Rare Report SSBN: USS West Virginia at Diego Garcia: Australia?

Pete Comment

I think it is rare that a US SSBN is reported visiting an Indian Ocean port, particularly to occasionally controversial Diego Garcia. Also note, in the Report  below, USS West Virginia is home based in the Atlantic (not Pacific) specifically at Kings Bay, Georgia. 

This publicized Indian Ocean presence may be partly for Putin's benefit, reminding him that however much he nuclear sabre-rattles, he is surrounded by US SLBMs. This includes central Russia's 31st and 33rd Rocket Army ICBM heartland.

I assume from Kings Bay this SSBN rounded the Cape of Good Hope (Southern Africa) to get into the Indian Ocean. Or perhaps it took the longer way round - around Cape Horn and then around "Australia's" Southern Ocean into the Indian Ocean (certainly not through the narrows of the Indonesian archipelago). 

This is also assuming this SSBN does not attempt Arctic Ocean sea-routes that are presumably over-frequented by Russian SSNs and other Russian ASW platforms. 

Once Australia's navy has its own SSNs one major role may be contributing to the defence of US and UK SSBNs. This would more directly involve Australia's navy in the US and UK(?) extended nuclear deterrent that covers Australia. Perhaps that has been put into words in a secret part of the AUKUS agreement. SSNs from Australia's main submarine Fleet Base West (near Perth) 2040s onwards, may be well situated to intercept China's increasingly frequent SSNs and even SSBNs entering and leaving the Indian Ocean.

Australia's Fleet Base West may increasingly serve as a more comfortable (also a   duplicate) Indian Ocean base for US nuclear sub visits, especially for crew changeovers. 

Report 

 US DoD’s unified Strategic Command, November 28, 2022, reports:

"USS West Virginia visits Diego Garcia during extended deterrence patrol

By U.S. Strategic Command Public Affairs

DIEGO GARCIA, British Indian Ocean Territory

 - The Ohio-class ballistic missile   submarine USS West Virginia (SSBN 736) stopped in Diego Garcia for a brief port visit Oct. 25-31, 2022, during an extended deterrence patrol providing security and stability to our Allies.

The visit, part of West Virginia's sustained deterrence operations in the United States Central Command and Indo-Pacific Command areas of responsibility, emphasizes the unmatched capabilities of a ballistic missile submarine to deter and, if necessary, respond from anywhere on the globe.

"Every operational plan rests on the assumption that nuclear deterrence is holding, and SSBNs like West Virginia are vital to a credible nuclear deterrence for the United States and our Allies," said Adm. Charles Richard, commander of U.S. Strategic Command.

West Virginia is one of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs that make up the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad by serving as an undetectable launch platform for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Before visiting Diego Garcia, West Virginia surfaced to embark Gen. Michael Kurilla, the commander of U.S. Central Command, in the Arabian Sea and participated in a joint, U.S. Strategic Command-directed communications exercise to validate emerging and innovative tactics in the Indian Ocean.

"West Virginia, like each of our ballistic missile submarines, is specifically designed for extended deterrent patrols," said Vice Adm. William Houston, commander of Naval Submarine Forces. "The stealth and response capability of these submarines combined with the crew's training make our SSBNs the most powerful warships in the world."

The submarine also conducted a complete crew exchange in Diego Garcia and a subsequent replenishment at sea, highlighting the SSBN force's readiness and flexibility to remain on patrol for an extended period of time.

West Virginia is one of six ballistic-missile submarines stationed at Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia, and can carry up to 20 submarine-launched ballistic missiles with multiple warheads.

Submarine Forces execute the Department of the Navy's strategic deterrence mission in and from the undersea domain. In addition to lending added capacity to naval forces, Submarine Forces, in particular, are expected to leverage those unique advantages that come with undersea concealment to permit operational, deterrent, and combat effects that the Navy and the nation could not otherwise achieve.

U.S. Strategic Command forces operate around the world, around the clock, to deter strategic attacks and employ forces as directed to guarantee the security of our Nation and our Allies. For more information about U.S. Strategic Command, visit https://www.stratcom.mil/. "

USS West Virginia (SSBN 736) docking at Diego Garcia. See the very short official Stratcom Youtube of the visit.
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US 2022 China Military Power Report out today: Submarines

The Pentagon’s 2022 China Military Power Report was released today, Nov 29, 2022 (Nov 30 Australian time).

It carries the full name "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China". This Congressionally-mandated report serves as an authoritative assessment of the US DoD's pacing challenge and charts the current course of the PRC's military and security strategy.

This follows the DoD’s release of its unclassified National Defense Strategy in October 2022, which "identified the PRC as the most consequential and systemic challenge to U.S. national security and a free and open international system." 

