Please read several past Submarine Matters articles on Chinese spy ship activities by clicking on:
April 18, 2025
China’s Latest Spy Ship Liaowang-1: Tracks Recon Satellites & Missiles from the Ocean
Please read several past Submarine Matters articles on Chinese spy ship activities by clicking on:
April 11, 2025
Russian spy sensors on UK SSBNs: Nord Stream Explosive "Sanctions"
Four days ago, while leafing through Aussie and, of course, Bulgarian newspaper clippings, I came upon the BULGARIANMILITARY(DOT)COM article below, which is based on a UK Sunday Times article.
"Russian spy sensors threaten UK nuclear subs in British waters
By Boyko Nikolov dated Apr 7, 2025 [at https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2025/04/07/russian-spy-sensors-threaten-uk-nuclear-subs-in-british-waters/ ]
Russian spy sensors had been found lurking in British waters, positioned dangerously close to the Royal Navy’s nuclear-armed Vanguard-class submarines. As reported by The Sunday Times, these devices were uncovered by naval forces, some washing ashore and others detected by specialized minehunter ships.
A UK Vanguard-class SSBN, with 2 armed escort boats, near (or in) HM Naval Base Clyde at Faslane, Scotland (Photo courtesy Tam McDonald via Wikimedia Commons)
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The find has sparked alarm across NATO, raising urgent questions about national security, the vulnerability of critical underwater infrastructure, and Russia’s shadowy tactics in an escalating era of hybrid warfare.
British officials suspect these sensors were deployed to track the movements of the Vanguard fleet, which forms the backbone of the UK’s nuclear deterrent, while intelligence points to an even more audacious possibility: Kremlin-linked superyachts may have played a role in planting them.
The implications are profound. The Vanguard submarines, four in total, are the UK’s ultimate strategic asset, each capable of carrying up to 16 Trident II D5 ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads. Stationed primarily out of HM Naval Base Clyde in Scotland, at least one is always at sea, maintaining what the Ministry of Defence calls a “continuous at-sea deterrent” that has operated undetected for over 56 years.
The discovery of these sensors suggests Russia may be attempting to pierce that veil of secrecy, a move that could shift the balance of power in a potential conflict. Beyond the submarines, the Royal Navy also identified unmanned underwater vehicles near vital communication cables, hinting at a broader campaign targeting the underwater arteries of Western connectivity.
What exactly are these sensors? While the Ministry of Defence has not released detailed specifications - much of the information remains classified - experts speculate they could be a mix of acoustic and magnetic detection devices. Acoustic sensors, for instance, pick up sound waves generated by submarine propellers or hulls cutting through water, a technology refined since the Cold War.
Magnetic sensors, on the other hand, detect the subtle distortions in Earth’s magnetic field caused by a submarine’s steel hull. Together, they could form a sophisticated net, capable of pinpointing even the stealthiest vessels. Some analysts suggest these devices might transmit data in real-time via satellite uplinks, though others propose they could be passive recorders, designed to be retrieved later by Russian operatives.
The technology echoes historical precedents, like the U.S. Operation Ivy's Balls in the 1970s, where American forces tapped Soviet underwater cables in the Sea of Okhotsk - a clandestine mission only revealed years later.
The Vanguard-class submarines themselves are engineering marvels, built to evade such detection. Commissioned between 1993 and 1999, each measures 491 feet long and displaces 15,900 tons when submerged. Powered by a Rolls-Royce PWR2 nuclear reactor, they can remain underwater for months, limited only by food supplies for their 135 crew members.
Their stealth relies on anechoic tiles that absorb sonar waves and a pump-jet propulsor that minimizes noise, making them among the quietest submarines in the world. Compared to Russia’s own Borei-class submarines, which carry Bulava missiles, the Vanguards are older but still formidable, with a missile range exceeding 7,000 miles.
Yet, if these sensors can track them, that stealth advantage could be compromised, a scenario that has British military officials scrambling for answers.
Adding a twist to this underwater intrigue is the suspected involvement of superyachts owned by Russian oligarchs. According to The Sunday Times, credible intelligence suggests these luxury vessels—some equipped with hidden compartments known as “moon pools”—may have been repurposed for espionage.
One yacht often cited in speculation is Eclipse, owned by Roman Abramovich until sanctions forced its immobilization in 2022. Stretching [162.5m], Eclipse [another website] boasts two helicopter pads, a submarine bay, and a rumored anti-missile defense system. While no concrete evidence ties Eclipse directly to this operation, its capabilities illustrate how such vessels could deploy sensors or drones discreetly.
Analysts note that these yachts, often registered under obscure flags, can traverse international waters without raising the same suspicions as military ships, blending civilian luxury with covert military objectives.
