Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) Issues

MISSION

On the Comment thread https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=19245896&postID=5077212490045962874 Anonymous on April 9, 2015 asked:

"I have few questions to ask you about submarines, what is actually air independent propulsion system of non nuclear submarine. There are many types of AIPS technology in the world and few are under development too so can you tell me which is best among these. And is it possible for a submarine with AIPS system to perform same like a nuclear submarine. I heard recently in a article talking about future diesel submarine will be capable like nuclear submarine with support of latest AIPS system."

On Comment thread https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=19245896&postID=6049042900970745217&page=1&token=1429705517253 another Anonymous on April 21, 2015 asked: ""why would you want the AIP removed from TKMS Type 214 for Australia?"

"S" has provided useful comments, included in the text and Comments thread

RESPONSE

At some stages-usually a submarine will draw air/oxygen (while near the surface) through its snorkel to power its diesel engines. The submarine's batteries can then be recharged. For a limited time Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) technology makes snorkel air/oxygen drawing unnecessary.

AIP provides diesel-electric submarines with greater submerged endurance (several weeks as opposed to just several days (on existing lead-acid batteries)) and very quiet operation. This enhances a submarine's survivability and mission flexibility. AIP systems use limited amounts of stored (chemically, liquid or compressed) oxygen or hydrogen fuel.

AIP involves chemical changes and sometimes moving parts. My article Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) Technologies and Selection of August 5, 2014 which has diagrams, addresses questions on how AIP systems work. Basically the most developed AIP systems were/are made by 3 Western European countries centred around the North Atlantic and Baltic Seas. These are:

- German fuel cell AIP offered in German TKMS-HDW's latest submarine designs (214s, KSS-IIs, Dolphin 2s, probably 218s, offered for the future 216).
- Swedish Stirling AIP submarines (in Swedish Kockum's designed Gotland, Södermanland and Archer classes, Japan's Soryu class and China's Yuan class)
- French MESMA AIP (just on 3 French DCNS designed Agosta 90B submarines operated by Pakistan). Offered for France's newer Scorpene submarines (no takers?). MESMA and a second generation AIP are probably being offered to Australia within a offered SMX Ocean/conventional Barracuda. It is unclear whether Brazil's 4 future Scorpenes will have AIP.

Based on sales numbers and different countries buying them, Germany's fuel cell AIP and Sweden's Stirling AIP have been the most successful.

Countries that have recently announced plans to develop AIP include: Russia, Spain, India (DRDO) and France indicates it may develop a "second generation AIP". Possibly Japan and South Korea may develop indigenous AIP systems.

Different countries and different submarines builders will claim that their AIP is best. But these are  commercial claims. It depends what the customer country wants, what they actually need - all dependent on their typical mission profiles. Technological advances (such as Lithium-ion batteries and evolving anti-submarine sensors) also influence the value of AIP products. 

Any comparison/claim that AIP is like nuclear propulsion is a commercial or government/Navy sales pitch. It is like comparing a conventional high explosive bomb with a nuclear weapon. Nuclear propulsion can drive a submarine continuously at 30 knots for 3 months (only limited by food stocks for the crew). In comparison AIP technologies might only move an operational submarine (with full warload) at slow speed (4 knots?) for 3 weeks (?). Higher performance AIP systems may be possible but there might be major downsides eg. their stored explosive hydrogen and/or oxygen might make them too unsafe to be a usable weapon system.

Additional discussion of AIP issues comes by way of my response to Anonymous April 21, 2015 question "Why would you want the AIP removed from TKMS Type 214 for Australia?":

Australia might not want AIP because: 

-  AIP is not a standard inclusion for all new diesel submarines. Inclusion of AIP depends on a customer navy's typical mission profiles. Within the Type 214 a fuel cell AIP seems to be a compulsory sales inclusion that many countries don't need.

- AIP is ideal for countries with mission profiles that value 2 to 3 week submerged-slow or zero speed (sitting on the sea bottom). Some countries, like Sweden or Germany, when in the Baltic Sea, (or Singapore near its area) might have only 2 to 3 day missions when AIP alone may be sufficient. 

