Donors' Report March 2022 - All Electric Submarines vs UUVs

Hi Donors

I have just sent you "Donors' Report March 2022 - All Electric Submarines vs UUVs"

Here is one link from it http://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2015/10/south-korean-hhis-hds-400-small.html

Cheers Pete.

Is an All Electric Submarine Viable?

Here is a question for you, the reader.

A new class of manned submarine will be a future "SSE". That means it will be an all electrical battery operated submarine with no on-board charging. Instead charging may occur at a wharf or from some other vessel, maybe a conventional or nuclear mothersub. Or perhaps charging by a mothership or boat with a diesel engine.

Would an SSE be viable? 

For what kind of missions?

Regards Pete

Australia & India Boost Indian Ocean Surveillance Links

Australia's Asia-Pacifice Defence Reporter APDR, on April 14, 2022, reported an Indian
P-8I maritime patrol aircraft was deployed to Darwin to exercise with a RAAF P-8A aircraft. 

Earlier Gessler, in very interesting March 24, 2022 posts (with Pete's comments in [...] brackets) wrote: 

An article was published in the Australian Financial Review (AFR) by Andrew Tillett   following up on the recently-concluded Virtual Summit between the Prime Ministers Modi of India and Morrison of Australia (which was incidentally right after PM Modi's in-person summit with the Japanese PM Kishida).

Tillett talks about an impending 'deployment' of Indian spy planes (journalist-speak for
P-8I maritime patrol aircraft) to Australia. [Pete comment: More in the "spy" sense P-8s can also be fitted with Airborne Ground Surveillance (optical, infrared, radar and signals collection sensors)].

As the AFR articles are behind a paywall, I'm only going to reproduce bits & pieces, and often paraphrasing: 

"The types of exercises [Australia has] done with the Indians in the past have been pretty light on, but this would be a step-up in terms of complexity. This is where we were 15 years ago with Japan: fairly uncomplicated maritime surveillance, then it becomes co-ordinating ships and aircraft at sea. Exercises are ladder of complexity and this is the first step being climbed." - said Peter Jennings of ASPI. 

Two examples of the previous exercises Mr. Jennings is alluding to are: 

https://news.defence.gov.au/international/poseidon-power-major-exercise and

https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-anti-submarine-exercise-us-7710105/

The second AFR article, indicates: 

"After several years of Australia and India stepping up the tempo of joint military exercises, the leaders also announced an Indian maritime patrol aircraft would be deployed to Australia sometime soon as part of strengthening collaboration on maritime issues. 

It’s unclear where the aircraft will be based but it is expected that Australian aircraft will also pay a reciprocal visit to India, as the leaders spoke about the need to keep open critical regional maritime corridors..." 

The two articles draw a lot from the joint statements issued via official channels, though the joint statement did not actually mention any specifics of an aircraft deployment: 

https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/35008/JOINT+STATEMENT++INDIAAUSTRALIA+VIRTUAL+SUMMIT

The important part under the "Security and defence cooperation" section goes:

"[Leaders] welcomed enhanced maritime information sharing and maritime domain awareness...Leaders underscored the importance of reciprocal access arrangements in facilitating deeper operational defence cooperation and its contribution towards free and open critical regional maritime corridors."

I'm not entirely clear regarding the nature of the Indian P-8's visit. Though the line in the second article about it being 'based' as opposed to the reciprocal Australian aircraft's 'visit' is interesting, but I don't know if that is anything substantial to go on. But what I can tell you is that India has been wanting to operate aircraft out of Australia's Cocos (Keeling) Islands, [which sit in the Indian Ocean] for quite some time.

[Pete comment: Wikipedia states: 

"The 2016 Australian Defence White Paper stated that the airfield [on the Cocos Keeling's West Island] would be upgraded to support the RAAF's P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.^[53] "]

This interest is documented in publications as well...

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/islands-opportunity-where-india-and-australia-can-work-together

https://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/australias-strategic-imperatives-in-indo-pacific-rpsingh-230222

The 'reciprocal' part may come in with regard to Australia's access to operate from facilities on India's Andaman & Nicobar Islands. [Pete comment: The Islands' capital, Port Blair, hosts several bases including Indian Navy and Indian Air Force].

