Middle power Australia can no longer assume we are protected by the US nuclear umbrella. In fact Trump's radical shift to Russia is instructive. In a new SSN concept nuclear armed hypersonic (H) missiles on SSHNs might, for middle powers, be the deterrent of choice against China and Russia. I thank the commenters from this article for the words below.
With the Russia-US alliance (RUS)
the democratic world is losing confidence in US security guarantees. This
includes Australia regarding the QUAD and AUKUS. There are multiple examples
coming out now of US isolationism which is more manifestly pro-Russian https://news.online.ua/en/the-us-is-ending-support-for-ukrainian-f-16s-but-there-is-a-way-out-891472/
and
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/mar/08/america-vetoes-g7-proposal-to-combat-russias-shadow-fleet-of-oil-tankers
Trump and Vance lead the
surrender to Russia. But at the US Defense coalface it is Elbridge Colby, Trump’s nominee for Undersecretary
of Defense for Policy, who flags the end of the AUKUS Virginia option. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/09/trump-pick-for-pentagon-says-selling-submarines-to-australia-would-be-crazy-if-taiwan-tensions-flare
Colby is likely to kill the Virginias for Australia in the near term. This is even before the US Presidential decision of the early 2030s kills the Virginia option - responding to USN advice that the US until the 2040s will lack Virginias even for protection of the US heartland. China's long awaited mass protection of SSNs and SSBNs will outstrip America's already low rate of SSN availability. Meanwhile the UK industrial base appears unable to deliver SSN-AUKUS before 2045 https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c871e41751yo
In any case British SSN availability to Australia relies on US techno-legal permissions. US veto power over British autonomy is underwritten by the US developed and Kings Bay, US, supplied Trident IIs/D5s which are Britain's only nuclear warhead delivery type.
At the same time, the current Australian Government and Opposition, at the public level, are in denial over the emerging Russia-US alliance. Australia’s vain Defence Minister Marles has always placed his political career over responsibility. See his denials here https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/transcripts/2025-03-06/television-interview-abc-730. Australia's Canberra capital is, publicly at least, in a parallel universe of vain hope, that doesn't address the new Russia US alliance.
Unfortunately Japan and South
Korea (SK) rely on US nuclear protection even more than Australia. Japanese
Taigeis and SK KSS-IIIs, like all conventional submarines, lack the speed and
range to be a viable Australian strategic weapon against China or Russia. Israel, as well, relies on US strategic and political protection. India, despite its nationalist protestations of autonomy, is reliant on Russia for nuclear submarine technology and, more secretly, Russian nuclear weapons tech.
Only less aligned country France https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c871e41751yo might sell nuclear submarines and nuclear weapons to Australia for a price. As Australia is now desperate - this runs contrary to my France can't help February 2025 articles here and here.
Peter Coates
22 comments:
Hi Pete,
Continuing the MAGA trend “what’s mine is mine, what’s yours is mine”, I do believe the US will soon significantly tighten ITAR regulations on advanced technologies. This will put a damper on their arms exports, though it’s a small percentage of the US GDP compared to the major hit that’s the American farm and produce industry can see incoming.
A sovereign capability in specific fields is very evident - AI, cybersecurity and Quantum computing. For civil and military nuclear power generation (and SSN production) South Korea could be a very willing and viable partner to Australia.
The next SSK-III batch 4 submarine design should definitely have the option of SMR nuclear propulsion, especially with the NK now claiming they are building a nuclear boomer..
https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/korean-smr-powered-container-ship-design-revealed
SK public is now polling as high as 76% approval for nuclear weapons
https://www.cato.org/commentary/why-south-korea-wants-nuclear-weapons-now-more-ever
We’ve privately discussed the very high potential for RoKN SSBN the next 15 years, but this could suit Australia, if it decides to uncouple itself from getting locked into AUKUS.
Playing the alternate reality game, Australia could decide to join Canada in purchasing 18 advanced SSK/N, 6 to replace the Collins in the 2030s, and then selecting the KSS-III batch 4, with a switch from the GD AN/BYG-1 Combat Control system to the BAe system used on Astute (Hanwa/Naval Group could have have ITAR-free OS).