The logistics of using superyachts are as fascinating as they are troubling. Modifying a yacht for underwater missions requires advanced engineering—think reinforced hulls to house submersibles or high-bandwidth communication systems to relay data.
The challenge lies in maintaining secrecy: a vessel loitering near a naval base risks detection by patrol craft or satellites. Yet, their civilian status offers plausible deniability, a hallmark of Russia’s “grey zone” strategy—actions that fall just short of open conflict.
This isn’t a new tactic. During the Cold War, Soviet fishing trawlers often doubled as surveillance platforms, shadowing NATO fleets. Today’s superyachts, with their global reach and opulent cover, represent a modern evolution of that playbook.
The discovery shines a harsh light on the West’s vulnerabilities beneath the waves. For decades, underwater infrastructure—submarines, cables, pipelines—has been a silent backbone of global security and commerce.
The UK alone relies on over 60 undersea cables to handle 95% of its internet traffic, according to the Ministry of Defence. Yet, protecting this domain has lagged behind threats. The Royal Navy’s response includes the RFA Proteus, a multi-role ocean surveillance ship launched in 2023.
At [200 meters] and powered by diesel-electric engines, Proteus can deploy submersibles and drones to inspect underwater assets. Its capabilities are impressive, but critics argue it’s a lone sentinel in a vast sea. Norway, by contrast, operates a more robust network of seabed sensors and patrol vessels in the North Sea, a model the UK might envy as it grapples with this breach.
Why were these sensors only found now? Experts point to gaps in underwater surveillance. The ocean is vast and opaque, with sound and currents masking intrusions. Traditional sonar struggles against small, stationary objects like sensors, and satellites can’t peer beneath the surface.
The UK has leaned on NATO allies for support, but coordination has been uneven. A senior British military figure told The Sunday Times, “There should be no doubt, there is a war raging in the Atlantic. This is a game of cat and mouse that has continued since the ending of the Cold War, and is now heating up again.” The sentiment reflects a broader anxiety: Russia’s underwater prowess, honed by decades of investment, may have outpaced Western defenses.
The Baltic Sea amplifies this tension. Over the past 15 months, 11 deep-sea communication cables have been damaged there, some by ships dragging anchors - an act Finnish authorities linked to the Russian tanker Eagle S in December 2024.
Seized by Finland, the vessel was found brimming with spy gear, per The War Zone. These incidents, alongside the UK findings, paint a picture of a region under siege. The Baltic, bordered by NATO members like Estonia and Sweden, is a choke point for data and energy flows.
Russia’s military exercises there, often involve its Kilo-class submarines—diesel-electric boats renowned for stealth—signal intent. Meanwhile, China’s growing Arctic presence adds another layer, with its icebreakers and research ships eyeing undersea routes. Together, they challenge the West’s dominance in a domain once taken for granted.
Historically, underwater espionage has shaped superpower rivalries. During the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet Union raced to master seabed warfare. The [US] deployed [USS] Parche, a modified Sturgeon-class submarine, to tap cables off Siberia, while Russia countered with its own deep-diving craft.
Today, Russia’s Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research [GUGI] oversees this legacy, operating vessels like the Yantar. Dubbed a “spy ship” by UK Defense Secretary John Healey in January 2025, Yantar is a [108 meter] research vessel with submersibles capable of reaching 20,000 feet. Spotted near UK waters repeatedly - most recently shadowed by HMS Somerset and HMS Tyne - it embodies Russia’s modern underwater reach, blending science with subterfuge.
The Nord Stream Bombings Can Be Seen As "Explosive Sanctions" Against Russia - on Biden's Watch See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nord_Stream_1 and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nord_Stream_pipelines_sabotage#United_States
The stakes in 2025 are higher than ever. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, now in its third year, has fueled a hybrid war that spills into NATO’s backyard. The Nord Stream pipeline sabotage in 2022, widely attributed to Russian [no Russian motive for bombing joint Russian owned pipelines that are making money for Russia. But Ukrainian (see below) or even US involvement ["These Nord Stream projects have faced opposition from some Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the United States"] makes more sense.] operatives, set a precedent for targeting infrastructure. The UK’s response has been muscular but stretched.
