Submariner bravery - HMAS Farncomb 2007

Eight years before the 2007 event - in June 1999, as part of combat system trials, HMAS Farncomb fired a live Mark 48 Mod 4 torpedo at HMAS Torrens, sinking the decommissioned destroyer.

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The following 2009 article concerns an event in 2007. It illustrates that the rare occasions when some details of submarine operations become public usually occur when a submarine has an accident or some other misfortune. In the following case public disclosure became even a rarer thing - a good news story about genuine bravery of submariners. The link is at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/sailors-washed-off-submarine-as-rescue-kept-quiet/story-e6frg6nf-1225776884379

 

"Sailors washed off submarine as rescue kept quiet     

• by: Cameron Stewart
• From: The Australian
• September 19, 2009 12:00AM  
  A covert intelligence-gathering mission by a navy submarine almost ended in disaster when a giant wave washed five of its crew into the ocean in the middle of the night.
   
  The accident, which was kept quiet by the navy for two years, took place during a deployment to Asia by HMAS Farncomb in March 2007.
   
  However, tragedy was averted when three sailors risked their lives by diving into the swirling ocean to rescue their crewmates in a 90-minute life-and-death struggle against the elements.
   
  Now the navy has announced three of Farncomb's crew will receive bravery awards for their actions -- the first such awards given to submariners in 27 years.
   
  The rogue wave swept the five men off the top of the surfaced submarine as they tried to clear fishing lines from its propeller. In rough seas and worsening weather, they could not make it back to the submarine, so the captain asked for volunteers to rescue them.
   
  Sonar operator Greg Langshaw, engineer Rohan Pugh and cook Steven Rowell put up their hands and, assisted by crewmates, they worked together to drag the five men back to the boat.
   
  The rough seas caused the submarine to heave violently, breaking one of Petty Officer Langshaw's ribs and causing severe bruising to others as the men were hauled back on to the vessel.
   
  Navy chief Vice-Admiral Russ Crane said: "All of Farncomb's personnel who were involved showed significant fortitude, teamwork and courage to ensure that all sailors were returned to the submarine without major injuries and (with) no loss of life."
   
  The accident occurred during a five-month deployment through Southeast Asia and the western Pacific, during which Farncomb gathered intelligence by sailing close to foreign coastlines, listening to communications.
   
  Defence will not say where Farncomb was or what its activities were at the time of the accident.
   
  The story of the Farncomb could easily have been a naval tragedy or even a diplomatic incident.
   
  Instead, it is a tale of courage and heroism from a group of sailors who risked their own lives to save their mates from death.
   
  The navy was uncertain about how best to recognise the bravery of the crew. For more than two years it kept quiet, but last month Chief Petty Officer Pugh, Petty Officer Langshaw and Leading Seaman Rowell were told they would be offered bravery awards.
   
  The navy says the delay was because "due process" needed to be followed. However, The Weekend Australian understands it only nominated the men for the awards this year.
   
  On Thursday, Governor-General Quentin Bryce announced awards for the three men, while several other crew members were awarded commendations from Vice-Admiral Crane.
   
  Chief Petty Officer Pugh says the award, which will be presented next March, was the last thing he expected. "I thought it was great to be recognised for it,' he said. "I think anyone would have done it."
   
  Submariners are rarely given public medals because, like the SAS, much of what they do cannot be revealed.
   
  The navy says the last bravery medals awarded to submariners were in 1982, when two crew aboard HMAS Onslow were decorated for their actions when their submarine filled with toxic fumes.
   
  The Farncomb incident occurred 20 years after two sailors were lost while on an exercise off Sydney Harbour.
   
  They were swept overboard when the Oberon-class submarine HMAS Otama dived while they were still in the conning tower."
   
  Comment
   
  This article can be related to two previous articles on this website:
   
  "Australian Oberon Spying Missions" http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/07/australian-oberon-submarine-spying.html and
   
  "Australian Oberon Submarine Intelligence Gathering" http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/12/australian-oberon-submarine.html 
  -
  Pete

Brazil's Future SSN - DCNS Assistance - Australian Interest?