Australia's mission profile is very long distances, warm water, fast transit, then perhaps mainly medium speed patrolling. This places more value on efficient conventional diesel-electic operation which would not be at the expense of weighty AIP inclusion.

Also technological advances are trending toward submarines using Lithium-ion batteries (LIBs). Issues of relative energy efficiency AIP - batteries compared to LIBs - and LIBs compared to other batteries are very complex. See page 6 of this publication http://navyleague.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/The-Navy-Vol_70_No_4-Oct-2008.pdf for a brief discussion of the relative capacity. 

The newest batch of Soryus are believed not to have Stirling AIP but instead have LIB to cover slow-medium, prolonged, submerged operation. See S's calculations in the Comments thread. 

AIP's other possible downsides include:

- it is very expensive to incorporate into new build submarines or to retrofit - often amounting to one third of the submarine's price.

- non-replenishable during a mission

- very unsafe, flammable, even explosive, "S" reported, April 22, 2015 that "I agree about weak points of hydrogen fuel cell system for submarine. Submarines of this type are safe under the ordinary or non battle situation, but most important thing is safety under the battle situation with strong vibration or shock. Even if hull is not damaged, if slight hydrogen leakage is caused by tiny damages of piping system including valves, pressure gauges and joints, the submarine becomes perfectly dysfunctional. Because concentration of explosion limit for hydrogen is very low, you must avoid any kinds of stimuli as such heat or electrical ignition which cause explosion. And in the case of accident with hydrogen leakage, perhaps you cannot rescue the submariners by hull cutting with ignition."

- AIP involves weight tradeoffs. The weight taken up by AIP may in an Australian submarine be considered better used for extra batteries or diesel fuel.

- can break down (especially if it has moving parts like Stirling AIP)

- may be more efficient in cold water rather than Australia's mainly warm operating areas

For all these and other reasons AIP was never placed in the Collins sub - even though the Swedish-Kockums designers specialised in AIP subs.

Pete

Vietnam's (Russian speaking) Kilo Submarine Service

Vietnam ordered 6 Improved Kilo 636s with at least three received from Russia so far.

On April 30, 2015 it was reported that Vietnam has been acquiring 50 anti-ship and land attack 3M-14E Klub (SS-N-27A “Sizzler”) supersonic cruise missiles for its Kilos. Russia has already delivered 28 Klubs to Vietnam over the last two years. Those Klubs may have a range beyond 300km.

Vietnam's Tuoi Tre News reports, April 21, 2015 perceived importance of Russian language training and importance of instilling group feeling in Vietnamese Kilo submarine crews. I wonder if it would be true to say that the Vietnamese are natural soldiers and sailors - given all the wars-threats they've had to face. With Russian and Chinese help Vietnam beat the US and Australia and other allies by the early-mid 1970s (though few here will admit it). Russia, the US and India are now all involved in establishing closer relations with Vietnam - for economic reasons and as part of a wider contain China strategy. The string for the Tuoi Tre News article is  http://tuoitrenews.vn/features/27604/life-at-kiloclass-submarine-brigade-in-vietnam. The article is also reproduced (with photos retained) at Talk Vietnam http://www.talkvietnam.com/2015/04/life-at-kilo-class-submarine-brigade-in-vietnam/ :

 
"Life at Kilo-class submarine brigade in Vietnam"

A Tuoi Tre (Youth) newspaper contributor has expressed her marvel at the wholehearted dedication, rigorous training, and diligent study of the Russian language among the sailors stationed at a submarine base in central Vietnam after a recent visit.

The Tuoi Tre contributor narrated her memorable experiences during her trip to Submarine Brigade 189 under the Vietnam People's Navy.

The brigade is based in the Cam Ranh Military Port, which is situated in Khanh Hoa Province.

Before the brigade was founded in June 2011, selected soldiers joined a training course in Russia in October 2010 prior to passing on what they had learned to their colleagues and juniors at home.

However, rigorous training began well before that.

Over 30 years ago, Submarine Regiment 196 came into being and boasted well-qualified human resources.