[See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nord_Stream_pipelines_sabotage [In late 2022-early 2023] "Russia [in fact] asked for an international investigation [of the Nord Stream bombings] at the UN Security Council which was rejected with 3 votes in favor out of 15.[14] Denmark, Germany and Sweden each initiated separate investigations,[15] describing the explosions as sabotage.[4][5][6][7] The Swedish and Danish investigations were closed in February 2024 without identifying those responsible,[16][17] but the German investigation is still ongoing.[18] In August 2024 media reported that in June German authorities issued a European arrest warrant for a Ukrainian national suspected of having used the sailing yacht Andromeda together with two others to sabotage the Nord Stream pipeline.[19] As of June 2024 the suspect is still at large, having reportedly left the EU for Ukraine.[20]]
Operation Atlantic Bastion, a planned deployment of air, sea, and land assets, aims to bolster patrols, per The Standard. NATO’s Baltic Sentry mission, launched in January 2025, adds warships and drones to protect cables, as reported by BBC News. Yet, these measures feel reactive, not preventive, against a foe that thrives on ambiguity.
What’s next remains murky. The sensors’ discovery hints at a wider network - perhaps targeting offshore wind farms or NATO’s own underwater arrays. The Ministry of Defence insists its deterrent remains intact, with a spokesperson stating, “We are committed to enhancing the security of critical offshore infrastructure”.
But doubts linger. Can the West catch up in this silent war? The technological race recalls the space race, a contest of innovation and will. Russia’s edge lies in its willingness to push boundaries, from superyachts to drones, while NATO scrambles to adapt.
For American readers, this saga underscores a shared vulnerability. The U.S. Navy’s Ohio-class submarines, counterparts to the Vanguards, patrol similar waters, relying on stealth to deter Moscow. If Russia can track British subs, what stops it from targeting American ones?
The Atlantic, once a NATO lake, is now a contested frontier. As geopolitical tensions simmer - Ukraine unresolved, China rising - the underwater domain may dictate the next flashpoint. Are we witnessing the opening moves of a deeper conflict, or just another chapter in a long, quiet struggle? The answer lies beneath the waves, where secrets and sensors wait." ENDS.
April 8, 2025
8 RAN officers & 14 enlisted submariners on US Virginias
Photo By Cmdr. Rick Moore | 250403-N-NF311-1067 PACIFIC OCEAN (April 3, 2025) – Adm. Bill Houston, director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, right, discusses the capabilities of Virginia-class fast-attack submarine USS Montana (SSN 794) with Vice Adm. Mark Hammond, chief of the Royal Australian Navy, left, and Greg Wilcock, Australian Consul-General Honolulu, center, during an underway embark aboard Montana, April 3, 2025. The U.S. Pacific Fleet Submarine Force provides strategic deterrence, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, precision land strike, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and early warning, and special warfare capabilities around the globe. (U.S. Navy photo by Cmdr. Rick Moore at https://www.dvidshub.net/image/8954889/us-australian-naval-leaders-ride-submarine-strengthening-bilateral-ties ).
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
A
Is the US Navy article (below at B) a US naval and
diplomatic response to doubts raised by former Australian Prime Minister
Malcolm Turnbull (and others) at [1] and [2] concerning the
sanctity of the AUKUS US Virginia SSN offer? See "There are currently eight Royal Australian Navy officers and 14 enlisted submariners serving on U.S. Virginia-class submarines," in article B below.
[1] Podcast Episode 3: Do we need a Plan B to AUKUS? of
April 3 2025 at Episode 3: Do we need a Plan B to AUKUS? At https://podcasts.apple.com/au/podcast/episode-3-do-we-need-a-plan-b-to-aukus/id1674095396?i=1000701970666
Recorded at Malcolm Turnbull’s Sovereignty and Security forum held in Canberra.
This panel discusses the viability of AUKUS in its current form, and what needs
to change to deliver sovereign undersea warfare capabilities that Australia can
afford to own and man." Beware the 2016-21 Attack-class program is defended stoutly!
[2] Former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull addresses the
National Press Club on the topic "Sovereignty and Security - Australia and
the new world disorder". Of April 1, 2025 at https://iview.abc.net.au/video/NC2512C003S00
available until 1:30pm on 1 May 2025.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
B
[I (Pete) have redded/bolded information probably not released by the Australian Government. Given new info in document B (below) the ASA or RAN will soon release the personnel numbers in that document.]
US, Australian Naval Leaders Ride Submarine, Strengthening Bilateral Ties
JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM, HAWAII, UNITED STATES
From Naval Reactors Public Affairs
JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM, Hawaii (Apr. 3, 2025) – Director of the U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program Adm. Bill Houston, who completed his Submarine Command Course training on Collins-class submarine HMAS Rankin in 2007, and Chief of the Royal Australian Navy Vice Adm. Mark Hammond, a 2003 graduate of the U.S. Navy Submarine Command Course, embarked USS Montana (SSN 794) for a combined operational familiarization opportunity at sea, April 3, 2025.
The underway on a Virginia-class fast attack submarine reinforced the strong bilateral ties between the two navies and underscored their commitment to maintain warfighting readiness and lethality to uphold security, freedom and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.