Part's of this Submarine Matter's article were updated in 2016-2017 eg. this explains use of the name "Naval Group".

Many of the 2014, or earlier, links are "404" ie. "dead". This is unfortunate, but goes to show the value of Submarine Matters which goes as far back as 2007.

Please link with Brazil's New Submarine Program (ProSub) and Australia - March 2015 Update 

The French company DCNS (now Naval Group) is providing a package of four conventional subs and one nuclear sub that will be domestically built. Brazil is the first customer for this package and may not be the only customer. Such an industrial solution might be more promising option for Australia than other industrial mixes of all conventional, all nuclear or foreign built.

The conventional diesel-electric subs Naval Group is assisting Brazil to build are four slightly larger than usual Scorpenes. The first might be launched in 2015.

The nuclear propelled submarine Naval Group is helping Brazil build is dubbed the "SN-Br" or "SNBR" for Submarine-Nuclear-Brazil. It may be the SN-Br will have attributes of Naval Group SSNs - perhaps somewhere between 2,500 ton Rubis-Améthyste SSN and the not yet commissioned  5,000 ton Barracuda SSN. Such tonnage would make it small by 7,000+ ton  US, UK and Russian SSN standards. The SN-Br may feature all horizontal torpedo tubes or some additional VLS
see http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/brazil-france-in-deal-for-ssks-ssn-05217/ The long delayed  SN-Br might be launched by 2030 and enter operation in 2034.

The Brazilian SSN (SN-Br's) Reactor

SN-Br will be powered by a nuclear reactor reportedly developed entirely by Brazil under Project Aramar.

Confusion or ambiguity about the extent of French content in the SN-Br's reactor may be due to French and Brazilian sensitivity about any criticisms that France is proliferating military nuclear technology to Brazil. Has France provided the French designed 2131-R Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) technology for the SN-Br Project? Might Brazil finally build something like the French K15 reactor (miniaturised for the Barracuda).

In a similar vein Russia's extensive assistance in designing and building India's INS Arihant reactor has also largely been kept out of the news.

In any case the SN-Br reactor may use less proliferation sensitive Uranium of only 7% and 10% enriched - see http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/brazil-submarine-import-and-export-behavior/ [more details below] - although this is hard to believe on power to weight and frequency of refuelling grounds.

The four conventional conventional subs (SSKs) and SN-Br are part of Brazil's program to build a navy that can defend its oil and trade interests in the South Atlantic. The SN-Br will also represent a revival of military uses of nuclear energy - noting that Brazil had discontinued its nuclear weapons program by 1990 http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/brazil/ .
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Australian Interest in Naval Group Brazilian Solution?
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[Situation in 2014 (not 2021) was...] For Australia's future submarine project, known as SEA 1000, Australia has several solutions to consider from submarine suppliers. So far this website has mentioned the TKMS German offer, TKMS as owner of Kockums is no longer allowing Kockums to bid for submarine orders, Spain's Navantia S-80, Japan's Soryu subs and the faint chance of US supplying Virginia-class SSNs.

The increasing need for Australia to domestically build submarines given the rundown in Australia's manufacturing industry will work against the remote possibility that Australia would opt for the Virginia Class SSNs. The unlikelihood of US technology transfer, small Australian production runs of Virginia subs and Australia's very low level of nuclear know-how are all reasons making the Virginia's unlikely.

The Naval Group solution of Australia building its own SSK or SSNs under Naval Group guidance may be the best fit as an industrial solution. While Naval Group has no experience making SSKs in the 4,000 ton range required by Australia Naval Group has experience making nuclear subs of that tonnage and greater. Due to Naval Groups lack of experience making a conventional propulsion system for a 4,000 tonne SSK, Australia may need to consider the propulsion system used by Japan's 4,000 tonne (submerged) Soryu class.

