About subs, military/naval, missiles, nuclear weapons & politics. New Aussie subs have been just talk since 2009. Collins LOTE 2028-2040? of partial help. UUVs help more. POTUS may cancel AUKUS Virginias in 2031 as the USN needs all SSNs to the 2040s. Australian Gov ignores US higher priority to Columbia SSBNs (one/year being commissioned 2029-2041). Meaning minimal Virginia production until 2043. Shawn C and Gessler are excellent authors.
Another indication the UK will be main foreign manager of Australia's future SSN:
The Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR), March 8, 2023 indicates:
Sir Nick Hine “A former UK Royal Navy vice admiral with decades of experience in naval strategy and submarine operations has been appointed as [UK company] Babcock’s first Managing Director – AUKUS & International to lead the company’s newly established division aiming to deliver key capabilities in support of the trilateral security treaty.
…Operating the UK’s only licensed facility for refitting refuelling and defuelling nuclear submarines, Babcock manages two of the UK’s three naval bases (HMNB Clyde and HMNB Devonport)…”
See the whole APDR article HERE.
Pete Comment
I don't think I'm cherry picking information when I say, in comparison I know of no US company team dealing with Australian SSN aspects in the way this UK company is.
India has set for itself the massive burden of conducting 6 major submarine activities. In no particular order of priority:
1. Using a foreign design to build 6 Project-75(I) SSKs with AIP.
The DSME-3000 Batch-II (B2) with indigenously developed AIP, LIBs and
6 to 10 VLS appears to by the most modern and powerful SSK/SSB. In Indian service its 10+
vertically launched SLCMs or SLBMs could be nuclear armed. Making the DSME-3000
B2 a potent SSB with a second strike capability against Pakistan. This sub
carries technical risks in that B2 is years from completion in South Korea (SK)
and financial risks. SK has never sold such an advanced sub to anyone and might not sell
it to India.
Germany would probably not
permit export of its Type 212CD to India given the risk its stealth technology might be leaked to India’s
(almost ally) Russia.
Less risky and less expensive than the DSME-3000 B2 would be Germany’s Type 214 with PEM AIP
or SK’s Type 214 variant (KSS-II) (if Germany permits re-export of its PEM AIP. These would be more likely prospects,
An advanced French Scorpene
with emerging LIBs or 2nd/3rd generation French AIP (if
export permitted) or DRDO AIP makes sense as there is already a Kalvari Scorpene assembly line in Mumbai. If India opted for higher cost and risk than a conventional Barracuda - perhaps tied in with French assistance for India's SSN project (see below) might make sense.
Other choices might be ruled out including:
- the Russian Amur-class - no working AIP and the rest of the sub is under-developed. Maybe India would be happy with an advanced Kilo with Ukraine proven Kalibr SLCMs (better than Klubs).
- Spanish S-80 Plus - no AIP with a record at sea, Spain has never developed and exported a submarine class (all by itself)
- Japan may be unwilling to export a sensitive specs submarine of Soryu or Taigei standard. However the likely lower specs subs (mainly) Japan has designed for Taiwan's "Indigenous" Defence Submarine may have potential.
2. Developing an indigenous DRDO
AIP
3. Completing the 4 x Arihant-class small SSBNs
4. Developing and building a full
size S5 SSBN
5. Developing and building 6
Project-75 Alpha SSNs
and
6. Constructing INS Varsha the future base to protect all of India’s SSBNs and SSNs in tunnels.
India is seeking to generate competition between several country/company submarine sellers to correct the lack of competition, through to 2022, resulting from the official "must have working AIP" Project-75(I) process.
India’s Financial Express
reported late February 2023:
“Germany is offering
next-generation submarines to India, worth a $5.2 billion deal to jointly build
six conventional submarines [to meet Project-75(I)]. While there is no official confirmation, the talks
over the submarine took place during [German] Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit,
it is learnt.” It is unclear which AIP submarine Germany is offering – the current
technology Type 214 or future (and much larger) Type 212CD.
If true Germany might be
offering the only competition against South Korea’s DSME Type 214 variant (Germany
might object that DSME is on-selling German designed 214 technology). To avoid any German objection DSME may be offering the SK designed DSME-3000.
The rumour mill is that Russia’s
Rubin Amur-1650,
Spain’s Navantia S-80 Plus and France’s Naval Group Scorpene (or conventional
Barracuda) are also in 75(I) contention. Some in India intend to upgrade/retrofit French Kalavari and future 75(I) SSKs with the DRDO AIP but this plan may come to nothing. Yet those three countries/companies have
failed to meet the major 75(I) criteria of having produced an efficient, mature,
modern, AIP with proven operation at sea.
Meanwhile arch-enemy Pakistan is relying on efficient China to perhaps deliver 4 x China assembled Hangor-class Yuan-variants to Pakistan by 2024. Pakistan may complete the final 4 Hangors by 2028 . All 8 x Hangors may have AIP. But the Hangors may lack the more effective German designed MTU 396 diesel engines - with China offering its reportedly inferior Chinese designed CHD620 diesels instead.
Looking at the security
aspects of the Nuclear
Powered Submarine Taskforce’s subsite is interesting:
“The taskforce is a
whole-of-government effort and is staffed with representatives from across
government, including…the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.” [ASIO]
Assisting ASIO in the vetting
process of the Taskforce’s 250+ staff is the “Australian Government Security Vetting Agency”
The Submarine Taskforce staff would probably, or hopefully, already
have Top Secret clearance for their pre-Taskforce jobs, To join the Taskforce
they would probably require a more stringent clearance of TOP SECRET (SPECIAL ACCESS or CODEWORD). This may
be the equivalent to the older clearance of TOP SECRET (ABSOLUTE)
required of DIO staff.
Those on the Taskforce with a need to know of the US
and UK Nuclear Reactor secrets would probably need to acquire US TOP SECRET (Q CLEARANCE [nuclear
weapons and related materials]) which may require passing US Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency
polygraph tests.
To pass Top Secret (Special Access or Codeword) clearance in Australia requires “Negative Vetting Level 2 and Positive Vetting clearance holders can access classified resources up to and including TOP SECRET.”