“We have a clear mission: achieve peace through strength,” said Houston. “We are a maritime nation, and our nuclear-powered submarines provide an asymmetric advantage that is defending American and allied interests 24/7 – anywhere, anytime.”
During their visit, Houston and Hammond interacted with the crew, observed operations and toured the submarine’s propulsion plant.
Houston emphasized the significance of the partnership. "The United States and Australia share a deep and enduring commitment to freedom and security," said Houston. "Our navies continue to train together, exercise together, and deploy together, ensuring that we are always ready to defend our shared interests and strengthen peace, stability and deterrence across the Indo-Pacific region.”
Hammond highlighted the importance of the partnership. “The Royal Australian Navy has operated alongside the U.S. Navy for more than 100 years, upholding international rules, norms and standards to ensure all nation states have fair and open access to the sea.” He continued, “Enhancing our operational interchangeability at sea through exchange programs and capability partnerships greatly enhances our collective security and our ability to support a stable, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific.”
Houston and Hammond were joined on the underway by Greg Wilcock, Australian Consul-General Honolulu and Capt. Aaron Peterson, commodore, Submarine Squadron 1.
Training the Next Generation of Submariners
Last month, USS Minnesota (SSN 783) conducted at-sea operations as part of an iteration of the Submarine Command Course out of HMAS Stirling, in Western Australia, allowing naval officers to prepare to take command of a submarine with their Australian counterparts, gaining valuable experience in submarine operations to include weapons handling, at sea tactics, and technology.
“America must be able to project power if we're going to defend our interests and our allies,” said Houston. “As one of our nation’s most formidable weapons, America’s nuclear-Navy does just that – sail the world’s oceans to defend our interests abroad.”
In August 2024, USS Hawaii (SSN 776) participated in a Submarine Tendered Maintenance Period at HMAS Stirling along with USS Emory S. Land (AS 39), demonstrating the U.S. Navy’s ability to sustain operational submarines overseas together with its allies.
"This partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom is a generational undertaking that will continue to shape the security landscape for decades to come,” said Houston. “We are sharing expertise and laying the groundwork for a future where our navies seamlessly operate the apex predators of the sea, together."
Under the Australia, United Kingdom, United States (AUKUS) Pillar I effort that supports Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered attack submarines, the U.S. Navy is training Australian submariners to operate fast-attack submarines and civilians from ASC Pty. Ltd. (formerly the Australia Submarine Corporation) to maintain them. There are currently eight Royal Australian Navy officers and 14 enlisted submariners serving on U.S. Virginia-class submarines, with dozens more undergoing training in the naval nuclear power pipeline and at the U.S. Navy’s Basic Enlisted Submarine School.
“Australia’s submariners are some of the most capable and talented in the world,” said Hammond. “They are expert stewards of diesel-electric powered submarines. The exceptionally rigorous training our submariners are receiving at the U.S. Navy’s Submarine School supercharges their skills and edges us even closer to operating our own nuclear-powered submarines from the early 2030s. Furthermore, the opportunity for our sailors and officers to gain hands-on experience working in U.S. Navy Nuclear submarines and learn from the extensive experience of their crews is invaluable to the achievement of our shared security objectives, and we are grateful to our U.S. partners for sharing their wisdom and experience operating these platforms.”
More than 150 Australian civilians are under instruction at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility to gain the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to maintain SSNs. Last month, four Australian civilian maintenance technicians graduated from the U.S. Navy’s Radiological Controls Technician Qualifying School (RCTQS), demonstrating significant progress in developing Australia's nuclear expertise and stewardship.
Sharing Success and a Common History
Both the U.S. and Australia share a strategic interest in maintaining stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region. Submarine cooperation is a key component of this shared strategic vision, and the combined submarine capabilities of the U.S. and Australia contribute to a powerful deterrent force.
Since WWII, the U.S. Navy and Royal Australian Navy have a shared experience operating in the vast Pacific against a common adversary, fostering a sense of camaraderie. Regular joint exercises and training opportunities have been a feature of the relationship for decades, including the participation by the Royal Australian Navy in the U.S. Navy’s Submarine Command Course since 1999, and the joint development of the MK 48 torpedo and AN/BYG-1 Submarine Combat System. The advent of the AUKUS Pillar I Nuclear Submarine cooperation program is a significant evolution of the long-standing relationship between Australia and the United States.
For over 75 years, the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program has maintained an outstanding record of more than 177 million miles safely steamed on nuclear power. The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program currently operates 99 reactors and has accumulated over 7,600 reactor-years of operations. Because of the program’s demonstrated safety record, U.S. nuclear-powered warships are welcomed in more than 150 ports of call in over 50 foreign countries and dependencies.
