Abbott's February 2015 Submarine Promise Juggling Again Controversial

Australian Prime Minister Abbott's juggling of promises on the new submarine selection has again become controversial. Most of this controversy is old however what is new is:

- the lack of communication and joint decision-making between Abbott and his Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop (and presumably with her Department (DFAT)).

- that the Australian "Cabinet's top secret National Security Committee (NSC) met in October [2014] and supported a move that would allow the bulk of Australia's submarine fleet to be built offshore."

Abbott has made two conflicting promises:  :

1.  in 2013 - mid 2014 to South Australia that 12 new submarines would be built in South Australia, and

2. Abbott's request-promise in mid 2014 with Japanese Prime Minister Abe that Australia wishes to buy 6-12 new submarines from Japan (and built in Japan).

When Abbott's position as Prime Minister is threatened (as in February 2015) he quickly needs to juggle Promises 1 and 2. This juggling may occur again.

On March 16, 2015 Australia's ABC aired a 4 Corners program called "House of Cards" (video and transcript here) that recalled Abbott's juggling of Promises 1 and 2. See shorter report of ABC program (below). This juggling occurred on February 8-10, 2015 when Abbott told Liberal-National Party Coalition politicians that he would allow ASC to participate in an "open tender". This appeared to be a decision moving in the direction of Promise 1, as it would make it possible for Germany, France and Sweden to win and then "build in Australia".

By February 10, 2015 Abbott had apparently forgotten the "open tender" promise and had replaced it (or returned it) to "competitive evaluation proces" generally assumed to mean ASC could play a small part of "build in Japan". "Despite press speculation at the time, the [Australia's National Security Committee (NSC)] did not make any final decision to build the submarines in Japan." However it was assumed by many in the Federal Government and the South Australian Government that the build would occur in Japan (see article below).

This is a March 17, 2015 ABC article about the submarine issues that were brought to the surface in "House of Cards" (March 16, 2015) http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-17/tony-abbott-changed-submarine-tender-policy-leadership-spill/6324620 : 

"Tony Abbott changed submarine tender policy overnight when faced with leadership spill

Four Corners 

By Marian Wilkinson, Karen Michelmore and Mario Christodoulou

PHOTO: One of Australia's current fleet of Collins class submarines, patrolling ocean waters. (courtesy Defence Department)

Prime Minister Tony Abbott took less than 24 hours to agree to re-examine the Government's policy on the $20 billion future submarine project, in an effort to shore up votes against a leadership spill last month.

The ABC's Four Corners program can reveal that Cabinet's top secret National Security Committee (NSC) met in October last year and supported a move that would allow the bulk of Australia's submarine fleet to be built offshore.

The sensitive decision was not announced at the time, although a press release had been drawn up for then defence minister David Johnston.

In February, the weekend before the spill motion, South Australian senator Sean Edwards told Mr Abbott his vote would depend on whether local shipbuilders, including the Australian Submarine Corporation [ASC], would be given the opportunity to participate in a tender for the contract.

"He rang me at 6.30 on Saturday night and I heard from him at ten past three the following Sunday, the next day," Senator Edwards told Four Corners.

"He said he'd had a discussion with the defence minister and they'd come to a position on this, which obviously I was seeking."

Policy change not discussed with Bishop

Mr Abbott did not raise the submarine discussions that weekend with Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, a spokeswoman for Ms Bishop told the program.

This was despite Ms Bishop being a member of the NSC.

Mr Abbott's agreement with Senator Edwards again revisited the previous outcome of the October NSC meeting, which had broken an election promise to construct the submarines in South Australia.

Details of the highly confidential October [2014] NSC meeting were based on accounts from sources closely involved in the submarine project.

Despite press speculation at the time, the NSC did not make any final decision to build the submarines in Japan.

However, it did decide to open the way for their construction overseas because of time and cost constraints.

South Australia's Minister for Defence Industries, Martin Hamilton-Smith, told [ABC's 4 Corners] his State Government "kept receiving feedback ... that the Japan option was very much the option".

"In fact, I was told we may as well give up," Mr Hamilton-Smith said.

