February 1, 2015

Balance of Power Senator Lambie AND Limited Submarine Competition?

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Balance of Power Senator Lambie

See February 1, 2015 revisions in Red.

The intervention on January 30, 2015 (see ABC article) of Australian Senator Jacqui Lambie in favour of Build the Future Submarine in Australia is of major significance. On that date Senator Lambie and Senator Nick Xenophon visited ASC in Adelaide, South Australia. The significance of the visit and statements by Lambie and Xenophon have been basically ignored by the international submarine industry and commentariat.

Senator Lambie does not tick all the superficial boxes considered important in the industry. She is not a tall, alpha male in a suit, with long experience as a senior politician or a retired senior military commander. She is relatively new to the Australian Parliament and rose to the rank of Corporal in the Army Reserve (however a certain German, who became powerful, rose to Corporal 100 years ago :)

Independent Senator Lambie, however, is one of the major holders of the balance of power in the Australian Federal Parliament with a record of threatening to block - or actually blocking - major $Billion dollar bills (also called "legislation"). Lambie, with other Senators, could potentially block or hinder the Abbott Government's pro-Soryu policy. 


Balance of power comes by way of the governing Liberal/National Coalition not having a majority of seats in the Australian Parliament’s Upper House – the Senate. There are 76 Senators, including:
Liberal/National Coalition - 33 seats
Australian Labor Party the main opposition party - 25 seats
The Minor Parties are:
Greens (who often vote with Labor) - 10 seats
Palmer United Party 2 seats
Liberal Democrats – 1 seat
Family First Party – 1 seat
The Independents are:
John Madigan – 1 seat
Nick Xenophon – 1 seat, and
Jacqui Lambie – 1 seat.

The Coalition requires 6 non-Coalition Senators to pass bills. Labor and the Greens regularly vote against the Coalition. This often leaves a Balance of Power situation where the governing Coalition needs 4 Senators from the other Minor Parties and/or Independents to vote with the Coalition. 

Jacqui Lambie has been the most recent Senator to become an Independent and she is the most unpredictable Senator.

Before voting the Coalition Government often has to "horse trade" on issues to avoid the embarrassing situation of having legislation blocked in the Senate because there are too many Senator votes against the Coalition's piece of legislation.

Senator Lambie is highly principled and represents Australia's smallest State, Tasmania. She might  expect some components for any new submarine would be made in Tasmania.

Senator Nick Xenophon from the submarine building and sustainment State of South Australia is coordinating efforts with Senator Lambie to potentially threaten to block any Submarine Made in Japan moves.

They admit they are coordinating efforts because Prime Minister Abbott's power is declining - making more amenable to the idea of Build in Australia. They recognise the major push for Soryu Made in Japan comes from Abbott's parliamentary office not Defence Minister Andrews' office.

The fall of the Coalition State Government in Queensland on the night of January 31, 2015 has further weakened Abbott's position.

Limited Submarine Competition

Separately in the ABC article is the prediction that: The Abbott government "is expected to announce a limited competition for the new generation submarine project involving firms from Japan, Germany and France in a matter of weeks." 

A limited competition is quite possible, but given a submarine purchase may cost $20+ Billions, the competition and the bids (or re-bids) from Japan, Germany and France would probably be long and comprehensive. The "competition" may also be used by Abbott and Andrews as a false exercise in "due diligence" to confirm that the current choice - the Soryu - has "won" the "competition". Choice of the Soryu, after all, is heavily about alliances - about alliance obligations to the US and by extension Japan - not only about the usual tender technical parameteres.

Pete

January 30, 2015

Indian Possible Interest in Buying-Building Japan's Soryu Submarine - Australia

Two Prime Ministers - Japan's Abe and India's Modi. Are their countries close enough for a Soryu deal?
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The Indian press reported on January 29, 2015 that India, under submarine purchasing-building Project-75I (I for India), may wish to select six Japanese Soryu submarines for building in India. The Rs 50,000 crore project price converts to $US8,133,990,000 that is $US8.13 Billion (where one crore is 10,000,000 Indian Rupees and one Rupee is worth 0.016 US Dollars).

