No French SSNs for Australia Possible: Part One.

Even if France wanted to part or completely build Suffren SSNs for Australia nuclear labour shortages in France would prevent this. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suffren-class_submarine. In any case France opposes supplying SSNs to Australia - the subject of Part Two. 

The same type of labour shortage problem impacting the US nuclear submarine  industry is effecting France's nuclear submarine industry. 

France is suffering a national shortage of skilled workers in its heavy industries. Within this the nuclear submarine sector is experiencing a shortage of skilled workers and probably designers.

The skilled labour shortage contributed to a 5 year delay in the Suffren-class SSN program. Suffren’s (laid down 2007) twice delayed entry into service slipped from late 2017 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suffren-class_submarine#Development to 2022 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suffren-class_submarine#Boats. This is worse than the UK Astute's record (laid down 2001, commissioned 2010 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astute-class_submarine#Boats_in_the_class ). 

Naval Group (NG), Frances only nuclear submarine builder, has only one nuclear submarine assembly line. This is at Cherbourg. This assembly line is fully booked with remaining Suffrens and new SSBN orders, out to 2050. 

So NG's limited nuclear sub construction force needs to complete 3 more Suffrens out to 2029/30 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suffren-class_submarine#Boats. 

The labour shortage will cause delays in France’s future new SSBN program which will make construction of subsequent Suffren SSNs, after 2030, impossible.

France's only submarine builder, NG winning the Netherland’s Walrus replacement project in March 2024 is also significant. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orka-class_submarine#Winning_bid This is for four newly designed diesel-electric submarines. This new project is putting added pressure on the limited NG designer and skilled sub-building  workforce. https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2024/03/orka-class-specifications-table-dutch.html

The first of France’s four new (ie. 3rd generation) SSBNs (known as SNLE 3G) is expected to join the fleet from 2035. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SNLE_3G. Work began on the first SNLE 3G (no boat name yet) on March 20. 2024 https://www.meretmarine.com/fr/defense/cherbourg-naval-group-decoupe-la-premiere-tole-du-prochain-snle-francais

The final three SNLE 3Gs will be completed at five year intervals in 2040, 2045 and 2050. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SNLE_3G#Design_and_operation

NG may then be able to concentrate on new SSN production, from 2050, which is likely to be much later than the UK commissioning the first SSN-AUKUS.

A SIGNIFICANT ARTICLE

See “Europe's Nuclear Revival Lacks a Key Ingredient: Skilled Workers” of July 3, 2024, at https://www.energyconnects.com/news/renewables/2024/july/europe-s-nuclear-revival-lacks-a-key-ingredient-skilled-workers/ :

“…Atomic power producers in France, the UK and Sweden are having trouble finding the hundreds of thousands of welders, engineers and planners needed for reactors they’re building now and ones they’re eyeing for mid-century…

[There is] a labor shortage so dire some French companies hire back retirees…

France finds itself lacking talent after [reactor builder Électricité de France] EDF ended a decades-long building spree in the early 2000s, turning the industry into a dead-end career path. The workforce of about 220,000 is now aging out while potential replacements look elsewhere…

That’s a recipe for lengthy construction delays and massive cost overruns — failings the industry already is notorious for…

In the port of Cherbourg, where French nuclear submarines are built, [large French engineering firm] Probent frequently offers retired welders and metal workers jobs in the shipyard…”

Netherlands Orka Program. TKMS Sad, Naval Group Joy

On July 24, 2024 TKMS' legal objections to the Netherland's Ministry of Defense's March 2024 selection of Naval Group to build the Orka-class replacements of the Walrus-class submarines were dismissed by the District Court of the Hague.

A final blow to German hopes occurred on September 10, 2024 when Naval Group and Dirk Beljaarts, Minister of Economic Affairs of The Netherlands, signed an industrial cooperation agreement related to the contract for the Orka Program. Orka is more formally known as the Replacement Netherlands Submarine Capability (RNSC) program.

