Australia's New Submarine Program - On Drawing Board

A Collins Class Submarine - new sub will probably be similar

For ABC News, March 18, 2009 Andrew Davies of the Australian Strategy Policy Institute, has written a useful commentary on Australia's program for a new and unique locally built submarine. The reasons for it are similar to India's ATV program:

"New submarine fleet a long way off
So far only a few things are clear - there will be a replacement for the Collins submarine, and it will be delivered sometime after 2020.

There has been a recent flurry of media reports about the plans for Australia's future submarine fleet. Depending on who you read, the number of subs to be built is anywhere from six to 18, and the project budget is somewhere between $12 and $35 billion.

So who is right? As it happens, the correct answer is 'none of the above' - yet. The road to a future submarine is a long one and there are many decision points to be negotiated before the final solution emerges. In fact, this project is a very good example of just how complex defence projects can be. It's easy to be critical in hindsight when projects like the Seasprite helicopters go wrong, but this is a good case study of just how hard it can be to see the right path in advance.

So far only a few things are clear; there will be a replacement for the Collins submarine, it will be built in Adelaide and delivered sometime after 2020, and nuclear subs are out of the question. Pretty much everything else is still to be settled. Even very basic questions such as how large the subs need to be, what technologies they will have and who is going to design and build them are still to be answered.

The complexities of the submarine project arise from a number of sources, but they all owe their existence to a single observation: there is no submarine on the world market that does what we want. When deciding to build the Collins class, the Australian government of the day decided that the country would be best served by having a submarine fleet that could conduct extended patrols thousands of miles from home. There is no suggestion that that requirement will be relaxed. In fact, the Prime Minister has stated that Australia's naval forces will be strengthened in order to play a role in an increasingly contested Asia-Pacific region, the countries of which will field dozens of new submarines over the next few decades.

The world's submarines fall into two broad classes - long-range and high-endurance nuclear subs and much shorter-range conventional ones. The only submarines that fall in between are our own Collins (a design now over 20 years old), Japan's fleet [Soryu and Oyashio class] (constitutionally banned from export) and a South Korean [KSS-III] design only just starting to take shape. So chances are that nothing on the world market will do the job we want. And even if it did, any submarine versus submarine engagement would look uncomfortably like an even fight if both sides were operating subs bought in the same marketplace.

Australia is almost uniquely well-placed to do better than that. We have a close alliance with the United States that gives us access to sensitive systems, weapons and technologies, and we have a hard-won national capability to build those technologies into a European-sourced submarine design. (The Collins was based on a Swedish [Kockums] design.) In other words, we can have the best of both worlds - US systems [especially Raytheon's combat system] developed for their very capable but all-nuclear fleet coupled with state-of-the-art European conventional submarine technology. The resultant boat could give us the edge we seek.

But there is a very delicate balancing act to be performed in doing that. For a start, there are technical issues to be surmounted in marrying the different design philosophies. For example, nuclear submarines have essentially no power limitations, so equipment designed for them does not take into account the power budgets that have to be managed in conventionals.

But just as importantly, the Americans and Europeans hold their submarine technologies very closely and don't want them to 'leak' (admittedly not a propitious word to use when writing about submarines) to other countries. Australia would have to manage the process very carefully to keep the potential providers confident that their secrets were safe with us. So the Australian Government will act as a trusted broker in government-to-government and navy-to-navy negotiations. Industry will be brought in progressively as the design firms up.

So where are we now? Basically, at step one. Defence has asked a number of submarine design houses for a 'concept design', essentially a high-level 'sketch' of what the future submarine might look like. That concept will be refined over the next two years, after which preliminary designs will be refined for another couple of years. Between 2013 and 2016 the detailed design will be developed, with construction not starting until (at the earliest) 2016.

Before the concept is fully developed, there can be no firm decision on the number of submarines - after all, how do we know how many we need before we know what each one can do? Similarly, costs won't be known until the design is well advanced. And, of course, we need to be convinced that the manning and support of any expanded submarine fleet could be managed.

So take any dramatic headlines in the near future about the size, shape and cost of Australia's future submarine fleet with a grain of salt.

-

Comments

-

Australia built the Collins Class and is planning a future conventionional submarine for similar reasons to the much more ambitious Indian ATV program (currently under construction). That is because they:

- provide the best technical solutions to specific national requirements

- provide greater national security through self reliance - independent of foreign suppliers

- further the national R and D bases

- maintain national naval construction-industrial bases, and

- boost national and ruling government prestige.