Many members of the regiment's force were later transferred to the current Submarine Brigade 189.

Younger recruits to the brigade all excel in technical training, have good physique and stamina, and cope well under pressure.

One of the initial challenges involved newcomers spinning over 100 times and they were requested to regain balance shortly after the spinning came to a stop.

They also took on an immense challenge which required them to stay in a compressed air chamber with its pressure equivalent to that at a depth of 50 to 70 meters.

Such strenuous challenges now become their everyday routines.

Training in dispute management aboard the sub!

The "sailors' arduous physical training did not surprise theTuoi Tre contributor as much as their single-minded devotion to honing their professional skills and command of Russian."

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[Drill and discipline are a key part of training.]

During her trip to the Russian-supported Submarine Training Center, which is located inside the Cam Ranh Military Port, she was amazed at the perplexingly intricate simulations, diagrams, and annotations written in Russian.

The center is one of Southeast Asia's most state-of-the-art facilities.

An officer affirmed that the sailors and staff there all have an adequate grasp of Russian.

The sailors’ eagerness to learn the Russian language was confirmed after the Tuoi Tre contributor met Team 7, which was once trained in India.

On Friday evening, the members did not watch films or sing together.

The 40-year-old team leader and his juniors as young as 24 years old were totally engrossed in their Russian studies.

Trained in Russia, the Tuoi Tre contributor sought permission to join their learning session.

Her keen observations showed that even those who just took up the language a few months back and mostly learn by teaching themselves are surprisingly proficient in the language.

The Russian experts who the Tuoi Tre contributor briefly talked to earlier during the trip gave them profuse compliments on their diligence, brightness, and willingness to learn.

The brigade received two Kilo-class submarines 182-Hanoi and 183-Ho Chi Minh City over one year ago but the officers and sailors have been in full control of the vessels.

They do not need accompanying Russian experts during their trips that last several days under the sea.

Vietnam signed a contract to buy six Kilo-class subs from Russia during Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s visit to Moscow in 2009.

Officers and hands on the 184-Hai Phong Submarine also manoeuvered the ship with relative ease thanks to their adequate grasp of the Russian language.

Apart from taking classes in professional skills, the sailors spend 3.5 hours from 7:30 pm to 11:00 pm every day but they still can get up at 6:00 the next morning for a three-kilometer run.

The officers insist only Russian be used in many of their internal meetings.  

No room for errors

Safety and teamwork are the utmost priority among submarine sailors.

“There’s no room whatsoever for errors, as they may cost lives,” the head of Submarine Brigade 189 stressed.

One of the stories which the Tuoi Tre contributor found most compelling was the sonar radar operators’ keen sense of hearing to detect all passing ships of various sizes.

During highly authentic emergency exit drills, whenever some problem arose in a chamber, instead of getting out, the sailors inside that chamber were required to lock themselves tight in and work on the problem in order not to affect other chambers.

The sailors and their special work thrive on their mutual understanding, trust, and willingness to sacrifice for their comrades.

More surprises in store

The Tuoi Tre contributor went from one surprise to another during her stay with Submarine Brigade 189.

One of them was how the male officers and sailors managed to keep their all-white uniforms speckless and crease-free, which is quite a challenge for many housewives [thems fighten words!].

The Tuoi Tre contributor also kept pondering over why all the naval soldiers boast such flawlessly white teeth.

According to Dau Van Hoang, captain of the 184-Hai Phong Submarine, the first priority for submarine sailors is having decay-free teeth.

“Inside the submarines, where oxygen is such a scarcity for several days on end, the entire crew members stay alive on a mixture of air, of which oxygen makes up a mere 29 percent or even a lower percentage,” he explained.

“The exhaled air is always recycled to be inhaled again. If one has decaying teeth, the air would be rendered unusable,” Hoang said with a beaming smile, showing off his immaculately white teeth.

In one of the intriguing stories the Tuoi Tre contributor was told during her trip, Lieutenant Vu Van Dung, of Team 7, was prepared to get married, with his marriage date fixed.