See reference on Submarine Matters to:
-  the slow pace of the Project-75I selection way back to 2008 and 2011
-  then an article of August 2014 (which also mentions the already building 6 Scorpene "Project-75" no "I")
-  see also the 2014 reference to the DRDO fuel cell which has complicated Project-75

If a legitimate tender process is held other contenders to sell a large conventional submarine are:
-  Germany (TKMS-HDW)
-  Russia (Rosoboronexport)
-  Spain (Navantia)
-  Sweden (Saab-Kockums), and 
-  France (DCNS). 

COMMENT

Several problems already seem evident in the possibility of Japan selling Soryus to India:

1. India's "build in India" intention may clash with Japan's (to date) insistence that any Soryus it markets should be built in Japan. 

There may be a solution that may allay many of Japan's concerns. If Japan is interested it can contact me by email - see email on my profile...

2.  Japan would be mindful of India's closeness to Japan's strategic opponent, Russia. Japan is very sensitive to the security of its submarine technology secrets. Therefore Japan would not want the secrets of any Soryu that is sold to India to be passed on to one of Japan's opponents. India has been close to Russia on a defence sales, weapons' development and on secondment of personnel, levels for decades. India and Russia are particularly close on submarine high technology matters - including INS Chakra, the Akula II SSN that Russia has long leased to India. 

3.  India may perhaps have a problematic reputation as a weapons system buyer from Western firms. France is unfortunate enough to be involved in both the major examples. 

a. The first example is in-building Project-75 (no I) where France (DCNS) has been assisting India to build 6 Scorpenes for the last decade (see Project 75 and third paragraph of this Indian article ). India has expressed displeasure with alleged French caused delays. Over the years India has increasingly wanted AIP in those Scorpenes - India sees AIP as important - in part to surpass the three AIP equipped DCNS Agosta 90Bs submarines operated by Pakistan. But India may not wish to pay the higher price adjustment that DCNS would want to charge (AIP being an expensive upgrade). India has countered with a project by DRDO to develop a fuel cell AIPIndia may also be using the usual strategy of great powers (sellers and buyers) - which is delay for political and commercial leverage. 

b. Secondly, under the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition - on 31 January 2012 it was announced that Dassault Rafale won that competition. The MMRCA competition may be worth around US$30 Billion. However on 10 January 2015, India hinted it would not sign the Rafale deal with Dassault but instead perhaps buy more Su-30MKIs or Su-35s from Russia. India may also be attempting to leverage a better result from Russia on the joint India-Russia PAK- FA stealth fighter-bomber project - also known as the T-50. 

4.  If India insists on AIP this may cause problems for Japan. In Japan's first 5 Soryus Japan included Stirling engine AIP from Sweden. It is unlikely that Japan would receive Swedish permission to sell Soryus with Stirling AIP to India. Sweden, after all, would prefer to sell its own Saab-Kockums  submarines, with Stirling technology, to India. If Japan accepted an offer from India-DRDO to build an indigenous fuel cell AIP (see above) this may be a problem or opportunity because Japan may be in a strong technological position to jointly or unilaterally develop an AIP.  

Broader Implications - Australia and Canada

If there is a prospect of "build Soryus in India" - even whether or not it happens - this may have implications for any Japanese Soryu sale to Australia. Perhaps "build Soryus in part or whole in Australia" might be more possible?

If India is serious about buying 6 very large conventional submarines - built in India - with AIP - then Germany's HDW 216 and France's SMX Ocean may both be stronger contenders than Japan's (build in Japan - maybe no AIP) Soryu. This may increase the production runs and drive down development costs for the 216 and/or SMX making them more attractive to Australia. Canada has also been grouped with India and Australia as a country with a relatively large budget in need of large, long range, replacement submarines.

Please connect with India's Rising Nuclear and Conventional Submarine Force, May 21, 2015 http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/05/indias-rising-nuclear-and-conventional.html .

Pete

January 29, 2015

Australian Prime Minister's Decline Weakening "Buy Soryu"

Are the sinking fortunes of Prime Minister Abbott also sinking the Soryu?

The last week has presented a further example of Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott's  lamentable political  judgement. Abbott is weakening his influence in his own Liberal Party and in Australia generally.