Orka-class Specifications Table: Dutch: Naval Group

After internet searching no current, precise, detailed, list of Naval Group (NG) specifications (specs) for the Orkas have been located. Instead I've drawn together (and sometimes inferred) specs from a variety of internet sources (see some links in the Table below). 

NG has limited the publication of the Orkas' projected specs as keeping the specs secret for as long as politically possible is standard in the submarine industry for National Security and Commercial-in-Confidence reasons. Detailed specs would reflect some of the Netherlands’s more secret needs. NG and the Netherlands will gradually release more spec details.

Now NG has won the Walrus replacement competition on the basis of the March 15, 2024 decision of the Dutch Council of Ministers. But the lower House of the Dutch Parliament, from debate beginning March 18, 2024, still needs to approve this decision. Best description of political situation is from the Netherland's Jaime Karremann the founder of Marineschips.nl.

Specs for preceding Walrus-class and Barracuda-class variants help. Also see Wikipedia's Orka website.

ORKA SPECIFICATIONS TABLE

Figures as at March 19, 2024
Class overview
Name:	Naval Group Orka-class for the Netherlands. "Variant chain" is Barracuda to Shortfin to Blacksword to Orka-class.
Operator:	Envisaged only for the Royal Netherlands Navy so far.
4 planned	Netherlands requires 2 commissioned (Orka and Zvaardvis) by 2034–2035. Then the 2 others (Barracuda and Tijgerhaai) before 2040. To be built at NG's Cherbourg shipyard in France?
Preceded by:	Walrus class .
Pressure hull steel	Likely to be 100 HLES high-yield pressure hull steel, see US HY-100 and HY-130 . Also  see Submarine Matters article Table that uses a Japanese document.
Officers and Crew	Between 35 and 43 standard + 16 extra bunks for divers/special forces or intelligence intercept/linguist officers (depending on mission)
Speed/range and Endurance	14 knots (surfaced), 22 knots (submerged). 15,000 nm. All improvements over Walrus specs.  Endurance est 70 days depending on fuel, food & crew exhaustion. Typical mission profiles may be: Transit + Ops Netherlands to Dutch Caribbean and return. Transit + Ops Netherlands to Arabian Sea and return. North Sea and Arctic Ocean against Russia.
Displacement:	3,300 tonnes (surfaced) so 3,700 tonnes (submerged) is estimated
Length	82 m  See Artwork with Specs below.
Diameter (Beam)	8.2 m  Artwork with Specs below.
Height	? meters (hull + fin/sail)
Pumpjet, Propeller	Pumpjet unlikely no pumpjet on NG artwork. Likely skewback propeller
Acoustic stealth	Rubber/elastic mountings for moving and reverberating parts inside. Noise cancelers.
Capable of projecting	Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) Underwater decoys (against torpedoes and mobile mines)
On hull behind fin/sail.	Dry dock shelter for divers, diver delivery vehicles and large displacement UUVs (XLUUVs)
Weapons	6 × 533 mm (21.0 in) torpedo tubes. 30 heavyweight (HW) weapons. Maybe Walrus weapons will be transferred ie Mk 48 HWTs, Harpoon SSMs, even Tomahawk land attack SLCMs and Stonefish mines. Or maybe French weapons. This is a big area of uncertain debate?
Sensors	Mainly French NG-Thales UMS-3000 ?
Combat System	A mixed US and French Combat System likely. Using a TTCWS interface. US Lockheed Martin and mainly French NG-Thales likely main intergrators. Combat system being the network of sensors, databases, consoles, optronic masts and weapons costing about one third of the upfront price of a submarine.
Max Depth	300+ meters
Exterior stealth	Anechoic tiles/coating
Propulsion:	4 x MTU 16V 396 SE or 4 x MTU 12V 4000 diesels. Likely no AIP. Jeumont Electric Motors (Jeumont now subsidiary of NG-Framatome). with 4.5 to 5MW of power.  Saft Lithium-ion batteries also see on the LIBs.