Following the leadership spill, Mr Abbott reconvened the NSC and Defence Minister Kevin Andrews announced on February 20 that the Future Submarines Project would involve a "competitive evaluation process".

Under that process, the Minister said the Defence Department would seek proposals from partners that included "options for design and build" of the submarines "overseas, in Australia and/or a hybrid approach" ENDS

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COMMENT

In my article of September 8, 2014 "Australia's Future Sub Likely to be Japan's Soryu, outsider is Germany" I indicated that it was likely Abbott had decided on buying Soryus built in Japan. I felt then and feel now that a foreign build is advisable. In that article I also raised some risks of Australia being Japan's first major defence customer as well as the Soryu's short range compared to what Australia wants.

The US may have put pressure on Japan and Australia to rush a Soryu deal but many details and issues (including substantial Australian participation) need to be ironed out first.   

Pete

Australian Defence Department's requirements for Submarine Bidders

Defence Minister Kevin Andrews successfully asserting himself. Graphics courtesy julian winter.

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Andrews finding it is better to publish strategy papers than respond to media scrums. Photo courtesy Adelaide Advertiser.

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The high level of controversy regarding Australia's future submarine selection has died down over  the past three weeks due to what I see as:

- Prime Minister Abbott's position is now less threatened. He has not needed to reiterate his "build in Japan" preference. Abbott has also withdrawn himself from other submarine comments and public appearances.

- the removal of Sweden's Saab-Kockums from the submarine competition. Saab's business model appeared to be very much "build in Australia" - a campaign Saab was understandably running in  Adelaide ship building circles. "Build in Australia" was facilitated by Saab having no functioning production line for new submarines in Sweden. In terms of production line the Archer class (RSS Swordsman) was re-launched in 2010 leaving a gap until a build date for the A26s becomes public. Potential customers would be reassured when Saab-Kockums's A26 production plans become known. [Stop Press - since I wrote these A26 comments 24 hours ago - Sweden has published a decision Sweden Orders [A26s] "Sweden is to buy two new submarines from constructors Saab Kockums. The A26 subs are to be delivered by 2022 and will cost up to SEK 8.2 billion ($945 million)" ]

- perhaps the main debate reducer was new Defence Minister Kevin Andrews decision to be  assertive and his issuing of the Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program (see  below).

The submarine controversy will of course resurface in acrimony but it is quiet at present. Submarine problems effecting relations with Japan will recur when Abbott's popularity in his Party and in public again slides. Doubts about Andrews may start again once the cost overruns and lateness of the Air War Destroyer and other defence embarrassments again hit the news.

A defence novice but with years of experience in several ministries Andrews is much wedded to defining the strategy and policy environment of major policy initiatives and programs. Hence he  delegated the task of writing a major paper Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program for publication. This task probably fell to the Australia Department of Defence, the Navy and probably the Expert Panel writing the Defence White Paper 2015. It is important that the Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program is consistent with the Defence White Paper (perhaps published around September 2015).

Publishing strategy papers avoids the tendency towards "policy on the run" with many voices issuing  fragmentary and conflicting statements. Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program below was issued as a Minister for Defence Media Release. It is well worth reading in full - as every part is significant and hopefully well thought out http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/02/20/minister-for-defence-strategic-direction-of-the-future-submarine-program/ :

"Minister for Defence – Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program

20 February 2015

Today the Government announces the acquisition strategy for the Future Submarine Program. This announcement sets out further details of the competitive evaluation process that will be undertaken by the Department of Defence.

Submarines are an essential component of Australia’s naval capability and the Government will ensure that the future submarine provides the best possible capability and value for money for Australian taxpayers while maximising the involvement of Australian industry.

Submarines are the most complex, sensitive and expensive Defence capability acquisition a Government can make.

Australia’s national security and $1.6 trillion economy depend on secure sea lanes. We need the best possible submarine to protect our trade and support our maritime security.

It must be delivered in time to avoid a capability gap in the mid-2020s when the Collins Class submarine is scheduled to be retired from service. The decisions we make on the Future Submarine Program will determine what kind of capability we have to defend Australia and Australian interests into the 2040s and beyond.

The process outlined by the Government today provides a pathway for Australian industry to maximise its involvement in the program, whilst not compromising capability, cost, program schedule or risk.