Regarding Australia's biggest future defence purchase - Abbott has frustrated many in his Party by going beyond the normal prime ministerial role. This is in terms of Abbott going over the heads of his former Defence Minister and perhaps his current Defence Minister Kevin Andrews in unilaterally(?) selecting a specific high cost weapons system - the Soryu submarine. If Abbott is doing this to please the US, and/or to build a special relationship with like-minded conservative politician Abe, then Abbott might want to reconsider. A proper tender for the future submarine is needed.

The future submarine (Soryu or not) may be with Australia for 45 years (selection, production, then in-service) perhaps long after Abbott and Abe are forgotten.

Abbott's support for the Soryu has always been opposed by most in his own Party, by many in the Australian Navy and probably most defence civilians in Canberra and Adelaide. With Abbott's decline the Soryu's chances of selection has declined. If or when Abbott is removed by his Party from the Prime Ministerial position it is not clear whether Abbott's policy of "buy Soryu and build in Japan" will be maintained.

Japan may not always be an ally but even a problem for Australia - as has happened before. At a minimum Japan may want Australia to join Japan in armed confrontation against China. Abe and new Defence Minister Nakatani are a rightwing departure from Japan's usual pacifist defence policies. They may change the defence complexion of Japan - not necessarily in line with Australian interests.

Abbott may have a conservative ally and loyal supporter in new Defence Minister Kevin Andrews. However Kevin Andrews is too new to the Defence portfolio, with no track record on defence issues, to have his own base of power to support a Soryu purchase - yet. Like earlier Defence Minister Dr Brendan Nelson Andrews may make a good Defence Minister in the near future.

There is powerful support in Abbott's own Party, the Navy and the Defence Department for the build of part or all of the future submarine in Australia. Germany's TKMS, France's DCNS and Sweden's Saab have made strong bids that support "Build in Australia." This means that if Abbott goes these other bids may win. Japan may need to be flexible enough to counter with a genuine "part or fully build in Australia".

No commentators or politicians are recognising the early January 2015 "Manufacture Soryu submarine steel in Australia" offer as genuine "Build in Australia". This is partly because this Australian steel will just be thrown on Japan's existing submarine steel stockpile. No-one expects Japan to be dependent on Australia for strategically vital submarine steel.

Background

Details on Prime Minister Abbott's latest political mistake, particularly in not consulting his Party, are:

MELBOURNE Australia - "Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott said on Wednesday he stood by his controversial decision to award Britain's Prince Philip a knighthood and was taking the firestorm of criticism "on the chin".  Several ministers [also called "frontbenchers"] have walked away from Mr Abbott's appointment of the nonagenarian Duke of Edinburgh to the ranks of the Order of Australia, MPs on all sides have mocked the move and the media condemned it severely."

The Australian, a major newspaper from Rupert Murdoch's powerful media empire, ran a highly critical editorial asking: "Tony Abbott is in office but is he prime minister?" http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/editorials/tony-abbott-is-in-office-but-is-he-prime-minister/story-e6frg71x-1227198890579 
"The decision to turn a distant duke into a knight Down Under suggests a prime minister who is tone deaf or, worse, complacent in his power to push through a personal preference indifferent to the fact that it is bound to enrage and bewilder many," it said."

Pete

January 25, 2015

Japanese Concerns Over Any Soryu Sale to Australia

Prime Ministers Abbott and Abe, on April 7, 2014, when they concluded a framework agreement for co-operation on defence equipment and technology (including submarine hydrodynamics). This is/was a preliminary to any Soryu sale. Abbott's political position is now threatened. 
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As Prime Minister Abbott - the main Australian advocate for a Soryu deal  steadily weakens politically it is valuable to consider possible Japanese concerns and misgivings over a Soryu sale.

Several days ago an Anonymous commenter said [retired Admiral]"Kobayashi is not arrogant, he just does not want to sell sub tech, that’s all. Australian thinks that Japan wants to sell her subs like Germany, Sweden or France. But this idea is perfectly wrong and huge misunderstanding, Japan does not want at all. Soryu’s secret is more important and valuable than money which Australia will pay Japan." 

Enlarging on possible Japanese concerns yields the following possibilities.