---

Artwork with Specs courtesy Naval Group (March 16, 2024) via (Mr) Jaime Karremann's website https://marineschepen.nl/nieuws/Wat-we-nu-weten-over-de-nieuwe-Nederlandse-onderzeeboten-160324.html

Final Dutch Decision Awaits Lower House 18/3 Onwards

The final Dutch decision stage on the Walrus Replacement apparently will not be the Dutch Council of Ministers meeting on Friday March 15, 2024 (Dutch time). 

Instead the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament must debate the Decision on, or from, Monday, March 18 (Dutch time). 

Sources

1.  https://www.dutchnews.nl/2024/03/netherlands-to-order-four-new-submarines-from-french-shipbuilder/ 

"The order is politically sensitive because Saab, one of the losing bidders, has a partnership with Dutch shipyard Damen. Parliament is due to debate the [Walrus Replacement] deal next Monday, once the council of ministers has signed it off on Friday." 

and 

2.  https://nltimes.nl/2024/03/12/dutch-government-ordered-four-submarines-french-state-company-naval-eu6-bil-deal 

"The formal decision will be made at the weekly Cabinet [more correctly Council of Ministers] meeting on Friday, the sources said. After that, the Tweede Kamer, the lower house of the Dutch parliament, must assess and approve the purchase."

Pete Comment

I am unaware whether this subsequent lower house approval is a mere technicality or whether it is a major hurdle that might overturn the Council of Ministers' decision.

Also, might lower house approval potentially take hours, days or weeks?

Further Reports France Won Walrus Replacement

On Wednesday 13, 2024 Anonymous commented: 

“It looks increasingly likely that Naval has indeed won this contract. Multiple Dutch news services announced it overnight Australian time.

https://www.dutchnews.nl/2024/03/netherlands-to-order-four-new-submarines-from-french-shipbuilder/

The official announcement is stated to occur this Friday [March 15, which will be Saturday, March 16 in Australia, but evidently losing tenderers are informally notified in advance.”

ARTICLE

That excellent Dutch News article of March 12, 2024 reports: lhttps://www.dutchnews.nl/2024/03/netherlands-to-order-four-new-submarines-from-french-shipbuilder/

“Netherlands to order four new submarines from French shipbuilder”

The Dutch government is expected to announce an order this week for four submarines from French shipbuilder Naval Group, sources have told RTL News. 

[Naval Group] The Paris-based company, which is 62.5% owned by the French state, saw off competition from Swedish firm Saab and Germany’s TKMS to build the vessels at a total cost of around €4 billion.

They will replace the Walrus-class submarines which have been in service since 1990. As much as 40% of the work will be carried out in the Netherlands, RTL reported. 

The order is politically sensitive because Saab, one of the losing bidders, has a partnership with Dutch shipyard Damen. Parliament is due to debate the deal next Monday, once the council of ministers has signed it off on Friday.

Two weeks ago the cabinet ordered four new frigates from Damen under a contract worth at least €2.5 billion. Arming the vessels will cost another €2.5 billion, making it the biggest maritime order ever placed with a Dutch manufacturer.

PETE COMMENT

Anonymous on March 11, 2024 provided estimated specs of the possible winning French submarine: “…it was mentioned that the French submarine for The Netherlands submarine replacement will have a displacement of 3,000 tonnes [surfaced?], a length of 80 meters and a smaller diameter (8 meters?)...”

Naval Group (NG) not having sea proven AIP (since MESMA days) might not be  disadvantaged compared to AIP specialists Saab and TKMS. This is because the Walrus and Replacements have very long range mission profiles (all the way to the Dutch Caribbean and return). For such long missions carrying AIP (especially the super-cooled liquid oxygen LOX) is a heavy, space-taking, burden, of marginal utility, rather than an asset.

