February 21, 2021

S-80 Plus an Orphan Sub

Following this article Locum provided interesting comments on February 9, 2021, to which I respond:

On Spain's/Navantia’s S-80 Plus. (4 being built for the Spanish Navy)

Hi Locum

I assume you are saying the Dutch knocked back the S-80 Plus “in December 2019.” on cost grounds. Also the major displacement/buoyancy error of the original S-80 would have worried the Dutch.

Australia had/has good relations with Navantia during the Hobart-class and Canberra-class builds, but Navantia's grievous error in the original S-80 design was unacceptable for Australia. In that regard keyword “S-80” came up often in anonymous Australian searches - up to 2013. It seemed the usefully large S-80 design was a strong possibility to be shortlisted by Australia – but by then Spain’s dreaded buoyancy mistake was discovered . 

Root of the Buoyancy Problem

In addition to your “original S-80 there was no spare room for drones or extra SOF / commando's, over the standard 8 SOF operators.” There were other Combat System weights (eg. torpedos, tubes, missiles, servers and workstations). These essential weights were not factored in by Spain when Spain did its buoyancy calculations.

I’ve said somewhere that Spain had never fully developed and launched a sub in Modern times without major French help. Probably it was this Spanish inexperience that resulted in the failed S-80 design.

Now since 2019

The Dutch would have noticed that the S-80 Plus design for the Spanish Navy, "3,200 tonnes (surfaced) and 3,426 tonnes (submerged)" see right side bar, has little reserve buoyancy and is too heavy for the Dutch Navy overall.

As you point out, an additional problem is the S-80 Plus “engine room is too cramped for...3 MTU 396s” that the Dutch Navy probably wants. Although I'd say the Dutch economic ministries may be happy with only 2 diesels in much cheaper MOTS European designs.

Like the Australian Collins and now Attack classes, the Spanish have created an extremely expensive orphan submarine class in the S-80 Plus. 

Collins, Attack and S-80 Plus are only attractive to their builder shipyards-navies with no export prospects to amortize individual sub and project cost burdens. Any Australian hopes that the Dutch would look to Australian Attack class builders will pan out to be the Dutch going to Naval Group directly.

10 comments:

Anonymous said...

A Long Way from Home with diesel-electric submarines.

A retired submariner frm an unknown country to a Dutch navy man: "Your Walrus replacements can operate with far fewer technicians / engineers in their crew, than the Walrus and former Zwaardvis classes. If you have a problem, than just sail to the nearest harbour and fly in your technicians and spare parts. That will save you quite a lot of bunks. Thus, you can design your new submarine smaller. This will solve your shortage of technicians and lower your operational costs.

France, Germany and Sweden can design excellent submarines. However, they do not have (recent) operational experience with long enduring missions with diesel-electric submarines.
For example, executing secret missions for many weeks along the Somali or Iranian coast. Requires another way of designing, thinking and working than operations with nuclear propelled boats or short range and endurance (Batic Sea) missions.

Because of this allmost a century long experience and knowledge. The Dutch submarine designers put a lot of effort in high levels of robustness, redundancy and reliability. Ease of maintenance and repair, while executing a mission, plays a crucial role too.

When the Spanish DoD wrote down the revised staff requirements in 2002 '03, for the ocean going, expeditionary and power projecting S-80. They had only experience with short endurance littoral waters operations.

The Walrus design was for it's time in the eighties and nineties, highly automated, but has a crew of 50 heads.
The S-80Plus has a very compact crew of just 32 heads. For comparison: the Type 212A does her business with 27 heads, that's allmost 16 % less.
The Collins class had originally a crew of 42 persons. Since 2009 this was increased to 58 heads. How will the very small S-80 Plus crew cope with maintenance, (combat)damage, malfunctions and exhaustion ?

The S-80 Plus engine room is not too cramped, but just like the Walrus class, cramped.
The single hulled S-80 Plus and Collins have a hull diameter of 7,80 meter.
The double hull Walrus has a maximum diameter of 8,40 meter. The pressure hull will have a pressure hull of approx 7,8 meter too.

Locum,

Pete said...

Hi Locum

Thanks for all your February 22 comments on Submarine Manning Levels.

In the SSN realm its interesting how the minimal crew Sov/Russian Alfas suffered https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfa-class_submarine#Preproduction

"Extensive automation would also greatly reduce the needed crew numbers to just 16 men. The practical problems with the design quickly became apparent and in 1963 the design team was replaced and a less radical design was proposed, increasing all main dimensions and the vessel weight by 800 tons and almost doubling the crew."

I'll do an article about SSKs and SSNs soon.

Pete

Anonymous said...

Recruiting,continuous training, retention,of personnal in a very shallow pool of talents is a major issue
Technical schools or Universities graduates, essentially petty officers and officers, psycho and physical fit and volunteer....not paying well..
Most navies are unable to do that, even for coastal mission and even more with oceanic /expeditionnary missions.It woould be interesting to look at the usage rate of subs (how many days /year /sub at sea per year?Parlementary,Senates, General public account reports ..ect in western democracies point to that problem compounded by spare parts/maintenance issues..High usage is at the core of operationnal excellence

Navies have enough problems with surface ships..

This led to larger sub with more comfortable quarters and also to women enlisting

Automation goes also in that direction



Pete said...

Thanks Anonymous for your February 22 comment.