Unlike other western countries involved in Australia's submarine selection - Japan is the only country actually in danger of conflict - with North Korea and to a lesser extent with Russia and China. Other contenders - Germany, France and Sweden - are not at risk. For these latter three countries the submarine selection is only a commercial-trade matter - while for Japan it is most importantly a strategic alliance, national security matter.

A sale of Soryus to Australia may weaken Japan's national security:

Selling to Australia would involve a major diversion of Japanese industrial and submarine corps resources to plan, train and generally liase with Australian industry and Australian submariners. Japan's limited resources might be better focussed monitoring or more active measures against Japan's potential enemies.

Sales to Australia might disrupt Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) submarine production lines to supply the Japanese submarine corps. This particularly in view of Japan's goal of expanding its submarine corps from the current 16 operational submarine to the goal of 22 submarines. More specifically there may be strategic pressure for a Soryu earmarked (by contract) for Australia on a production line to be diverted to thJapan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) instead. Such a diversion might raise political and contractual difficulties for Japan.

The prospect of sales to Australia may encourage the Soryu's submarine builders (MHI and KHI) to modify the Soryus to a standard configuration that does not suit JMSDF requirements. For example it is possible that two reasons for Japan's decision to delete Stirling air independent propulsion (AIP)  from the future batch of Soryus were:
- Australia's assessment, since the 1980s, that AIP is problematic, involving negative trade-offs, that  do not meet Australia's needs, and
- for legal property right reasons Japan could not sell Swedish Stirling engine AIP technology to third countries, including Australia.

It is also possible the future batch of Soryu will have much longer range, to suit Australia's operational requirements but this longer range might not be ideal for the JMSDF's needs.

Due to China's trade value to Australia Japan cannot rely on Australia to support Japan in any confrontation or outright conflict with China (eg. arising from East China or South China Sea matters). Australains see the islands in the East China and South China Seas as more to do with current opportunistic economic claims than national historical claims. This means that in any conflict in those seas Australia may support the claims of its major trade partner - which is China.

Australia's security laws and rules may be detrimental to Japan's security overall. Part of the weakness would stem from Chinese government and corporate  influence over Australia. For example Australia's China situation may result in Australian steel-making companies inadvertently sharing newly acquired Japanese steel secrets with Chinese steelmaking business partners.

Australia's laws overall make racial discrimination illegal in employment - particularly for government jobs, including the submarine corps. A main area of Japanese concern might be Australian tolerance of former Chinese citizens, or ethnic Chinese generally, being inducted as Australian submariners or into broader Australian government or submarine-shipbuilding industry positions. China has a reputation for pressuring ethnic Chinese in the West - even if they have only distant cousins or elderly grandparents still living in China. The Chinese government can deny Chinese citizens careers, lose jobs, lose pensions or worse if their Australia based relatives are not cooperative. Australia cannot match Japan's ability to control the ethnic security of submarine crews or such security in the broader submarine industry.

January 21, 2015

Comments on What Appears to be a Soryu Sale Press Relaease

The Soryu lobby (Japan of course but to an extent the US) issued what amounts to a Soryu Press Release (see below) on January 20, 2015. This was possibly to influence any statements Australian Defence Minister Kevin Andrews was expected to make during his visit to the Australian Submarine Corporations (ASC) submarine facility in Adelaide on January 22, 2015. As it turns out Andrews said little memorable other than the Australian Government had made no submarine selection decision.

COMMENT

After some positive feedback (with pertinent information) from Japanese commenters I'm toning down the title and some of my comments in the post. The "Soryu Press Release" is a Japan Times article of January 20, 2015. The article/Press Release:

- would have been mostly written by and cleared by the Japan Ministry of Defence.
- there is the exaggerated implication that Australia is privileged to be allowed to receive such a Japanese technical achievement.
-  but nevertheless Japan may not carry out the standard industrial task of revealing to Australia key technical secrets. This withholding of secrets may include those behind the Soryu's  potentially dangerous Lithium-ion battery (LIB) see "Japan...has yet to decide which secrets to share".
- that the US is in favour of the Soryu export to Australia for the US's own strategic and financial reasons
- makes the standard claim that is Australia is happy to work in strategic alliance with Japan and the US over Japan's interest in contested islands in the East China and South China Seas. Australia has been very cautious in not being drawn into Japan-China cofrontations in those seas
- basically Japan's Soryu pitch is that Australia is strategically obligated to buy the Soryu..