However, he was sent to India for a task right before the wedding.

The two families decided to proceed with the wedding anyway, and Dung’s bride and her family agreed to carry out the bridal ceremony through Skype, a chatting program.

On the wedding day, the bride, the two families, their relatives, and friends celebrated the big day in Vietnam, while the groom attended the ceremony and party through Skype.

A Kilo submarine docks proudly at the Cam Ranh Military Port in Khanh Hoa Province. Photo: Tuoi Tre

Russian-made Kilo-class submarines, dubbed “black holes in the ocean” for its astonishing ability to vanish into the depth of the ocean, were built on a pilot basis during the mid-1990s. Four electric-diesel Kilo-class subs have been handed over to Vietnam. The fifth one, [HQ-186 Da Nang] left the Admiralty shipping yard in Russia on a trial run on April 1, 2015. The sixth, [HQ-187] Vung Tau, whose building began in May last year, is expected to be transferred to Vietnam [in 2016].

"

Pete

Indians duped by Pakistani Rumour of Sale of 8 Submarines from China?

As Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Pakistan today and tomorrow an 8 submarines for Pakistan deal is supposed to be signed. I suspect no firm deal will be signed because expectations in the Indian and international press are based on a Pakistani rumour campaign.

Pakistan has been trying to extract free or reduced price submarines from China for years. Pakistan has used an information loop rumour strategy over the last few weeks to try to pressure China to sell. 

How can Pakistan, with a naval budget of around $750 million(?) per year afford to buy, crew and maintain the 8 for wildly different amounts:
- $250 million to $325 million each to 
- equivalent of $500 million to 625 million each?

The specific aim is to pressure Chinese President Xi Jinping to sign a deal when he visits Pakistan April 20 and 21, 2015. If Pakistan claims a deal has been made then it would need to prove it with details, including:
- numbers of subs sold?
- type of subs? (ie. old Ming or newer Yuan class submarines, not vague "Project" "S-26" of "S-30" designations)
- delivery or building schedule? (when is the first submarine and last to be delivered?)
- are the submarines used or new-build according to Pakistani specifications?

HISTORY OF RUMOURS

- March 9, 2011 The Hindu “Pak plans to acquire 6 submarines from China” Obviously didn’t happen.

- March 1, 2014  Times of India story  - quoting a Pakistani official proved groundless with no deal made "by end 2014." - China didn't sign.

Pakistan times its latest rumour campaign in preparation for President Xi vist:

- March 31, 2015 Dawn article  "ISLAMABAD:  [Pakistani] Naval officials informed the Standing Committee on Defence Monday that the federal government has endorsed a summary to get eight submarines from China." -No Chinese promise.

- April 2, 2015  Discussion board insert - referring to speculative Dawn article - No Chinese promise. 

- April 2, 2015 Reuters article  - - Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has approved a deal "years in the making" [but has China approved?] to buy eight submarines from China, a Pakistani government official said on Thursday, in what could be one of China's largest overseas weapons sales once it is signed. The [Pakistani] official...said the deal to buy the diesel-electric submarines would likely be signed by Chinese President Xi Jinping when he visits, "but that is still not final".
"...Asked about the submarines, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying [only said] China and Pakistan were friendly neighbors and that the two sides had normal military exchanges. "I can tell you, relevant cooperation does not violate international convention and accords with China's three principles on military exports," she told a daily news briefing." - No Chinese promise.

APRIL 22, 2015 UPDATE AND COMMENT

President Xi has now departed Pakistan and, in line, with my earlier prediction there has been no Chinese mention (that I've seen) of Chinese submarines for Pakistan http://tribune.com.pk/story/873354/chienese-president-xi-jinping-to-address-joint-session/ . The usual Pakistani speculation remains.

Pakistan’s has five medium sized submarines but needs newer submarines to counter India. Pakistan’s flotilla is:

- two Agosta 70s (PNS Hashmat and PNS Hurmat) completed in 1979-1980 – past the usual 30 year in water use-by date - hence probably semi or non-operational, and

- three Agosta 90Bs with completion dates (PNS Khalid (1999), Saad (2002) and Hamza (2006)) As they are AIP, Exocet capable/equipped and the last two built in Pakistan this is quite an achievement.