Or perhaps even the new [South China Sea like] Indian base being built on one of Mauritius' two Agalega islands in the Indian Ocean. [Mauritius is Indian military dominated. The Agalega island might be available for Australian use or at least visits].

See an investigative video on the base here and above. The Indian base on the Agalega islands seems tailored for operations of Indian P-8Is or other large aircraft.

I'd wait and see regarding what kind of 'deployment' AFR is talking about (because it could simply be another joint exercise). But as a closing note, I'd say that in addition to building Domain Awareness underwater (such as through 'Fish Hook' 

[older, deep oceanic term "SOSUS" and the modern, broader term US "IUSS" network. Also see SMI's references to IUSS] 

it is also important for QUAD nations to extend that cooperation into Surface, Air and Space domains. This is in order to build and maintain a full spectrum of surveillance and domain-awareness capabilities against PLAN activities in the Indo-Pacific, which would only be growing by leaps and bounds in the coming years and decades.

[Please link the above with Submarine Matters' September 11, 2018 article Japan-US-Indian IUSS cable link completed across Bay of Bengal ]

India Friendlier Than China to Russia

Danil Bochkov for The Diplomat has written an excellent article dated March 26, 2022. The Diplomat article is paywalled - so I'm only providing this fragment:

"...Chinese neutrality, however, should not be conflated with de facto support of Russia. Since the outbreak of the conflict over a month ago, Beijing has remained unwilling to either openly bail out Moscow or criticize it.

India, by contrast, has been even more energetic in reaching out to Russia by ramping up oil purchases and jumpstarting trade in national currencies. India has already gained an advantage from the ongoing confrontation between Russia and the West by almost quadrupling its daily purchases of Russian oil at much cheaper prices. Now New Delhi is going even further by approving a proposal raised earlier by Russian authorities to allow Russian investors to buy debt securities of Indian companies. In fact, doing so required India to ease control over the system of its external commercial borrowing, which speaks of New Delhi’s willingness to deepen financial cooperation with Russia. Now Russian organizations can invest in bonds of Indian companies and pay for it with rupees via its own account open in the Reserve Bank of India..."

"GUEST AUTHOR Danil Bochkov is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council. He earned his Master of Economics at MGIMO-University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. He also has a master’s degree in world economy from the University of International Business and Economics (UIBE, Beijing). He tweets at @danil_bochkov"

SEE THE WHOLE EXCELLENT THE DIPLOMAT ARTICLE HERE.

Solomons: China’s Future Air Naval Base on Tulagi Island

China's impending security agreement with the Solomons Islands is something for all in the Southwest Pacific (including Australia and New Zealand) to worry about. Submarine Matter's reported the China-Solomons danger way back in 2019. 

It pays to look at where China will build its air and naval bases in the Solomons. This includes renewed interest in the small Solomons island of Tulagi. Tulagi, like China's South China Sea islets, is just large enough to host a Chinese air and naval base.

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On November 6, 2019 Submarine Matters intelligence reported
https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2019/11/chinas-future-forward-base-of-tulagi.html

"China’s Future Forward Base of Tulagi a Threat to Australia." 

"In August 1942 US Marines (in the Guadalcanal Campaign) fought and died to liberate the strategically important island of Tulagi (in the Solomon Islands) from the Japanese. 

Now Tulagi, with its dual-use capable natural deep water harbour and airfield has been leased, cheaply, for 75 years to China. See the map below.

Australian politicians appear to have been taken by surprise and have been unable to head off the lease. China is now too politically powerful and can target its increasing cash reserves to buy off islands that are close to, and strategically important to, Australia.

The New York Times, not Australian news outlets, broke the story on October 16, 2019 and advised:

“The renewable 75-year lease was granted to the China Sam Enterprise Group, a conglomerate founded in 1985 as a state-owned enterprise, according to corporate records.

A copy of the “strategic cooperation agreement,” obtained by The New York Times ... reveals both the immediate ambitions of China Sam and the potential...for infrastructure that could share civilian and military uses.

Signed on September 22, 2019 the [lease] agreement includes provisions for a fishery base, an operations center, and “the building or enhancement of the airport.”

Tulagi island (part of the Solomon Islands) in relation to Australia. (Map courtesy Agency France Press via Yahoo News, October 2019)

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[Under pressure from Australia the Solomons Island government cancelled the October 2019 deal with the Chinese "military technology" aligned China Sam Enterprise Group. But a new 2022 agreement might see a Tulagi 75 year lease renegotiated.]

