Collins Midlife Upgrade/Extension - Companies, Tomahawks and Possible Timings

The most comprehensive, up-to-date Asia-Pacific sub numbers-types map I've seen - at March 3, 2016. Australia's six Collins subs may need to be upgraded with Tomahawk cruise missiles to keep pace with Klubs fitted to Kilo subs of India, Vietnam, China, Russia and perhaps two future Indonesian Kilos. (Graphic courtesy news(dot)com(dot)au with this clearer, larger, image)

--- 

The leaking of Top Secret Cabinet documents on Future Submarine project timings has prompted Submarine Matters to draw together many details on the Collins "life extension" (or "midlife upgrade"). The midlife upgrade may result in much work for Lockheed Martin in cooperation with Saab and Thales.

The Australian Defence Department apparently has been advising for years that the future subs would not be delivered until the early 2030s. 

Defence sources said the handover of a future submarine by 2026 was always more of a political aspiration (of former Prime Minister Abbott) rather than a sensible shipbuilding schedule.

Australia’s six Collins subs were launched between 1993 and 2001 which, after the standard 30 years of operation, would usually lead to decommissioning between 2023 and 2031. A submarine midlife upgrade would aim to keep them operating until the mid-2030s.

In the meantime a midlife upgrade of the Collins might include more modern sonar, the latest software and hardware for its AN/BYG-1 combat system, derusting, new batteries, overhaul of the diesel engines and maybe introducing Tomahawks. The upgrade would cost much more than A$2 Billion total.

TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILES

An additional item which Australia might include in the Collins is Tomahawk (land attack and long range anti-ship) cruise missiles (compatible with the combat system) which would be launched through the torpedo tubes. Wikipedia records: "During the [Collins] construction phase, consideration was given to acquiring submarine-launchable Tomahawk cruise missiles; giving the [Collins submarines] the capability to attack land targets after minor modifications.^[44] Plans to acquire Tomahawk or similar land-attack missiles remained under consideration until 2009, when the Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 white paper was released; stating that land-attack missiles will instead be incorporated into the armament of the Collins-class replacement."

With the future submarine delay a decision not to include Tomahawks could mean Australia falling behind in a region with increasing numbers of submarine fired Klub land attack cruise missiles. This is noting that Kilo diesel electric submarines belonging to Russia, India, China, and Vietnam are being fitted with land attack Klubs missiles (with ranges varying from 300km to 2,500km (depending on user modifications)). Indonesia may also buy two Kilo submarines fitted with Klubs.

UPGRADE WORK FOR LOCKHEED MARTIN, SAAB AND THALES

The life extension may result in much work for Lockheed Martin in cooperation with Saab and Thales. This is noting that the AN/BYG-1 combat system to be upgraded in the Collins is intertwined with the broader sensor, communications and weapon systems of the Collins. Lockheed Martin, Saab and Thales are already working together on submarines solutions. This may allow them to provide an integration solution for most of the upgrades required by the Collins. See Lockheed Martin on Tomahawks for US and UK submarines.

----------------

Saab (as early as October 2015) publically anticipated the likely timeline of the Future Submarines and need for a midlife upgrade of the Collins. Nigel Pittaway in DefenseNews, October 10, 2015 reported:

“Saab Pitches Collins Submarine Upgrade

…Speaking at the Pacific 2015 Maritime Exhibition in Sydney last week, a Saab senior executive said …a Collins midlife upgrade [will be] a cost-effective measure to maintain capability…“In Australia, you have decided on a new submarine program, which is fantastic, but it’s not going to be here for a number of years…”

…Australia is looking to acquire up to 12 new conventional submarines under Project Sea 1000, but has a tight timeline if it wishes to avoid further full cycle docking overhauls, which will need to be performed on at least two submarines if the Collins needs extending beyond 2030.

…However, the slow progress of the program is causing concern that the submarines cannot be designed, selected and built in time to avoid a Collins life extension.

…[Gunilla Fransson, Saab’s senior vice president, Security & Defence Solutions] said that if Saab’s proposal for a Collins midlife upgrade is accepted, the work would be undertaken in Australia. “You sustain the Collins boats here in Australia and I don’t see any reason why you could not upgrade them here,” she said.

