Japan's Mixed Signals On Defending Taiwan: Submarines.

On Monday July 5, 2021, Japan's Deputy Prime Minister, Taro Aso, said that Japan, supporting US forces, must defend Taiwan if China invades the island due to the "direct [PRC] existential threat" to Japan's security. Aso added "If Taiwan falls, Okinawa will be next. We must think about this seriously, and steadfastly prepare our defence might". Taiwan is just 110km off the coast from Japan's westernmost point, the populated island of Yonaguni.

Aso's hard-line tone is a significant departure from Japan's whole bedrock of post-WWII self defense force policy statements. Under the Biden Administration's US led militarized Quad policies, China is increasingly the enemy to be stopped.

An intervention of the large numbers of conventional Japanese naval (see submarines and surface fleet) aircraft and missile assets may be very helpful to Taiwan. This is partly because Taiwan's own assets might be early and quickly destroyed in a PRC conventional missile first strike. Also the US can only focus relatively smaller conventional naval-air assets (compared to the PRC's growing regional arsenal) in defence of Taiwan. The US nuclear superiority over the PRC would not be helpful as the US would not wish to go to nuclear war over Taiwan.

Japan has significant anti-invasion assets, but it also has a more moderate policy on protecting Taiwan than converyed by Aso on July 5th. After Aso's July 5 comments China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Mr Zhao Lijan predictably responded that Aso "harmed the political foundation of China-Japan relations”.

So on July 6 Aso retracted and retreated to Japan's long held moderate policy - any major tension between the PRC and Taiwan should be resolved through dialogue between PRC and Taiwan. Implicitly Japan's should stay out of any PRC-Taiwan fighting.

But if Aso has been a Japanese equivalent of one of China's new breed of Wolf Warriors his comments could be dismissed as exteme propaganda posturing. Aso is, instead, a very senior politician who has been Deputy Prime Minister since 2012, Minister of Finance since 2012, Minister of Foreign Affairs (2005–2007) and even Prime Minister (2008-2009). He has been in the Japanerse parliament (the "Diet") for 42 years, He is also a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politician like current Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. So Aso is influential with the Prime Minister, foreign policy and most probably the closely interwoven Japanese defence policy.

SUBMARINES

As well as supportive words to Taiwan from Aso (even if retracted) Japan has been more quietly contributing to Taiwan's program to design and construct 8 submarines. Taiwan has has repeatedly flagged that its new submarines would be of teardrop design. but that may be a deception. I know of no countries who are still building teardrops. More likely Taiwan's submarines will have a more modern sub's cigar shape. 

If Japan were strongly influencing the basic hull design then a Soryu cigar shape may be possible, especially if Taiwan's subs feature AIP for longer terms sitting on the seafloor, guarding the Taiwan Strait.

Many of Japan's own (soon to be) active fleet of 22 submarines could make a major contribution to destroying PRC invasion force subs and major surface vessels trying to cross the Taiwan Strait.

In the medium term, out to 2030, Japanese and Taiwanese navies would work with USN carrier and SSN forces to attack Chinese carriers (with stealth jets). destroyer/frigates and future Type 075 LHDs (carrying Chinese equivalents of the F-35B). Chinese forces would move to block US and Japanese reinforcement forces from Yokosuka and Guam that were trying to intercept Chinese forces. Chinese and US hypersonic missiles, smart mines and weaponized AUVs would take a major, as yet unaccessible, role. 

It will be interesting to see if Aso's hard-line tone against China, voiced on July 5th, is later persistently or at least sporadically repeated by Japanese politicians, admirals and generals.

Hunter frigate & Attack class sub delays: Covid one reason: As predicted.

Due to announced future spending of more A$200 Billion on COVID-19 the Australian Government announced severe payment delays in big ticket naval defence projects including the 6 x Hunter class future frigates reduced from 9 for the RAN...Major contractors, including BAE Systems, has found the Hunter class delayed by 5 years.

Delays over the Hunter class project may not necessarily be a bad thing. Originally they were to be commissioned from 2027. This would have been premature for many of the preceding Anzac class frigates which would have served less than 30 years. 

First Hunter in service in 2031 (or more likely later) means many Anzac frigates will serve a creditable 30 years or more.
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Whether Covid causes a delay in the Attack class submarine program remains to be seen. But I suspect yes, it would have. This is especially as Covid has struck France more severely than Australia.

I'm assuming Covid has caused some delay in the Attack class design work taking place at Naval Group's complex at Cherbourg.