BTW: Singapore has just started a study on building SMRs in urban areas.
Nuclear submarines sure are getting popular.
North Korea Reveals Nuclear Submarine, And It Is Ginormous:
http://www.hisutton.com/North-Korea-Nuclear-Submarine-OSINT.html
Hi Anonymous at 3/11/2025 3:28 AM
Bringing together possible mockups proveth a nuclear submarine not.
Like the fabled Wuhan "nuclear submarine" all we have is a "photo" which may be an Animation.
We have a section of what looks like a massive pipe. No engine, nuclear or conventional, in sight.
" 'Hero Kim Gun-Ok'." could also be a shell mockup.
Thanks Shawn at 3/10/2025 9:54 PM
for your comments.
Very true and disturbing about the ITAR regulations angle that may see the US reneging on AUKUS Pillar One (Virginia SSNs) and even Pillar Two "AI, cybersecurity and Quantum computing" and also GHOST SHARK XLUUVs"
I've been looking at the possibility of South Korea (SK) developing a nuclear powered submarine (variously called KSS-N, KSSN and KSSX-N) in several articles since 2012. See https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/search?q=kss-n which yields:
"South Korean...Nuclear KSSX-N Option"
of Feb 22, 2012 at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2009/09/south-korea-has-bought-six-more-u-214.html
and
"South Korean Submarines, 3,000+ ton KSS-III, Nuclear Potential"
of 16 April 2015 at
https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2015/04/south-korean-submarines-3000-ton-kss.html
What I suspect is currently an NK mockup or animation at http://www.hisutton.com/North-Korea-Nuclear-Submarine-OSINT.html may partly be NK responding one better to https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/korean-smr-powered-container-ship-design-revealed
The US has always actively prevented Canada from obtaining SSNs. This is due to opposing national interests on Arctic sea lanes and resources. Warming of arctic oceans will only increase US intransigence over SSNs for what Trump sees as the US's 51st state of Canada.
Glaring weaknesses of SK as a potential SSN supplier to Australia includes the 20 years SK might take to produce a stealthy SSN design. SSNs took all other powers decades to develop quiet SSNs.
Also SK is extremely vulnerable to land invasion or "nuking" by neighbouring NK, China and Russia. Unlike France, SK has no nuclear deterrent to defend its future SSN shipyard and no current second generation Suffren class SSN in the water.
Without the US protecting SK, SK's nuclear armed neighbours might take extreme steps to stop SK developing nuclear weapons, SSBNs or SSNs.
Interesting about Singapore SMR intentions.
Mucho Regards Pete
"The US has always actively prevented Canada from obtaining SSNs."
But conventional submarines are another matter:
South Korea Offers Submarines to Canada as Relations with Washington Deteriorate:
https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2025/south-korea-offers-submarines-to-canada-as-relations-with-washington-deteriorate
South Korea can no longer count on US conventional or nuclear protection.
Trump, who threatened the SK government in his 1st term (demanding much more SK money for US protection) could withdraw US forces from SK on whim.
This puts SK's CONVENTIONAL submarine makers at the same Russian, Chinese and NK risk that SK's nuclear capability is under.
Hi guys,
Trump has called for SK to pay the US $10 billion a year protection money:
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/south-korea-trump-tariffs-us-troops-cost-nuclear-weapons-4985061
At this point in history, SK has developed a big arms industry with a lot of ITAR-free gear - the KSS-III batch 2 are supposed to have 80% SK sourced gear, and SK makes their own missiles, aircraft and ballistics missiles - Trump's current behaviour is pretty predictable, and I'm sure that there's plenty of contingency plans getting activated now.
Canada is establishing its own sovereign military shipyards, and reinvigorated its military shipbuilding, but it relies too much on American systems and weapons, which it needs to reevaluate.
Oh, I was doing some research on the French Rubis class, as it's the smallest SSN class with 2,600 tonne displacement, but I didn't realise just how bad their CAS-48 reactors are - the RCN assessed them as unsafe and noisy.
https://www.forecastinternational.com/archive/disp_old_pdf.cfm?ARC_ID=1737
Pete
Thanks for the article, which accurately spells out the factors underlying my own concerns previously. It is really a mess now.