As Pakistan is more than $60 Billion in debt and has a naval budget of around just $750 million it may not even be able to crew or maintain 4 to 8 extra submarine even if China donated them.

Pakistan has been talking about converting Babur cruise missiles for submarine use but China already has small SLBMs like the JL-1  that might be more appropriate.  

Pakistan may be able to put nuclear warheads on its Exocets.

I think China considers Pakistan too unstable, and uneconomic to give it second strike submarine platforms. Pakistan is also a source of Islamic militancy but China has Islamic terrorism problems. They are not natural allies other than in their joint effort to partially surround India.

Pete

Australian Naval Shipbuilding 30-40% pricier. Submarines Unmentionable.

A Virginia SSN being completed in a massive Newport News shed. Will Australia ever build such submarines efficiently?

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On April 16, 2015 Australia's Minister for Defence [Media Released] a RAND Corporation Report Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise – preparing for the 21st century. Probably the most significant finding is that “The cost of building naval ships in Australia is 30-40 per cent greater than United States benchmarks,…”. In contrast to South Korea's shipbuilding success Australia's shipbuilding industry has long been afflicted with the higly unionised British disease. Responsibility averse government and private sector management is another major failing.

Even with this defacto 40% tariff protection Australia cannot compete because ships and submarines  routinely completed 1 or 2 years late - often with subsequent modifications necessary. 

For Submarine Matters the absence of any discussion of Australia’s future submarine build in the Report compromises the whole report. It is akin to taking Future Frigates out of the equation.

The RAND Report, in part, found that:

·     "Australia could sustain a naval ship building industrial base by carefully managing a continuous ship building strategy in the longer–term, with a regular pace of delivering the new ships. But this would need to be premised on reform of the Australian naval ship building industry and significant improvement in productivity.

·       Australian naval ship builders can sustain an 18-24 month pace of large ship construction starts if Defence carefully manages its acquisition program and keeps the Future Frigates operational for 25 to 30 years [ie. needlessly shorter period than usual].

·       The gap between the completion of the Air Warfare Destroyer project and the start of the Future Frigate – Labor’s valley of death – cannot be overcome, but the impact could be lessened.

·       The cost of building naval ships in Australia is 30-40 per cent greater than United States benchmarks, and even greater against some other naval ship building nations. Australia is currently one the most expensive places to build naval vessels. This premium can be reduced by improved productivity through:

o  -  Establishing a consistent production and build demand.

o  -  Selecting a mature design at the start of the build and limiting the amount of changes once production begins.

o  -  The necessity of ensuring a well-integrated designer, builder and supplier team.

o  -  Matching the industrial base structure to demand.

o  -  Ensuring there is visionary leadership provided by company management.

The RAND report is a critical input into the Defence White Paper and the Naval Shipbuilding Plan. The Government will now carefully consider the report’s analysis and findings in preparation for the release of these documents later this year."

SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (SMH) COMMENT

On April 16, 2015 David Wroe http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/major-local-shipbuilding-report-excludes-submarine-costings-20150416-1mmed1.html reported:

“But the report strikingly left the future submarine project out of its calculations, concentrating instead on surface warship such as new frigates and patrol boats.

When asked why, lead researcher John Birkler told reporters submarines had been "specifically excluded" from RAND's terms of reference by the Abbott government. "We were asked not to include submarines," he said.

Mr Birkler went on to indicate that RAND had been told by the government last year that Australia planned to build its submarines offshore.” “His remarks, backed up by a table in the report that places the future submarine project in the "build offshore" column, is clearly at odds with the government's repeated insistence that it had at no point decided to have Japan build the new fleet of up to 12 submarines.”