NEWS INFO
| Date Taken: | 04.07.2025 |
| Date Posted: | 04.07.2025 16:06 |
| Story ID: | 494780 |
| Location: | JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM, HAWAII, US |
| Web Views: | 256 |
| Downloads: | 0 |
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March 31, 2025
Chinese owned Port of Darwin hosts a US SSN & US Submarine Tender
Since the preceding article Guam based Virginia-class USS Minnesota (SSN-783) and US submarine tender USS Emory S. Land (AS 39) docked [1] in late March 2025 (or are still docking) at Kuru Wharf. Kuru Wharf (see a Canberra-class LHD docked at it below) is outside the breakwater within HMAS Coonawarra Naval Base at Port of Darwin, Northern Territory, Australia.
Inside the breakwater (above) of HMAS Coonawarra only patrol boats or other craft with a draught of 2m maximum (in any tide) can dock. [2]
The Port of Darwin is Chinese owned and run [3] [4].
Two days after my March 31, 2025 report of the presence of USS Minnesota and USS Emory S. Land within the Chinese owned and run Port of Darwin Australian Government owned ABC News reported, April 2, 2025 [5]:
“US nuclear submarine docks in Darwin Harbour despite
Chinese port concerns
Over recent days, increased security measures have
been put in place around Darwin Harbour for the arrival of a US nuclear
submarine which has docked near the [Chinese company] Landbridge-owned port.
On the weekend, Defence Minister Richard Marles toured the USS Minnesota while it was in the Northern Territory capital but declined to say if the Trump administration had expressed any concerns about the continuing Chinese lease."
Then on April 4 Australian Prime Minister Albanese for the first time revealed a new plan for the Port of Darwin. [6] This plan is for an Australian-owned company to take control of Port of Darwin away from China, or for the port to return to being an Australian government asset. All coincidence? You be the judge :)
[1] https://www.pacom.mil/Media/NEWS/News-Article-View/Article/4137812/emory-s-land-arrives-in-darwin/
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAS_Coonawarra#Facilities_and_operational_units
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_Darwin#Privatisation
[5] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-04-02/pm-more-to-say-about-china-darwin-port-lease/105129244
March 28, 2025
Australian Sub Depot Ship. Twofold Bay? French SSNs Australia?
Regarding matters raised by Bill Seney in his comments of 15 March 2025, I respond:
The Port of Darwin is a poor choice for even temporary porting (say one month) of a Collins submarine, let alone large SSNs. This is due to its tidal changes (very shallow water a couple of times a day) and consequent inability of a small Collins to leave port for part of the day and/or reliance on creeping through very narrow channels.So large US submarine tenders (like the 23,000 tonne Emory S. Land class) are not suited to Darwin's inner harbour. Rather the outer harbour is deep enough for such a tender and for SSNs.
Emory-class tenders are used at US Middle East naval bases (often merely called "wharfs"), the Diego Garcia base, occasionally at HMAS Stirling, but mostly at the US Apra-Guam naval base.
Things may be different for much smaller depot ships used by other countries, like the UK, which are scaled down for small-moderate defence budgets.
Twofold Bay?
If Australia had its own small depot ship an appropriate East Coast deepwater port it could use is underpopulated, uncrowded, Twofold Bay, just south of Eden, NSW. There is already a tiny RAN facility there, which Collins submarines and other RAN warships occasionally use.
Twofold Bay is midway between Melbourne and Sydney and doesn't suffer from the incumbent high shipping use or population overcrowding of the other three east coast sites considered for an east coast SSN base. There may be ample room to eventually build a 300,000 population city in that area, called the Far South Coast of NSW.
Australia's broader submarine tender/depot discussion frequently extends to depot ships in Australia's Christmas or Cocos Island territories. To that I say submarine depot ships and ported subs are valuable assets that must be defended by near co-located friendly warships and fighter aircraft mostly against Chinese attack.
French SSNs for Australia?
Re part building French SSNs in Adelaide - Australia would have much to do regaining French trust and offering big money to France. AUKUS Pillar One would need to be stone dead FIRST beforehand. US intelligence would know straightaway if we were chatting to the French.
Australia cannot really afford AUKUS let alone courting a simultaneous French SSN deal.
Also its bad timing. France has got its hands full being the alternate nuclear defender of NATO ever since US "diplomacy" became a Russian plaything.
It takes decades to develop an efficient, discrete submarine "reactor package". Even the UK didn't attempt it - instead buying a US S5W reactor for the UK's first nuclear sub and heavily relying on US reactor tech ever since.