The Government expects that significant work will be undertaken in Australia during the build phase of the future submarine including combat system integration, design assurance and land based testing. This will result in the creation at least 500 new high-skill jobs in Australia, the majority of which will be based in South Australia.

The Future Submarine Program is the largest Defence procurement program in Australia’s history and represents an investment in the order of $50 billion in Australia’s security. These costs will be subject to refinement through the competitive evaluation process. A significant proportion of this investment will be spent in Australia during the lifetime of the future submarine.

Successive governments have used various kinds of competitive evaluation processes for major Defence capability procurements.

As part of this competitive evaluation process, the Department of Defence will seek proposals from potential partners for:
a) Pre-concept designs based on meeting Australian capability criteria;
b) Options for design and build overseas, in Australia, and/or a hybrid approach;
c) Rough order of magnitude (ROM) costs and schedule for each option; and
d) Positions on key commercial issues, for example intellectual property rights and the ability to use and disclose technical data.

In addition to this – and on the advice of Defence – the Government has endorsed a set of key strategic requirements for our future submarines:
a) Range and endurance similar to the Collins Class submarine;
b) Sensor performance and stealth characteristics that are superior to the Collins Class submarine; and
c) The combat system and heavyweight torpedo jointly developed between the United States and Australia as the preferred combat system and main armament.

Defence advises that for Australian industry to have the best opportunity to maximise their involvement in the Future Submarine Program, it needs to work with an international partner.
Based on work completed by Defence, France, Germany, and Japan have emerged as potential international partners. All three countries have proven submarine design and build capabilities and are currently producing submarines.

France, Germany and Japan will be invited to participate in this competitive evaluation process that will assess their ability to partner with Australia to develop a Future Submarine that meets our capability requirements.

The Department of Defence will invite potential international partners to seek opportunities for Australian industry participation in the Future Submarine Program.

The competitive evaluation process will help the Government balance important considerations including capability, cost, schedule, and risk. Interoperability with our alliance partner, the United States, will also be a fundamental consideration.

The competitive evaluation process will take around ten months, after which an international partner will be selected for Australia’s Future Submarine Program. Further details about Australian industry involvement are also expected to be known at that point.

The competitive evaluation process will ensure that capability, cost, schedule, and key strategic considerations, along with Australian industry involvement, are carefully and methodically considered, and avoid unnecessary delays to the Future Submarine Program.

The Department of Defence will soon be holding industry briefings to inform Australian industry about the process and how they can engage with potential international partners.

An expert advisory panel will also be appointed to oversee the competitive evaluation process. Further details about this will be announced once individual appointments are confirmed." ENDS

Pete

Update on Japan's legislative process for Soryu sale to Australia

Shinzo Abe when appointed Prime Minister in December 2012. He is steadily altering Japan's defence policies and laws, in response to the threats from China, North Korea and terrorism.

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Japanese air force F-15s, based in Okinawa. They mainly protect Japanese territorial interests in the East China Sea area. Amended laws will provide greater legal backing for broader Japanese military activities.

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Japan's competitors (Germany and France) in the submarine sale to Australia have policies and legal systems well in place to sell to Australia. Japan's own defence sales legal system probably needs years of work to make sales to Australia sufficiently legal under Japanese law and more acceptable to the broad Japanese public. The time-lag is made more serious by Australia being Japan's first multi-billion dollar weapons customer. So as things stand today Japan is at a legal disadvantage compared to established weapon exporters Germany and France. 

The Abe Government also needs to establish greater legal certainty while Abe's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has so many seats in both the lower (House of Representatives) and upper (House of Councillors) houses of the Diet (Parliament).  

The mass of decisions and documents required by Japan’s Government and companies to sell Soryu submarines to Australia require major legislative changes. This is a short update on part of the legislative process.

In July 2014 the Cabinet of Japan’s Abe Government agreed on three new requirements for using the right of collective self-defence. The three requirements were (and are) that:

1.    there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan and also in some cases its allies,

2.    there is no appropriate means to repel this incursion other than the use of force in self-defence, and

3.    the use of force is confined to the minimum level needed to repel the attack.