The military value of Tulagi includes its potential use as a forward Chinese naval and air base in cutting naval strategic lines of communication between the US and Australia (map above). 

China can improve Tulagi’s airfied to accommodate maritime patrol aircraft to blockade Australia northern approaches (Tulagi to Port Moresby (New Guinea) and return) and Australia’s eastern approaches (from Tulagi to New Caledonia and return). From Tulagi Chinese strike aircraft could hit the cities of Cairns and Townsville (both on the Australian mainland).

Tulagi as a forward operating base for Chinese surface ships and submarines would save many days of passage to block the major east coast Australian city-ports of Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne.

Australia’s leaders have been virtually silent about the strategic possibilities of the Tulagi Lease:

“News of the lease agreement sent Australian diplomats scrambling to find out more details. [Australian] Foreign Minister Marise Payne...had not responded to a request for comment...”.

Perhaps Australia knew about Tulagi-China negotiations in advance. But as Australia could not alter the situation, because of China's power and money, Australia was reduced to feigning surprise.

The possibility that China could develop Tulagi at the rate of its rapid South China Sea island seaport-airport building is a major concern, to say the least. 

Also see an article in The Strategist.

Pete"

PMB Batteries for Collins & Other Navies

It is good to see Adelaide based PMB Defence is an efficient specialist battery supplier for the Collins subs, for submarine forces overseas and PMB stands ready for Australia's future SSN build. See video above.

Each Collins has 400 tonnes of Lead-acid batteries on board.

On March 22, 2022 Anonymous provided links and comments concerning PMB.

See PMB Defence Corporate Brochure. 

In more detail PMB Defence announced on September 16, 2021:  

“...In the past several years PMB has grown to be arguably a world leader in submarine battery systems.  We have been engaged by the UK Ministry of Defence to develop a Nickel-Zinc based battery system for their submarines, and by Saab Kockums and Sweden to develop a lithium-ion based battery system.  In addition, we have acquired designs and capability that have resulted in lead-acid based contracts of supply with several nations including Canada and Sweden who operate conventional submarines, and the United Kingdom for their nuclear back-up batteries.  

We continue to seek work in other export markets that can leverage the considerable domain knowledge and expertise we have gained largely through our close collaboration with the Australian customer.  As a result of the successful growth and diversification described above, we still anticipate a growth in production rates in the short to medium-term…”

See also “PMB Defence wins battery supply contract for British submarines” of December 21, 2021. 

APDR on MQ-28A Ghost Bat (was "Loyal Wingman")

Australia’s Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR) has provided an interesting, article, dated March 22, 2022, concerning:

“Boeing’s Australian-produced uncrewed aircraft named ‘MQ-28A Ghost Bat’”

“Boeing Australia congratulated the Australian government and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) on their selection of ‘MQ-28A Ghost Bat’ [was called the “Loyal Wingman” UCAV in Australia] as the military designator and name for the first Australian-produced military combat aircraft in over 50 years. Australia Defence Minister Peter Dutton announced the designator and name at a dedicated ceremony held at RAAF Base Amberley, Queensland. 

“The introduction of the new popular name is a rare and special moment in aviation history for our RAAF partners and industry team of over 35 Australian suppliers,” said Glen Ferguson, director Airpower Teaming System Australia and International. “Selecting the Ghost Bat, an Australian native mammal known for teaming together in a pack to detect and hunt, reflects the unique characteristics of the aircraft’s sensors and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance abilities, and is a fitting name for this pioneering capability,” said Ferguson. 

With a rapid development timetable of just three years from ideation to first flight, the development program leverages advancements in digital engineering, advanced manufacturing and unique Australian supply chain technologies. While the RAAF Loyal Wingman development program name will phase out, Boeing’s product name for global customers will remain the Airpower Teaming System. 

“Our enduring partnership with Commonwealth of Australia and Australian Defence Force (ADF) is fundamental to the successful development of MQ-28A’s complex technologies and capabilities, and has global export potential for Australia,” said Dr Brendan Nelson, president Boeing Australia, New Zealand and South Pacific. 