“Saab would certainly like to position ourselves to support Australia in an extended Collins life of type. You have a very capable local submarine company in ASC, which certainly has the capability to perform the work, together with Saab Kockums and other local Australian companies.”” [WHOLE DEFENSENEWS ARTICLE]

COLLINS TABLE

(heavily modified from Wikipedia)

Name	Laid down	Launched	Commissioned	Usual Decommissioning 30 years after Launch. (Upgrade to operate to?)	Namesake
Collins	14 Feb 1990	28 Aug 1993	27 Jul 1996	2023 (2033?)	Vice Adm  Collins
Farncomb	1 Mar 1991	15 Dec 1995	31 Jan 1998	2025 (2034?)	Rear Adm  Farncomb
Waller	19 Mar 1992	14 Mar 1997	10 Jul 1999	2027 (2035?)	Capt Waller
Dechaineux	4 Mar 1993	12 Mar 1998	23 Feb 2001	2028 (2035?)	Capt Dechaineux
Sheean	17 Feb 1994	1 May 1999	23 Feb 2001	2029 (2036?)	Seaman Sheean
Rankin	12 May 1995	26 Nov 2001	29 Mar 2003	2031 (2036?)	Lt Cdr Rankin

Pete

Balanced article on Aus Future Sub - "evolved Collins"

Plan of the current Collins submarine. What will an evolved Collins look like?

----------

Might an evolved Collins look like this? With a VLS cruise or ballistic land attack capability.

------------

I've bolded some interesting parts of Australian David Wroe's article in The [Melbourne] Age, October 19, 2013, page 17. He wrote http://newsstore.fairfax.com.au/apps/viewDocument.ac;jsessionid=F30A70117F5FF6C3877A4684855752C8?sy=afr&pb=all_ffx&dt=selectRange&dr=1month&so=relevance&sf=text&sf=headline&rc=10&rm=200&sp=brs&cls=3105&clsPage=1&docID=AGE1310191FEJ46QP3QT

"Defence all at sea on new submarines"

Submarines are the stealthy killers in maritime warfare. They are the queens on the chessboard, the strategic game-changers. Any country has to think long and hard about messing with another country that has an advanced submarine fleet. You can't be sure there isn't one sitting quietly off your own coast or waiting in hiding to sink your ships.

That Australia needs a fleet of reliable submarines is beyond doubt to our military planners. [Former Prime Minister] Kevin Rudd's 2009 defence white paper promised to build a dozen of these killers to replace the trouble-plagued Collins-class fleet of six. The paper vowed the new fleet would have "greater range, longer endurance on patrol, and expanded capabilities compared to the current Collins class".

But four years on, Defence boffins are still wrestling with the complex task of figuring out just what kind of submarine we want - and what we can afford. Time is not their friend; the Collins class is due to start being retired in just over a decade [2025], giving rise to fears of a "capability gap" in which we have too few subs - or none at all - while the new fleet is still being built.

It will be a further 18 months [2015] before the new government decides which of the two leading design options [HDW, DCNS, Navantia?] to go with, during which Australians can expect to hear much more furious argument. There is much at stake, not least an estimated $36 billion of taxpayers' money, thousands of jobs in Adelaide and Australia's current technological superiority in a rapidly changing region where Asian countries are investing heavily in their militaries.

The popular thinking in defence circles is that the new fleet should be very much Australia's own submarines, its sovereign asset. In the grandest iteration, this is nothing less than a nation-building project.

"It's going to be hard. Things will go wrong," said Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt, the outgoing head of the future submarine program. "But it's right up there with our biggest ever national undertakings, along with the Olympics, the Harbour Bridge and the Snowy scheme."

The quickest and cheapest option would be to buy an off-the-shelf European design, which would be small but modern and reliable. But this has been effectively ruled out on strategic grounds. Most experts say Australia needs a long-range submarine that could, say, patrol the South China Sea in the event of territorial disputes there or to protect shipping lanes. That means a big submarine with a big crew that can range far and wide and stay at sea for months.

The rule of thumb, says Moffitt, is that a submarine can stay at sea for about a day for each crew member on board. The Collins has a crew of 60 and can easily go to Hawaii and back. The European off-the-shelf designs accommodate crews of just 27 to 30.

"What we know with absolute confidence is that the performance of those submarines for our application ... falls dramatically short of even what Collins does. They don't have the endurance," Moffitt said.

James Brown, says our neighbours to the north are making strides in acquiring submarine fleets - not just big players such as China and Japan but also Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam.

"In 20 years' time there are going to be a lot more submarines in the region. We have to respond to that in some way and that means having a decent submarine fleet of our own."