-

I think all these factors are legitimate reasons for paying a higher cost for indigenously built submarines.

-

Australia appears to have excluded the nuclear propulsion option due to cost, reliance on the US nuclear submarine shield (under ANZUS) and US pressure on Australia to remain diesel/electric. The US earlier dissuaded Canada from considering nuclear propulsion as that would give that dependent allie a measure of independence.

-

Pete

French Attack Submarines (SSNs) For Australia?

1st Published March 31, 2009

France's current Rubis Amethyste Class SSN
---

Artists conception of France's future Barracuda Class SSN. The first of 6 is due to be launched in 2016. Good timing for Australia's 2020 Submarine Project.

----

I've been having discussions (see comments Australia's New Submarine Program - On Drawing Board March 20, 2009) with scientist, computer specialist and friend JB Moore over a scenario where Australia opts for French nuclear propelled submarine designs and components for Australia's future submarine project.

Australia appears to have excluded the nuclear propulsion option due to cost, reliance on the US nuclear submarine shield (under ANZUS) and US pressure on Australia to remain diesel/electric. The US earlier dissuaded Canada from considering nuclear propulsion as that would give that dependent allie a measure of independence and might encourage other Pacific countries to go the nuclear propulsion route such as South Korea, Taiwan and Australia.
-

The US has policies, laws and has signed treaties against nuclear proliferation. Proliferation under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty includes the spread of nuclear weapons, fissile material, and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information, to nations which are not recognized as the 5 "nuclear weapon States" (UK, US, Russia, France and China).


As submarine reactors often contain weapons grade uranium (97% for US sub reactors when only 85+% ie "Highly Enriched Uranium" is dense enough for a bomb)) exporting such a reactor would amount to weapon proliferation. Teaching Australian technicians the skills to maintain and operate such reactors would also amount to proliferation. So the US given its worldwide sensitivities would be highly unlikely to help Australia in the nuclear propulsion and nuclear weapon areas.

If Australia's threat environment seriously increased up to 2025 an alternative source of assistance may be France for naval reactors and Israel for actual weapons. France has a history directly of assisting Israel build the plutonium production reactor at Dimona in Israel as well as building the plutonium processing facility at the same site. This was directly aimed at nuclear weapon production, however Australia could not hope to have such a close relationship with France. French assistance on nuclear propulsion for an Australian submarine might be sufficient - while a whole solution for a French designed Australian SSN would be preferable.

By US/UK standards French SSNs are small - a better size for Australian requirements. For example the 6 French SSNs of the Rubis Amethyste Class only displace 2,400 tons surfaced, 2,700 submerged. The Rubis Class are less than a third of the weight of US Los Angels or newest Virginia class SSNs. The Rubis' crew of 62 (the smaller the better for Australia) is only half that of US SSNs. Rubis are fairly recent with the first launched 1979.

The future French Barracuda Class SSNs may be the best way to go if Australia considered nuclear propulsion. A drawback would be a possible need to convert to the French weapons suite, torpedoes, mines, cruise missiles and combat system.

Australia also fields Harpoon anti shipping and land attack missiles in its Collins Class subs. Given probable Israeli sub cruise missile warhead developments and Israel's past willingness to supply weapons technology to South Africa - Israel could well help Australia some day:"In June 2002, former State Department and Pentagon officials confirmed that the U.S. Navy observed Israeli missile tests in the Indian Ocean in 2000, and that the Dolphin-class vessels have been fitted with nuclear-capable cruise missiles of a new design. Israel issued new denials, albeit in an indirect manner. In October 2003, unidentified senior U.S. and Israeli officials were quoted as saying that Israel had successfully modified nuclear warheads to fit its Harpoon missiles." 

Pete

Ignorant Announcement of a Chinese "Stealth Submarine"

This is the sub accompanying the article. Its bunting and launch flags do not look Chinese. Its most likely a picture of the HDW 214 - actually built under licence in South Korea and known as the Son Won-il U214 class sub.

A most uninformed article from South Korea's Chosun Ilbo, October 4, 2010.

"Has China Built a New Stealth Submarine? China's neighbors are worried that the People's Republic may already have produced a stealth submarine, the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong reported Sunday.