During 2022, the program will continue to accelerate the development and testing of the MQ-28A Ghost Bat, with a focus on sensor and missionisation capabilities to deliver on RAAF commitments. These requirements will continue to expand as Boeing moves towards the aim of delivering an operational capability for the ADF.”

Pete Comment

It is extremely rare in Australia for such a complex weapon project to be developed so quickly. The likely long range and uncrewed nature of the semi-autonomous MQ-28A Ghost Bat might present a solution to large numbers of Chinese manned aircraft that one day may be based on islands to Australia’s north.

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See MQ-28A Ghost Bat perform short test flight to funky soundtrack.

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Virginia & Astute SSN Batteries, Diesels & Snorkels

Virginia and Astute SSNs have 2 diesel generators, more than 100 tonnes of Lead-acid batteries and a snorkel for their diesels. (Diagram courtesy Stanford University, 2017)

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A less explored aspect of Virginia and Astute SSNs is that Lead-acid batteries and diesels are part of their electrical network. I’m not sure how batteries contribute to their constant, as against emergency, power needs? Three references: two online [1] [2] and my hardcopy Astute Manual [3], indicate the importance of batteries for nuclear submarines.

To date it seems all US nuclear subs (eg. Virginia's) and UK Astutes have been using standard Lead-acid batteries. Lead-acid batteries are comparatively safe, easy to manage, long life with a high number of recharge cycles, inexpensive and heavy enough to provide buoyancy "ballast" as they are placed along the base of a submarine’s hull.

While nuclear sub reactors are the ultimate propulsion and non-propulsion ‘hotel load” source of power, batteries provide (diesel rechargeable) backup in reactor shutdown emergencies, provide for silent running (maybe with occasional use thrusters?) and for other mission profiles.

US Virginia-class subs use 2? Caterpillar model 3512B V-12 diesel generators. In emergencies, at mast depth, these diesels can use the Virginia's snorkel to recharge the batteries and/or directly drive the propeller/pumpjet.

The UK Astutes each have 112 tonnes of Lead-acid batteries, use 2 MTU 396 or MTU 4000 diesel generators and a snorkel.

[1] The USN’s 2021 request for information on “Nickel-Zinc Submarine Main Storage Battery” https://www.navysbir.com/n21_1/N211-053.htm in part indicates “OBJECTIVE: Develop a Nickel-Zinc (NiZn) battery system that does not rely on Lithium Ion (Li-ion) technology and would replace lead-acid battery system with a more efficient, environmentally safe, maintenance free, and long life battery in the form of a large-format (1,000Ah+) NiZn battery with cycle life and capacity maximized within the design.”

DESCRIPTION: The U.S. Navy Submarine Fleet main storage battery currently employs Valve-Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) technology to meet platform energy and power requirements. However, with the increasing reliance of electronics on large platforms, future mission needs will require additional battery capacity beyond what current lead-acid battery technology is able to provide...[but] in the same volume. The development of a large-format NiZn battery will offer the needed battery capacity increase on submarines while offering a safer alternative to Li-ion batteries, which, though energy dense, come with a high risk of failure...NiZn is an emerging battery technology optimized for high capacity and long life while also delivering high power in an environmental friendly and safe chemistry…The NiZn battery concept must achieve 75% of capacity through 200+ Navy Equivalent Charge/Discharge cycles…” See whole document.

[2] Also see the short life (due to low number of recharge cycles) for contemporary Nickel-zinc batteries - discussed in this 2019 Submarine Matters’ article http://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2019/10/nickel-zinc-main-batteries-unsuited-to.html

[3] My hardcopy “Astute Class Nuclear Submarine Owners' Workshop Manual: 2010 to date” (Haynes, 2018) https://www.amazon.com/Astute-Nuclear-Submarine-Owners-Workshop/dp/1785210718 . Pages 118 to 122 indicate in summary: if the Astute submarine needs to run silent its reactor system will be reduced to minimum power. Power is then drawn from the battery for the sub’s hotel load and propulsion needs. On battery only slow submarine speed is possible. An Astute does have a snorkel to run its two MTU 396 or MTU 4000 diesel generators at mast depth. An Astute has 112 tonnes of Lead-acid batteries.

Pete Comment: It is unclear how long US and UK nuclear subs will continue to use Lead-acid batteries before these are replaced by NiZn, Li-ion or other formula batteries.