They are also an effective deterrent to protect Australia itself, he says. If Australia were threatened, it could use its long-range submarines to launch land-attack cruise missiles at the aggressor's homeland. Then there are intelligence missions - submarines are good for sitting quietly and listening, but only if they have the range and endurance to travel far and wide.

Or as Andrew Davies, a leading submarine scholar at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, puts it, submarines are what you use when you want to take the war up to the enemy. Nazi Germany couldn't match the British and US navies on the surface, but the legendary German U-boat took the fight right up to the east coast of the US.

"Submarines are not crocodiles you leave in the moat," he says.

Having ruled out a nuclear design, Australia will return to some form of conventional submarine that, like the Collins, uses diesel engines to charge batteries which in turn power motors for propulsion.

That leaves two options: a totally fresh design, or a so-called "evolved Collins", which takes the existing fleet, irons out its flaws and modernises parts that would otherwise become obsolete.

The smart money seems to be on the evolved Collins. ASPI's Davies calls it "sort of a no-brainer". Defence Minister David Johnston was quoted in media reports this week as saying the evolved Collins was the "leading option" - though his office afterwards played down the remarks.

It might all sound strange to the average Australian taxpayer who's been reading for years about the Collins' many flaws and annual support costs thought to be about $500 million.

But experts both inside and outside Defence say that, after years of repairs and adjustments, the Collins is now a formidable submarine. The combat system and sensors have been fixed, though the propulsion system still needs work. In recent weeks, the ASC - formerly the Australian Submarine Corporation, the government company set up to build and sustain the Collins - has cut open the hull of one boat to completely remove the engine, so it can be thoroughly overhauled.

As you read this, three Collins are at sea, which meets the benchmark for 50per cent of the fleet being operational at a given time. That's a success.

Whether the government decides on an evolved Collins design or the rival option of starting with a blank sheet of paper, [nothing is "blank". Existing Collins are full of corporate knowledge/lessons and future refinement expectations] carry corporate Australia's submarine industry has learnt from the Collins mistakes, said David Gould, the Englishman recruited to head up Australia's submarine program at the Defence Materiel Organisation.

That includes how to work with other countries, whose help we will inevitably need in designing the new submarine. As a 2011 RAND Corporation report found, we don't have the depth of expertise to design submarines ourselves, meaning we will need help from a country that specialises in conventional subs - Sweden [after the HDW 218SG decision Sweden is no longer an option] Germany, Spain or France.

Last time, the commercial agreement with the Collins' Swedish designer Kockums left Australia in a weak position with a lack of clarity as to what our rights were in regard to the intellectual property and the expectations on the Swedes.

"We won't be doing that again," Gould said. "This is about sovereignty - our sovereign ability to have the submarine that does what we demand of it ... so that when we put the crew into danger, we really do understand what we're doing. We haven't delegated that understanding to someone else."

And while we won't be designing everything ourselves, we will need the expertise to oversee and integrate all the work, says Rowan Moffitt - that means a generation of naval architects, systems engineers and systems integration experts.

"That's a quarter of a century of submarine building ... in which we will have to have an education and TAFE system producing the people we need through that period," Moffitt said.

Meanwhile, the clock is ticking on two fronts. First, the Collins will almost certainly need to continue service for an average of seven years beyond its original retirement date to avoid a capability gap around 2030. Gould maintains this can be managed.

There is also the question of the industry "valley of death". Whatever design Australia chooses, the submarines will be built in Adelaide, at the ASC. The industry association, the South Australian Defence Teaming Centre, this week welcomed [Australia's Defence] minister Johnston's apparent preference for the evolved Collins on the ground that work would start sooner.

The association's chief executive, Chris Burns, said unless the industry was "cutting steel" by early next decade, the Adelaide workforce, which is currently working on the Air Warfare Destroyer project, will find itself idle and those skills will be lost.

"The average age of a welder is about 50," he said. "It's very complex, specialist work and ... our true concern is that that work and those skills will be lost if there is a large gap between the end of the AWD [in 2019
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hobart-class_destroyer#Construction ] and the start of the future submarine."

Moffitt points to an assessment by the Australian Industry Group that the future submarine program would employ about 5000 workers and 1000 Australian businesses, most of them small and medium-sized enterprises.