The Australian Navy has had the kind of problems you outline because Western Australia's non-risky, surface lifestyle, high paying mining and energy industries

directly compete with Western Australia's submarine base missions (more risky, often submerged, paying similar or less)

Also miners retain their Social Media (Twitter etc) lifestyles while submerged submariners definitly cannot. Women aboard almost appraches a social life, but not quite.

Fly in, fly out to Perth, Darwin etc (on fortnightly cycles) beats 55 day missions.

Re your "It would be interesting to look at the usage rate of subs"

From my reading it is only US and UK SSBN forces that occasionally publish mission lengths and Gold/Blue, Port/Starboard crewing. There are very few indicators of SSK or SSN mission lengths from any navy.

Pete

Anonymous said...

Thank you for your blog!, and a big hello from Spain

The S80/S80+ has been (or IS??) a nightmare for Navantia and the ARMADA, but I believe that the main problem with the buoyancy issue was the Ethanol Steam reformer: buoyancy and design problems did occur even with much more experienced Navies (ASTUTE???), but in the S80 project we had the additional AIP system, and within it, the ethanol reformer. It is an extremely complex component, and we believe in Spain that the development of such technology (and the solutions to make it fit inside the hull) was the main reason for the weight problem.

NAVANTIA and the ARMADA both thought that we (Spain) were able of designing and building a brand new sub with several "FIRST" for our country: first own design, first own & alone sub building, first AIP based on Ethanol reforming, first euro sub integrating US components&systems...too many FIRSTs in just one project.

Anyway, we are sure the project is going to be expensive, very expensive. But if you look around, there are not many AIP - alcohol reforming based - subs in development right now. It seems as if Germany is leaving behind the MH technology, and TKMS is investing in Methanol reforming...maybe, NAVANTIA is not so far away and behind in the competition for the future AIP technologies....who knows!!

Pete said...

Hi Spanish Anonymous [your Feb 25, 2021 12:55:00 AM comment]

Your comments about Spain’s S80/S80+ has been/is? “a nightmare for Navantia and the ARMADA” are very compelling.

Thanks for correcting my Combat System buoyancy theory.

Instead you point out “the buoyancy issue was the Ethanol Steam reformer” [AIP]

Sounds like Spain’s new AIP will continue to delay the S-80 Plus for years. Unless Spain decides not to use AIP.

Australia was/is too ambitious with its first homebuilt submarine (Collins) and second one (Attack-class).

As you imply it seems Spain was/is too ambitious in building its first homebuilt in Modern times. I note Spain homebuilt its own D-class submarines in 1933-34 http://www.navypedia.org/ships/spain/sp_ss_d1.htm

Looks like Germany might be more successful in developing alcohol reforming AIP (for Germany Methanol) given Germany’s longer AIP experience and more money (with its export submarine market).

Kind Regards

Pete

Anonymus said...

Hi Pete

Another great Hello from Spain,

if Spain finally decides to give up the AIP (and I believed it possible), the S-80 case would go from being a nightmare to becoming a horror story

King Regards

Pete said...

Hi again Spanish Anonymous [Feb 25, 2021, 7:12:00 PM]

I suppose Navantia can keep on maturing its S-80 Plus AIP until its ready. Spain has no real strategic threats (that I know of) although Spanish subs may be expected to do electronic monitoring as part of NATO/War on Terror.

Navantia has long been talking to Germany about Germany's alcohol reformer AIP solution. http://www.revistanoticias.sener/en/news/aip-system-for-submarines/50/

Spain/Navantia may just need to accept that paying for German transfer of AIP technology is a cost of the S-80 Plus project.

Regards

Pete

Anonymous said...

Good morning all (first anonym. from Spain)

yes, there are three companies in Spain involved in alcohol reforming for the Subs AIP:

1.- Abengoa EtOH reformer: this company was awarded the S80 AIP Reformer. MANY, MANY problems, but it seems as it is (hopefully) going ahead
2.- Tecnicas Reunidas ETOH: very competent and experienced spanish engineering company, with huge projects in refinery (Gulf, Asia, etc). Contracted by Armada as a "B PLan " in case Abengoa failed...
3.- SENER CH3OH reformer: engineering company, very very competent in miltary projects and world leader in Naval engineering. This company has an agreement with Germany to collaborate and promote the CH3OH reformer for subs AIP. And they are suggesting that such CH3OH reformer could be an alternative to EtOH...

Armada and Navantia are fully focused on the ETOH reformer as it is, in fact, a full spanish development, either by Abengoa or by Tecnicas Reunidas.

SPain has two very challenging scenarios: Morocco and Algeria. Both countries are involved in a weapons adquisition race. Algeria, for instance, has now six Kilo Subs, and Morocco is exploring such boats to be added to the Morioccan Navy...SO, the first two S80+ would be "put in the water" (as we say in Spain) fitted for, but without, the AIP. S81+ is expected to be in the water this spring...depending on Covid!! S83+ and s84+ woyld be delivered with the full AIP.

Thank you and congratulations for your superb blog!!

Pete said...

Hi First Anonymous from Spain
@Feb 27, 2021, 12:55:00 AM

Where you say "Thank you and congratulations for your superb blog!!" all I can do is thank you, deeply. It makes many hours per week working on Submarine Matters worth it. Cheers :)

I'll use your description of 3 types of alcohol reformer AIP Spain is working with

and the strategic interests (potential threats) in an article soon.

Regards

Pete