June 18, 2016

DCNS, ASC Negotiating Shortfin Build Partnership

Pete's Comment - In about 2030 ASC will be launching Shortfins (faster, quieter, world class, bold and cutting edge) maintaining ASC's Collins and Air Warfare Destroyer (above) standards. (Photo courtesy ASC)

IHS Jane's Defence Weekly, June 17, 2016 reports:

"DCNS and ASC negotiate new commercial partnership for Australia's future submarines"

Jon Grevatt, Bangkok - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly

June 17, 2016

Japanese Nuclear Propulsion 1 - The Mutsu Episode

Mutsu photo (Courtesy http://jolisfukyu.tokai-sc.jaea.go.jp/fukyu/tayu/ACT95E/06/0601.htm)

---

Mutsu Diagram (Courtesy)

---

S has located a chapter in Japan's history that is surprising. That Japan developed and utilised "dual-use" nuclear reactor propulsion to power the ship Mutsu (see Wikipedia and IAEA) in the 1970s to 1992.

In Comments in mid June 2016 S identified Japan’s one public example of a nuclear propulsion for a ship.

Japan's Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) built a nuclear propelled ship, the Mutsu, nearly 50 years (1968-1970). Mutsu's had a 36 MW Mitsubishi pressurised water reactor (PWR). The reactor was completed in August 1972. Low enriched (less than 20% U235) Uranium was loaded into the reactor in September 1972.

Minor radiation (neutrons and gamma rays) emanated from Mutsu's reactor during workup assessments, at sea, in September 1974. This was misinterpreted by the Japanese press as a leak of radioactive substances. The ray "leakage" was only equivalent to twice as much as the usual "radiation" from an old-style television picture tube.

With this press coverage the Mutsu's future became a high profile anti-nuclar issue. Local fisherman blocked Mutsu's return to her home port for more than 50 days.

“The Japanese Government finally came to an agreement with the local government and fishermen. The Mutsu was allowed back to port on condition that it was to find a new home port, and the ship returned to Ōminato on 15 October.

In Sasebo, between 1978 and 1982, various modifications were made to the reactor shield of the Mutsu, and its home port was moved to Sekinehama in 1983. Following an overhaul, the Mutsu was completed in February 1991. She then completed her original design objective of travelling 82,000 kilometres in testing, and was decommissioned in 1992. Over 25 years the programme had cost (about US$ 1.2 billion).” [quite a modest sum for reactor development.]

But Mutsu had a second life - after its reactor was removed in 1995 it was renamed the (non-nuclear) Mirai.

During and after the Mutsu experience Japan's Atomic Energy Agency has not planned, built or purchased a nuclear propelled ship.

S Comments

Building nuclear submarines is technically possible for Japan and many in the Japanese Navy (JMSDF) would be happy having Japanese nuclear propelled submarines. But public and political anti-nuclear sensitivities in general and memories of the Mutsu, have blocked any serious thought of Japanese nuclear propelled submarines. Even if the Japanese Navy built nuclear submarines, no local governor of a Japanese prefecture would permit such a submarine to enter a port.

Pete's Comment

This is also noting that Japan's major submarine bases are Kure (in Hiroshima Prefecture) and Yokosuka (near extremely populated Yokohama-Tokyo). It is odd that US nuclear propelled submarines and the US Seventh Fleet supercarrier share the Yokosuka base - but that is a nuclear political paradox.

An isolated naval base in Japan would probably need to be built to permanently base Japanese nuclear submarines. Australia has a similar problem in that Fleet Base East (Sydney Harbour) could not serve as the number two base (including emergency porting) for any future Australian nuclear submarines.

The military value of a Japanese civilian ship reactor is that it represents a dual-use technological testbed for future miniaturisation and increase in power output (100 MW would be a submarine minimum). This is a necessary preliminary for a mature submarine reactor. Though the French Rubis class SSN had a 48 MW reactor - that was for an unusually small 2,400 tonne SSN with only 14 x heavyweight weapon shots.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Next week S and Pete will complete Japanese Nuclear Propulsion 2 - further down the technological track towards a Japanese submarine reactor capability.

S and Pete

June 16, 2016

An Abbott Defence Ministry May Offer Japan Hope

If (current) Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull wins the July 2, 2016 Election, with a likely reduced majority, post election ministerial rearrangements are highly likely. A reduced majority would weaken Turnbull while strengthening the conservative wing of the Liberal Party, with conservatives still supporting deposed Prime Minister Tony Abbott (above).