BACKGROUND

NTI July 18, 2013 reported http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/brazil-submarine-capabilities/ The Brazilian Navy's overall strategic goal is to gain an increased sea-denial capability, and it views submarines as a way to achieve that goal. Brazil's USD 8.3BN submarine development program (known as PROSUB) has set a goal of producing 15 diesel-electric submarines and 6 nuclear-powered submarines by 2034. These boats are slated to replace the older Tupi and Tikuna-class submarines. [9]

http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/brazil-submarine-import-and-export-behavior/
In January 2008 Brazil signed a defense cooperation agreement with France that was followed up with an agreement on submarines in December of the same year. Detailed contracts were finally signed in September 2009, stipulating the terms of the submarine acquisitions and related technology transfer programs. [15] 

According to these agreements a strategic partnership was formed between the two countries to build four conventional Scorpène-class submarines as well as the hull for Brazil's planned nuclear powered submarine (referred to as 'SNBR'). Brazil is solely responsible for the nuclear parts of the 'SNBR' vessel, and the contract clearly states that "the Brazilian party will not receive assistance from the French party for the design, construction and putting into operation of the on-board nuclear reactor, the installations in the nuclear reactor compartment, and the equipment and facilities whose functions are primarily concerned with the reactor's operation or nuclear safety." [16]

From http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/brazil-submarine-import-and-export-behavior/ [now a dead link] 

The fuel (most likely enriched to levels between 7% and 10% U-235) and the reactor will be provided by the Brazilian Navy's Aramar Technological Center in Ipero and based on the Nuclear-Electric Generation Laboratory (Laboratorio de Geracao Nucleo-Eletrica - LABGENE) and USEXA (a pilot uranium hexafluoride conversion plant) projects. [17] 

Furthermore, parts for a prototype 48MW pressurized water reactor (RENAP-11) have allegedly already been manufactured. Negotiations on a verification regime for Brazil's naval nuclear fuel involving the IAEA and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) are ongoing. [18]

The 2009 contract also provides for the formation of a joint venture between Naval Group and Brazilian construction company Odebrecht Engenharia. [19] The joint venture covers the construction of a new shipyard and naval base at Sepetiba Bay (near Rio de Janeiro), as well as the production of the submarines themselves. [20] The total cost of the order is expected to be around $8.4 billion over 20 years for the completion of five submarines, the shipbuilding infrastructure, and the weapons system. The conventional submarines are rumored to cost an estimated $600 million each and the nuclear vessel is estimated at $1.5 billion.

[21] The first four submarines will be single-hull, conventional Scorpène-class attack submarines that are slightly modified for greater endurance and time between maintenance. This enables them to meet the operational requirements of patrolling and protecting the expansive Brazilian coast, offshore natural resources and sea-going commerce. [22] Similar to the deal with HDW in the 1980s, the contract with Naval Group states that construction on the nose of the first submarine will begin at the Naval Group shipyard in Cherbourg, France, and will then move to Brazil for completion at Sepetiba Bay.

[23] Assembly and construction of the remaining three conventional submarines, as well as the nuclear-powered variant, will take place entirely in Brazil, though many preassembled parts and components will be brought in from France. [24] Construction on the Scorpènes began in July 2011, with the first submarine slated to be commissioned into the Navy around 2017. [25] According to the construction schedule the last of the conventional submarines is due to be completed by 2025 and the nuclear vessel is expected to be finished by 2023.

[26] Seeking an increased sea-denial capability, the Brazilian Navy plans to procure fifteen diesel-electric submarines and six nuclear-powered submarines to replace the Tupi and Tikuna-class boats when those submarines are retired. The extent of foreign involvement in the development of these new submarines is unclear, but given the Brazilian emphasis on development of an indigenous submarine building capacity it seems likely that a significant amount of construction will take place domestically. [27]

FURTHER READING

See also:

Anthony Boadle of Reuters, March 1, 2013, [dead link]  http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/01/brazil-defense-submarines-idUSL1N0BT5WK20130301

ANU’s Stephan Fruehling wrote in ASPI Strategist a most interesting article on this:  Nuclear propulsion and the future of Australia’s submarine force of March 11, 2016, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/nuclear-propulsion-and-the-future-of-australias-submarine-force/ [still available]