"It's not a one-off, stop-start project. By the time the 12th submarine is finished, it will be time to start looking for a replacement fleet. It could conceivably have no end so long as we seek to have 12 submarines in our inventory."

It nonetheless hinges on a future government being willing to commit the tens of billions of dollars necessary. That won't happen unless the Coalition starts to get defence spending back on track towards the target of 2 per cent of GDP.

With his cabinet colleagues desperate for budget savings, David Johnston will need every ounce of his strength for that fight."
-
Pete

Mid-life upgrade of the Collins class will be a real headache.

HMAS Rankin - probably at Fleet Base West - Rockingham, Western Australia. The Collins submarines have been extra-ordinarily problematic. Even after a mid-life upgrade systemic problems (eg. continuing diesel engine unreliability) are likely. HMAS Rankin may have had the most problems. APDR Reported "With reference to delays, it is worth mentioning at this point the history of HMAS Rankin – the 6th submarine in the series. She was launched 41 months late because in the late 1990s during her construction resources had already been diverted to making urgent improvements to other members of the Collins Class. Rankin started a prolonged period of maintenance in 2008 and is still out of the water and is likely to remain so until [2014] – an extraordinary absence of six years." (Photo of HMAS Rankin courtesy nachohat(dot)org).

---

In continuation of Submarine Matter’s article on the Collins mid-life upgrade issue of March 4, 2016 further information and comments are:

-  All foreign and Australian companies involved with the Collins mid-life upgrade will most probably need to work with ASC. ASC will likely have main carriage. This may have eventual impacts on blowout of Government cost estimates and extended timings Collins are out of the water being upgraded.

-  the Collins mid-life upgrades will occur while ASC is heavily involved completing the AWDs (see problems) (now due to be completed by 2020) and ASC will then be ramping up to build the Future Frigates (from 2020). A midlife Collins upgrade will be intricate. 

-  Mid-life upgrades to the Collins is of course not a start from clean-slate issue. There is a whole series of issues and costs in upgrading an old problematic submarine. Upgrades to the Collins may continue to be as many and as complex as reflected in Kym Bergmann’s comprehensive Asia Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR) article of May 6, 2013 - see http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/304/Collins-Class-upgrades-a-mixed-scorecard .

-  Reflecting how over-committed Australia’s warshipbuilding programs will be in the early 2020’s (clashing with a mid-life upgrade for the Collins) see:

   =  Page 21 of the 2016 Defence White Paper (10MB): “The Government’s shipbuilding plans are based on long-term continuous builds of surface warships, commencing with construction in Australia of offshore patrol vessels from 2018 and future frigates from 2020.” The AWDs may be further delayed past 2020. And

   =  page 89 - 90, Table 6, Summary of key investment decisions from FY 2016-17 to FY 2015-26 of http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Docs/2016-Defence-Integrated-Investment-Program.pdf (5MB) which appears to be a spike in warship, submarine and naval aircraft spending.

The Government will suddenly need to accelerate Defence spending regardless of expected low revenue and heavy commitments for non-defence spending.

-  the alternative of steadily retiring 5 of the Collins (no mid-life upgrade) until 2030 should be considered. Given all those years HMAS Rankin (launched 2001 but in dry-dock 2008-2014) was out of the water it perhaps could remain operational to 2035. 

-  This is noting the last time Australian submarines fired torpedos in anger - was 1915 near Gallipoli. There were no Australian submarines operational during World War Two.

-  On the more usual intelligence collection function - there are other platforms and other countries' submarines that will continue to contribute.

-  Large unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) launched from northern Australia may offer a new intelligence-collection solution. These could utilise the rapid advances in Lithium-ion batteries.

-  If a mid-life upgrade (perhaps on only two Collins) is done - perhaps better to have it done in Sweden. ASC will be too busy building the large warships anyway. Saab Kockums is doing mid-life upgrades of two of Sweden’s three Gotland class submarines. There is limited information on the upgrades (to occur in 2017?) on Saab’s website - more information would be useful.

Pete

Australia's Collins-class Submarine Program by Sub Brief

Above and here Sub Brief’s “Jive Turkey” presented Australia's Collins conventional diesel-electric guided-missile submarine (SSG) Program on April 15, 2021. Some sections are supplemented in greater detail by Wiki’s entry on the Collins class:

1:17 The proposal for a new type of submarine to replace the Oberon class submarines began in July 1978, when the RAN director of submarine policy prepared a paper detailing the need to start considering a replacement for the 6 ageing Oberons with a new class of subs, to be built in Australia (Aus), supported by Aus shipyards, equipped with advanced tech, long life-span of greater than 20 years service, must have peace time (intel gathering, covert insertion, periscope and electronic monitoring, etc) and hunter killer (mainly torpedo and anti-ship missile) capability.