I have been previously opposed to Australia having nuclear weapons even though I supported the RAN getting SSNs for operational reasons. If the US nuclear umbrella is now worthless then that view is obsolete.
I can’t see any available ship or air launched capability for Australia delivering a deterrent weapon towards a regional threat, given the rapidly proliferation and improved accuracy of SSM and SAM systems worldwide. RAN ships are too few and underarmed. The only candidate aircraft, the B21, we would have to buy from USA and it would have all the US control and ITAR risks you have outlined. A stealthy or hypersonic missile launched from an SSN seems a far more realistic deterrent.
But how to get that capability now? I remain of the view that French SSNs like Suffren, allied to stealthy missiles like Stormshadow/Scalp/MdCN seem our most feasible option of those available at present.
Australia is not the only country in this leaky boat now. Canada, South Korea, Japan and Singapore must all be concerned. Perhaps a shared project is feasible?
Naval Group has previously floated the option of an Ocean SSK with a VLS module. A Block II Suffren with a VLS module fitted might do the job. Anything else would take decades.
The position of the UK must be difficult. They have an enormous amount invested in their SSBN deterrent yet this is now vulnerable to US interference in multiple respects. They might also wish to rejoin an AUKUS style agreement, sans US and including France.
This option also looks worth analysis. Could one fit in a VLS? It has slightly smaller dimensions than the SSN (torpedo tube launched) MdCN.
https://theaviationist.com/2024/05/24/france-conducts-launch-of-asmpa-r/
Thanks Anonymous at 3/12/2025 2:42 PM
I'll turn your comment into the basis for an article next week.
I'll also provide details of the latest variant of the French Air-Sol Moyenne Portée ("Medium-Range Air-to-Surface") or ASMP which could be modified into a submarine launched hypersonic missile - which I designate SLHM.
https://theaviationist.com/2024/05/24/france-conducts-launch-of-asmpa-r/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air-sol_moyenne_port%C3%A9e
Regards Pete
SSN and nuclear weapons for Australia both face considerable challenges and I doubt Australia could go it alone. Fortunately there are other options.
Buying or license building French Suffren class SSN is an option but as you have identified there is a bottleneck in French production. On the other hand Japan has the capacity to build submarines and commercial nuclear reactors and while they have no experience with submarine reactors if they were able to license French technology I suspect they could build a Suffren class SSN without interfering with French production. Such a program, split between France, Australia and Japan might make up for a less than reliable US government.
I cannot see public opinion in Japan permitting a Japanese nuclear weapons program but here Australia has other options.
A basic uranium bomb requires uranium enrichment and Australia is the home of the Silex laser enrichment process, which combined with Australia' uranium resources, makes it plausible for Australia to build basic fission weapons.
Australia also has a route to more advanced nuclear weapons through the CANDU nuclear reactor. The CANDU reactor uses unenriched uranium and heavy water as a moderator. It has the capacity to be refueled online, moving fuel bundles about to maxim8ze burn up of uranium. This also means that by moving fuel bundles about in a different order it can maximize production of plutonium. (See the history of India's nuclear weapons program.)
Using heavy water as a moderator also produces Tritium, needed for boosted fission weapons.
A final advantage is that the CANDU is a power reactor and if US government policy returns to normal and Australia no longer needs a nuclear weapons program the reactor is perfectly good for producing electricity..
Note that the CANDU is a Canadian technology and is not subject to American export controls.
Thanks Anonymous at 3/13/2025 1:46 PM
I suspect the US would consider Japan building Suffren or indigenously designed SSNs (or indeed SSBNs) as highly destabilising in northeast Asia. Alternatively Trump's isolationist removal of the nuclear umbrella over Japan might open up severe regional reactions against Japan.
This is in the shape of nuclear armed NK, China and/or Siberian Russia violently stopping Japan having a nuc sub and especially nuc weapon capability. This might also trigger a nuclear arms race with Japan's "frenemy" South Korea https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frenemy
All those 4 countries have long memories of Japanese militarist aggression. They wouldn't want history repeated.
So Australia obtaining SSNs from France directedly (God forbid built in Osborne by 2060?) might cut out the problematic Japanese middleman.