[In unconvincing contradiction] “A spokesman for Mr Andrews said that at "no stage were RAND Corporation informed by the government or the Department of Defence that an offshore submarine build was the only option being considered".” See WHOLE SMH ARTICLE

MY COMMENT

The Report's productivity improvement recommendations are US best practice. This is understandable given the US authorship. The recommendations, however, appear to be technologically and economically unsustainable for Australia. Australia cannot cover all the design and development functions unlike the output of Soryus at the MHI-KHI shipyards and unlike output of the Virginia class at Newport News and General Dynamics Electric Boat.

Pete

South Korean Submarines, 3,000+ ton KSS-III, Nuclear Potential

See detail on possible South Korean nuclear submarine technology in redded KSS-N sub-heading below.

One of South Korea's (international convention of just "Korea" now used) nine Chang Bogo class (KSS-Is). Korea is completing a sale of three to Indonesia.

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One of Korea's four Son Won-Il class (KSS-IIs) in commision - five to go. Larger than the KSS-I and AIP equipped. Looks like a pre-launch ceremony. 

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With the KSS-III being described as a "3,000 tonne submarine" for a decade the above dimensions (very similar to the single hull Collins) may be accurate. The "3,000 t" would be surfaced displacement.

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A larger KSS-III? If its length is really 83.5 m and breadth/beam 7.7 m, then compared with the Collins (77.4 m, 7.8 m) the KSS-III's displacement appears to be around 3,400 tonnes (surfaced) and 3,800 tonnes (submerged). There are many other variables in estimating displacement of course! Other possibilities are that the above is a "4,000 t" nuclear KSS-N? or 83.5 is propaganda to equal the Soryu's 84 m length.

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Another model of what the KSS-III may turn out like. It appears to have 6 VLS hatches but a 6 missile Vertical Multi Purpose Lock (VMPL) is more likely.
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South Korea (international convention of just "Korea" now used) has a long and competitive ship-building tradition. Korea has the world's largest ship-building industry - with 41% of world market share (in first quarter 2015). This has put Korea in a good position to build German TKMS-HDW designed submarines (from kits?) since 1990. Korea has also has submarine export success and is perhaps well prepared to develop a 3,000-4,000 tonne conventional submarine. It faces threats even greater than Japan does - having a land border with North Korea and in much closer proximity to China. The Korean Navy has publicised its creation of a Submarine Command for reasons difficult to discern but perhaps to suggest an eventual capability of a pre-emptive or second strike nuclear deterrent.

South Korea's KSS-I, KSS-II and KSS-III building program suggest a goal of having a rolling average of at least 18 submarines operational and perhaps 22 to match Japan's medium term goal. The so-called "indigenous" submarine (KSS-III) project may still draw heavily on TKMS-HDW technology but "indigenous" also provides ambiguity if Korea needs to develop KSS-III into a nuclear propelled submarine "KSS-N" possibly nuclear armed. 

South Korea's strategy includes the creation of a pre-emptive strike "kill chain" (of threat detection, decision making-authorisation and (mainly missile) pre-emptive strike) against North Korea. Submarines would be a (or the) principal pre-emptive strike and counter-strike platform. Subsonic cruise missiles are generally too slow for these roles - making supersonic+ cruise and ballistic missiles the logical solution.

Used South Korean has two Dolgorae class mini submarines (above) launched 1990 and 1991, 175 tons, with two small 410mm torpedo tubes. They have crews of 14 and may be used for surveillance and perhaps special forces. They were acquired by South Korea to obtain initial experience with the basics of operating a submarine force and to train surface ASW ships in the detection of subs.

In 2011 South Korea indicated it would be building new mini-subs, known as KSS-500As, weighing 510 tons. They may operate only on Lithium-ion Batteries and diesel engines. 

KSS-Is and KSS-IIs

Korea's navy operates:

- 9 Chang Bogo class (KSS-I), a variant of the TKMS-HDW type 209/1200. In 2011 Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) won a contract to supply Indonesia with two pre-assembled Chang Bogos (to be delivered probably in 2016-2017) with a third Chang Bogo to be assembled in Indonesia (perhaps the beginning of an indigenous Indonesian production line!). The 9 KSS-Is have been regularly upgraded which may extend their service life past the usual 30 years. A major future upgrade may be Lithium-ion batteries fully or partly replacing lead-acid batteries - although such a retrofit may be very difficult. See NTI document for names of specific, commissioned KSS-Is and KSS-IIs up to 2011.