In any case NG's Walrus Replacement may well have longer full submergence Lithium-ion Batteries, probably from French company Saft.

If Naval Group won, this is bad news for Saab, long expected to be the winner. Saab has desperately needed foreign orders since Saab lost Singapore’s Invincible-class tender to TKMS in 2013.

Walrus Replacement Decision March 15? Naval Group?

Regarding the Walrus Replacement competition.

Jaime Karremann, at Dutch website Marine Schepen (Naval Ships) on March 7, 2024, at https://marineschepen.nl/nieuws/9-vragen-over-finale-nieuwe-onderzeeboten-070324.html commented:

“Despite unconfirmed reports that French shipyard Naval Group will emerge victorious, no formal decision has yet been announced. This [announcement] is expected to happen on Friday, March 15,” [2024] 

[In Australia this would be on Saturday, March 16]

Pete Comment

French Naval Group is offering the diesel-electric Shortfin Barracuda design. It is also possible that one of the 3 competitors (Saab, TKMS or Naval Group) will be eliminated – making it a 2 horse race until a further elimination – eventually leaving the winner in a year or 2.

This competition has been covered heavily https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/search?q=walrus by Submarine Matters over the last decade all the way back to Kevin in 2015. 

Dutch SSK Selection Benefits Australia: Homage to US

From 10 comments of August 29, 30 and 31, 2023 below my article "4 New SSKs Better Than 5 Collins LOTEs: No Virginias?" I assume:

1.  Germany is not winning the Walrus Replacement selection and hasn't even decided whether it is offering a Type 212CD E (as "its low magnetic steel hull can only be welded in Germany") or an enlarged Type 214 offered as a Type 216? (which could be assembled hence welded in the Netherlands).

2.  Swedish Saab's offer of an Expeditionary Submarine C718 has probably been selected - to enter service from 2034.

3.  France has been largely quiet on the Walrus Replacement. But I assume Saab's C718 design will use many French components including large Jeumont PM motors and E drives, Sonar suites from Thales, optronic masts from Safran, Navigation systems from ECA and probably Lithium-ion LFP batteries from Saft/Total..to name a few.

The winning C718 may provide a design and pricing benchmark for Australia from the late 2020s to locally build 4 to 6 C718s. This benchmark would serve to minimise Australia's customary shipbuilding inefficiency dividend. Inefficiency that underwrites Australia's "20,000 well paid union jobs", poor work practices and rich sinecures for retired Labor and Liberal politicians, admirals and other officials. 

Homage?

This may follow a Trump 2.0 (or geriatric Biden 2.0) Administration's 2026 decision to cancel the Virginia offer. Meanwhile the US will retain Albanese's extraordinary "coals to Newcastle" $3 Billion feudal payment of homage to Biden and the already highly profitable American arms industry.

4 New SSKs Better Than 5 Collins LOTEs: No Virginias?

In response to TDUA's well argued comments of August 29, 2023.

I agree. Given the work practices of Osborne Shipyard the Life Of Type Extension (LOTE) with expensive upgrades, may cost more than A$2 Billion and 3 years for each of 5 Collins. HMAS Collins herself may be cannibalised for spare parts as many parts have been out of production for more than 15 years. 

The A$10 Billion (or more) LOTE submarine budget will also be occurring over the period of A$150 to 200 Billion being spent on the Virginia purchase, infrastructure upgrades (eg. an East Coast Base) and training of 1,000s of nuclear technicians/scientists/submariners/shipbuilders/officials in the late 2020s and 2030s. This is for up to 3 Virginias in the 2030s and maybe 2 in the 2040s. The LOTE + Virginias will form a huge distortion of Australia's defence budget, with likely reductions in non-submarine weapon systems across the Australian Defence Force. 

Also, I see the hull life (immersed contraction and expansion cycles) of each Collins as a finite limitation that might only give each Collins 8-9 years of life after their LOTEs.