There is some recognition by Japanese commentators that Australia will incur major economic costs by sacrificing much of its ship-submarine building industry. However these  commentators under-rate the opposition and rift in Prime Minister Abbott's own governing Party with increasing feeling against submarines being built in Japan. Instead there is increasing support across the` political spectrum and within Australia's Navy favouring construction of the submarines in Australia.

The risks for Australia of being Japan's first major defence customer are ignored.

An incentive for Japan is, of course, is Australia's money to offset Soryu 2 (Lithium battery) development costs.

 The article/pitch/Press Release is below - with string  http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/18/national/stealth-tech-no-given-in-japanese-sub-deal/#.VL3UDUeUen8 :



"Stealth tech no given in Japanese sub deal

BY REIJI YOSHIDA

Retired Vice Admiral Masao Kobayashi commanded Japan’s submarine fleet from 2007 to 2009. In a recent interview in Tokyo with The Japan Times, when asked to explain one of the country’s most tightly guarded military secrets, he seemed reflective.
Kobayashi pointed to the ceiling lights in the quiet interview room and said: “Take those fluorescent lights, for example. Any fluorescent light generates sound.”
Other than our voices, there were no other sounds in the room.
“Fluorescent lights generate extremely small vibrations. We take anti-vibration measures for every single light in a submarine,” he said.
Japan’s engineers have painstakingly worked to minimize the vibrations given off by the multitude of components in submarines to prevent even those undetectable by the human ear from being picked up by the super-sensitive sonars of enemy subs and sonobuoys from anti-submarine aircraft, Kobayashi said.
Noisy components include fans, pumps, motors and fluorescent lights. Some are carefully muted with vibration-damping rubber, he said.
“The quiet submarines we have today are the result of numerous long, patient efforts,” Kobayashi said.
The Maritime Self-Defense Force’s submarines are not nuclear-powered but have a reputation for being ultra-quiet.
Now Australia, seeking to build a new fleet of large, long-range submarines, seems keen on acquiring Japan’s latest Soryu-class subs, or at least their technology.
If the deal goes through, the top-secret submarines will become the first major pieces of military hardware Japan has authorized for export since the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe lifted the decades-long blanket ban on arms sales last year.
Vice Adm. Robert Thomas, commander of the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet, reportedly said Oct. 24 in Tokyo that then-Australian Defense Minister David Johnston was very interested in Japan’s Soryu-class subs.
“I talked to him about it four years ago and I said: ‘You want to find the finest diesel-electric submarine made on the planet — it’s made at Kobe works in Japan,’ Thomas was quoted as saying by Bloomberg News.
The U.S., which has close but separate security pacts with Japan and Australia, probably wants Australia to buy Japanese submarines because it would greatly strengthen their strategic military ties, Kobayashi said.
Deeper Japan-Australia military cooperation would help ease the heavy burden on the U.S. fleet, which is busy decommissioning many of the nuclear-powered attack submarines it built during the Cold War, he said.
“The U.S. rapidly built many Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines during the Cold War. Many of them are being decommissioned now,” Kobayashi said.
“I think the U.S. wants to create a strategic triangle of Japan, Australia and the United States. That’s probably a factor behind” the apparent U.S. nod to Australia’s proposal to Japan, he added.
Japanese defense officials are thought to be pleased for the same reason Washington is. They want to deepen strategic military ties with Australia.
“Australia would make a good partner for cooperation. There are no major diplomatic problems between the two countries other than whaling,” a senior Defense Ministry official said on condition anonymity. Australia opposes Japan’s annual whaling expeditions.
Japan has just started receiving the submarine specifications sought by Australia but has yet to decide which secrets to share, two senior defense officials said.
Japan soon plans to use lithium-ion batteries to drive the motors in its latest Soryu sub, making them even quieter. Australia is believed to be interested in this advance, the officials said.
But advanced lithium-ion batteries are one of Japan’s top military secrets, one warned.
“(Exporting) them would be a rather sensitive issue. We’d need to study if it’s really appropriate for an outside party (to have that technology),” the Defense Ministry official said.
In Australia meanwhile, opposition lawmakers and trade unions are strongly opposed to procuring Japanese submarines because it could considerably undermine the domestic defense industry and reduce jobs in South Australia.
Joint development might be an option, the two Japanese officials said, noting that nothing concrete has been officially proposed.
Teruhiko Fukushima, a professor at the National Defense Academy in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, who is an expert on Australia, said Prime Minister Tony Abbott seems eager to procure the subs to bolster Canberra’s military ties with Japan and the United States.
“Abbott should be considering a Japan-U.S.-Australian alliance as a kind of insurance” against the recent rise of China’s powerful military, Fukushima said.
“The introduction of Soryu-class submarines would be a plus to strengthen that alliance,” he added.
“If the Abbott administration survives the next election and wins a second term, there will be a greater chance that Soryu-class submarines will be introduced in Australia,” he said.
Last June, Australia and Japan conducted “two-plus-two” talks between their foreign and defense ministers.
In the joint statement that followed, Australia expressed “strong opposition to the use of force or coercion to unilaterally alter the status quo in the East China Sea and the South China Sea,” an apparent warning to China to not aggressively press its territorial claims in those areas, which include the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands, which China and Taiwan also claim. China calls the uninhabited islets Diaoyu and Taiwan calls them Tiaoyutai.
Fukushima also said that on Nov. 26, 2013, only three days after Beijing declared the establishment of an air defense identification zone over the East China Sea that included the Senkakus, the Abbott administration summoned the Chinese ambassador in Canberra to express its concerns after the ADIZ drew strong protests from Tokyo and Washington.
“There is no doubt Abbott puts great emphasis on the relationship shared by Japan, the U.S. and Australia,” Fukushima said.
But he also noted that China is Australia’s No. 1 trade partner and that the public would never approve of political actions that could seriously damage those economic ties.
“The best way for Abbott is to strengthen the Japan-U.S.-Australian relationship while maintaining good economic ties with China at the same time. Australia would never turn its back on the Chinese market,” he said." ENDS