2:41 May 1983, development begins. An initial list of 6 SSK/SSG builders considerd. Also Rockwell proposed a new Combat System (CS)(sensors, database, weapons amounting to about 30% of project).

3:12 May 1985 German vs Swedish main foreign contractor designs shortlisted. Rockwell vs Signaal (notional competitor (group of some US companies)) shortlisted for CS. Sweden’s Type 471 design and Rockwell’s (always the favoured company’s) CS selected. Budget was A$4 Billion in 1986.

4:34 June 1987, Osborne Ship and Submarine yard built for all Collins subs to built in Aus (instead of normal practice on winner (Sweden) building first hull in Sweden).

5:26 Aus’s future submarine class was named in honour of Vice Admiral Collins (1899-1989) with first of class. HMAS Collins, launched by his widow on August 28, 1993

6:14 Collins class Specs: built 1990-2003, 3,100 tonnes (surfaced), 77m long, 7m beam, 3 x Garden Island-Hedemora HV V18b/15Ub 18 cylinder diesel engines, 3 x Jeumont-Schneider Generators 1,400 KW each. the GIH diesel engines turn the JS Generators which in turn charge the batteries. which in turn spin the propeller

7:42 more specs – same as on right sidebar here 

9:11 Feb 1990 keel laid, and other milestones. Rockwell’s advanced CS, with each crew station meant to see all, was ahead of its computer power time, and was never completed to specs,

10:25 Construction problems continue including non release of software for Rockwell CS

11:15 Computer Sciences Corporation takes over CS software development problem. Integrating 1990s software with 1980s hardware a major headache. Software not even matured when HMAS Collins goes on sea trials in 1994. See further detail as CS problems gradually resolved by CS companies (including Raytheon) used by USN nuclear subs. In fact the AN/BYG-1 Combat System used on Collins and US nuclear subs, will be carried over to the future Attack-class.

[Pete Comment: After CS problems were resolved the Collins Garden Island-Hedemora https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedemora_Diesel (a small Swedish company which terminated diesel making around the 1980s) diesel engines' limitations on use remains the Collins class's major problem. 

This is a major reason the Attack class will adopt MTU diesels - a multinational company that supplies diesels to a wide range of civilian and naval ships as well as submarines. ]

12:36 Big Problems with Sea Trials:

- Jive says the contract Aus expected was basically appropriate for a nuclear submarine, ie. silent and reliably operating at high speed [ie. in top 10% of its submerged speed tempo], over a long range and with months of endurance. [All this was not appropriate for even a standard-long range diesel-electric sub, like a large Brazilian Scorpene or a "around Africa" Israeli Dolphin 2]. So Aus was bound to be disappointed with the Collin's performance.

- the fuel tanks are backfilled with seawater (as intended) BUT some of that seawater leaks into diesel engine, stopping compressed diesel fuel from igniting, but cylinders and pistons would compress. The whole process stopping engine(s). [This problem has never been completely fixed. Major “sun-roof” cutout of top rear hull has weakened the pressure hulls of the whole Collins class thus reducing diving depth. Removal and overhaul of diesels (to remove rust-corrosion, salt, water ) from diesels is required each major overhaul. This makes the total annual overall bill for the Collins subs about A$700 million!]

“During trials of the first submarines, the propulsion system was found to be prone to failure for a variety of reasons.^[93] Most failures were attributed to the fifteen-tank diesel fuel system: the tanks were designed to fill with salt water as they were emptied to maintain neutral buoyancy, but water would regularly enter the engines due to a combination of poor design, gravity separation of the fuel and water being insufficient, and operator error resulting from poor training.^[93] Problems were also caused by bacterial contamination of the diesel fuel, which, along with the salt water, would cause the fuel pumps to rust and other components to seize.^[94] The fuel-related issues were solved by installing coalescers, improving training and operational procedures, and adding biocides to the fuel.^[94]”