Instead 4 new SSKs would be a hedge against any understandable US decision not to deliver any Virginias. This decision will likely be USN and Congress driven over concerns about improved and more numerous Chinese SSNs and SSBNs threatening the American homeland.

The efficient Netherlands has similar long range, large SSK, submarine requirements as Australia.

Better for Australia (than the LOTE) would be leveraging information (including pricing) from the Netherlands thorough Walrus Submarine Replacement Program to select 4 TKMS, Naval Group or Saab designed SSKs. This Dutch selection program that began in 2014 would makeup 10 years of lost time in Australia. Australia could demand the same pricing for 4 Osborne built SSKs as Dutch built Walrus replacements. This would work as a ceiling on excessive pricing by foreign contractors, shipbuilding unions and Australia wide suppliers generally, that gouged the Collins build and the terminated Attack-class build.

Even if those 4 SSKs (each good for 33 years) were built at Osborne this would be a better solution than 5 LOTED Collins (only good for 9 extra years). 

Australia has always had very few available Commanders and crew to man our subs. This scarcity is unlikely to change. Hence the diminished number of 4 SSKs (each with 52 crew) makes more sense than an unviable 12 SSKs (envisaged for the Attack class) or 3 to 5 Virginias (each with 135 crew).  

In any sub-choice scenario 10 Anduril GHOST SHARK XLUUVs could also complement an Australian submarine force for the ongoing intelligence gathering tasking and even, in a run-up to war, smart-mine laying.

So, while so many in the ALP leadership and RAN are true AUKUS believers, they need to hedge in favour of new SSKs against the substantial chance the US won't deliver the vaunted Virginias. 

Smorgasbord of Submarine Subjects

The Submarine Matters article France's Innovative Submarine Industry eg. Scorpenes of August 11, 2023, prompted an avalanche of comments from August 11 to 15, 2023. I won't attempt to address all issues raised, but some of them.

French Naval Group's (NG) Scorpene SSKs (17 sold to 4 customers) are more equivalent to German TKMS' non-AIP Type 209s (90 sold to 15 countries). The Scorpenes and 209s are capable and less expensive than Type 214s (whose relatively expensive AIP tends to be for specialised uses like missions in the Yellow, Black, East China and Mediterranean seas). 

Whether the NG conventional Barracuda (see this Youtube with cc subtitles on and NG website), TKMS (website link Type 212CD E) or Saab (with its website link C718) are likely to win the Netherland's Walrus Replacement Competition, perhaps announced in 2027, is anybody's guess. Much depends on the Netherland's Navy and broader Dutch government's requirements, which are complex, confidential and perhaps even changeable as differing technologies mature. 

Countries with long submarine building histories and whose submarine forces are all  conventional (particularly Sweden and Germany) have some advantages in submarine and AIP design and industrial focus. This is compared to countries attempting to build conventional and nuclear subs (like India and Russia, both with no AIP) or France with an all nuclear sub navy while only building conventional subs for export. 

China is an exception building nuclear subs (own navy) and conventional subs (for own navy and export) and China has developed second generation AIP and is exporting AIP conventional subs. 

Medium sized concept submarines without a fin/sail haven't sold well in the last hundred years for reasons of sea-keeping, safety, command, navigation and security - all especially in the surfaced approaches to and from port and in emergency ascents. 

The issue of submarine customers choosing Lithium-ion or Lead-acid Batteries and AIP is very complex. The distances and mix of missions a customer expects are relevant. Also is the customer country building its own, exporting or importing subs? Economies of scale, money available and whether the customer is also developing nuclear subs all come into it.

Canadian Submarine Replacement: A Long Term Project

There has been considerable discussion by submarine commentators (here and here) over the very long term Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP). The Canadian competition is to replace Canada’s Victoria-class with new subs commissioned in 15 to 25 years time. Canada needs a large submarine design to meet its under ice and oceanic long range, long endurance needs. Twelve conventional subs are envisaged, valued at around US$62 Billion (presumably including subs, training, spares and many other add-ons).