On March 6, 2015 a council meeting of the majority LDP and its coalition partner Komeito further discussed revising laws. It was decided that an outline of security legislation will be formulated by the end of March 2015, and the government will start writing the texts of the bills in April 2015. The bills will amend such laws as:

-          the Law on Response to Armed Attack Situations, and

-          the Self-Defense Forces Law

The LDP sees actual changes to Japan’s Constitution as a long term goal requiring agreement in the Diet and also a referendum. Article 96 of the Constitution provides that a proposed amendment must first be approved by both houses of the Diet, by at least a super majority of two-thirds of each house (rather than just a simple majority). It must then be submitted to a referendum in which it is sufficient for it to be endorsed by a simple majority of votes cast. A successful amendment is finally promulgated by the Emperor, but the monarch cannot veto an amendment.

Soryu to Australia

The legislative changes mentioned above add legal legitimacy and also help build consensus for a non-pacifist Japanese defence policy. Actual Principles and Guidelines form part of the mass of decisions and documents required to sell Soryu submarines to Australia. Principles and Guidelines include:

1.     The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology of April 1, 2014 http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press22e_000010.html and 

2. The Implementation Guidelines for 1 Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000034954.pdf
This was adopted by Japan's National Security Council on April 1, 2014 .

Within the Guidelines I understand that Provision 1,2)A will be applied in possible the Soryu or related technology transfer to Australia. The Provision is:

1. Cases in which Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology may be
Permitted

2) Overseas transfers that contribute to Japan’s security, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of Japan’s security, and that:

A. are related to international joint development and production with countries
cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S.,"

COMMENT

The Abe Government appears to be steadily working towards changes in laws needed to permit such exports as the Soryu to Australia.

The agreement of Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) with its more centrist coalition partner Komeito seems required for these changes in laws. Komeito’s power comes from its centrist nature and its numbers in both the lower and upper house of the Diet (Parliament). Komeito’s agreement to the wording the LDP wants in the laws may be an obstacle, if Komeito hesitates from April 2015 onwards.

It is difficult to assess whether the Principles and Guidelines needed to sell Soryus to Australia are currently overly strict or prescriptive. There are sensitivities in the Australian military over how Sweden, due to Sweden’s export guidelines, decided to embargo Carl Gustav anti-tank weapon ammunition to Australia during the Vietnam War. Sweden’s decision not to sustain the Carl Gustav weapon system with ammunition, in time of great need, was probably the main Australian concern.

I do not know whether Japan’s submarine sale competitors, Germany and France, have similar Principles and Guidelines that may potentially restrict sale or sustainment of their submarines.

Japan's defence laws may be modified to be less pacifist but most depends on how they are interpreted, by politicians, the judiciary and the public.

I would be grateful to Japanese readers if you could comment whether I have an accurate view or not.

Regards

Pete

Brazil's New Submarine Program (ProSub) and Australia - March 2015 Update

See Guanabara Bay (Baia de Guanabara) to the right of central Rio. Guanabara Bay is the home of Brazil's current submarine base. To the left of Rio is Sepetiba Bay (Baia de Sepetiba). Brazil's new submarine base-shipyard complex at Port Itaguaí, 80 km west of Rio. The creation of the new base is due to base growth, environmental and population concerns including dangers from stored ammunition and the remote possibility of nuclear reactor leakage.

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Please link with: Brazil's Future SSN -DCNS Assistance - Australian Interest? of January 5, 2014.

Brazil's Future Submarine Program (ProSub) Comparison with Australia's

Brazil's decision to build its own submarines is, of course, relevant to the submarine building aspirations of many in Australia. Australia's experience in the 1980s and 90s was similar in that it built its current submarines, the Collins, in Australia just as Brazil built its current Tupi class, in Brazil. A difference now is that Australia aims to have its new submarines built overseas while Brazil is building its Scorpenes in Brazil.

Another difference from Australian is that the fifth and last Brazilian submarine will be nuclear propelled - known as SN-BR. Going nuclear propelled is a major financial and technical risk for Brazil. A roughly comparable case is India's development of its indigenously built INS Arihant. Arihant has been developed with probably closer Russian support than France intends for Brazil. Still India has found that Arihant's reactor has been more problematic than expected with consequent delays in fully running the reactor.