New Sub Related Appointments to Naval Group Australia's Board

Nick Bonyhady has written an interesting July 7, 2021 article for the Sydney Morning Herald. This concerns Naval Group Australia's appointment of Jane Halton to its Board of Directors.
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To get a more detailed corporate view, I located the following Naval Group Australia Media Release of July 7, 2021: 

"NAVAL GROUP AUSTRALIA APPOINTS NEW BOARD DIRECTORS JANE HALTON AND LILIAN BRAYLE TO STEER ATTACK CLASS PROJECT

Naval Group Australia has announced the appointments of experienced public service executive Jane Halton, and Naval Group Executive Vice President for the Australian Future Submarine Program Lilian Brayle, to its Board.

Ms Halton and Mr Brayle’s appointments have been confirmed by a meeting of the Naval Group Australia Board. The pair will add their significant respective experience of the Australian public and business sectors to the organisation which is delivering the 12 new Attack Class submarines.

Naval Group Australia Chairman David Peever said Ms Halton and Mr Brayle brought significant experience and insight which complimented Board’s existing skills, as the program moved to a new phase and preparations continue for the start of Attack Class submarine construction.

“The Attack Class project has made significant progress since Naval Group was selected by the Commonwealth as its international partner for the Future Submarine Program,” Mr Peever said.

“The Board is fully committed to meeting the requirements of the Commonwealth and to jointly delivering a new and advanced fleet of submarines, while creating hundreds of Australian jobs.

“Naval Group is continuing to develop the national supply chain for components and equipment that will be included in the submarines, which is boosting Australia’s sovereign defence capability.

“Jane Halton is an exceptional Australian. The Naval Group Australia Board looks forward to working with her, and continuing to deliver the advanced capability that Australia requires.”

Ms Halton’s distinguished career includes service as Secretary of both the Department of Finance and Department of Health, as well as Deputy Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. She has served on the boards of multiple Australian companies and not-for-profits.

Mr Brayle was appointed as Naval Group Executive Vice President for the Australian Future Submarine Program and a member of Naval Group Executive Committee in May 2021. A dual citizen of France and Australia, Mr Brayle brings experience in managing international industrial programs, particularly in defence, across both countries.

Ms Halton said she was pleased to join the leadership of the largest defence procurement in Australia’s history, and at an important time in the development of the Attack Class project.

“The Attack Class project is an important program for Australia's future security, and I'm excited to join the growing local team as we approach the next exciting milestones,” she said.

Naval Group Australia has announced $1 billion in opportunities for Australian businesses to participate in the program, including a $900 million local manufacturing package for the delivery of 23 complex items of submarine machinery and a $100 million expressions of interest to supply tools and equipment needed to fit out the new submarine construction yard at Osborne.

More than 2000 businesses in Australia have now also registered their interest with the Naval Group Australia Industry Capability Network portal. This provides an opportunity to become part of the wider domestic supply chain that is being built to sustain the 50-year submarine program.

For further information about Naval Group’s ongoing commitment to Australian jobs and local businesses go to https://naval-group.com.au/ "

S Korea Hedging with its KSS-3 Ballistic Missile Submarines

In response to Sung Chan Lee's comment of July 6, 2021  

I, of course, agree with you Sung Chan Lee.

South Korea (SK) deploying its KSS-3 ballistic missile submarines shows an intention to eventually arm the ballistic missiles with a deterrent warhead - which can only be nuclear.

SK is also signalling the US that it is essential the US maintain the "nuclear umbrella" - a continuing willingness to defend SK with nuclear weapons.

If the SK warheads remained just conventional high explosive this would confuse North Korea (NK) (and everyone else) as to why SK is building ballistic missile submarines of 3,500-4,000 tonnes armed with ballistic missiles with a TOTAL high explosive throw-weight of only 6 to 10 tonnes. 

Even if a tonne of a SK conventional warhead equalled 2 tonnes of old fashioned TNT (TNT being the standard for measuring nuclear yield equivalent ) then a one tonne SK warhead would have a yield of only 0.002 kilotonne.

Meanwhile a single NK SLBM warhead (weighing one tonne) may have a yield of 100 kilotonnes (the usual 2 stage "Teller-Ulam"  thermonuclear weapon minimum) and maybe up to 500 kilotonnes = half a Megatonne.

So SK is hedging. If the US does not plainly indicate it will defend SK by nuclear means (principally against NK but also against China and Russia) then SK's KSS-3s constitute a very viable nuclear weapon delivery platform.

Regards

Pete

S Korean Pontoon SLBM Test: Only Nuclear Armed Makes Sense

Pete Comment

Following a series of North Korean submerged, static pontoon tests of SLBMs (intended to be exclusively nuclear tipped) South Korea has just done a similar test. South Korea reportedly successfully tested a variant of the usually land launched Hyunmoo 2B missile with an estimated range of 500km.