The full 196 page .PDF "2022 China Military Power Report" is HERE.

Major mentions of submarines in it include:

Page XIII - "As the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage, the PRC is increasing its shipbuilding capacity and capability for all naval classes: submarines, warships, and auxiliary and amphibious ships. China also has developed underwater systems, publicly revealing a long-range system in 2019 [More on that long range system(s) here and here].

Page 52 – “Submarines. The PLAN has placed a high priority on modernizing its submarine force, but its force structure continues to grow modestly as it works to mature its force, integrate new technologies, and expand its shipyards.

The PLAN currently operates six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 44 diesel-powered/air-independent powered attack submarines (SS/SSP). 

The PLAN will likely maintain between 65 and 70 submarines through the 2020s, replacing older units with more capable units on a near one-to-one basis.

The PRC continues to increase its inventory of conventional submarines capable of firing advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, the PLAN purchased 12 Russian-built KILO class SS units, eight of which are capable of launching ASCMs. China’s shipyards have delivered 13 SONG class SS units (Type 039) and 17 YUAN class diesel-electric air-independent propulsion attack submarine (SSP) (Type 039A/B). The PRC is expected to produce a total of 25 or more YUAN class submarines by

Page 53 – “2025. In late 2021, the PLAN retired the first two KILO class submarines purchased from Russia in the 1990s. Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed twelve nuclear submarines – two SHANG I class SSNs (Type 093), four SHANG II class SSNs (Type 093A), and six JIN class SSBNs (Type 094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) (7,200KM), the PLAN’s six operational JIN class SSBNs represent the PRC’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. By the mid-2020s, China will likely build the SHANG class (Type 093B) guided-missile nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSGN). This new SHANG class variant will enhance the PLAN’s anti-surface warfare capability and could provide a clandestine land-attack option if equipped with land-attack cruise missiles (LACM). The PLAN is also improving its antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities through the development of its surface combatants and special mission aircraft, but it continues to lack a robust deep-water ASW capability. By prioritizing the acquisition of ASW capable surface combatants, acoustic surveillance ships, and fixed and rotary wing ASW capable aircraft, the PLAN is significantly improving its ASW capabilities. However, it will still require several years of training and systems integration for the PLAN to develop a robust offensive deep water ASW capability.

Page 54 - Eight of the PLAN’s 10 KILO class SSs are equipped with the Russian built SS-N-27b [Kalibr] ASCM (120NM, 220KM). The PRC’s SONG class SS, YUAN class SSP, and SHANG class SSN field the PLAN’s newest domestic submarine launched YJ-18 and its variants, which constitute an improvement over the SS-N-27b ASCM… As the PLAN continues to transition into a global multi-mission force, the addition of landattack capabilities to its modern array of anti-surface and anti-air capabilities is a logical next step. 

In the coming years, the PLAN will probably field LACMs on its newer cruisers and destroyers and developmental SHANG class Type 093B SSGN. The PLAN could also retrofit its older surface combatants and submarines with land-attack capabilities as well. The addition of land-attack capabilities to the PLAN’s surface combatants and submarines would provide the PLA with flexible long-range strike options. This would allow the PRC to hold land targets at risk beyond the Indo-Pacific region. 

Page 94 – “The PRC is conducting continuous at-sea deterrence patrols with its six JIN-class (Type 094) submarines (SSBNs), which are equipped to carry up to 12 JL-2 or JL-3 SLBMs.”

Page 96 – “Sea-based Platforms. The PRC likely began near-continuous at-sea deterrence patrols with its six operational JIN class SSBNs, which are equipped to carry up to 12 CSS-N-14 (JL-2) or CSS-NX-20 (JL-3) SLBMs.

The PRC’s next-generation Type 096 SSBN is probably intended to field MIRVed SLBMs judging from past developmental trends. The 096 SSBNs will likely begin construction in the early-2020s. Based on the 30-plus-year service life of the PRC’s first generation SSNs, the PRC will operate its [Type 094] JIN and Type 096 SSBN fleets concurrently.

The current range limitations of the JL-2 will require the JIN to operate in areas north and east of Hawaii if the PRC seeks to target the east coast of the United States. The fielding of newer, more capable, and longer ranged SLBMs such as the JL-3 gives the PLAN the ability to target the continental United States from littoral waters allowing the PLAN to consider bastion operations to enhance the survivability of its sea-based deterrent. The South China Sea and Bohai Gulf are probably the PRC’s preferred options for employing this concept.

Page 166 – see “Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces” table, which includes submarines [heavily in China’s favour]

[As I can't convert .PDF to .html below is last year's table, courtesy Econbrowser. Until the 2022 Table is available in .html].