- shaft seals not aligned properly during construction causing seawater leaks in of up to 984 liters per minute in a deep test dive, almost sinking Collins. Quick action permitted sub to rapidly move to surface. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins-class_submarine#Propulsion_system
“Propeller shaft seals were a significant problem on Collins and Farncomb.^[95] Although designed to allow for a leak of 10 litres per hour, during trials it was found that the seals would regularly misalign and allow hundreds of litres per hour into the boat—during one deep diving test the flow rate was measured at approximately 1,000 litres a minute.^[95] ASC claimed that solving these problems could be done by manually adjusting the seals as the submarine dived and rose, but this would have required a sailor dedicated solely to that task, affecting efforts to minimise the required number of personnel.^[95] It was found that the problem could be temporarily alleviated by running the propeller in reverse for 100 revolutions, pulling the seal back into alignment, although a permanent solution could initially not be found, as ASC refused to accept responsibility for the problem, and the original manufacturer of the seals had closed down.^[95] New suppliers were found, with modified seals fitted to the first two submarines in late 1996, before completely re-designed seals were fitted to the boats in late 1997, solving the problem.^[96] 

- Propeller problems: 

“The propellers themselves were also found to be poorly manufactured, having been shaped by hand, with at least one cast at the wrong pitch.^[97] This was rectified by using a five-axis milling machine for future shaping work and replacing the miscast propeller.^[98] The material used for the propellers was also found to be weaker than expected, developing fatigue cracks after only a few years of use.^[97] Instead of going to Kockums, which had started to go into decline after the end of the Cold War, the submarine project office sent the propeller to the United States Navy for redesigning.^[99] Despite the Americans fixing the problems with the propeller design, resulting in significant performance improvements, the Swedish company was dissatisfied with the Australian actions; the dispatch of the propellers was one of the points of contention in the company's legal action in the mid-2000s against the Australian government over ownership of the intellectual property rights to the submarine's design.^[100]“Bad cavitation problem causing lengthening of sail.

- Other propulsion problems: See:

“Other propulsion problems included excessive motor vibrations at certain speeds which damaged various components (which was attributed to the removal of a flywheel and to corrosion caused by the fuel problems), and excessive fuel consumption in Collins at high speed (found to be caused by manufacturing problems with the turbines and turbochargers).^[101] The propulsion system was also found to be a secondary source of noise: poor design of the exhaust mufflers, weight-saving measures in the generator mountings, and an incorrect voltage supply to the battery compartment exhaust fans were noise-creating factors found and eliminated during studies by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation.^[102]

In March 2010, the Department of Defence revealed that the generators in five of the submarines were flawed and had to be replaced.^[103] The three Australian-made generators aboard each of the five submarines (the generators aboard Collins were French-built, and exhibited no defects) are to be replaced in the submarines as they come in for their next maintenance docking.^[103]

- Periscopes and Masts
Periscopes had two problems, the first of which was shared with the other masts.^[104] They were not streamlined; raising a periscope while moving would create enough drag and turbulence to shake the entire submarine.^[105] As with many elements of the submarine, there were disagreements as to who was responsible for the problem.^[105] It was solved by modifying the masts to redirect the water flow around them (for example, a spiral wrap was fixed around the head of each periscope).^[106]

The periscopes also had problems with their optics: periscope users reported difficulty in refocusing after changing magnification, duplication of images, and bands across the field of vision.^[106] These problems were attributed to RAN demands that the optical view be the first exposed when a periscope was raised above the water, instead of placing the infrared sensor and single-pulse radar at the head as on other submarines, requiring the optical path to be routed around these components.^[106] The periscopes were gradually improved, and were no longer a problem by the time the fast track submarines entered service.^[56]

17:00 July 1996 HMAS Collins commissioned

17:35 - 6 x horizontal torpedo tubes capable of carrying 22 heavyweight shots, including top mod Mk.48 torpedoes, also Harpoon missiles and UK mines, no Tomahawk hardware  capability. SURTASS towed sonar array, LINK-11 datalink for big picture situational awareness.

19:22 History of Service. Great Record including October 21, 1999 HMAS Waller inserted Clearance Divers into Oecussi/Ambeno enclave, East Timor. Lots of exercise sinkings by Collins subs of “enemy” ships and subs (including Los Angeles class) ,

21:06 In mid 2000s begin some rather early 10 Year Mid-Life Upgrades (totalling 24 months per sub). The Collins class of today much better than Collins class of 2001.

Why Saab-Kockums Excluded? Australia doesn't trust it.