Three weeks ago, photos of a new submarine built at a Chinese naval shipyard in Wuhan failed to draw much attention when they were posted on several websites. But that changed last week when the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation disclosed that the Wuhan shipyard had built a new submarine, as well as more details of the craft.

China has not yet officially announced that this is a stealth sub, but neighboring countries have become nervous as military experts say that is what it is, the paper claimed.

"The talk in our community is that we are seeing the first signs of a completed new design," the daily quoted one Asian military expert as saying. "The question is ... just how quiet have they been able to make it? Stealth is everything when it comes to submarines and at some point China is going to finally crack it."

/South China Morning Post It also quoted the People's Liberation Army Daily as saying Da Liang Long, a professor at the PLA Navy's Submarine Academy, won an award from the Central Military Commission for his "considerable" work on submarine stealth technology.

"Naval officials in the region say encounters between submarines are increasing. Such encounters will become more frequent as countries such as Japan, Korea, Australia, Vietnam and Indonesia expand and update their submarine fleets in the face of China's rising military strength. The PLA will soon have more submarines than the United States Navy," the daily added.

Comment

This ignorant report may be referring to China Type 041 Yuan Class submarine mentioned on this blog previously.

All subs are stealth subs. What first makes them stealthy is that they can submerge out of site! Other usual stealth featues are their:

- dull black-gray colour,

- cylindrical (non sticky out bits) shape to cut sonar returns and noisy water turbulance

- dampened engine mounts for quietness

- dull black rubberised acoustic cladding for quietness

- "periscopes" are now sensors that use optical fibres rather than a thick  noisy scope sticking through the hull.

Can you name other common stealth features?
-
Pete

British and French "Boomer" SSBNs Collide

Three years later, in 2012, now repaired La Triomphant, paid a friendly visit to Faslane Naval Base (HMNB Clyde), Scotland. Photo courtesy Dougie Coull Photography http://dougie-coull-photography.blogspot.com.au/2012/08/le-triomphant-s616-french-submarine.html

CNN Europe, February 16, 2009 report: " A British Royal Navy nuclear submarine and its French equivalent collided while on operations in the Atlantic Ocean earlier this month, defense ministries in Paris and London confirmed Monday. The French submarine Le Triomphant suffered damage to its sonar dome. Both vessels, HMS Vanguard and Le Triomphant, were armed with nuclear warheads and suffered damage but were able to return to port under their own power following the collision..." From TimesOnline, Feb 17, 2009 a submarine commander comments "The sea is not homogenous — you do get some funny effects. When you go above 23 knots, if the other guy is directly ahead you get a bow blanking effect: all his noise source is shrouded and you cannot hear him...The most dangerous thing you ever do is bring that submarine up from depth to periscope depth. The millionth percentage of chance is that someone else is going to be exactly where you are going to be."

Comment

The near risk of disaster and political embarrassment alone would put the career of Britain's First Sea Lord and his French equivalent in doubt. This would also normally be career enders for the respective captains, watch keepers and sonarmen.
Autopilot on but sonars being left unmonitored would be a worrying scenario for multi-billion dollar vessels each with a nuclear reactor and 16 ballistic missiles. With each missile carrying 6 to 8 nuclear warheads.
Intentional ramming is out of the question. These vessels are very delicate, hugely expensive and submarines don't intentionally ram.
Intentional monitoring is also unlikely because these (SLBM) or SSBN subs are built to act as hidden, mobile, missile bases rather chase other subs (the job of attack/SSN subs).
Given the huge cost of Vanguard and Le Triomphant it is likely they both carry "black boxes" which will reveal what happened.

 

Possible Reasons for Collision

 

A more likely explanation for the collision is a combination of human error, mainly environmental causes and possibly technical malfunction.

The way I see it (according to the damage reports revealed) is that Triomphant was following Vanguard at around 23 knots or in another environmental "dead zone" that would render the French sonarman "deaf". Either that or Vanguard was just too quiet to detect with Triomphant's passive sonars - and visa versa.

Vanguard may have heard Triomphant and decided to make itself noisy (making its presence known) by blowing out water ballast. This would also move it upward to hopefully avoid collision. The surfacing sounds would have been suddenly loud and confusing for the French sonarmen. The motion of Vanguard may have pushed it upward and onto forward moving Triomphant which could not avoid collision in time.