Pete

January 20, 2015

Soryu Submarine Steel Details - Japan Offer to Australia

A highly automated welding setup for a submarine's pressure hull. In this case a TKMS Type 214 - probably using HY-100 steel.
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For Comments of the Arrium issue see the April 8 2016 Submarine Matters article 
Arrium - Pyne's Submarine Steel Claims Don't Stack Up.


Please connect this Submarine Matters post with subsequent post Submarine Steel Strength, China and Japan, April 8, 2015.

It seemed on January 5, 2015 Japanese government and industry tried to strengthen the Soryu (build in Japan) campaign by taking the extra-ordinary step of publicising what was before a confidential negotiating point - that is Japan would assist Australian steel makers in making the steel for any Australian Soryus that are built in Japan. This may mean 10,000 tons to 20,000 tons of special submarine steel made in Australia.


Japan's Naval Steel (NS) Proof Stress Measure

A slight aside - European submarine makers may use an "EN" measure. I am advised by an Anonymous commenter that TKMS-HDW 214 hull is made of "EN" or "WL" 1.3964 (correspond to HY-80) non-magnetic steel. "EN" may mean European Naval while "WL" in German means "Werkstoff Leistungsblatt" (Material Performance Sheet of VG Standard) - see http://www.gl-group.com/infoServices/rules/pdfs/gl_ii-1-6_e.pdf  The US uses a High Yield (HY) unit of measure. Shows how confusing and complex steel measures are! On topic - the Japanese Ministry of Defence uses a "Naval Steel (NS) measure for steel proof stress.

An excellent Japanese document http://www3.ocn.ne.jp/~y.hirama/yh_e_papers_sub_f.html  
"History of the Japanese Submarine (After WWII)" indicates the Japanese submarine steel used for the Japanese Oyashio submarine class that preceded the Soryu class. Perhaps the Soryus use the same steel as the Oyashios. The Japanese Ministry of Defence designation for the Oyashio-Soryu(?) steel is  "NS80" and also NS110. NS80 means a proof stress of 80kgf/mm2 (indicated in Japanese language document http://www.mod.go.jp/trdi/data/pdf/G/G3111C.pdf , page 4, table 4.2.1 left column, with "耐力" meaning "proof stress") NS80 converts to 113,760 lbf/in2 or HY-114. 


