Even the US may have been unable to build a submarine reactor without the political connections, budgeting and engineering brilliance of Admiral Rickover. This Wikipedia entry has seemingly intentionally deleted almost all of Rickover's huge contribution to nuclear power - giving "Mamie Eisenhower" equal opportunity billing. Rickover successfully project micro-managed construction, land and at-sea testing of submarine and surface ship reactors and dictated the regulatory environments for them. He did the same for the land based civilian reactor sector and most things radioactive safety.
Britain totally relied on the US for submarine reactor development from 1959. Britain then refused to admit it benefitted from continuing US assistance and inspiration for PWR1. British nationalistic pride, Rolls Royce commercial objectives and US military industrial reluctance may have amounted to insufficient US assistance for PWR2. This partly explains PWR2's technical shortcomings. I admit I talk too often about PWR2 - yet it has largely incapacitated the 10s of $Billions UK Astute class, while also limiting the UK Vanguard class. Whether the UK can garner sufficient US assistance for PWR3 and PWR3+/4 remains an Anglophone anxiety.
Russia had/has a large enough industrial base, inventive talent, Admiral Gorshkov, set of national priorities (eg. nuclear weapon strategy) and skilled espionage to largely parallel develop submarine reactors.
China, France and India benefitted from similar strengths as Russia.
Arpit is right in questioning whether middle power, South Korea, can develop submarine reactors like the great-sometimes super powers above. China, a superior innovator and manufacturer to SK, has taken decades longer than China hoped to develop quiet, efficient, submarine reactors.
Also SK suffers from poor geography. However good the nuclear submarines SK builds they are hemmed in by the Japanese island chain and close proximity to NK and more especially to Chinese and Russian fixed undersea sensors, SSNs, SSKs and other nearby ASW platforms.
SK and China may be strongly opposed to Japanese naval/military resurgence in the shape of Japanese developed nuclear submarines.
It is only the US that has the benign vast ocean space geography to fully benefit from the speed and other characteristics of nuclear submarines. The US advantage includes "owning" the Western Hemisphere for thousands kms until it gets to adversaries - Bering Strait excepted.
There is much more in the late July 2026 comment string that I'll respond to in future weeks.
11 comments:
A bit of Google research comparing SK, UK and France:
Population
SK 51.6 million
UK 69.9 million
France 69.1 million
GDP
SK USD $ 1.93 trillion
UK USD $ 4.6 trillion
France USD$ 3.6 trillion
Commercial reactors
SK 26 + 2 building
France 51
UK 8 + 2 building
South Korea lags in all these key features so I agree that it would be a stretch for them to develop an independent nuclear submarine program. On the other hand they have a robust domestic nuclear power industry so I do not see why they could not license build Frenck K15 submarine reactors.
(I choose the K15 for my example as it uses LEU, reducing nuclear weapons proliferation concerns, and is suitable for a submarine closer in size to the current KSS-III.)
I also agree that Australia does not have the money to pursue every nuclear submarine option but AUKUS is expensive and deliveries look to be slipping more and more.
Even if AUKUS submarines never materialize not all the AUKUS money is necessarily a waste. Facilities to service nuclear submarines in Perth should work for South Korean subs as well as UK or US subs. UK and US would still benefit from this even if Australia went with SK subs, as it provides forward repair facilities that could prove useful.
Let's see what Australia would bring to a partnership with SK:
Population 28 million
GDP 2 trillion
Reactors: none, but large uranium reserves and native enrichment technology
I think it is useful for Australia to consider talking to South Korea about a nuclear submarine partnership, if for no other reason than to have a Plan B if AUKUS goes bellyup. It might also convince the US to not take Australia for granted.
Reply to Shawn C from previous post: The marine reactor South Korea is trying is an MSR (Molten Salt Reactor). I don't know what their goals are or what they are trying to achieve, but not a single land-based commercial reactor based on an MSR exists; they are all test reactors. And the Koreans want this for marine ships and submarines? This is nothing but hubris.
This was the same thing tried by India in the 1980s. In 1980, DRDO proposed a PHWR reactor for submarines, which Naval Headquarters refused to sanction, and rightly so, it was madness.
Regarding the requirement for infrastructure, here is a little excerpt from the blog of the late Prasun K. Sengupta.
"Past experience indicates that the most high-risk work is in refuelling the PWR, for the following reasons: The work is done by many different people with varying levels of qualification for the work at hand; and approximately 50 different technical operations are carried out during the process, 25% of which may potentially expose the operators to radiation. The most dangerous situations during the removal of spent nuclear fuel include: Disassembly and mounting of mechanisms for control and safety systems; disassembly and mounting of the reactor lid; removal and replacement of fuel assemblies; refilling of primary circuits in the thermal system and testing of hydraulics; connecting, adjusting and checking of safety devices; manual checking for movement of the compensation register; PWR start-up, measurement of neutrons and thermal measurements and checking. It is for this reason that the NAOB will host hull refit and PWR refuelling facilities located within a dry-dock. Typically, a SSBN or SSN will be brought into a flooded dry-dock, a caisson will next positioned to seal the dock’s entrance, and the dock will be dewatered, lowering the submarine on to supports on the dock floor. Following docking, electrical and cooling water services will be connected to support the on-board electrical systems and the PWR, then the refit activities will commence. Before any refuelling operations take place, the primary circuit will have to be chemically decontaminated to reduce the background radiation in the reactor environment. During refuelling, access holes will have to be cut in the submarine’s hull and a reactor access house (RAH) will be installed over the submarine. The top of the PWR will be removed and a shielded water tank will be installed. Reactor components and single fuel elements will then taken out of the PWR through the water tank into shielded containers. Used fuel will be transferred from the dry-dock to a nearby underground on-site interim storage facility. When all the fuel has been removed, the reactor components will be inspected and serviced, and single new fuel elements will then be installed in the reverse sequence."