100kt warheads for SLBMs are the world standard minimum. Perhaps that would also apply to future Australian submarine launched hypersonic missiles. So yes "boosted fission" or even better 2 stage thermonuclear is the go.
Buying from Israel might cut corners. But don't tell anyone I thought it up! H-Bomb negotiations are a tad sensitive...
March 25, 2025
Heightened US ITAR Regs Blocking AUKUS: Also SK, NK, Japan, Canadian & Singaporean nuclear issues
In response to Shawn C’s comment
of March 10, 2025, I (Pete) say:
Very true and disturbing about the possibility the US may retrospectively heighten ITAR regulations to block Australian access to US and US (via the UK) AUKUS technology. That may see the US reneging on
AUKUS Pillar One (Virginia SSNs) and even Pillar Two "AI, cybersecurity
and Quantum computing" including US Anduril and Australia DoD/RAN developed GHOST SHARK XLUUVs.
Also the US could force the UK to block Australian access to US content/inventions the US passed to the UK eg. in UK reactors for SSN-AUKUS submarines intended for Australian in the late 2030s to 2050s.
I've been looking at the possibility of South Korea (SK) developing a
nuclear powered submarine (variously called KSS-N, KSSN and KSSX-N) in several
articles since 2012. See https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/search?q=kss-n
which yields:
"South Korean...Nuclear KSSX-N Option"
of Feb 22, 2012 at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2009/09/south-korea-has-bought-six-more-u-214.html
and
"South Korean Submarines, 3,000+ ton KSS-III, Nuclear
Potential"
of 16 April 2015 at
https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2015/04/south-korean-submarines-3000-ton-kss.html
What I suspect is currently an NK “nuclear submarine” mock-up or
animation at http://www.hisutton.com/North-Korea-Nuclear-Submarine-OSINT.html
may partly be NK responding one better
to South Kora’s https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/korean-smr-powered-container-ship-design-revealed
The US has always actively prevented Canada from obtaining SSNs – see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada-class_submarine#American_opposition
. This is due to US-Canadian national competition regarding Arctic sea lanes
and resources and the US desire to retain its nuclear submarine ownership
monopoly in “America’s Western Hemisphere”. Warming of arctic waters, freeing up shipping and submarine access, will only
increase US determination to be the SSN monopolist of the Western Hemisphere.
Delays in SK being a potential SSN supplier to Australia includes the
20-40 years SK might take to produce a stealthy SSN design. It has taken the
super or great nuclear powers decades to develop quiet SSNs.
Also SK (if unprotected by the unreliable US) is extremely vulnerable to land
invasion or "nuking" by neighboring NK, China or Russia. Unlike
France, SK has no nuclear deterrent to defend its future SSN shipyard and no
current second generation Suffren class SSN already in the water.
Without the US protecting SK, SK's nuclear armed neighbours might take extreme
steps to stop SK developing nuclear weapons, SSBNs or SSNs. The same goes for
Japan. Japan modifying its 1970s-90s Mutsu nuclear ship reactor
into a submarine reactor https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/search?q=mutsu
might be violently stopped by Japan’s authoritarian neighbours.
Interesting about Singapore's SMR studies. https://www.newcivilengineer.com/latest/case-made-for-smrs-to-be-built-underground-to-protect-from-military-and-natural-threats-25-11-2024/
of Nov 12, 2024:
“Small modular reactors (SMRs) should be built underground, including in city centres, to protect them from military attacks, seismic activity and other natural hazards, according to a new academic study. The recommendations come from a paper written by Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) senior fellow Alvin Chew. Academy of Engineering Singapore fellow and International Society for Rock Mechanics and Engineering (ISRM) fellow Zhou Yingxin co-authored the paper.”
March 21, 2025
Rapid US-Russia Friendship Changing Nuke Sub World: France
Now that Russia is tending not to be seen as a threat by the US there may be fewer US SSNs in the Atlantic Ocean facing Russian SSNs and Russian SSBNs, in the medium-long term. The Atlantic US SSNs may be relocated, with the main US SSN effort being against China (in the Pacific and Indian oceans) and against North Korea.
Whether Russian Pacific Fleet SSBNs, SSGNs and SSNs work in alliance to the Chinese submarine fleet is another uncertainty.
But as US forces and reliability as an ally desert Europe, the Russian threat is rising against the UK, France and the rest of Non US (NUS) NATO.
The age old Russian Intelligence aim of splitting the Western, especially NATO, alliance is succeeding under Putin, a former KGB officer and FSB boss.
The splitting off of the US from NATO, might make accelerated production of SSNs and SSBNs for the French Navy and also UK Royal Navy a high priority.