All nuclear weapon states, which eventually developed SSBNs (from decades ago to more recently) went through a preliminary submerged pontoon test stage for their nuclear intended SLBMs. Their SLBMs were never intended to be merely tipped with a high explosive warhead. From pontoons the SLBMs graduated to the technically more difficult step of experimental SSBN or SSB test launches which can occur when the submarine is stationary or moving slowly (say 4 knots).

Significantly South Korea is the only non-nuclear weapon state to test a SLBM. The implication being South Korea feels it needs to make preparations to nuclear arm its SLBMs. This would make strategic and deterrent sense given the severe unstoppable nuclear threat South Korea experiences from North Korea.  Basically the Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarines South Korea is gradually deploying would be uneconomical and irrational if used to merely launch high explosive SLBMs from their 6 silos. Uneconomical and irrational is if each of the 6 SLBMs have a one tonne high explosive warhead, equalling only 6 tonnes total throw-weight. This is less than the 7.7 tonnes of bombs/air-to-ground-missiles of a South Korean F-16 or more significantly 8 tonnes delivered by a South Korean F-35A (23 in service, so far).

SLBMs are only economical and act as a deterrent (their main purpose) if they are nuclear armed. Otherwise North Korea could feel comfortable first or second striking with its nuclear tipped SLBMs, land based missiles and free fall aircraft dropped nuclear bombs against Seoul and other critical targets in South Korea. And in any case the Law of Nuclear Ambiguity means that North Korea must assume that all South Korean SLBMs on their way to North Korea would be nuclear tipped and deserve a nuclear response.  

For more details see NavalNews very useful July 4, 2021 report which adds:

"The first ship of the Dosan Ahn Chang Ho-class [aka KSS-3 (or no hyphen) or III (with or without a hyphen). South Korea desperately needs standardized weapons' designations!] is fitted with 6 cold launch VLS (vertical launch systems) reportedly capable of launching both the Hyunmoo 4-4 SLBM and a submarine launched land attack cruise missile (SLCM) known as Hyunmoo 3C with a range of 1,500 Km. The follow-on class, known as KSS III Batch 2, will be fitted with up to 10 of those VLS" [still only 10 tonnes total high explosive - less than 2 F-35As].

Naval Group and LOTE Still Best Sub Solutions for Australia

I am writing in response to Lee McCurtayne's comment of July 4, 2021 regarding future submarine options for Australia.

One problem the Ausralian Government (AusG) has if it wanted to work with SAAB to build a Collins 2 is Australia and Naval Group (NG) have already signed legal contracts to design and build Australia's future Attack class subs. 

The AusG is accountable to taxpayers and voters. As Australia moves toward a Federal Election (on or after August 7, 2021 or on or before May 21, 2022) the AusG does not want to be seen as vacillating over South Australia's very electorally sensitive submarine building industry. Furthermore A$500+ million has already been paid to NG. If a contract was terminated by the AusG then NG could demand at least a A$500 millions breach-of-contract compensation penalty with attendant bad press. Not a good look for the AusG.

In contrast political instability would rule if a Collins 2 was started at this late stage. Nothing has been signed with SAAB-Kockums (or Japan of Germany's TKMS for that matter). Non-NG negotiations, contract signing, design work, construction and testing of a Non-NG future sub might still mean delivery to the RAN after 2030 (maybe simultaneously or even after NG's Attack class).

SAAB's medium sized extended range (ER) A26 is only a paper design. The early ER concept is also likely much smaller (just over 80m long and 3,000+ tonnes) than the large 97m, 4,500 tonne (surfaced) (likely 4,800 tonne submerged) future submarine Australia wants and needs. 

No conventional sub, even an Attack class or Collins 2, would be “Regionally Superior" for Australia. That would take an SSN - with only Naval Group in a position to sell SSNs, in the medium-long term, to Australia. This is  specifically the NG Suffren-Barracuda SSN which has a lower proliferation sensitivity LEU (on dangerous HEU vs LEU scroll 1/6th way down) reactor. 

Meanwhile the only other viable SSN sources, the US and UK, have expressed no serious interest in supplying SSNs to Australia. SSNs are locked up by F-22 like US not-for-export-extreme sensitivity rules. UK reactors based on a US design and US reactors themselves are not for export as they are nuclear proliferation blocked due to their 90+% (bomb grade) HEU fuel cores.

Australia can't afford any "dual build" of Attack class and Collins 2s or to build Attack class while spending the 7+ years to buy an "interim submarine". We can barely afford the Attack class by itself and only have the submarine building facilities for one class at a time. 

As I have said in the past, a viable interim solution is the AusG's long held solution, which will also harness SAAB-Kockums expertise. That is the delayed "life of type extension (LOTE)" which is still not easy or cheap. The LOTE "...will ensure there is no capability gap before the Attack class submarines enter service in the...2030s."