Following this article, Pete has changed a few bits of the indomitable Shawn C's comment
of January 31, 2021:
Due in part to increased local piracy the Singapore Navy's Maritime Security Command has undergone some strengthening and reorganisation.
Looking at the Singapore Navy's (Updated January 26, 2021) Organisational Chart here and below:
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- the 8 x Independence-class Littoral Mission Vessels (LMVs) of 1,200 tonnes are in the
"Second Flotilla" under MSR. These vessels are new build (4 years old or less) and
represent an increase in displacement and, with it, capability.
- MSR's other main change is the inauguration of Maritime Security & Response Flotilla
consisting of:
= 2 tugboats, and
= 4 most serviceable around 22 y/o Fearless-class Patrol Vessels (PVs) 500 tonnes
redesignated Sentinel-class Maritime Security Response Vessels (MSRVs)
with the names/numbers: MSRV Sentinel 55, MSRV Guardian 56, MSRV Protector 57,
and MSRV Bastion 58
[Pete comment: These Singaporean Sentinels should not be confused with the similar size (353 tons), similar function, US Coast Guard Sentinel class (aka "Fast Response") cutters, some operating out of Guam. Might cause a bit of confusion if some of these US cutters operate out of Singapore!]
See the stirring "Maritime Security and Response Flotilla Inauguration" video below of the 4 Singaporean Sentinel-class with the 2 Tugboats here and below, uploaded by MINDEF on January 26, 2021:
Shawn comments:
With
the return of the retired Fearless-class PVs as Sentinel-class 'MSRVs' (Maritime Security Response Vessels,
and yes, someone in Singapore's Defense Ministry has a love of creating new
acronyms: MSRV, MRCV, JMMS) the near-shore security role has re-assumed
priority.
This is primarily due to the rise in sea robberies in local waters, with 34 attempts in 2020 in the Singapore Straits - see the Straits Times article
There
were three attempted robberies last week in the Singapore Straits - see Maritime Executive article.
The majority of these cases are robberies, but
there has been hijackings in the Malacca Straits and off the East coast of
Peninsula Malaysia.
The introduction of the Singaporean Sentinel class would
indicate an increased naval presence around the waters off Singapore, with
naval units backing up coast guard vessels with greater 'in-the-area' firepower
and sensing. Meanwhile the LMVs could be re-tasked with Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) patrol duties,
specifically the Malacca Straits,
but probably to patrol the shipping routes that lead from Singapore to Indonesia's Natuna Islands. See NavyRecognition . Com article.
Pete Comment
Securing undersea energy pipelines and communications cables and SLOC work, may involve bigger fish than pirates - even wandering Russian navy ships or subs or Chinese naval/militia/coordinated "fishing boat" activity.
Watch this space.
11 comments:
Hi Pete,
Oh I forgot to mention the speculation I have regarding the increased interest in submarine communication cables and oil/gas pipelines by the PLAN and Russia, and how this ties-in to the maritime security of ASEAN.
For example, the Trans ASEAN Gas Pipeline: http://www.ascope.org/Projects/Detail/1060
While Singapore is a major node for 27 submarine cables https://www.submarinecablemap.com/#/country/singapore
Its conceivable that a hostile party could try to disrupt communication and pipelines in the relatively shallow Singapore Straits and Natuna Sea, and this may explain the expansion of the Singapore Navy's nearshore assets.
I also forgot to note:
The RSN's MRCV mystery does have a deadline - the out-of-service-date of Singapore's Victory-class missile corvettes, which are now 30 years old, as Singapore has one naval shipyard, any delays to a single build program will have a knock-on effect, so for example, if the MRCVs are late, then the JMMS will be postponed (estimated post 2030 service date).
https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/taiwan-fears-china-cut-undersea-cables
I wonder how each incident or scenario plays out when it comes to maritime security.
So far if I am not mistaken the piracy incidents originate from Indonesia. The robberies occurred in their territorial water if I am not wrong as I recall one occasion when the pirates were apprehended by Indonesian vessel while RSN and a PCG was observing at a distance.
Based on data with regards to recent piracy activity along the Singapore Strait and Malacca Strait, I wonder how many of the incidents occurred in another country's territorial waters, international waters or Singapore waters(probably 0).
What kind of response are the agencies or organisations able to provide and the limitations of the boundaries and rule of law?
From Territorial Waters/boundary to each agencies Jurisdiction and international law, as well as ships having their own flags and identity of that particular country say a hostage situation onboard a tanker of another country, what process is needed through diplomacy or foreign relations before say a negotiation or rescue operation is carried out on a foreign ship?
A lot of considerations
Hi Shawn C
[your February 1, 2021 at 8:50 PM comment]
1. Re the increased interest in submarine communication cables and oil/gas pipelines by the PLAN and Russia, ties-in to the maritime security of ASEAN.
The Trans ASEAN Gas Pipeline: http://www.ascope.org/Projects/Detail/1060 looks politically and technically complicated. Even Southeast Asian nations could cause problems for it.
Yes Singapore Navy's nearshore assets and even large anti-submarine assets (Singapore’s frigates) might be needed to keep undersea pipelines and cables secure. This is especially if Chinese or Russian subs cut or tap communications cables.
2. Another possible projects has been https://www.popularmechanics.com/science/a31141691/australia-asia-sunshine-pipeline/
"Entrepreneurs in Australia have an ambitious new plan they claim could provide enough electricity to replace 20 percent of the existing grid of Singapore. The idea is to pipe renewable solar energy through an undersea electricity cable from Australia’s largely empty Northern Territory."