Instead of the planned 6 x SSNs of the Suffren class for France and 7 Astutes for the UK Royal Navy 2 more might be built of each.
The main job of these SSNs are to protect their own navy's SSBNs (leaving and entering port and maybe on patrol). Whether the rolling average of 4 SSBNs in each of the French and UK navies increases is unknown. The 4 new ones planned are the 4 x SNLE-3Gs and 4 x Dreadnoughts.
The reason Britain owns its current Vanguard-class SSBNs are as nuclear weapon platforms. But troublingly the warheads rely on regular US Tritium injections and the warhead guidance systems come from the US. Meanwhile the "UKs" Trident missiles are rented/leased from the US and the Trident's regular maintenance only takes place at King's Bay in the US. So Britain really needs total Trident system autonomy to operate in Trump's Russian influenced brave new world.
At least France's SSBNs, M51 nuclear missiles and M51.1 TNO nuclear warheads are not reliant on a senior ally.
What all this means for Australia's possible basing of US SSNs in Australia (low likelihood of UK SSNs being based here) and Australian SSN acquisition from the US, the UK or France, is difficult to predict.
France's increasing need to strengthen its own SSN defences against Russia means French SSNs for any foreign customer is very unlikely. But this does not preclude France from renewing the conventional Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A (Attack-class) deal with Australia.
Russia, unopposed by the US, threatens Russia's European west and also Russia's Siberian east. The latter may present a higher threat to other countries (South Korea and Japan) that might conceivably supply conventional subs to Australia. This may now make South Korea and Japan hesitant to supply submarines (conventional or, in future, nuclear) to Australia.
Low morale in the Australia's Infant Nuclear Sub Sector
No wonder there is low morale in Australia's infant nuclear submarine sector https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/05/australian-submarine-agency-morale-crisis-asa-nuclear-submarines The pay is high though.
The newly minted UK trained RAN nuclear engineers might find themselves largely side-lined - waiting 20 years till UK built SSN-AUKUS are available. https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/aussie-submariners-qualify-as-royal-navy-nuclear-engineers/ There being no Aus Virginias likely.
With the America first policy US Virginias might not be based in Australia's Fleet Base West after all. Instead Guam, Hawaii and even Diego Garcia might remain more frequented bases.
There are too few Astutes even for Northern Hemisphere service in the Royal Navy with permanent Astute basing in Fleet Base West or even substantial rotations never a serious prospect.
Current RAN nuclear engineers might serve out their career on Royal Navy subs - less likely on US subs - if Australia is "fired" as a US ally.
March 16, 2025
Updated Japanese Submarine Table: 4th Taigei Commissioned
INTRODUCTION
Japan uses a continuous build (1 new submarine per year) system. New classes (the Taigeis are the latest) are created every 10 years or so. Production is shared between Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI). There are gradual improvements (often in diesel, snorkel and sensor systems) within classes and between classes.
Also see SubMatt's Updated History & Photos of Japanese Submarines After WWII of January 17, 2015 at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2015/01/history-of-japanese-submarine-after-wwii.html It contains a vast amount of Japanese originated information on Japanese submarines. From the end of WWII (September 2, 1945) to June 30, 1960 Japan had no operational submarines.
From December 1957 Japan restarted submarine production based on US experience (eg US Gato class) and based on long institutional experience building advanced submarines for the former WWII Imperial Japanese Navy.
The latest news, in the Table below, is the commissioning, on March 6, 2025, of the 4th Taigei-class submarine named Raigei "Thunder Whale" at KHI's shipyard. It may have between 640 and 960 "SLH" (a semi-secret designation) LIBs which are charged by 2 x 12V25/25SB diesels or variants (total 4,240kW of power)
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TABLE
This Table is unique to Submarine Matters mainly created by "S" Anonymous and Pete.
Japan's Diesel-Electric Classes of Submarine (SSKs)
The Second Oyashio class-Soryus-Taigeis as at March 8, 2025.