Pete

Chinese SLBMs and DF-21D carrier killers, 2013

The area in yellow is the maximum claimed range of 3,000 km for the DF-21D anti-ship (and ASW?) "carrier killer" ballistic missile. A shorter claimed range of 1,450 km may be for a heavy warheads - see my final comments below. The outer perimeter of the yellow zone may be from launch points from coastal China, particularly Hainan Island. The physics of the DF-21D may mean it can't hit a target that is less than 100 km from launch point - see http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20131213000003&cid=1101

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This diagram of the DF-21D Guidance System includes remote radar on land, aircraft, drones, sea and satellite and sensors on the warhead itself. I maintain that the same sensor platforms and undersea sensors placed by China would also provide nuclear and conventional warhead DF-21Ds with an anti-submarine capability.

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China's JL-2 (CSSNX-14) SLBM. Though it is China's main SLBM it was still under development in 2013. 

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After terrorism and Iran and Pakistan's nuclear status US civilian and military intelligence are most interested in the growth in capabilities of China’s military forces. This is because China’s forces might pass US forces in size as China’s economy grows larger than the US economy. China’s transition to becoming No.1 in military and economic size may occur in the late 2020s or early 2030s. Whether China will be No.1 in military capability during that period is also dependent on the quality of China’s military personnel and technology. The degree of politically imposed limitations will also influence capability as the red bolded section of the report below reveals.
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Below are excerpts from Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Chinese nuclear forces, 2013, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2013, Vol. 69, No. 6, pp. 79-85, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/6/79.full.pdf They include some interesting comments regarding Chinese SSBNs, SLBMs, Chinese area or sea denial DF-21D missiles that perform some of the anti-surface ship and ASW functions of submarines. The red bolded section provides comments on the high degree of Communist Party Central Military Commission caution and political control concerning China's nuclear forces. This degree of control may handicap the capability of these forces during threats and actual nuclear war.

SSBNs and SLBMs

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The authors report:

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[p. 82] China has two types of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) developed for two types of nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines: the JL-1 and JL-2. Neither missile is operational.

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The 1,700-km-range, two-stage JL-1 (CSS-NX-3) SLBM developed for a single old Xia-class (Type 092) submarine first entered service in 1986 and is not considered operational. The Xia is based at the North Fleet Base near Qingdao in the Shandong province. The submarine underwent a lengthy shipyard overhaul in 2005-2006 but appears to have stayed in port since then. The Xia/JL-1 weapon system is expected to be retired soon.

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Development of the new JL-2 (CSSNX-14) SLBM for the second-generation Jin-class (Type 094) submarine is nearing completion. After several setbacks, China appears to have overcome

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[p. 83] technical difficulties and successfully test-launched the JL-2 in 2012-2013. The US intelligence community expects the JL-2 may reach initial operational capability in 2013 or 2014. [Endnote 5. The Pentagon predicts initial operational capability in 2013 (Defense Department, 2013), while the Defense Intelligence Agency (2013) predicts initial operational capability in 2014.]

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The JL-2 is a modified version of the DF-31. Equipped with a single warhead and, possibly, penetration aids, the JL-2 has never been flight-tested to its full range but is estimated to have a range of 7,000-plus km. Such a range is sufficient to target Alaska, Guam, Russia, and India from waters near China but unless the submarine sails significantly eastward, not the continental United States.

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Three Jin-class submarines are in service (without missiles), and the US intelligence community speculates that China may build a total of five before proceeding to develop a third-generation (Type 096) over the next decade.

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With 12 missile-launch tubes per submarine, three Jin-class boats could carry 36 missiles with an equal number of warheads - a significant increase from the 12 SLBMs that the sole Xia-class submarine carried.

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The Pentagon asserts that the Jin/JL-2 weapon system “will give the PLA Navy its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent” (Defense Department, 2013: 6). While that may be true in theory, a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine fleet faces several doctrinal, technical, and operational constraints in practice. Under current doctrine, China’s Central Military Commission does not allow the military services to have warheads deployed on missiles under normal circumstances. Handing over custody of nuclear warheads to deployed submarines in peacetime would constitute a significant change of Chinese doctrine.