-  4 Son Won-Il class (KSS-II) as at April 2015. Five more are due to be commissioned by 2020. These are variants of the TKMS-HDW Type 214 submarines. Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) built the first three (commissioned 2007-2009). DSME, HHI and STX Offshore & Shipbuilding are alternately building the second batch of six with one of the six commissioned in December 2014 and the final one due to be commissioned in 2018. Like the KSS-Is the KSS-IIs carry some US built Harpoon missiles for anti-ship and possibly land attack. Like the KSS-Is the KSS-IIs are orientated to a surveillance, anti-shipping, anti-submarine and (a short range) land attack capability. 

KSS-III, 3,000-4,000 tonne Design - Conventional and Potentially Nuclear  

There will be eventually 9 (KSS-III) 3,000-4,000 tonne submarines.  See the 3rd and 4th pictues above that contain varying dimentions attributed to the KSS-III (also called "DSX-3000") which indicate its surfaced displacement may be anywhere between 3,000 and 3,400 tonnes. DSME will be the main designer. The lead KSS-III boat began development in November 2014 at DSME's submarine yard at Okpo. It my be a major step forward in utilising Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs). The second batch of KSS-IIIs (especially if they use new technology LIBs) may take 8 years to build and launch (2024) and then 3 years to commission (about 2027). 

The larger size of the KSS-III will permit it to include some of the latest submarine technologies, including:

- large diameter unmanned underwater vehicles (LDUUVs)
- Seal/diver delivery vehicles (SDVs)
- dry-wet cells for special forces in dinghies/divers/Seals
- VLS or more probably the major advance of Vertical Multi Purpose Lock (VMPL) capable of launching 1,500+ km cruise and Harpoon missiles,, VMPLs are also capable of launching LDUUVs and SDVs. 

As well as retaining fuel cell (or less likely Stirling) AIP, KSS-IIIs could also incorporate features from the TKMS-HDW Dolphin 2 including the large rudder system and reinforced hull bottom which allow such a large SSK to operate in shallow, littoral waters. Also Germany's TKMS-HDW could provide assistance using features from the so-far drawing board only HDW 216 (intended to be a 3,000+ tonne design). 

One additional reason Korea is going the indigenously developed submarine route is that international political pressure on Germany would probably prevent Germany from openly assisting South Korea to develop the KSS-III in the medium-long term into a nuclear propelled KSS-N submarine, possibly armed with nuclear weapons.

The capability to use Tomahawk or indigenous Hyunmoo-3 series cruise missiles of 1,500+ km (far longer than the 140 km range KSS-I/KSS-IIs UGM-84 Harpoons) potentially makes the KSS-III much more effective against such additional threats as China and Russia. The future KSS-IIIs may also be capable of firing ballastic missiles.

The US may have been politically unwilling to supply the Tomahawk to Korea. Instead Korea appears to have incorporated many of Tomahawk's features into the Hyunmoo-3 series. By building an indigenous missile, warhead ambiguity is introduced. Korea is one of those countries (like Japan) that could develop a nuclear weapon in less than a year. Miniaturisation may be a major hurdle but a Hyunmoo-3 (or other cruise missiles) could trade range to achieve a heavier warhead than 500 kg.

KSS-III could best be described as multi-purpose. For a medium sized navy like Korea's KSS-IIIs (or KSS-Ns) could combine some of the capabilities that larger navies cover more comprehensively with distinctly different types, such as SSKs, SSNs, SSGNs and SSBNs. 

KSS-N, a Nuclear Development of the KSS-III? 

Korea appears to have long maintained an option of a KSS-N (also called KSSX-N and SSX) a 4,000+ ton nuclear propelled development of the KSS-III. On past plans see Globalsecurity.com report. However to date any plan has not occurred due to pressure from all of Korea's neighbours, US opposition and the necessity of building an indigenous submarine rather than a submarine that heavily relies on a foreign country (Germany). Also a nuclear propelled Korean submarine would diminish any chance that North Korea would remove/destroy its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Korea might develop the KSS-N submarine if threats against it sufficiently increase and/or US military support diminishes.