Future Dutch Submarine RFQ: "3,200 tonnes"

Submarine Matters has been monitoring the Netherlands' Future Dutch Submarines (aka Walrus-class submarine replacement) process since 2015.

All credit to a (likely) Dutchman (codename “Kevin”) and more recently non-Dutch /Kjell for describing the Netherlands submarine needs and the replacement process. See this overview of the process.

On November 16, 2022 Netherlands Ministry of Defense Press Release (reproduced by Naval News) indicated:

Today, as previously discussed with the House, the Ministry of Defense has [issued a Request for Quotations (RFQ)] for 4 new submarines from 3 candidate shipyards. The candidate yards are Naval Group , Saab Kockums and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. They are expected to submit their bids around the [northern summer - June to August] 2023.

Defense then needs a number of months to analyse the detailed bids. Based on predetermined requirements and award criteria, the Ministry of Defense decides which yard is allowed to build the boats. One of the award criteria is the participation of Dutch companies in the development, construction and maintenance of important systems of the boat. Defense also wants as much Dutch involvement as possible to strengthen the technological and industrial base. The winning yard must sign an agreement for this with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy.”

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On November 27, 2022 /Kjell identified the Naval News Youtubes, with the intrepid Xavier Vavasseur, interviewing the 3 bidders and Dutch DMO to the extent possible, including:

Naval Group - Around Nov 24, 2022 “Naval Group's Conventional Barracuda” 1:25 maybe pumpjet, benefitting from France’s Barracuda SSN [and maybe Attack-class  SSK] programs. Mediterranean, Caribbean seas, Atlantic, Indian oceans, seabed capable. All quieting technologies included https://youtu.be/B3Agdn7_CJA

SAAB Damen - Around Nov 24, 2022 “Saab C71 Submarine (based on A26)” Offering Multi-mission Portal, UK Sonars offered. Can have modular extensions, Dutch technical/maintenance autonomy important. https://youtu.be/oaRwYfxRpJA

TKMS - Youtube around Nov 25, 2022 “Type 212CD E” ie. the 212 Common Design, Extended Range sufficient to transit Netherlands to Dutch Caribbean several weeks on station, then transit back. Maybe 3,200 tonnes submerged. At 1:40 what look like 10 vertical launch doors are apparent https://youtu.be/91OaZFdprTY

Dutch DMO Requirements - Youtube around Nov 23, 2022 “Dutch Naval Programs at NEDS 2022: Submarines” Dutch Admiral (Director Defense Materiel Organisation (DMO)) saying new subs will need to have all capabilities of the Walrus class [implicitly range, so same/more diesel fuel, so higher displacement likely] https://youtu.be/vj_oFLqsfww . Portion on subs is at 1:40 to 7:10.

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The Nov 16, 2022 Press Release was foreshadowed in an earlier, September 30, 2022 Netherlands Ministry of Defense Press Release https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2022/09/30/belangrijke-mijlpaal-vervanging-onderzeeboten-offerteaanvraag-gereed indicating ability to carry “long range missiles” is a requirement.

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Pete Comment

It is unknown whether the Dutch Navy requires Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) and/or AIP for the future subs. Some past commenters have considered Naval Group and TKMS less likely winners because the Dutch don’t like being dominated by these large neighbours. Then again, having lost the Australian order Naval Group’s SSK Division might be very hungry – thus maybe offering the lowest price. But who knows?!

SONARS and POWER USAGE

Where "C" wrote on Nov 25, 2022 "I'm no sonar engineer, but I'm still baffled why a sonar system in passive mode would consume upwards of 75Kw - active is different for sure - those are BIG numbers."

I'm also no sound engineer, but I would say:

A passive sonar uses a lot of power to amplify very weak sounds and for massive processing of signal tasks to make sense of sounds, esoecially identifying the precise source. See what Aaron describes in 2 below.

SSKs and SSNs (all attack subs) are more famous users of spherical active and passive sonar uses for ASW and anti-ship work.

However attack subs also use very weak, discrete beam, active/passive navigation/movement sonar pulses to image the seafloor, seamounts and other obstructions that the sub would otherwise risk banging into. Again these are very weak pulses undetectable by enemy sonars/seafloor hydrophones but are received on a constant basis by the sub's active/passive bow sonar.