Its likely that each then sounded active sonars or other noise makers to identify themselves and each other. Both then probably surfaced for any possible damage control, limited damage assessment and rather surprised communication.

It may be months until limited explanations are released.

Pirate Attacks in the Seychelles

For small countries with no navy but a Coast Guard with 2 patrol boats pirate kidnappings and hijackings can be especially disturbing. http://www.sbs.com.au/dateline/story/transcript/id/600946/n/Pirates-in-Paradise.

Piracy also threatens the tourist industry of Indian Ocean island countries (see photo above).

Pete

Private fleet to target pirates in Indian Ocean

US Combat Commands (from "Fencer" via wikipedia) Note that India is included in US Pacific Command (USPACOM).
-
The Australian, February 19, 2011 reports:

Private fleet to target pirates (Originating from Agence France Press and [London] Times] [WASHINGTON:] Insurers in London are setting up a private fleet of armed patrol boats to stamp out Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden, but a US military commander has warned there is no naval solution to the problem.

Admiral Robert Willard, head of the 300,000-troop US Pacific Command said yesterday the Somali pirates were skirting international pressure in the Gulf of Aden by moving deeper into Asian waters, and that the only fix would be to restore stability in the African nation. [Admiral Willard's words are particularly relevant because his Pacific Command is responsible for half of the Indian Ocean. In addition to the Admiral's vast military experience is his role of being aerial coordinator for the Paramount movie Top Gun.].

He voiced exasperation at years of naval efforts to stem the flow of pirates from Somalia, which has been effectively without a central government for two decades.

"It's remarkable that 28 nations combining their maritime forces together in the Gulf of Aden have not been able to defeat this challenge," Admiral Willard told the Asia Society on a visit to Washington. He said the pirates were becoming a menace in southern India and as far away as the South China Sea.

Admiral Willard said joint action by Southeast Asian nations had all but eliminated the piracy that once plagued the Malacca Strait - a vital route for the oil that powers Asia's largest economies - but the Somalian problem could be solved only in Somalia. "I don't think you're ever going to defeat this threat at the far extremes of their operations on the sea lanes," he said. "Rather, you have to go to the centres of gravity - the source on land in the Horn of Africa - and put a stop to it there."

Donna Hopkins, the senior US State Department official on counter-piracy, agrees: "The problem is not going to go away until Somalia is fixed.

"It is an artefact of an ungoverned space with a long coastline in a region of fragile governments that's located on a critical trade route, through which 40 per cent of the world's energy passes," she said. "So it's a perfect storm."

However, insurers are weary of making massive payout and are taking the naval solution into their own hands - with the support of shipowners, freight operators, governments and navies. Leading figures in the London insurance industry have been working for two years on the Convoy Escort Program, which aims to provide protection for tankers and reduce the cost of insuring shipping operations. Giles Noakes, chief maritime security officer of the Baltic and International Maritime Council, said he would brief US politicians in Washington next week.


One of the key architects of the program is Sean Woollerson, a partner in the marine, oil and gas division at Jardine Lloyd Thompson, a leading Lloyd's broker for companies seeking insurance protection, particularly for war risks and kidnap and ransom.

"It has taken an extraordinary amount of hard work and effort over the past two years, but we hope we're about 70 per cent of the way there," Mr Woollerson said yesterday.

Under the plan, a non-profit association involving private and public sector members would be set up. It would control a fleet of 18 vessels, each with a fixed gun position and an armed crew authorised to engage pirates in battle.

Each vessel would carry eight armed security personnel and four additional crew, as well as inflatable speedboats known as "Ribs" that could be dispatched into combat if the tankers they were protecting came under attack. Although managed separately, the fleet would be under the operational control of the relevant national navy and the crew would have to conform to international rules on combat and engagement.

The pirates seem to be growing ever better organised and more capable. So-called mother ships are now venturing more than 1600km out to sea armed with AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades and grappling hooks.

Sustaining themselves for weeks while they search for vulnerable vessels, the pirates communicate with commanders onshore via satellite phone, receiving information from networks of contacts watching the narrow shipping lane through the Gulf of Aden.

US officials do not deny that information on shipping movements may also be leaking from international commercial centres such as Lloyd's of London and the Baltic Exchange."
-
Pete