India's experience is also a reminder to Australia that if Australia wanted nuclear propulsion it is probably best for Australia to buy or "lease" complete SSNs from the US rather than evolving indigenous solutions. Arihant is unlikely to be India's last developmental submarine. SN-BR may not be Brazil's last. If SN-BR is based on France's Rubis-Amethyste class SSN that may save Brazil much time and cost. Still much depends on foreign policy outlook. Brazil and India are basically non-aligned while Australia is very dependent on and aligned with the US.

A further difference between Brazil and Australia is that Brazil is pursuing a lower (conventional Scorpene) and high (SN-BR) capability strategy while Australia has restricted itself to a "medium" strategy of an unusually capable conventional submarine.

A similarity between Australia and Brazil is the need to move the submarine base. Australia moved its submarines from (HMAS Platypus) in Sydney from the 1980s to HMAS Stirling (Rockingham, Western Australia). There were several reasons for Australia's decision including the desire to host nuclear submarines of Australia's allies away from a (or the) major city. Implicitly Rockingham also offered the option of being the base for Australian nuclear submarines.

Returning to Brazil - Port Itaguaí shipyard and base is being constructed by the Sociedade de Proposito Especifico (SPE) consortium, which includes Brazil’s Odebrecht (50%), France’s DCNS (49%) and the Brazilian Navy (1% “golden share,” with veto power).

There are many question marks (?) that follow due to language differences, repetition in official sources and much old information in secondary sources. In French and Portuguese Submarine Program is reversed to Program Submarine, hence ProSub. With base-shipbuilding facilities now (fully?) established actual submarine building has commenced.

Brazil's new Conventional Submarines

Four of the five new submarines will be enlarged (75 m long, 2000 tons displacement) Scorpenes of DCNS design "CM-2000" and ProSub designation "S-Br". Brazil's Scorpenes may well have a crew of up to 45 and 18 torpedos or missiles. It is unclear whether these Scorpenes will have AIP(?). The hull of the first Scorpene (Riachuelo) was laid down at Cherbourg, France on 27 May 2010 and flown in prefabricated sections ("jumboized") by Airbus to Brazil in late 2012. Sections (including steel fabrication) for the next three Scorpenes are being made in Brazil.

No.     Name            Laid down               Launched      Commissioned   Based

S40     Riachuelo       27 May 2010              maybe 2018      maybe 2019             Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

S41     Humaitá         1 Sept 2013                 maybe 2020      maybe 2021             Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

S42     Tonelero         maybe 2015                maybe 2021      maybe 2022             Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

S43     Angostura       maybe 2017                maybe 2022      maybe 2023             Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

Brazilian Nuclear Submarine (SN-BR)

Due to non-proliferation and broader political sensitivities DCNS and Brazil claim that DCNS will not actually help Brazil place the reactor in SN-BR. This claim may be somewhat disputed due to the reactor being of partly French design and SN-BR perhaps being based on the French Barracuda SSN. Training of some Brazilian crew on French SSNs is likely - on Rubis-Amethyste SSNs and/or Barracudas.

No.        Name                  Laid down          Launched         Commissioned    Based 

SN10    Álvaro Alberto     maybe 2023        maybe 2030       maybe 2035         Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

Brazil has medium-long term plans for 5-6 further SSNs if Álvaro Alberto is successful.  

There currently appears to be expectations that SN-BR will be around 100m long and 9m wide. This coincides with France's Barracuda SSN dimensions of: 99.5m long and beam: 8.8m. The Barracuda , when launched around 2018-19 will be 4,765 tons (surfaced) and 5,300 tons (submerged). Therefore the future SN-BR may have a similar displacement when launched around 2030. The broader Brazilian nuclear submarine program involves Brazil's aim to fully enrich and shaping uranium for placement in the submarine reactor.