Despite Abbott's public denials Abbott still intends to return to power. Perhaps first Abbott might be appointed Defence Minister and then he may attempt to unseat (current) Prime Minister, Turnbull, later this year.

The following may be of concern to DCNS but may offer hope for Japan:

Australia's SkyNews reports, June 16, 2016:

"...Mr Turnbull is said to be facing pressure from within Liberal ranks to give his predecessor a promotion.

Some have suggested Mr Abbott be given the defence ministry.

Cabinet minister Peter Dutton conceded Mr Abbott had the backing of some within the party for a ministerial job....”

COMMENT

What could Abbott in charge of Defence (including the submarine contracts) mean for the not yet legally finalized DCNS submarine decision?

Pete

June 15, 2016

SOCOM's Dry Combat Submersible prompting safer US LIB Development

Lockheed Martin's S302 Dry Combat Submersible (DCS) intentionally dull locking to promote stealth (Artwork courtesy H I Sutton's Covert Shores)
---

STOP PRESS

Since I wrote the article below (in June 2016)

- See this August 10, 2016 Popular Mechanics article indicating that the latest Dry Combat Submersible (DCS) is less stealthy than older models because the DCS can only be lowered from a surface ship rather than attached to a submarine.

- StrategyPage, August 2, 2016, reports :

"SOCOM has ordered three of these [Dry Combat Submersibles] for $55.4 million each. Each DSC can carry a crew of two and six SEALs and their equipment. Max depth is 100 meters (320 feet) and max speed is nine kilometers an hour".

____________________________________________________________

JUNE 2015 ARTICLE

I have re-written this article as the route I suggested of emulating the Russian all features Losos-Piranha diesel mini-sub took the debate far away from the battery only submersibles the US has been developing. The US seems determined to develop submarine Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs).

The SOCOM Dry Combat Submersible (DCS) Program is seeking, new, efficient, safe LIBs with a low risk of catching fire. See General Atomics' updates at the end of this article.

Problem - SEALS (called Clearance Divers elsewhere) and other special forces (even, the odd, non-military, Agent) become tired in WET submersibles where they have to wear and breathe scuba gear. The water can also be freezing making them cold and even more exhausted before they hit the beach

A DRY submersible has occasionally been seen as a solution but having quiet, long enough range, propulsion has been a major technical obstacle. Also the occupants of a DRY submersible may still need to change into some WET gear to transition from submersible to beach. All this may leave DRY submersibles a comparatively low priority for the USN, with much likely riding on new, efficient and safe Lithium-ion Batteries.

DRY submersible programs need to compete with the USNs already well developed WET swimmer delivery vehicles for divers/SEALS wearing scuba gear. See Submarine Matters article Navy SEAL and Submarine Capabilities of August 18, 2014.

Reading https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_SEAL_Delivery_System a DRY submersible was developed from studies in 1984 until problems became too great by 2009

- Along the way a "study issued in 2003 cited two major technical problems: noisy propellers and silver-zinc batteries that depleted more quickly than planned. A new propeller made of composite material [was] developed to rectify the noise problem. Development [was] under way on lithium-ion batteries to replace the silver-zinc batteries and enable the electrical system to meet the navy's requirements [by 2006] however, technical, reliability, and cost issues [proved practically] insurmountable."

- Then a prototype was "damaged in a "serious fire" in November 2008 [which ended that DRY program] As of December 2008 the cause of the fire is yet to be determined."

Pete's Comment - It may well be that use of not yet fully developed LIBs was at the root of the fire.

A US Defense Department document of 2011 indicates the US requirement revived (or continued) in 2011 for a battery powered dry submersible - see http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2011SOFIC/Wed1515Rms22_23Armstrong.pdf

The requirement as at 2016 seems to have shifted from the USN main carriage to US Special Operations Command (SOCOM). There may be a two finalist runoff for a 10 meter long DRY submersible, called the SOCOM bland User Operational Evaluation System (UOES). Finalists may be General Dynamics Electric Boat vs Lockheed Martin, each working with a three-year, $44 million SOCOM firm-fixed price design, build and deliver contract. A requirement includes carriage of up to six people.