Following Australia's Collins-class Submarine Program by Sub Brief of April 20, 2021, GhalibKabir commented/asked:

"To this day I cannot wrap my head around why Kockums and RAN went with Hedemora Diesel instead of a Pielstick or the go to workhorse good ol' MTU..."

A support group in Australia, without any real knowledge of Kockums' troubled Collins history, frequently ask why Australia doesn't cancel the Naval Group submarine contract and return to Swedish Kockums (now absorbed into Saab) instead. 

Sweden imposing the Hedemora diesel motor (on the Collins) is one of the primary reasons Australia did not/does not want to return to Saab-Kockums. Supporters regularly advocate building a "Collins 2" aka "Son of Collins". 

Some History - in the mid-2010s Kockums was a poor risk, in corporate turmoil, for Australia to buy its submarines. Kockums from 1999 was owned by the Germans and in no position to build submarines.

In 1999, following the acquisition of Celsius AB by Saab, Kockums was sold to the German shipbuilding company HDW. In 2005, HDW was bought by the German industrial conglomerate Thyssen Krupp.^[2] The time after 1999 was rife with conflicts between Kockums' only Swedish customer, the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV), and Kockums' German owners. ThyssenKrupp insisted that Kockums ought to discontinue large submarine construction and to focus on the development of small submarines. Meanwhile, anonymous sources from inside Kockums claimed that ThyssenKrupp's goal in acquiring Kockums was never to reach synergies with HDW, but only to eliminate its main competitor.^[2]

On 14 April 2014 about 200 employees had left Thyssen Krupp for Saab and it was reported that Saab and Thyssen Krupp had started to negotiate about selling Kockums.^[32] In June 2014 Thyssen Krupp agreed to sell Kockums to Saab.^{[33 ]}During a visit to Kockums facilities on 30 June 2015 the Swedish defence minister, Peter Hultqvist, announced that two submarines will be ordered for a cost of 8.2 billion SEK (US$ 867 million).^[36] The two submarines will be delivered to the Swedish Navy in 2024 and 2025 ^[37]

Technical experts have demonstrated Kockums' actions and corporate instability was far deeper and more significant than Swedish cop-outs that "Kockums didn't deserve the "dud sub" tag".

In the 1990s Kockum's mishandling of the then Swedish company Hedemora's diesel problems, perhaps the main continuing defect of the Collins, was reason enough to exclude Sweden from the mid 2010's SEA 1000 shortlist. Also in the mid-2010s when Australia was compiling its shortlist Saab had never managed an order for new submarines - not even from its own Swedish Navy.  

A submarine's diesel motors are a major propulsion component that can kill a submarine. Efficiency and reliability are key. Submarine motors are thus expected to be tried, tested and mature pieces of technology - built to handle a customer (like Australia's) mission conditions. Diesels need to be big business, for the builder to have the money and expertise to tailor the diesels to customer needs.  

Simply put - Hedemora, when under Swedish ownership, had built submarine diesels for the Swedish Navy's Baltic Sea conditions. This was more than unhelpful for the Australian Navy's warmer, saltier and rougher, Indian and Pacific oceanic conditions.

See https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt3fh0pr.12?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contentshttps://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt3fh0pr.12?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents which explains:

"The Collins boats are the only diesel submarines [in the world with this particular 18 cylinder Hedemora] engine....In 1998 a liaison with ASC visited Hedemora [in Sweden] to try to resolve some of the problems with [these] engines and was shocked to see [Hedemora] only had 35 employees and was up for sale. Hedemora's ability to assist [the Australian Submarine Corporation] ASC was minimal, and Australia had to deal with the responsibilities of operating and supporting a unique engine that was a key to the submarines' success."  

Someone had to buy Sweden's Hedemora, the only builder of the Collins' diesels, before Hedemora went broke. 

Furthermore, Peter Yule's and Derek Woolner's 2008 book The Collins Class Submarine Story: Steel, Spies and Spin on page 225 explains, in part:

"The problems with the [Hedemora] diesels led many to question the choice of Hedemora engines...[As early as 2008 Hans Ohff] believes Hedemora should never have been involved in the project because it was a small and declining company that lacked the resources to develop and support submarine engines of the size required for the Collins, or to remedy any defects." 