Using SILEX for enrichment to 95% HEU may not require Australia to construct a reactor. I imagine there may be LEU tailings around Australia's old Uranium mines that could form the feedstock for Australia's own (non US pilot plant) SILEX factory. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enriched_uranium#Separation_of_isotopes_by_laser_excitation_(SILEX)
But, yes a Canadian CANDU or a French or Israeli built "Dimona" style reactor-reprocessor in the Australian desert? could produce useful Pu, maybe Tritium all providing more weapon effectiveness.
SSNs and/or air refueled some underused Aus F-35As as delivery systems?
Cheers Pete
"This might also trigger a nuclear arms race with Japan's "frenemy" South Korea"
The problem is potentially larger than that:
"While on the surface it might seem as though a warmer relationship between
two of the world’s largest nuclear powers could reduce the risk of nuclear war,
the opposite is true. We are on the precipice of a global turn toward nuclear
instability, in which many countries will be newly incentivized to build their own
arsenals, increasing the risk of nuclear use, terrorist subversion, and accidental
launch. Countries like South Korea, Japan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are all so-
called nuclear latent states that could potentially build nuclear weapons
quickly—as are Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands.""
Source:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/14/trump-nuclear-weapons-proliferation-nato-security-guarantees-korea-poland-germany-japan/
The long range of a SSN is not very useful if you're looking to control near-land choke points. If your closest friendly port is on another continent, then, yes, a SSN makes sense. But if you are in a war in East Asia and none of Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Timor Leste and so on are willing to let you refuel, then I'd suggest the war has been lost already.
SSNs make sense if you're fighting in deep ocean. But that isn't Australia's defense challenge in South East Asia, or Oceania.
A good point about pushback against a Japanese SSN program. If French shipyards are booked, could Australia build the non nuclear part of an SSN and buy a reactor package from Japan? Would that be less likely to cause push back?
Japan is one of the few countries able to build PWR that might be suitable for submarines and have spare capacity.
As I understand it you are correct that SILEX allows the production of a 10-20 kt U-235 gun type fission weapon like the Little Boy that was dropped on Hiroshima.
To get into the hundred kt range you need a boosted fission weapon:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boosted_fission_weapon
One advantage of the CANDU over the Dimona style reactor for Australia is that building CANDU reactors does not commit Australia to a nuclear weapons program. Who knows what the political situation will be like by the time the reactor is built?
The CANDU reactor can be built and run primarily for electricity with the option of building boosted fission weapons if the need exists by the time the reactors are operational.
Please note that this analysis is from 2001 and that the Suffren class is about twice the size of the Rubis and uses the improved K15 reactor, not the CAS-48.
Submarines need more than food and fuel. Replacement parts, gear to test parts that are problematic, replacement weapons, etc.
The classic solution to this has been the submarine depot ship, equipped with the parts, workshops and technicians to do basic maintenance and repairs.
Home port it at Stirling Naval Base and most of the time it can supplement some of the existing facilities. Every once and a while send it on exercise to Darwin or an ally in SE Asia and in a war it will give SSKs a lot more time on station.
This Naval News article evaluates the current state of AUKUS and, presuming it at risk, looks at other SSN and SSK options for Australia. Interesting that Australia’s dilemma is now getting international attention. Also interesting that despite this being on the website sponsored by Naval Group, the feasibility of Suffrens for Australia is downplayed. Of SSK options, South Korean KSIII looks most promising.
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/03/all-or-nothing-australia-and-its-aukus-submarine-dilemma/
It is an unfortunate fact for Australia that, thanks to the Ukraine war, several NATO navies have ordered more subs since AUKUS began. Remaining industry capacity is more limited, as are Australia’s options now if AUKUS fails. iMO it remains the case that it is almost too late for AUKUS pillar one to succeed. usN has not ordered extra SSNs in any year since AUKUS was announced.
Thanks everyone for your comments above.
Today I've responded to some issues with https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2025/03/low-morale-in-australias-infant-nuclear.html
and especially changing alliance trends and possible unanticipated French and UK SSN production for their own navies at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2025/03/rapid-us-russia-friendship-changing.html
I'll respond to more of the issues you've raised above in articles next week.
