Australian Nuclear Weapon Hedging: A Work in Progress

In response to  Shawn C's May 29, 2024 comment:  

True about Australia having very able and fast snorkelling Collins SSKs. Australia has continuously used SSKs since 1967. 

Many commentators are then at a loss as to why Australia is moving to SSNs - costing about 5+ times more than SSKs. The answer is the value Australian governments place on the nuclear weapons potential of Australia's future SSNs. Nuclear subs (the world over) make the best nuclear weapon platforms - hence SSBNs. This implication, of course, contradicts Australian governments' spin - spin that Australia is distorting its whole defence budget in favour of SSNs because  SSNs are the best way to fight a conventional war. 

The whole scope of Australian governmental strategy remains unclear. This is a very secret area with many possibilities. It could be the very long term SSN program permits Australian nuclear insurance hedging under the protection of the US and to a lesser degree the UK. Without this protection China could disrupt the nuclear elements Australia is putting in place in case US extended nuclear deterrence proves insufficient  over the next 3 decades. 

Elements already, or soon, in place include: Australia's world largest Uranium reserves; the Australian invented and owned weapons grade suitable SILEX uranium enrichment method; development of dual-use long range Gilmour rockets/missiles; Australia's long history of Hypersonics research; and, Australia's long possession of nuclear device designs which are publicly available (see "restricteddata"). Also see Howard Moreland and "The H-bomb secret".

Australia needs a deterrent against China. Australia projecting even conventional explosives against the Chinese mainland would likely mean a Chinese nuclear response. Australia, against China, has a need for long range strike weapons - with nuclear subs being the most discrete way to move close to the Chinese coast. This will put China's population centres at risk - thereby improving Australia's essential deterrence strategy.

Australia's use of nuclear explosives won't happen in a broader regional proliferation vacuum. It is likely Australia would find justification moving to nuclear explosives after South Korea and Japan have finalised nuclear weapon capabilities (even short of these countries having such weapons). Also the unknown India factor may play a part if India's power projection in the Indian and Southern oceans become somewhere between ambiguous and threatening. What Indonesia does or may likely do might also be a factor.

If the US extends long range nuclear sharing to Australia - something only extended to short range NATO country strike - might be something that heads off Australia needing to develop a complete national nuclear capability.

I have created the acronym SSHN for Submarine, Nuclear Powered with Hypersonic Missiles. Advanced missiles, with hypersonic glide vehicles. These would make even Australian SSHNs (like Virginias (if ever delivered) or then SSN-AUKUSs) a more cost-effective platform than traditional large SSBNs which would be too expensive for Australia - a middle power. The "B" for Ballistic missiles (SLBMs on submarines) are also proving relatively easy to shoot down in the Ukraine and especially in the latest Israel vs Iran conflict. SSHNs can accommodate smaller intermediate range 3,000-5,500km missiles - missiles with a shorter flight-warning time than full-size SLBMs, like the 12,000+km range Trident D5.

So Australia's long held resistance to all things nuclear is being overcome by fear of China - triggering the need, or option, of having Australian nuclear weapons. Alternate Australian nuclear weapon platforms, be they long range bombers or land based ICBMs in silos, are too specialised. Such bombers and ICBMs are also very vulnerable to pre-emptive strike from Chinese submarines that might launch hypersonic or ballistic missiles off Australia's coast. 

All of the above musings are a work in progress. I have never had paid governmental access to any of the above -  so I can write about it. The only thing near access was a tipoff from a two star Australian Defence Attaché, Washington. He advised that many US officers he was talking to repeatedly raised the rhetorical question:

"Do you really think the US would defend Australia against a major nuclear power if the price was US cities getting nuked by that nuclear power?!"

France also gleaned that response - which is why France developed its own nuclear deterrent in the 1960s.