UNDER AUSTRALIAN OWNERSHIP HEDEMORA HAS IMPROVED - BUT THE COLLINS' PROBLEMS ARE NOT OVER

Some history - Hedemora Diesel is a trademark to the Swedish company Hedemora Turbo & Diesel AB [which] used to produce diesel engines for ships, locomotives, and oil rigs along with backup generators to hospitals. The company later shifted its focus to supply existing engines with spare parts and service. In February 2006 Hedemora Diesel was bought by the Australian company Coote Industrial Ltd.^[1] The Collins' diesels are now called Garden Island-Hedemora HV V18b/15Ub (VB210) 18-cylinder diesel motors.

__________________________________

SOME CONTEXT - SWEDISH KOCKUMS' PROPULSION PROBLEMS

Regarding the Collins submarines trials in the 1990s:

The fuel tanks were backfilled with seawater (as intended) BUT some of that seawater leaked into the Hedemora diesel engines, stopping compressed diesel fuel from igniting. But cylinders and pistons did compress, wrecking them. The whole process, of course, stopped the engine(s). This problem has never been completely fixed. Major “sun-roof” cutouts of top rear Collins hulls to remove the diesels for regular Total Overhauls (to remove rust-corrosion, salt, water) has weakened the pressure hulls of the whole Collins class thus reducing diving depth. This contributes to the total overall, overhaul, cost for the Collins submarines being about A$700 million per year.

“During trials of the first [Collins] submarines, the propulsion system was found to be prone to failure for a variety of reasons.^[93] Most failures were attributed to the fifteen-tank diesel fuel system: the tanks were designed to fill with salt water as they were emptied to maintain neutral buoyancy, but water would regularly enter the engines due to a combination of poor design, gravity separation of the fuel and water being insufficient, and operator error resulting from poor training.^[93] Problems were also caused by bacterial contamination of the diesel fuel, which, along with the salt water, would cause the fuel pumps to rust and other components to seize.^[94] The fuel-related issues were solved by installing coalescers, improving training and operational procedures, and adding biocides to the fuel.^[94]”

Shaft seals did not align properly during construction, causing seawater leaks in of up to 984 liters per minute in a deep test dive, almost sunk a Collins sub, perhaps  HMAS Dechaineux. Quick action by a crewman permitted this sub to rapidly move to surface to remove the pressure on onrushing water. 

“Propeller shaft seals were a significant problem on Collins and Farncomb.^[95] Although designed to allow for a leak of 10 litres per hour, during trials it was found that the seals would regularly misalign and allow hundreds of litres per hour into the boat—during one deep diving test the flow rate was measured at approximately 1,000 litres a minute.^[95] ASC claimed that solving these problems could be done by manually adjusting the seals as the submarine dived and rose, but this would have required a sailor dedicated solely to that task, affecting efforts to minimise the required number of personnel.^[95] It was found that the problem could be temporarily alleviated by running the propeller in reverse for 100 revolutions, pulling the seal back into alignment, although a permanent solution could initially not be found, as ASC refused to accept responsibility for the problem, and the original manufacturer of the seals had closed down.^[95] New suppliers were found, with modified seals fitted to the first two submarines in late 1996, before completely re-designed seals were fitted to the boats in late 1997, solving the problem.^[96] 

“The propellers themselves were also found to be poorly manufactured, having been shaped by hand, with at least one cast at the wrong pitch.^[97] This was rectified by using a five-axis milling machine for future shaping work and replacing the miscast propeller.^[98] The material used for the propellers was also found to be weaker than expected, developing fatigue cracks after only a few years of use.^[97] Instead of going to Kockums, which had started to go into decline after the end of the Cold War, the submarine project office sent the propeller to the United States Navy for redesigning.^[99] Despite the Americans fixing the problems with the propeller design, resulting in significant performance improvements, the Swedish company was dissatisfied with the Australian actions; the dispatch of the propellers was one of the points of contention in the [SWEDISH] company's legal action in the mid-2000s against the Australian government over ownership of the intellectual property rights to the submarine's design.^[100]

“Other propulsion problems included excessive motor vibrations at certain speeds which damaged various components (which was attributed to the removal of a flywheel and to corrosion caused by the fuel problems), and excessive fuel consumption in Collins at high speed (found to be caused by manufacturing problems with the turbines and turbochargers).^[101] The propulsion system was also found to be a secondary source of noise: poor design of the exhaust mufflers, weight-saving measures in the generator mountings, and an incorrect voltage supply to the battery compartment exhaust fans were noise-creating factors found and eliminated during studies by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation.^[102]