Slow Brazilian SSN Program due to No Argentine Threat

As I mentioned (between the lines) before, Brazil did the right thing in advising the FBI of the approach by the Toebbe couple. This is partly due to Brazil's good relations with the US.

In response to Gessler’s comment of March 18, 2022.

Brazil’s nuclear propelled submarine Alvaro Alberto SN-BR program is moving so slowly in large part because a strategic nuclear threat from Argentina no longer exists. Argentina is no longer contemplating a nuclear weapons program. Decades ago part of the Brazilian nuclear submarine program had a Strategic Rationale which included:

“The Brazilian Navy modernization program plans the development and construction of six SSN submarines.^[27] In the Brazilian doctrine, the raison d'etre of the national defence strategy is to develop deterrence capability against a possible hostile force to the national territory.^[28] The country understands that with its future nuclear fleet, at least some of its weapons will be able to survive the first strike of an enemy and prevent further attempts at aggression.^[29]"

This rationale included a nuclear weapons development arms between Brazil and Argentina race extending back to the 1950s see:

"In the 1970s and 1980s, during the military regime, Brazil had a secret program intended to develop nuclear weapons.^{[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]} The program was dismantled in 1990, five years after the military regime ended, and Brazil is considered free of weapons of mass destruction.^[8]

In the 1950s, President Getúlio Vargas encouraged the development of independent national nuclear capabilities.^[2] At that time, the United States worked actively to prevent Brazil from acquiring the centrifuge technology that could be used to produce high-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.^[13]

 …Brazil pursued a covert nuclear weapons program known as the "Parallel Program",^[2] with enrichment facilities (including small scale centrifuge enrichment plants, a limited reprocessing capability, and a missile program).^[14] Brazil also reportedly bought highly enriched uranium from China in the 1980s.

… [But] In 1990, President Fernando Collor de Mello symbolically closed the Cachimbo test site, in Pará, and exposed the military’s secret plan to develop a nuclear weapon.^[14]

Then–U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated in 2004 that he was sure that Brazil had no plans to develop nuclear weapons.^[23]"

Under the military dictatorship, Argentina began a nuclear weapons program in the early 1980s, but this was abolished when democracy was restored in 1983.

"During the 1980s, the Alacrán (English: Scorpion) and Cóndor 1 (English: Condor) missiles were developed.^[1] The Cóndor 2, with a range of around 1,000 kilometres,^[2] was intended to be developed with assistance from Egypt and Ba'athist Iraq. However, the project was condemned by the United States and the Missile Technology Control Regime.^[3] It was reportedly scrapped during the Menem administration under pressure from the United States government and due to a lack of funds in 1990.^[3][4]

Argentina conducted a nuclear weapon research program during the [early 1980s military dictatorship], in part because of a similar Brazilian program assisted by West Germany.^[3] International concern over the possibility of an Argentine nuclear weapons program magnified after the Falklands War in 1982, when the U.S. intelligence community estimated that Argentina could build a nuclear bomb from its civilian nuclear program.^[9] Government officials at the time confirmed, in November 1983, that research carried out at the Balseiro Institute's research reactor had yielded the capacity for weapons-grade uranium enrichment.^[10] 

The program was abandoned, however, shortly after the return of democracy, on December 10, 1983. President Raúl Alfonsín placed the nuclear program back under civilian control.^[3] The program was also abandoned because Argentina did not have bad relations with Brazil, and because Brazil was wealthier than Argentina and thus more advantaged in an arms race.^[11]

After the Brazilian transition to democracy, Argentina and Brazil began cooperating on nuclear non-proliferation.^[11] In 1991 the National Congresses of Argentina and Brazil ratified a bilateral inspection agreement that created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) to verify both countries' pledges to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. 

[However] In 2010, the [Argentine] government announced that it would start working in the creation of a nuclear submarine.^[12] …The announcement was highly criticized by politicians from opposing parties.^[13]"

Pete Comment

The end of any Brazilian-Argentine nuclear weapons arms race has meant a Brazilian nuclear submarine has a lower, slower, priority. It also appears lack of Argentine political support and lack of money has slowed or ended an Argentine nuclear propelled submarine program. 

See earlier Submarine Matters' articles on "SN-BR" all the way back to 2014.