If also used in the Oyashios and Soryus NS110 means 110kgf/mm2 proof stress converting to 156,414 lbf/in2 or HY-156.

How this "Combination" of steels are configured is unknown. It may (?) mean:

- each hull of a double hull uses NS80 and/or NS110

- different parts along the the hull use those different grades, or

- perhaps there is a "sandwich" of the two grades.

Language and conceptual difficulties seem considerable with Australian (DSTO or Bisalloy?)  metallurgists perhaps having to frequently make NS to HY conversions using http://www.endmemo.com/sconvert/kgf_mm2ksi.php ?

In terms of depth HY-156 for the Soryu may indicate an operating depth of just over 600 metres (2,000 feet) with a "crush depth" much deeper than that.

On Materials (“HY-80” and “HY-100”, "maraging" and "composites) see BACKGROUND below.

Submarine Steel in Australia

In contrast to Oyashio-Soryu "NS" Steel the Collins class “hull is constructed from a high-tensile micro-alloy steel, developed by Swedish steel manufacturer SSAB, and improved by BHP of Australia, which was lighter and easier to weld than the HY-80 or HY-100 nickel-alloy steel used in contemporary submarine construction projects, while providing better results in explosion bulge testing" [see Yule & Woolner, The Collins Class Submarine Story, pp. 165–174].

So Japan’s (and perhaps Australia’s) future Soryus (the yet to be launched "Soryu 2s") use a steel  combination apparently beyond the capabilities of HY-80 or HY-100 used in the Collins

It is likely that an Australian steel maker will only contribute a portion of the steel tonnage to a pre-existing stockpile in Japan of submarine grade steel. It is highly unlikely that Japan would rely on Australia to be the sole/only source of submarine grade steel for the Soryu. Unsurprisingly Japan values its national autonomy in materials for Japanese developed weapons like the Soryu.

Australian companies approached by Japan may include BHP-Billiton and BlueScope Steel. However the main company Japan approaches is likely to be current naval steelmaker Bisalloy Steels Pty Ltd based in Port Kembla-Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia. 

In the 1980s-1990s Bisalloy supplied 8,000 tonnes of hardened steel for the Collins submarine program with research and development involvement of BHP and the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO).

Bisalloy Steels Pty Ltd (company website) has connections to Indonesia (PT Bima Bisalloy), Thailand (Bisalloy Thailand) and from July 2011 investment in the Chinese CJV - Bisalloy Jigang (Shandong) Steel Plate Co. Ltd. It would be crucial that Japanese-Australian submarine steel technology does not find its way to foreign affiliates - particularly China.

The DSTO connection is interesting because in July 2014 it was announced that Australia and Japan had agreed to jointly carry out submarine related defence research under an Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of Japan Concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology (text of the Agreement as provided by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)).

As well as the publically stated Marine Hydrodynamics Project this Agreement may involve submarine steel and the DSTO Maritime Division. See DSTO Maritime Division Naval Architecture Project: “Structural materials and fabrication systems - Our Structural Materials and Fabrication Systems group encompasses the performance and assessment of structural materials and fabrication methodologies that may be used in naval structures or critical components within a naval platform. This includes metallurgical assessments and material assessment technologies for both initial selection as well as ensuring through life performance for fatigue.”

BACKGROUND

WHAT DO “HY-80”, “HY-100”, "Maraging" and Composite Use mean?

The English speaking world is more accustomed to talking about HY units of measure. I originally was going to limited this section to HY (high yield steel) issues - the "Harish" (on maraging) and Anonomous (on Composites) asked timely questions in Comments.

HY-80 and HY-100


"A submarine's hull is normally constructed of steel, or exceptionally of titanium. Special High Yield [HY] steel alloys have been developed to increase the diving depth of submarines, although the improved depth performance of these alloys imposes a price of increased fabrication challenges. These special steels are denominated by their yield stress in thousands of pounds per square inch -- thus HY-80 steel has a yield stress of 80,000 pounds per square inch [called 80 kpsi or more usually 80 ksi] [corresponding to a depth of 1,800 feet], HY-100 a a yield stress of 100,000 pounds per square inch [100 ksi][corresponding to a depth of 2,250 feet], and so on.