There has just been an announcement that two South Korean (SK) shipbuilding companies, Hanwha Ocean (was DSME) and HD HHI, are competing for the future Canadian order.  Apparently both SK companies signed a technical cooperation agreement with British defence firm Babcock on June 7, 2023 to strengthen their future bids. 

Mention of SK companies boosts expectations that KSS-3s might become contenders. KSS-3 Batch 2s offer AIP and LIBs for longer deep submergence. Important for Canada they should also offer longer and safer under ice performance. Japan’s two Soryu Mark 2s (see Oryu and Toryu at Table here) with AIP and LIBs also might be a future contender type. Japan's Taigei-class  with its higher tonnage of LIBs also might be a contender. Long snorting range of these large SK and Japanese subs also might be important for Canada’s three ocean needs.

Canada might take 5 to 10 years to select a winning design, so it is early days yet. If Canada joins AUKUS even (US permitting) the UK SSN-AUKUS design might be a contender for Canada in about 10 years time.

In part anticipating a multi-year gap between the withdrawal of the Victoria-class and introduction of a new class Canada is also developing an XLUUV undersea drone capability.

Canada might also be interested in the (likely 3,000+ tonne) winner of the Netherlands’ Walrus replacement competition. For that competition Germany is building large Type 212CDs, France is offering a conventional Barracuda “Shortfin”  design and Sweden is offering a large “Oceanic Extended Range” A26 design . These large Euro-sub contenders are waiting for a Dutch decision in the mid-late 2020s.

However SK and Japan still have the advantage of operating at sea AIP and LIBs in large submarines. Italy’s AIP and LIBs Type 212NFS suffers from its small size and might need TKMS approval for any export to a third country.

Canada’s future submarine competition is yet another long term project that SubMatts periodically will return to. 

Walrus Replacement Process: Excellent Description

Giving great insights into Dutch politics “Locum” made very interesting comments on the Walrus Replacement Process, on December 5, 2022 at 8:12 AM and 8:13 AM, as follows.

"Das Boot, Which Boat?

[Which submarine type may replace the Netherland’s 4 Walrus-class submarines?]

The 73 meter long TKMS Type 212CD submerged tonnage is 3,200 (metric) tonnes. While the 80+ meter long Type 212CD E’s submerged displacement is 3,500 tonnes.

The prototype and launching customer for the Type 212CD E is the [Israeli] 'Dolphin 3' / Dakar-class. 

The English Wikipedia page of the Dutch Walrus class states incorrectly that TKMS is offering the future "Type 212CD". In fact TKMS is offering the larger Type 212CD E derivative that has 80 - 90 % commonality with the Type 212CD. (For comparison: the French Tigre helicopter and Aussie Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) have a commonality of 80 %). The 212CD E [offered to] the Netherlands comes without the VLS. And the standard DM2A4 Sea Hake torpedo's will be swapped for the Mk 48.

Long range cruise missiles in the eventually Dutch 212CD E's will be launched via the torpedo tubes.

The Dutch navy originally specified the Thales 2076 sonar. This is because since WW2 the Dutch navy have been cooperating with the UK Royal Navy's submarine service. However, the sensor equipment has a significant impact on the overall submarine design. Therefore the integration of the Thales 2076 into, for example the Type 212CD E or the Shortfin Barracuda, would be [excessively expensive]. So the Dutch navy dropped the Thales 2076 requirement for the Walrus replacement.

Politics & Industrial Participation

The Walrus wiki page is correct about 2 conflicting groups. One group, the Dutch navy and Netherlands industry, want a Walrus 2.0 [as large and capable as the existing Walrus subs]. So the Dutch navy has the most freedom to fulfil their requirements and the Dutch industrial participation will be maximal.

The other group wants to import a submarine, at the lowest possible costs and risks [this would be a smaller typical Eurosub, perhaps only 2,200 tonnes submerged].