In 1979 the Brazilian military government of the day created a secret program to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle outside international safeguards. Under the Brazilian navy’s special projects commission (COPESP), the program initially focused on developing a small light-water reactor for submarine propulsion and an indigenous uranium-enrichment capability using gas centrifuges. COPESP began construction of a pilot enrichment plant at the Aramar Experimental Center in Iperó (São Paulo state) in 1987. At the inauguration of the plant, authorities said the facility would produce low-enriched uranium (5 percent enrichment) for existing power and research reactors and for nuclear submarine reactors. [Pete's Comment - 5% enriched Uranium seems very low energy intensity for a submarine reactor. 5% may have been a notional figure to satisfy non-proliferation regulators if the program was exposed.]

Under the 1991 Brazilian-Argentine peaceful use of nuclear energy "Guadalajara" Agreement. Article III states that “none of the provisions of the present Agreement shall limit the right of the Parties to use nuclear energy for the propulsion of any type of vehicle, including submarines, since propulsion is a peaceful application of nuclear energy."

From around 2010 the currently proposed(?) reactor is known as  2131-R Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). France assisted in the reactor design, but the reactor itself will be built in Brazil (?). An earlier NTI article (first paragraph) talked of  land-based test reactor RENAP-11 (of 11 MW), which may not yet have been developed. The submarine reactor itself may be of 48 MW noting that the French Rubis-Amethyste class SSN used a PWR reactor known as the K48 with an output of 48 MW. The Rubis weighs 2,400 tons (surfaced). At the upper end of the French scale the Barracuda SSN of 5,000 tons will have a 150 MW reactor. 150 MW would be very ambitious for a first generation indigenous submarine - noting India's INS Arihant publically relies on a 83 MW reactor.

Brazil has probably gone beyond the following description. Currently, Brazil mines and perhaps buys some uranium, converts it into yellowcake. The yellowcake is shipped from Brazil to Canada for enrichment using the hexafluoride gas method. The gas (?) is then shipped to Europe for enrichment by the US-UK-Dutch-German Urenco Group.

In December 2014 it was reported "A demonstration plant was built at the Aramar Experimental Center in Iperó (São Paulo state), which remains a naval facility to provide fuel enriched [by hexafluoride gas cascade] to less than 20% for the submarine program. Currently enrichment here is reported to be to 5% U-235." "less than 20%" enriched is stated because more than 20% enriched is considered Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) which is considered a heightened nuclear proliferation concern. Brazil and France do not want to push things by venturing into political pressures from non-nuclear neighbours or from legal nuclear weapon states like Russia and the US.

Artist's impression of Brazil's new Submarine Program (ProSub) Base and Shipbuilding facility at Port Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay. Brazil's decision to build its own submarines of French-DCNS designs is, of course relevant, to the submarine building aspirations of many in Australia. 

Current Brazilian Submarines

Brazil's currently has five TKMS Type 209s commissioned 1989-2006 and designated the Tupi Class. Four were built in Brazil. It is unclear whether the first of class, BNS Tupi (commissioned 1989) is still active(?). They are based at Guanabara Bay, Rio Base Naval Almirante Castro e Silva (see first NTI paragraph).

Value to Brazil of Submarines

Brazil’s submarines are seen as a key part of the country’s national defence strategy which includes protection of Brazil’s offshore energy reserves, protecting the Amazon's fresh water and countering great power nuclear submarine supremacy (including that of the US). Nuclear submarine supremacy became a major issue when Britain's SSNs totally dominated (Brazil's neighbour) Argentina's Navy in the 1982 Falklands War. SN-BR can more effectively monitor (remaining submerged longer) and neutralize naval forces - as it can patrol a wider area more quickly.
The nuclear submarine project, because of the dual-use nature of its reactor development and uranium enrichment, has been touted as holding the promise of enhancing both civilian and military exports.
Nuclear propulsion also contributes to Brazil's great power aspirations - short of actually building nuclear weapons.

Sources 

The following sources are useful although there is much repetition and it is unclear what is old and what is current information. Therefore there are many question marks (?).  Comments from Brazilian readers are welcome to fill in the blanks :) 

The website http://www.defesanet.com.br/prosub/ contains a wealth of updates on ProSub.  

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/brazil-france-in-deal-for-ssks-ssn-05217/  

For the World Nuclear Association's report, updated March 2015, see “Nuclear Power in Brazil” http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/Brazil/

Drawn from USNI http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-06/why-does-brazil-need-nuclear-submarines

Pete