SS No. Diesel Type Motor | Build No Name | Pennant No. | Ministry of Finance (MoF) approved Ministry of Defense Budget in Billions of Yen (¥B) | LABs + AIP: or LIBs | Laid Down | Laun -ched | Comm ission ed | Built By |
8105 + 8106 Oya shio means currents | ¥52.2B FY1993 2 x 12V25/25S diesels for all Oyashio class (each diesel 2,000kW) | LABs only | 1994 & 1995 | 1996 & 1997 | Built at KHI | |||
7SS-15SS 8 active Oyashios 10 subs SMC-7? | 8107 -8115 various | SS-591-600 | ¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003 | LABs only | 15SS Feb 2004 | 15SS Nov 2006 | 15SS Mar 2008 | MHI & KHI |
16SS Dragon class Mk I | 8116 | SS-501 | ¥60B FY2004 Mk.1 LAB+AIP Soryus have 2 x Kawasaki + a SMC-8 motor | LABs + AIP | Mar 2005 | Dec 2007 | Mar 2009 | Built at MHI Home Port Kure |
17SS | 8117 Unryū | SS-502 | ¥58.7B FY2005 | LABs + AIP | Mar 2006 | Oct 2008 | Mar 2010 | KHI Kure |
18SS | 8118 Hakuryū | SS-503 | ¥56.2 FY2006 | LABs + AIP | Feb 2007 | Oct 2009 | Mar 2011 | MHI Kure |
19SS | 8119 Kenryū | SS-504 | ¥53B FY2007 | LABs + AIP | Mar 2008 | Nov 2010 | Mar 2012 | KHI Kure |
20SS | 8120 Zuiryū | SS-505 | ¥51B FY2008 | LABs + AIP | Mar 2009 | Oct 2011 | Mar 2013 | MHI Yokosuka |
21SS LIBs Concept Research Project | No 21SS built. It was an 8 year research project on LIBs. 1st LIBs sub launched was 27SS in 2018. | |||||||
22SS | 8121 Kokuryū | SS-506 | ¥52.8B FY2010 | LABs + AIP | Jan 2011 | Oct 2013 | Mar 2015 | KHI Yokosuka |
23SS | 8122 Jinryu | SS-507 | ¥54.6B FY2011 | LABs + AIP | Feb 2012 | Oct 2014 | 7 Mar 2016 | MHI Kure |
24SS | 8123 Sekiryū | SS-508 | ¥54.7B FY2012 | LABs + AIP | KHI Kure | |||
25SS | 8124 | SS-509 | ¥53.1B FY2013 | LABs + AIP | 22 Oct 2013 | 12 Oct 2016 | MHI Yokosuka | |
26SS | 8125 | SS-510 | LABs + AIP | 2014 | 6 Nov 2017 | KHI Kure | ||
27SS a Soryu "Mk II" as it has LIBs. 1st Soryu Mk II | 8126 | SS-511 | ¥64.4B FY2015 with 2 12V25/25SB diesels (totaling 4,240kW) agree it has 640 LIB/SLH modules], other improvements | LIBs only (SLH type) | Nov 2015 | 4 Oct 2018 | 2020 | MHI Kure |
28SS Soryu Mk II, final Soryu | 8127 | SS-512 | NCA? LIBs | Jan 2017 | KHI Yokosuka | |||
29SS 1st Taigei Class means Whale 3,000 tonne (surfaced) | 8128 Taigei "Big whale" Used as a test sub. Not opera- tional | SS-513 | ¥76B FY2017 (Heisei 29) Higher ¥76B budget may be due to 1st of class many changes. 2 x | SLH LIBs maybe 960 | 14 Oct 2020 | 9 Mar 2022 | MHI Home Port Yokosuka | |
30SS 2nd Taigei Class | 8129 Hakugei "White whale" First opera- tional Taigei | SS-514 | SLH LIBs | KHI Home Port Kure | ||||
01SS 3rd Taigei Class | 8130 Jingei "Swift whale" | SLH LIBs maybe 960+ | 8 Mar 2024 | MHI | ||||
02SS 4th Taigei Class | 8131 Raigei Thunder whale | SS-516 | Impro ved SLH LIBs | 26 Mar 2021 | Mar 6 2025 | KHI | ||
03SS 4th or 5th? Taigei Class | SS-517 | LIBs | 19 Apr 2022 | March 2026? | MHI | |||
04SS | SS-518 | LIBs | 2022? | KHI | ||||
05SS | 8134 | SS-519 | LIBs | 2023? | 2025? | 2027? | MHI | |
06SS | 8135 | SS-520 | effectively conduct info gathering warning & surveillance page 24 [1] | LIBs | 2024? | 2026? | 2028? | KHI |
07SS | 8136 | SS-521 | ¥B? FY2025 | LIBs | 2025? | 2027? | 2029? | MHI |
08SS | 8137 | SS-522 | ¥B? FY2026 | LIBs | 2026? | 2028? | 2030? | KHI |
Key to Table: Table information provided by S = Anonymous to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = Lithium-ion Batteries.
¥***B = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI = Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries.
¥***B = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI = Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries.
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[1] Japanese “Ministry of Defense Progress and Budget in Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities: Overview of the FY2024 Budget” page 23
at https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_budget/pdf/20240607a.pdf
at https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_budget/pdf/20240607a.pdf
From the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD): "Defense Budget" List going back to Financial Year FY2020 at https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_budget/index.html
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