Hi Bill at 7/31/2026 12:52 PM
France being politically ready and willing to share its K15 technology is a crucial preliminary. I think France assisting Israel and probably South Africa to develop nuclear weapons hurt France's image with all existing great power members of the nuclear club - especially with Soviet/Russia the US and UK. Now China (a major French trade partner) would also be mighty displeased if France helped SK with submarine reactors.
If France had actually offered Australia a K15 powered Barracuda in 2016 we and France would most probably be building it. There is a myth that France did offer in 2016 but a couple of soundbites from DCNS/Naval Group execs a nuclear reactor deal didn't make.
There are many countries that mine Uranium - so I don't think Australia possessing Uranium is a big political or economic nuclear deal factor. Australia is still legally/US blocked from enriching U (within Australia) even though we invented SILEX and are helping the US enrich Uranium Tailings.
If Australia had/has secret enrichment designs then all the better.
All that being said I agree with your other statements:
"Even if AUKUS submarines never materialize not all the AUKUS money is necessarily a waste. Facilities to service nuclear submarines in Perth [and Adelaide] should work for South Korean subs as well as UK or US subs. UK and US would still benefit from this even if Australia went with SK subs, as it provides forward repair facilities that could prove useful.
Let's see what Australia would bring to a partnership with SK:
Population 28 million
GDP 2 trillion
Reactors: none, but large uranium reserves and native enrichment technology
I think it is useful for Australia to consider talking to South Korea about a nuclear submarine partnership, if for no other reason than to have a Plan B if AUKUS goes bellyup. It might also convince the US to not take Australia for granted."
[Pete comment - I think Australia is probably talking to SK (and maybe Japan) in secret backchannels on possible future SSN cooperation. Because, I think, long dead US and UK Governmental (Biden's-Boris Johnson's) promises to deliver SSNs according to the 2021 AUKUS timetable have fallen apart. ].
Pete
South Korea has experience refueling their domestic designed and built commercial PWR. Refueling a submarine PWR is more complicated than refueling a PWR at a power plant, but South Korea has some relevant experience.
Thanks Arpit at 7/31/2026 6:41 PM
A very interesting comment. It'll take me some time to digest it.
Cheers Pete
French Ano
As a pièce of info the change of the fuel,the steam generator above exchange,the internal inspection of the empty reactor (key safetyrequirements ) is done in a few weeks in militaries harbour(Toulon or Île Longue close to Brest) using robots as in civilian PWR.Not in a Navy yard as there are dedicated hatches for that on the sub Hull
As in civilian PWR the spent fuel is stored in a water pond before post processing /Pu extraction in LaHague
For info re Bill Seney comments from Fr Ano
Civilian PWR are refueled every 18 months (by robots) .Steam generators are exchanged every 10 years for compliance with safety regulations (critical barrier between hot and normal parts)
The reactor tube is also inspected (US and visual) by a robot
In a country with a few dozen PWR for tens of years…it is quite a routine
N sub are an élément of a much larger and expensive system
LEU approach (also in China,we believe) is aimed at « piggy back « on civilian systems for huge cost difference
Pete, retired Admiral Peter Briggs has published a detailed six part series on the construction and maintenance realities of AUKUS at John Menadue’s Pearls and Irritations website. The sections on land and infrastructure bottlenecks, dry dock and workforce constraints are very good IMO. Briggs casts serious doubts on AUKUS timelines, even if nothing goes wrong at BAE’s end. https://pearlsandirritations.com/post/2026/07/aukus-infrastructure-technical-and-maintenance/
Pete in terms of what “bargaining chip” Australia might offer in return for French nuclear sub reactor technology, I suggest there are several. First would be a site for safe nuclear waste disposal. The SA Royal Commission into nuclear waste disposal confirmed there are multiple suitable safe sites in SA. South Korea might also be interested in that.
Second would be other Australian defence technology like autonomous vehicles- Ghostshark and Ghostbat, which Australia has the IP for. France might want to build these for its own needs.
After that there is the Jorn OTHR. France and Europe might value that highly as USA effectively departs NATO.
Hi Bill Seney at 7/31/2026 8:27 PM
Yes I agree with all of your:
"South Korea has experience refueling their domestic designed and built commercial PWR. Refueling a submarine PWR is more complicated than refueling a PWR at a power plant"
What "relevant experience" may SK have refueling a submarine PWR.
I know SK gov and companies have developed very small reactors - but not "ruggedised" for submarine use.
SK also had long term planes to build nuclear powered surface ships but I don't know how mature SK plans were/are?
Cheers Pete
Hi Anonymous at 8/03/2026 11:46 AM
I've been looking at Admiral Peter Briggs essays for some years.
I might not agree France offers practical or US-UK politically permissible solutions for Australia. France hasn't been really offering SSNs to Australia - or anyone else. But I very much agree with Peter's criticisms of AUKUS including US, UK SSNs delivery (timings and prices) problems for Australia.
Probably goes down to processing the many issues thrown up by SubMatts commenters so I can introduce the excellent material Peter is generating.
Cheers Pete
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