Cheers Pete
Hi Shawn at 3/12/2025 9:02 AM
Trump's protection racket may at last persuade SK to take the risk of developing nuc subs, maybe even nuc weapons. Though this would better have been under US protection like the UK and Israel developed their nuclear weapons. This is considering SK's KSS-III SSB is the shape of an SSBN minus the nuclear trimmings.
Yes Canada (as Aus should) is also coming to the realisation US software "kill switches" might be possible in all sophisticated weapon systems - such as the F-35. What would happen to Canadian F-35s in NATO-Europe if they have to resist an invasion from America's new friend, Russia!?
Due to noise and other things the French Rubis's were given a major rebuild - see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubis-class_submarine#AM%C3%89THYSTE_rebuild
The K15s on the Suffrens are supposed to be much quieter than the Rubis's CAS48s. In 25 years time a future French SSN class may well have K22s that are going into Frances 3G SSBNs.
Thanks, https://www.forecastinternational.com/archive/disp_old_pdf.cfm?ARC_ID=1737 is an eye opener.
Pete
Hi Shawn at 3/12/2025 9:02 AM
Trump's protection racket may at last persuade SK to take the risk of developing nuc subs, maybe even nuc weapons. Though this would better have been under US protection like the UK and Israel developed their nuclear weapons. This is considering SK's KSS-III SSB is the shape of an SSBN minus the nuclear trimmings.
Yes Canada (as Aus should) is also coming to the realisation US software "kill switches" might be possible in all sophisticated weapon systems - such as the F-35. What would happen to Canadian F-35s in NATO-Europe if they have to resist an invasion from America's new friend, Russia!?
Due to noise and other things the French Rubis's were given a major rebuild - see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubis-class_submarine#AM%C3%89THYSTE_rebuild
As Bill says the Suffrens use K15s. These are supposed to be much quieter than the Rubis's CAS48s.
In 25 years time a future French SSN class may well have K22s that are going into Frances 3G SSBNs.
Thanks, https://www.forecastinternational.com/archive/disp_old_pdf.cfm?ARC_ID=1737 is an eye opener.
Pete
Hi Ian Whitchurch at 3/15/2025 12:32 PM
The US DoD/Navy believes (and has occasionally stated) the US is selling us the Virginias so these Aus Virges can patrol and if need be defend the Taiwan Strait.
I would say the US has also prescribed AusVirg missions to specialise in Indian Ocean patrolling, tailing and, if need be, destroying Chinese SSNs and SSBNs.
SSNs can "control near-land choke points" though not as economically as Australia's and Singapore's SSKs.
Cheers Pete
Hi Bill Seney at 3/15/2025 10:36 PM and 3/15/2025 3:18 PM
The Port of Darwin has tidal changes, and channel-dredging requirements that make it a poor choice for even temporary porting (say one month) of a Collins let alone large SSNs. So large US submarine depot ships, which have several appropriate ports to choose from, are a special class of ship submarine great powers use.
eg. US submarine depot ships have been seen in some Middle East ports, Diego Garcia, occasionally HMAS Stirling but mostly at Apra-Guam naval base.
Then people suggest submarine depot ships with submarines could be based in Australia's Christmas or Cocos Islands. And to that I say submarine depot ships and ported subs are valuable assets that must be defended by near co-located friendly warships and fighter aircraft mostly against Chinese attack.
Re part building French SSNs in Adelaide (under "FA") much effort regaining French trust and offering big money to France would be required. AUKUS Pillar One would need to be stone dead FIRST.
This is because Australia cannot really afford AUKUS let alone courting a simultaneous French SSN deal.
Also bad timing - France has got its hands full being the alternate nuclear defender of NATO ever since US diplomacy became a Russian possession.
Takes years to develop an efficient, discrete submarine "reactor package". Even the UK didn't attempt it - instead buying a US reactor for UK's first nuc sub and heavily relying on US reactor tech ever since.
A 100 kt warhead is the world standard minimum - so yes "boosted fission" or 2 stage thermo is the go. Buying from Israel might cut corners.
Cheers Pete
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