Wiki is incorrect, in stating that the Walrus replacement process started in “November 2014”. The then Dutch Secretary of Defense Ms Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert had already signed in the first half of 2013 a Memoranda of Understanding with Norway and Germany regarding close submarine development (then called Type 212 NG [Next Generation]). The planned in-service date for the first Walrus replacement was, at that stage, envisaged to be 2025.

January 2015. Damen Schelde and Saab-Kockums signed a deal to design a Walrus replacement together. (Saab-Kockums offered the Type 712 or C71 a purely Swedish design [based on the future A26].) The reason for this is that the Netherlands had already lost the [indigenous capability to design and build submarines in 1994]. In 1994, the Dutch government decided not to replace the 2 Zwaardvis (Swordfish) class boats. Therefore the Dutch submarine service was cut form 6 to just 4 boats. The Dutch submarine manufacturer RDM (Rotterdam Droogdok Maatschappij, which translates as Rotterdam Drydock Society) managed to survive until 2004. After that, the Dutch lost at least 20% of their submarine building knowledge.

The then SecDef Jeanine Hennis was certainly not pleased with this Damen-Saab  cooperation. Because it made her choice for the winning shipyard more difficult. However, this Damen-Saab cooperation was backed by the Dutch navy and Dutch industry.

Consensus & Compromise

The Dutch Low Lands are mostly flat and have often a low sky of clouds. If you are sticking out your head with a great idea or achievement, it will be 'chopped off'.

And ten Dutchmen have 10 often conflicting opinions.

So in the Netherlands decisions are always taken when there is a consensus by compromise between these often conflicting groups / parties.

With no consensus in 2013 - 2015, first the decision for a new boat was delayed 2 years. Not only the Department of Defense, but also the Department of Finance, the Dept. of Foreign Affairs, Dept. of Trade (Economic Affairs) and the Dept. of General Affairs (the Prime Minister) became involved. Five departments with often conflicting political agendas.

So a 'sounding board' (klankbord) [committee] for the Walrus replacement was set up. This small group, included a former Air Force general and a former Shell Oil CEO, but had no (former) Dutch navy official. Their conclusion: was an options list for the Walrus-replacement:

1. [large] expeditionary subs,
2. [smaller] homeland defense (coastal) boats,
3. unmanned / autonomous boats, and
4: no replacement at all.

Next step was an approx 1 year research period to set up a "future vision" for the Dutch submarine service. [But] the Dutch navy had already, in 2012-2013, expressed their general requirements for an expeditionary Walrus-replacement, in a crystal clear and public way.

2017. The SecDef, 'just to make this process easier' [not], added Navantia and DCNS (now Naval Group) to the shortlist.

2018 - 2019. The Walrus-replacement process was delayed again by approx 1 year. Because politicians wanted to secure the Dutch industrial participation in the Walrus-replacement process.

The resulting Defense Industry Strategy (DIS), was in fact '20 year old wine in new bags'.

December 2019, Navantia was chucked out, the afterwards given reason was that the S-80 Plus-class boat did not offer enough functionality. The Acquisition phase was started with the dialogue sub-phase by submitting the third (!) Request For Information to Saab-Kockums, TKMS and the Naval Group.

In the spring of 2020, the Walrus-replacement process was delayed again, because the Dutch General Accountability Office (Algemene Rekenkamer) wanted an audit.

In this audit , the same questions were asked again, questions same as those asked by the "sounding board (klankbord)" of 2015 / 2016.

December 2021. The current 'purple' (joint DoD wide) Dutch Defense Materiel Organisation (DMO) is smaller than the former 'blue only' Directorate Materiel Royal Dutch Navy. This DMO lacks the capacity and capability to do this dialogue with 3-4 shipyards at the same time. Because the Dutch have still made no choice for a shipyard. Their Request for Proposals had to be vague, in order not to give away classified specifications to third parties. And the shipyards 'kept their cards close to their chests' too.