During World War II, American fleet submarines normally operated at a depth of 200 feet, though in emergencies they would dive to a depth of 400 feet.

Post-War American submarines, both conventional and nuclear, had improved designs and were constructed of improved materials [the equivalent of "HY-42"]. These boats had normal operating depths of some 700 feet, and a crush depth of 1100 feet.

The Thresher, the first American submarine constructed of HY-80 steel, reportedly had a normal operating depth of 1,300 feet, roughly two-thirds the crush depth limit imposed by the HY-80 steel.

The Seawolf, the first American submarine constructed of HY-100 steel, is officially claimed by the Navy to have a normal operating depth of "greater than 800 feet," and estimated here as 1,300 feet (400 metres). If there is a linear increase then the possible HY-156 for the Soryu may indicate an operating depth of just over 600 metres that is 2,000 feet.

The Soviet Alfa submarines, constructed of titanium, reportedly had an operating depth of nearly 4,000 feet.” 

An interesting February 2008 discussion of the tradeoffs of HY and other materials is here: http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/navy-maritime/steel-alloy-modern-cold-war-subs-7346/ : "I am wondering why in the newest American Seawolf Subs only HY-100 steel (Yield of 100,000 psi) is used, while there were rescue Subs in the 1960s (!) that already had HY-140 steel. Los-Angeles-Subs only have HY-80 steel alloys, what technichal reason is there to use not steel with higher yield?..."

Maraging?

See http://www.keytometals.com/page.aspx?ID=CheckArticle&site=kts&NM=99 . This paper is highly complex. Here is a conversion website for 1,000 pounds per square inch (ksi) and Mega Pascals (Mpa) http://www.convertunits.com/from/ksi/to/Mpa
Under sub-hearding "Medium-Alloy Hardenable Steels"
"There is another type of steel in this general class which is a medium-alloy quenched and tempered steel known as high-yield or HY 130/150. This type of steel is used for submarines, aerospace applications, and pressure vessels, and is normally available as plate. This steel has good notch toughness properties at 0°C and below. These types of steels have much lower carbon than the grades mentioned previously."
Under sub-heading "High-Nickel Maraging Steels" 
"This type of steel has relatively high nickel, and low carbon content. It obtains its high strength from a special heat treatment called maraging. These steels possess an extraordinary combination of ultra-high-strength and fracture toughness and at the same time are formable, weldable, and easy to heat treat. There are three basic types: the steels with 18% nickel, 20% nickel, and 25% nickel. These steels are available in sheet, forging billets, bars, strip, and plate. Some are available as tubing."

Pete's Comment - It seems HY steel (alloy) has toughness but is flexible enough to frequently experience the contractions and expansions of a submarine operating under different pressures-depths. The maraging process meanwhile provides very hard steel (alloy) but that steel is brittle. That steel is not flexible enough for multi-depth expansion and contraction. Maraging steel is particularly useful for tolerating rapid heat changes, making it useful in a submarine's engine but not for a submarine's hull.

Composite Use in Submarines

It seems that in parts of submarine exteriors, and I imagine even more so inside the sub, composities are increasingly used, to save weight and for other benefits. The pressure hulls may remain mainly HY steel or titanium (in some Russian subs?). Areas that heat up greatly may also remain steel.

A statement that probably applies more widely to other submarine makers and nuclear subs is  https://www.thyssenkrupp-marinesystems.com/en/composite-materials.html:


"Constant evolution of [TKMS-HDW subs] allowed for the intensified application of composites. Today for both HDW Class 212A and HDW Class 214 designs beside the traditional Glass-fibre Reinforced Plastics (GRP) also Carbon-Fibre Reinforced Plastics (CFRP) are used. These are used in particular when it comes to the design of large three-dimensional shapes or when outstanding transparency is required, e.g. to cover specific sonar windows."


Pete's Comment - This composite use over sonars may be to avoid steel obscuring too much of the sonar signal spectrum-spread. Also sonars are usually/always? outside the pressure hull - so steel to handle pressure is not required.

Pete