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Moreover, no Chinese ballistic missile submarine has ever sailed on a deterrent patrol, so China’s navy and the Central Military Commission have essentially no experience in operating a submarine force during realistic military operations. Developing this capability will require development of new command-and control technologies and procedures.

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But even if China deployed warheads on submarines and sent them to sea in a crisis, where would they sail? For a JL-2 to reach the continental United States, a Jin-class submarine would have to sail through the East China Sea and well into the Pacific Ocean, through dangerous choke points where it would be vulnerable to hostile antisubmarine warfare. [Endnote 6: Chinese nuclear submarines are apparently very noisy (Kristensen, 2009b).]

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China’s main concern is the survivability of its minimum nuclear deterrent, and it spends considerable resources on dispersing and hiding its land-based missiles. This makes its submarine program puzzling, for it is much riskier to deploy nuclear weapons at sea, where submarines can be sunk by unfriendly forces, than to deploy them on land.”

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DF-21D Anti-ship (and anti-submarine?) Missile

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Pete’s Comment - Chinese area or sea denial MRBMs missiles perform some of the anti-surface ship and ASW functions usually performed by submarines.

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[p. 81] “China’s primary regional nuclear missile is the two-stage, solid-fuel, road-mobile DF-21 (CSS-5) medium range ballistic missile (MRBM). The DF-21 exists in two nuclear versions: the DF-21 (CSS-5 Mod 1) and the newer DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod2)… the new version probably has a longer range of about 2,150 km.

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China has also started deploying conventionally armed versions of the DF-21 (the DF-21C, and the DF-21D which is an anti-ship missile), a potentially dangerous mix of nuclear and conventional missiles that creates risks of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and mistaken nuclear escalation in a crisis. [Endnote 4: The Second Artillery's organization of DF-21s is unclear, but it is thought that nuclear and conventional units are kept separate. For insightful studies of China's missile force, see Stokes (2010) and Stokes (2012).]”

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Pete’s Comment

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The existence of the DF-21D MRBM may reduce the need for rapid development of China’s conventional and nuclear submarine forces (forces that are believed to be evolving slowly). The disparity of estimates of the DF-21D's range - from 1,450 km to 3,000 km may reflect Chinese political objectives or may be physical facts. 1,450 km may be the range with a heavy warhead (typically 1,500 kg) or for a "bus" of 3 MIRVed warheads. 3,000 km may the range for a light (typically 500 kg) warhead.  

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Pete

Volgograd bombings and Sochi Olympic security

The location of the first bombing (December 29, 2013) at Volgograd's main train station. Volgograd was known as Stalingrad in World War Two. The sculpture in front is a representation of the Barmaley Fountain - the most iconic symbol of the Battle of Stalingrad.  

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Below is an article I wrote - published on Australia's On Line Opinion http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=15876

Volgograd bombings and Sochi Olympic security

The terrorist bombings in Volgograd over the last two days are a tragedy for those killed and a threat to President Putin’s Sochi Winter Olympic preparations. On December 29, 2013 seventeen people were killed in Volgograd’s main railway station and on December 30, 2013 fifteen people were killed by a bomb on a trolleybus in that city. The blasts are believed to have been suicide bombings by Islamic separatists from Russia’s region of the North Caucasus.

SBS reported on December 30, 2013 that Ian Chesterman, the head of Australia's Winter Olympics team for the Sochi Olympics was confident about the safety arrangements for the team. Mr Chesterman indicated "We've been given assurances from the highest levels of the Russian government that the security will be very tight in Russia and Sochi.”

Volgograd (called Stalingrad during the Stalin era) is a major industrial city in Southern Russia around 900 km north of the Caucasus. Significantly Volgograd is a railway hub easily accessed from the Caucasus. Russia’s North Caucasus lies between the Black and Caspian Seas just north of Georgia.

The North Caucasus’ terrorist threat is clearly an international problem - particularly during the Sochi Olympics which run from February 6 to February 23, 2014. This is in terms of the threat to athletes competing at the Olympics and tourists visiting Russia. The Boston Marathon bombings in April 2013 were also inspired by North Circassian separatism. Events in Boston provide a grim reminder that threats also exist to cities and transport outside of Russia during the Olympics.

