industry involvement, are carefully and methodically considered, and avoid unnecessary delays to the Future Submarine Program.

The Department of Defence will soon be holding industry briefings to inform Australian industry about the process and how they can engage with potential international partners.

An expert advisory panel will also be appointed to oversee the competitive evaluation process. Further details about this will be announced once individual appointments are confirmed." ENDS

Pete

Update on Japan's legislative process for Soryu sale to Australia

Shinzo Abe when appointed Prime Minister in December 2012. He is steadily altering Japan's defence policies and laws, in response to the threats from China, North Korea and terrorism.

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Japanese air force F-15s, based in Okinawa. They mainly protect Japanese territorial interests in the East China Sea area. Amended laws will provide greater legal backing for broader Japanese military activities.

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Japan's competitors (Germany and France) in the submarine sale to Australia have policies and legal systems well in place to sell to Australia. Japan's own defence sales legal system probably needs years of work to make sales to Australia sufficiently legal under Japanese law and more acceptable to the broad Japanese public. The time-lag is made more serious by Australia being Japan's first multi-billion dollar weapons customer. So as things stand today Japan is at a legal disadvantage compared to established weapon exporters Germany and France. 

The Abe Government also needs to establish greater legal certainty while Abe's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has so many seats in both the lower (House of Representatives) and upper (House of Councillors) houses of the Diet (Parliament).  

The mass of decisions and documents required by Japan’s Government and companies to sell Soryu submarines to Australia require major legislative changes. This is a short update on part of the legislative process.

In July 2014 the Cabinet of Japan’s Abe Government agreed on three new requirements for using the right of collective self-defence. The three requirements were (and are) that:

1.    there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan and also in some cases its allies,

2.    there is no appropriate means to repel this incursion other than the use of force in self-defence, and

3.    the use of force is confined to the minimum level needed to repel the attack.

On March 6, 2015 a council meeting of the majority LDP and its coalition partner Komeito further discussed revising laws. It was decided that an outline of security legislation will be formulated by the end of March 2015, and the government will start writing the texts of the bills in April 2015. The bills will amend such laws as:

-          the Law on Response to Armed Attack Situations, and

-          the Self-Defense Forces Law

The LDP sees actual changes to Japan’s Constitution as a long term goal requiring agreement in the Diet and also a referendum. Article 96 of the Constitution provides that a proposed amendment must first be approved by both houses of the Diet, by at least a super majority of two-thirds of each house (rather than just a simple majority). It must then be submitted to a referendum in which it is sufficient for it to be endorsed by a simple majority of votes cast. A successful amendment is finally promulgated by the Emperor, but the monarch cannot veto an amendment.

Soryu to Australia

The legislative changes mentioned above add legal legitimacy and also help build consensus for a non-pacifist Japanese defence policy. Actual Principles and Guidelines form part of the mass of decisions and documents required to sell Soryu submarines to Australia. Principles and Guidelines include:

1.     The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology of April 1, 2014 http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press22e_000010.html and 

2. The Implementation Guidelines for 1 Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000034954.pdf
This was adopted by Japan's National Security Council on April 1, 2014 .

Within the Guidelines I understand that Provision 1,2)A will be applied in possible the Soryu or related technology transfer to Australia. The Provision is:

1. Cases in which Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology may be
Permitted

2) Overseas transfers that contribute to Japan’s security, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of Japan’s security, and that:

A. are related to international joint development and production with countries
cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S.,"

COMMENT

The Abe Government appears to be steadily working towards changes in laws needed to permit such exports as the Soryu to Australia.

The agreement of Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) with its more centrist coalition partner Komeito seems required for these changes in laws. Komeito’s power comes from its centrist nature and its numbers in both the lower and upper house of the Diet (Parliament). Komeito’s agreement to the wording the LDP wants in the laws may be an obstacle, if Komeito hesitates from April 2015 onwards.

It is difficult to assess whether the Principles and Guidelines needed to sell Soryus to Australia are currently overly strict or prescriptive. There are sensitivities in the Australian military over how Sweden, due to Sweden’s export guidelines, decided to embargo Carl Gustav anti-tank weapon ammunition to Australia during the Vietnam War. Sweden’s decision not to sustain the Carl Gustav weapon system with ammunition, in time of great need, was probably the main Australian concern.

I do not know whether Japan’s submarine sale competitors, Germany and France, have similar Principles and Guidelines that may potentially restrict sale or sustainment of their submarines.

Japan's defence laws may be modified to be less pacifist but most depends on how they are interpreted, by politicians, the judiciary and the public.

I would be grateful to Japanese readers if you could comment whether I have an accurate view or not.

Regards

Pete