- On June 10, 2016 Scout Warrior reported on the General Dynamics Electric Boat bid, GD-EB is working with Italy’s Giunio Santi Engineering (GSE) given Italy's lengthy record of building devastingly effective mini-subs and diver delivery vehicles.

and

- on June 7, 2016 H I Sutton/Covert Shores, discusses the Lockheed Martin S302 Dry Combat Submersible (DCS) design

Ideally DRY and WET submersibles can fit into dry deck shelter (DDS) that sits on a submarine back behind the sail/fin of large submarines. A large SSN may be required for DDS/decompression chamber assembly above. I wonder if Australia's future Shortfin would be large enough? (Diagram courtesy HI Sutton/Covert Shores)

---

I've pieced together some details of the LIB specs likely to apply to the SOCOM Dry Combat Submersible. A 2005 reference indicated: For "Class 8" (2 pilots + 6 special forces) submersible "...it will apparently be eleven metres long, propelled by two eight-kW motors and powered by a lithium-ion battery. This will give a range of 50 nautical miles (93 km) at five knots, with a maximum speed of six knots."

A September 3, 2013 report from Military Aerospace repeated similar specs to the 2005 reference, with "USSOCOM officials are interested in dry combat submersibles that can move at speeds of at least five knots, at depths to 200 feet, with provisions for two pilots. [earlier indicating] Officials of the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Crane, Ind., have awarded a $12.5 million contract to General Atomics for lithium ion batteries to be used on the Dry Combat Submersible program of…SOCOM at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla."

On April 13, 2016 GovConWire reported: "TYSONS CORNER, VA, April 13, 2016 - General Atomics‘Lithium-ion Fault Tolerant battery technology has been certified by Det Norske Veritas Germanischer Lloyd after it completed tests aboard an undersea vehicle of the U.S. Special Operations Command, ExecutiveBiz reported Tuesday."

Two days earlier, on April 11, 2016 General Atomics Electromagnetic Systems (GA-EMS) reported:
""Unlike prior Lithium-ion battery technologies, GA-EMS' LiFT battery system offers a single cell fault tolerance to prevent uncontrolled cascading failure. This means the battery is capable of surviving a catastrophic cell failure without propagating to neighboring cells, ensuring the safety of on-board personnel and equipment," stated Paul Clark, senior manager responsible for LiFT program at GA-EMS."

So the US is clearly developing LIBs for, at least, DRY delivery submersible use. Whether the US will have LIBs as backup batteries on its SSNs and new SSBNs is a mystery.

There seems to be no pictures of GA's LiFT batteries available...

See a subsequent Business Insider article of July 27, 2016.

Pete

June 14, 2016

Many In Japanese Government Relieved Japan Did Not Win Submarine Bid

Both Prime Minister Abe (above) and MHI President, Shunichi Miyanaga (below) were/are deeply unhappy with Japan's loss in the submarine bid. But many in the Japanese Government are not grieving.

In early June 2016 an anonymous with connections in Japan’s military-industrial complex, commented that Japanese attitudes to losing the bid to sell submarines to Australia were complex and had several levels of meaning.

As is well known Prime Minister Abe was very pro sale but how he instructed government departments to push the sale is less well known. After Japan was defeated by China in the Indonesian high speed rail contract (in September 2015), the Prime Minister's Office ordered the Ministry of Defense (MoD) “Do not fail in the submarine bid.” But the peak Japanese National Security Council (NSC), which is answerable to the Prime Minister, became the Government Headquarters for the submarine bid, not the MoD. Possibly due to bureaucratic rivalry many considered the NSC’s orders nonsense. This included such orders as “Go to Australia to lobby for the subs every month”. The MoD considered this all very odd and consequently it was not inspired to do much selling.

The Japanese Navy (Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF) was highly negative because of concerns about information security. This particularly concerned Japan exporting its high yield pressure hull steel (NS80, NS90 and NS110). See mentions in this Submarine Matters Table. Other sensitive technology was the snorkel system and related technology. This was apparent from:

1. Japanese journal SHIPS OF THE WORLD No 321, Sept 2015, page 108.

2. Sankei Shinbun April 27, 2016. The JMSDF were negative about submarine exports, but PM Abe and his office rushed to export. KHI and many below the top of MHI worried about leakage of secret information.

3. Nikkan-Gendai (news online) writing about the defeat of Japanese bid. (http://www.nikkan-gendai.com/articles/view/news/180342/4 which could be translated as “the truth of the matter about the bid is that, Abe's push was premature. Building Soryus required special building techniques which could not be duplicated in Australia. Meaning Japan was lucky that it lost.”