This made the dialogue phase ineffective and it was stopped at the end of 2021.

The process was made faster and simpler, by setting up a Request For Quotations, which were sent at November 16, 2022. 

The 3 shipyards need approx 6 - 9 months to set up their quotations. The Dutch DoD expects that the winner will be announced at the end of 2023. The Dutch DoD demands that the time from building to commissioning takes a maximum of 10 years.

The current plan is that the first 2 Walrus-replacement boats enter service between 2034 - 2037.

Locum"

Future Dutch Submarine RFQ: "3,200 tonnes"

Submarine Matters has been monitoring the Netherlands' Future Dutch Submarines (aka Walrus-class submarine replacement) process since 2015.

All credit to a (likely) Dutchman (codename “Kevin”) and more recently non-Dutch /Kjell for describing the Netherlands submarine needs and the replacement process. See this overview of the process.

On November 16, 2022 Netherlands Ministry of Defense Press Release (reproduced by Naval News) indicated:

Today, as previously discussed with the House, the Ministry of Defense has [issued a Request for Quotations (RFQ)] for 4 new submarines from 3 candidate shipyards. The candidate yards are Naval Group , Saab Kockums and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. They are expected to submit their bids around the [northern summer - June to August] 2023.

Defense then needs a number of months to analyse the detailed bids. Based on predetermined requirements and award criteria, the Ministry of Defense decides which yard is allowed to build the boats. One of the award criteria is the participation of Dutch companies in the development, construction and maintenance of important systems of the boat. Defense also wants as much Dutch involvement as possible to strengthen the technological and industrial base. The winning yard must sign an agreement for this with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy.”

++++++++++++

On November 27, 2022 /Kjell identified the Naval News Youtubes, with the intrepid Xavier Vavasseur, interviewing the 3 bidders and Dutch DMO to the extent possible, including:

Naval Group - Around Nov 24, 2022 “Naval Group's Conventional Barracuda” 1:25 maybe pumpjet, benefitting from France’s Barracuda SSN [and maybe Attack-class  SSK] programs. Mediterranean, Caribbean seas, Atlantic, Indian oceans, seabed capable. All quieting technologies included https://youtu.be/B3Agdn7_CJA

SAAB Damen - Around Nov 24, 2022 “Saab C71 Submarine (based on A26)” Offering Multi-mission Portal, UK Sonars offered. Can have modular extensions, Dutch technical/maintenance autonomy important. https://youtu.be/oaRwYfxRpJA

TKMS - Youtube around Nov 25, 2022 “Type 212CD E” ie. the 212 Common Design, Extended Range sufficient to transit Netherlands to Dutch Caribbean several weeks on station, then transit back. Maybe 3,200 tonnes submerged. At 1:40 what look like 10 vertical launch doors are apparent https://youtu.be/91OaZFdprTY

Dutch DMO Requirements - Youtube around Nov 23, 2022 “Dutch Naval Programs at NEDS 2022: Submarines” Dutch Admiral (Director Defense Materiel Organisation (DMO)) saying new subs will need to have all capabilities of the Walrus class [implicitly range, so same/more diesel fuel, so higher displacement likely] https://youtu.be/vj_oFLqsfww . Portion on subs is at 1:40 to 7:10.

++++++++++++

The Nov 16, 2022 Press Release was foreshadowed in an earlier, September 30, 2022 Netherlands Ministry of Defense Press Release https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2022/09/30/belangrijke-mijlpaal-vervanging-onderzeeboten-offerteaanvraag-gereed indicating ability to carry “long range missiles” is a requirement.

+++++++++++++

Pete Comment

It is unknown whether the Dutch Navy requires Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) and/or AIP for the future subs. Some past commenters have considered Naval Group and TKMS less likely winners because the Dutch don’t like being dominated by these large neighbours. Then again, having lost the Australian order Naval Group’s SSK Division might be very hungry – thus maybe offering the lowest price. But who knows?!