The conflict in the North Caucasus is highly complex and includes an insurgency and broader terrorism. The conflict is mainly between the politically and militarily dominant (generally Christian) ethnic Russians and the Muslim Circassian majority that they dominate. The Internal Crisis Group is reported as indicating that the North Caucasus insurgency and terrorism is driven by Islamic radicalisation, separatist aspirations, as well as:

Unresolved disputes over territory, administrative boundaries, land and resources…along with ethnic and religious tensions, the state's incapacity to ensure fair political representation, rule of law, governance and economic growth…The region's internal fragmentation and insufficient integration with the rest of the Russian Federation contribute to the political and social alienation of its residents.

The problem with Sochi is that many in the relatively poor North Caucasus see it as a symbol of ethnic Russian domination. Sochi lies in an ethnic Russian enclave on the east coast of the Black Sea and on western the edge of the North Caucasus. Sochi is a relatively wealthy beach resort in summer and alpine resort in winter.

President Putin has staked Russia’s and his personal reputation on an untroubled and safe Sochi Olympics. As with all Olympics these days counter-terrorist security preparations are huge. Russia has deployed around 50,000 police, troops and other security officials in and around Sochi. Other Russian cities including Volgograd also have heightened security.

Putin has banned gatherings, demonstrations and marches that have not been approved by security officials in "controlled" and "forbidden" zones in and around Sochi. This would include “gay propaganda” demonstrations. These restrictions are in force from January 7 to March 21, 2014.

One Russian counter-terrorist measure during the Sochi Olympics is communications surveillance. Something not revealed by Edward Snowden is that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) may have placed Russia under more intensive domestic communications surveillance than any security service in a Western country. Agentura.ru reports that Russia’s main system for intercepting communications, known as SORM has been extensively upgraded in Sochi. SORM enables the FSB to place all communications in Sochi under surveillance including telephone and mobile phone conversations and emails. Logically this would include surveillance of communications of athletes, tourists and Olympic officials during the Sochi Olympics. In that regard Agentura.au reports “On November 8th, 2013 Russia's Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev signed the decree which expressly authorizes the [Russian] government to collect data on telephone calls and Internet contacts made by the Olympic Games' organizers, athletes and foreign journalists.”

The Russian military is also deploying surveillance drones, anti-aircraft tanks, jetfighters and even anti-submarine defences - as Sochi is a Black Sea coastal city.

Given the terrorist threat to the Sochi Olympics that has revealed itself over the last 48 hours all these security preparations may be necessary. As a Russian and former KGB and FSB operative Putin would be torn between his natural urge to put strict counter-terrorism measures in place and his wish that Russia appear relaxed and democratic. In order to appear efficient and in control Putin is likely to launch a “successful operation” against the terrorists within the next few days to weeks – arrests at least."

Pete

Christmas in Australia



Christmas in Australia is at the height of the Southern Hemisphere Summer - so its HOT!  Under such conditions Christmas is often spent at the beach.

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Gloucester Cathedral Choir - In the Bleak Midwinter - not "bleak" at all but a warm song.

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 After friends and family my favourite thing about Christmas is the Carols, particularly from cold, snowy, slushy, places, like Britain.

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 Celtic Woman, Silent Night. Sung in Irish-Gaelic then in English.

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 Celtic Woman - Jesu Joy of Man's Desiring, composed by Johann Sebastian Bach between 1716 and 1723. It is often performed at Christmas.

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Australia's Liberal-National Party Coalition Government have sent me this Christmas Card personally. Aren't they lovely? All creatures great and small :)

Merry Christmas and Happy New Year

Pete

China selling two Type 035 Ming-class submarines to Bangladesh

Chinese Type 035 Ming-class submarines. Two Mings are being sold to Bangladesh for delivery 2019.