The peak leadership of MHI was very serious about the bid and was shocked by the defeat. In late 2015 MHI had experienced major losses due to delivery delays for two cruise liners for Germany’s AIDAprima Cruises. This encouraged very powerful MHI President Miyanaga in his resolve that MHI should win the submarine bid as a key business reconstruction measure for MHI. Below Miyanaga the middle management and workers of MHI were negative about selling. Negativity among the workers included much harder work being expected of them but without a pay rise.

KHI, quietly most in MHI, JMSDF and MoD did not feel too depressed by the defeat of the Japanese bid after Prime Minister Turnbull’s April 26, 2016 announcement. Australia could have attempted to build Soryus in Adelaide, but, building the Soryu needs special technology and a skill base that has grown up around Japanese building methods. Despite this PM Abe wanted the submarine sale.

The special technology (and knowledge) includes not only NS110 (super high yield steel) and gas tungsten arc welding (to work NS110). But also the roundness of cylindrical hull critically effects submergence depth. An error of the roundness needs to be less than 5mm for a cylindrical hull of that is 9.1 meter in diameter. This means a maximum error of 0.055% which is very difficult to achieve.

Anonymous feels that MHI and KHI have higher submarine technical skills than DCNS (with its paper Shortfin design) in most areas. But, MHI and KHI do not have enough ability in presenting. The defence business arms of MHI and KHI are mainly full of engineers rather than sales men and women.

PETE'S COMMENT

While sour grapes crossed my mind the above certainly indicates that there was insufficient consensus in Japan's military-industrial and political complex for the Australian customer to feel confident. Australia was right to be cautious about such a fragmented, hybrid, government-business sales "team".

Perhaps, in several years, the various Japanese players could have eventually worked together and with Australia to smoothly build the submarines in Adelaide, but it would have been high risk for Australia.

When Abe's orders were combined with the equally non-consensual brainstorms of Abbott's Prime Minister's office to:

- Buy from Japan

- Build in Japan and

- in a near "crash program" to start replacing the Collins in the mid 2020s,

We are lucky crisis was averted, or perhaps delayed. Fingers crossed.

Pete

June 13, 2016

Funky Carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth and the SRVLs

In non-submarine news, several weeks ago the captain took control of UK aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, at Rosyth Dockyard in Scotland. The 65,000 to 71,000 tonne, conventionally propelled, Queen Elizabeth and its sister-ship Prince of Wales, will be the second-largest carriers in the world, after the USS Nimitz-class carriers. Then third, after the first US Nimitz sized Ford-class is commissioned.

The UK carrier program was to be a joint UK-French venture but France strongly wants to stay with nuclear propulsion. France is relying on heavily utilising its nuclear Charles de Gaulle rather than building a second or third carrier.

Only the US can afford to simultaneously operate supercarriers dedicated to fixed-wing and amphibious assault carriers (with helicopters, Ospreys, STOVL Harriers and F-35Bs).

Queen Elizabeth is due to start sea trials in March 2017. Flight trials with helicopters will begin in 2017 and F-35B flight trials towards the end of 2018. An "operational military capability" will be declared in 2020.

The Queen Elizabeth was designed primarily to carry the mainly F-35B air wing (up to 40 max). A typical warload, however, might be be 24 F-35Bs and some helicopters. These could be a Maritime Force Protection package of nine anti-submarine Merlin HM2 and five Merlin Crowsnest for airborne early warning; alternatively a Littoral Manoeuvre package could include a mix of RAF Chinooks, Army Apaches, Merlin HC4 and Wildcat HM2. Command and control of all four armed services (if you counted Royal Marines as independent) might be challenging.

Shipborne Rolling Vertical Landings (SRVLS)

The F-35Bs will likely adopt shipborne rolling vertical landings (SRVLs) on the carrier's deck. With a rolling vertical landing the aircraft uses downward jet thrust to hover while it is still moving fast enough to also generate wing lift and on hitting the deck will rely on its computer controlled disc brakes.

SRVLs may not require clearing as much of the deck as conventional fixed wing arrested landings. SRVLs will also enable the F-35B to land on the carrier with an increased weapon and fuel load compared to straight vertical. Straight vertical landings often meant jettisoning weapons and dumping almost all fuel.

SRVLs can also reduce the level of wear on the lift engines and extend their operational life. However a number of defence analysts have suggested that operational SRVL landings may only be possible within a limited range of sea states and praying that the computer controlled breaks work.