Korea has long and extensive experience building nuclear power reactors - mostly large but still useful in any future development of submarine reactors. Interestingly DSME (as at April 2015) appears to be designing a "nuclear propulsion [surface] ship". This would have the legitimate purpose of meeting market demand for nuclear propelled, very large, ice-breaking, oil and LNG tankers. This activity also provides dual-use potential for submerged nuclear propulsion. 

In terms of an actual reactor technology path the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is also operating and further developing a small 100 MW ("SMART") pressurised water reactor with a output (at least) that may suite a 4,000 ton KSS-N. The SMART reactor's main current weakness is that it uses 5% enriched Uranium (U) 235 providing a poor power to size/weight ratio. 5% means SMART presently needs three year (overly frequent) refueling. Korea probably could legitimately develop the SMART at a higher (ice breaker surface ship) U enrichment percentage to make it much more useful as a submarine reactor. Korea has been seeking IAEA-US permission to develop a greater U enrichment capability but has been blocked. Although at a small amount-laboratory level Korea has a proven Uranium enrichment ability.

So Korea's indigenous submarine (KSS-III) program is well worth watching for its potential.

I'll do an article on North Korea's submarine situation in the future.

More Sources

http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/south-korea-submarine-capabilities/

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/show-daily/sea-air-space/2015/04/12/korea-south-north-navy-modernize-coastal-scandal-sub-helicopter-frigate/25512681/

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/kss-n.htm

Pete

Minister Andrews' overseas visit to submarine competitors.

Australian Defence Minister, Kevin Andrews

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I originally wrote  on April 15(using a report of April 10 in the Kieler Nachrichten) concerning Minister Andrews meeting the German and French Defence Ministers and visiting Kiel and Cherbourg. Now there is ministerial confirmation (April 21).

Minister Andrews' itinerary:

April 23, 2015 - Meeting German Defence Minister Dr Ursula von der Leyen, then Visiting TKMS-HDW submarine yard at Kiel, Germany. 
Confirmed in Kiel's newspaper, 
-  Kieler Nachrichten, article of April 10 (Windows 7 or 8 or right-clicking mouse can translate into English). and
-  Kieler Nachrichten April 23 indicated Ministers Andrews, when at TKMS-Kiel, was given a presentation on the HDW 216. He was also given information on submarines TKMS has been constructing for Israel (which are Dolphin 1s and 2s) and Egypt (which are Type 209s]

April 24, 2015 – Meeting French Defence Minister Jean-YvesLe Drian and DCNS senior executives. .  
-  French website of April 21 reporting Minister Andrews visit to Chsubmarine . 
-  Kieler Nachrichten April 23 reported Minister Andrews was to be given a presentation by DCNS, Cherbourg shipyard on the "Scorpene." This may suggest DCNS is not calling its offer to Australia the "SMX Ocean" of "conventional Barracuda" but Scorpene-4000 (probably 4,000 ton (submerged?).

Ministerial Confirmation:

Ministerial Media Release on all this came on April 21.
Ministerial Media Release of April 23 of April 23 visit to German Defence Minister then TKMS-HDW at Kiel
Ministerial Media Release on April 24 of April 24 visit to  French Defence Minister and to DCNS at Cherbourg.

The Ministerial Media releases were all informative and signify that Minister Andrews is serious about finding out what Germany-TKMS and France-DCNS have to offer in Australia's future submarine competition. This systematic openness is a welcome change compared to the  practice of Ministers prior to 2015.  

Minister Andrews spent ANZAC Day (April 25) at commemoration services in France and Belgium.

Still unknown if/when Minister Andrews is visiting Japan, including Tokyo to meet Defence Minister Nakatani then KHI and MHI submarine yards at Kobe, Japan

Accompanying Minister Andrews may be the Australian Navy, Head Future Submarine Program, a senior executive of Australia’s Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) and perhaps a senior executive of ASC.

Pete