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Zachary Keck of The Diplomat, December 22, 2013, writes that China is selling Bangladesh two obsolescent Type 035G Ming-class submarines for $203.3 million for delivery by 2019. See The Diplomat article http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/china-to-sell-bangladesh-2-submarines/ based on a Bangladeshi New Age article http://newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2013-12-20&nid=77363#.Urjor2fxvX5

The Ming-class submarines (Type 035) are medium sized diesel-electric submarines. In the 1960s China reverse engineered the Russian Romeo Class into the Chinese Romeo-class Type 033. The Ming-class Type 035 were developed in the 1970s from the Romeo Type 033. China built more than 20 Mings from the 1980s to 2000s in part as a hedge against more risky, higher tech conventional sub projects being delayed particularly the Song-class, Type 039 submarine

Globalsecurity reports that compared to the Romeos the Ming features more powerful diesel-electric propulsion, higher battery capacity, improved propeller and maneuverability, improved seakeeping and underwater endurance and is quieter. 

Chinese Defence Today reports that the Ming has a improved, more streamlined hull design than the Romeos, new engine gearing, all resulting in increased submerged speed. transferring mechanism were used to achieve a higher underwater speed. The Ming also has an improved combat system.

On February 28, 2014 Ahmed Sharif provided some valuable clarifying comments:

"Bangladesh's submarine program is at least 10 years old. In March 2004, a govt. minister told the Parliament about buying 4 subs by 2012. But due to political turmoil, the program got delayed, until late 2008, when a naval confrontation with Myanmar accelerated everything. The program got more acceleration after reports of Myanmar Navy's plans to acquire subs. Over the years, at least 100 sailors received submarine training both in Turkey and in China. There's no reason to believe that the subs would be operated by 17 sailors. Of course initial operation may require Chinese help, but Bangladesh Navy sets a high standard in training and operations, which indicates that even if there is Chinese assistance, it would be for a very short period of time. And these subs are arriving in 2015, not in 2019. This was recently confirmed by a high-placed govt. official to the media. And on another note, the 2 subs are likely to be first batch of a bigger submarine arm. Things are likely to be determined by the economic growth of the country."

SPECIFICATIONS  for China's Type 035 Ming-class submarinefrom in Chinese Defence Today dated May 10, 2006, include: 

TORPEDOES

Eight 533mm torpedo tubes (6 bow, 2 stern), carrying a total of 18 torpedoes in tubes and storage racks. Alternatively the submarine can carry 32 mines in its tubes.

The Yu-4 (SAET-60) is a passive homing torpedo designed to attack surface targets up to 15km at a speed of 40 knots. The high-explosive warhead weights 400kg.

The Yu-1 is reverse engineered from the Russian Type 53-51, which was designed to attack surface targets with a maximum range of 9.2km at a speed of 39 knots, or 3.7km at 51 knots. The high-explosive warhead weights 400kg.

SENSORS

Fitted with a Pike Jaw hull-mounted, medium-frequency for active and passive search and attack. Later Mings are also equipped with a Sintra DUUX 5 low-frequency passive ranging and interception. The Ming has an I-band surface search radar (NATO code-name: Snoop Tray).

Countermeasures include electronic support measures (ESM), radar warning receiver and direction-finder.

PROPULSION

Diesel-electric arrangement, consisting of 2 Shaanxi 6E 390 ZC1 diesel rated at 5,200hp (3.82MW), with 2 Xiangtan alternators and 2 shafts.

Displacement (Surface): 1,584 tons

Displacement (Submerged): 2,113 tons
Length: 76m
Beam: 7.6m
Draft: 5.1m
Speed: (Surfaced) 15 knots, (Dived) 18 knots, (Snorting) 10 knots 

Diviing Depth: N/A
Endurance: 8000 miles at 8 knots snorting, 330 at 4 knots dived.
Crew: 57 (10 officers)

PETE's COMMENT

It must be remembered that the Ming is a improvement on basic 1950s Russian submarines. Its (pre-teardrop) design and electronics may make the current Ming equivalent to a British Oberon Class submarine of the early 1970s. That said the Ming is inexpensive so Bangladesh can probably afford two.

Bangladesh's two Mings, when handed over by 2019 are probably strongest in brown and green water defensive warfare in the northern Bay of Bengal around Chittagong.
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Pete