1. On what happens when this imaging system doesn't work or isn't efficiently used see my November 2021 reporting on the Seawolf class sub USS Connecticut's major accident hitting a seamount:

1A - here https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2021/11/us-sub-did-hit-seabed-projecting.html

1B - especially the diagram here https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2021/11/uss-connecticuts-sonar-navigation-wasnt.html

2 Aaron, a former USN Los Angeles class SSN and Ohio class SSBN Sonarman,  does discuss how sonars/sonarmen work in detail here and on his "Sub Brief" Youtube website https://www.youtube.com/c/subbrief

Aaron's (aka Jive Turkey's) description is interesting:

2A - 2min45secs into "The Ping" https://youtu.be/24uLeEKma5g It sounds like Aaron was using a great deal of energy for his Active (anti-sub or surface ship) "Ping".

2B - 20min into "USS Connecticut South China Sea Collision" https://youtu.be/5VKQPBhu0z0  eg. avoid collision "tools...that they will not make public" which Pete suspects is navigation sonar mode.

A Seawolf-class bow sonar arrangement (photo courtesy USN via The Drive 2020.)

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2C - 1:36 into "USS Connecticut Damage Update..." https://youtu.be/vB-eSTpvKgs shows what I think is the half spherical active sonar - it is so positioned (mainly downward) to send weak navigation pulses, picked up by the much larger spherical passive sonar. (photo above)

So much for us all to learn on the edges of guesswork.

AUKUS SSNs "could cost A$10 Billion each"

In an exclusive Andrew Tillett for the Australian Financial Review (AFR), on November 25, 2022, reports a whole range of new (possible) issues titled:

“Warning that nuclear submarines could cost $10b each”

"C" on Submarine Hotel Load Power Uses & Amounts

“C” on Nov 23, 2022 made a long comment on submarine hotel load power uses.

It’s a comment well worth turning into the following article:

"Replying to Anonymous's very interesting response [of Nov 16, 2022 here]  to my Hotel load point: the comment from Fleet Command Kobayashi [scroll down here for his photo and bio] is revealing and useful in confirming my suspicion that submarine commanders are likely judicious in what systems they run during endurance exercises.

I would add that the Thales VELOX-M8 Intercept Sonar example I gave (which is one of the very few examples I have found in literature where the vendor has given a power value) was 400W, or 0.4Kw, which is not a lot in the bigger picture of hotel load computations, which seem to waffle between 50 and 200 KWh. This is an intercept sonar, ie. a relatively small item of kit, an adjunct auxiliary to the primary arrays mainly used for classifying a received tone (sound electronic support measures (ESM) [intelligence gathering] essentially). The processing unit takes up about 6U of rack-space, and I'm not sure the array size, but intercept sonars are typically very small, the British type 2019 "nipple" being iconic [scroll half way down the very informative "The History Of British Submarine Sonars" for "SONAR TYPE 2019 DOME"].

Nonetheless the point that designers actively have tilted away from certain system layouts typical in nuke boats because of power consumption is good to have confirmed.

Here's my extremely rough cut of load for a medium-large boat with a crew of c. 60, and these are, in my view, very generous:

ENVIRONMENT

12KW for Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) (rough guide of 5 people per KW)

1KW for lighting (incandescent lighting should be long gone, LED's are so vastly superior in sub context its not funny)

FOOD

3Kw for refrigeration (A 30 cubic-meter cold room will draw about this)

5Kw for food preparation (this will flux according to usage, but this will power an oven an 4 hot plates at full tilt, but I use this number as an "average")

2Kw for misc (kettles/boilers etc, also an average as will flux)

OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY (OT)

This is trickier and depends on degree of automation on board, I work in Mining OT space so by way of comparison, all the OT control systems of a large processing mill, with around 250 devices draws, for CONTROL purposes, between 2 and 8 Kw, depending on how many things are in state-change at any point in time. This feels a reasonable starting point, so...

6KW for onboard OT. (eg. raising a mast will require a controller that draws only a few watts constantly, but the actual Variable speed drive (VSD) which is driven by it, that does the actual hoist, will draw mush more for the few seconds its working)

SONAR, COMBAT, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC

Well this is the big hole. I don’t know. So far everything else has come in at about 30KW, which, if numbers like 100KW for hotel are taken, leaves a ball-aching 70KW in mostly computational activity. Its plausible, but thats roughly equivalent to around 100 mainstream IT servers, which feels excessive. Each terminal station, if it includes a pair or large LCD screens, networking and computation will likely draw 0.5 to 1KW, so a boat with 8 such terminals means there is 8KW up front.

I welcome adjustments/insights/amendments to this, as at the moment its just not adding up, unless current systems are just woefully inefficient and using 90's era or older systems - which may very well be the case.

C”

Pete Comment

For further reading relevant to submarine propulsion and non-propulsion (hotel load) electrical uses see Marine Insight's "Different Systems on a Naval Submarine" of April 17, 2021 at https://www.marineinsight.com/naval-architecture/different-systems-on-a-naval-submarine/