Foreseeing Indonesia wanting to charge fees for such a pipeline to cross through their Archipelago - there’s a competing future concept https://www.pv-magazine-australia.com/2020/03/25/australia-singapore-to-drive-cooperation-on-low-emissions-technologies/
"The prime ministers of Australia and Singapore have agreed to work together on practical projects and initiatives in developing [shipped] hydrogen markets and [produced by Australian] renewable electricity trade."
3. What with the MRCVs, Victory-class missile corvettes and JMSSs Singapore indeed has a complex job. Maybe the Australia’s Henderson, Perth, shipyard complex could help out?
Hi Benjamin
[your February 2, 2021 at 3:53 AM comment]
Yes Singapore is highly regulated and policed compared to less regulated East Malaysia and many islands of the Indonesian and Philippine Archipelagos. So pirates and other non-state security problems May tend to come from those latter places.
Singapore seems to be doing much co-ordinated naval/coast guard security work with those other regional nations, US Navy, insurers and the IMO.
@Benjamin,
My conjecture is that there's been a lot of 'loot and scoot' cases where crossing a maritime boundary would stop 'hot pursuit', and the Straits of Singapore are about 5nm wide, with a high amount of small boat traffic in Indonesian waters, so its quite easy for small craft to dash in and out of the shipping lane (and other things: https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/singaporean-boatman-who-helped-two-others-get-batam-amid-pandemic-gets-jail-fine).
This is probably why the MSTF was created, and with the body fenders and ballistic armour of the Sentinel Class, they were modified for close boarding action and quick response, and may even have updated communications and small UAV facilities for local C4ISTAR.
Confronting small wooden boats smuggling cigarettes with 76mm guns might seem excessive, but there's a theory that the porosity of the maritime situation will attract a non-state actor. One of the nightmare scenarios for Singapore is a hijacked LNG carrier rammed into a terminal.
@Pete,
The Arafura class OPV's design lineage can be traced back to the RSN's Victory class corvettes: https://luerssen-defence.com/english-luerssen-corvette-victory/
Singapore's anti-submarine naval assets have actually 'diminished' - 6 sonar/torpedo-equipped Fearless class OPVs have retired, while the torpedo mounts (and probably sonar) on the six Victory class MCVs were removed in 2012 during an MLU that added ScanEagle (they're top heavy boats, probably at maximum load). My belief is that the lesson learnt by the RSN is that you can't expect to use mid-range active sonar in a very noisy environment to detect a submarine, and pop it with a light torpedo, without the submarine detecting your vessel first, and launching a heavyweight torpedo from outside your range.
Pretty sure there's been a doctrinal shift to other ASW assets, but for undersea pipeline and cable monitoring, the LMVs should have suitable unmanned assets.
Seems like the fleet might be stretched for MSTF and MSRF.
12 ships total.
Areas to patrol are the Malacca strait and Singapore Strait a pretty big area.
Hi Shawn C.
[second part of your February 2, 2021 at 7:24 PM addressed to @Pete]
Looking at the RSN's Victory class corvettes (583 tons) with a 76mm main gun and missiles (Harpoon, Barak) and Torpedoes, 42 crew https://luerssen-defence.com/english-luerssen-corvette-victory/
and
the RANs Arafura class OPV https://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/future/opv are both Lurssen designs.
Major differences include the Arafura being much heavier (1,640 tonnes) and oddly carrying only a 40mm main gun – no missiles or torpedoes though 2 boarding boats, 40 crew.
So Arafuras would be hard pressed to take on any regional missile patrol boats.
The Arufura presumably have all that extra weight/size to tolerate higher offshore sea states. eg. as long range rescue vessels deep into the Indian, Pacific and Southern oceans. Rescue role de facto includes saving (or arresting) refugee boats with space for 20-30 refugees.
I imagine Singapore’s main ASW assets are its own Submarines, the 9 x Fokker MPAs, helicopters and the Frigates https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formidable-class_frigate. And yeah much UUV, UAV and USV potential.
Pete
Speaking of USVs...
https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/navy/pressroom/articles/2021/05feb21_article/?fbclid=IwAR1i4cV5-npPmfUscA7zxDgaPdQrtcNJeWn9cb9AqqvGRA5ku5PMzcN69Ag
2nd Type 218sg Submarine RSS Impeccable seen at Kiel
https://m.kn-online.de/Nachrichten/Wirtschaft/Werft-TKMS-hat-das-neue-U-Boot-Impeccable-fuer-Singapur-auf-den-Lift-gezogen
Thanks Shawn C [your February 6, 2021 comment]
Yes USVs deploying UUVs to blow up or defuse mines looks much safer than having vulnerable crewmen or divers in the loop.
Pete
Thanks Benjamin [your February 17 comment]
The photo at https://m.kn-online.de/Nachrichten/Wirtschaft/Werft-TKMS-hat-das-neue-U-Boot-Impeccable-fuer-Singapur-auf-den-Lift-gezogen
of the second 218SG "RSS Impeccable" shows it has a very mixed mission shape of L/D ratio = 70m/6.3m = 11.11.
Missions? AIP to sit on the seafloor of the Singapore Strait or Strait of Malacca but also good shape for long range (Singa to most of Indon, Malaysian or Phil archipelagos missions?) missions.
Pete
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