After the AUKUS submarine schedule was announced on March 14, 2023 Australia's Defence Minister Marles quickly started to argue Australian having Virginia SSNs would not erode Australia’s sovereignty/discretion on whether or not they would work with the USN to defend Taiwan. Marles’ main concern was widespread opposition (within his own governing Labor Party ranks and in public surveys) to the “A$368 Billion” SSN price-tag and perceived loss of sovereignty. Put another way Marles argued Australia would enjoy sovereign freedom of choice not to fight alongside the US Navy.
US Governments don’t see things that way - since America forces in WWII saved Australia’s “bacon” in the Battle of the Coral Sea and Guadalcanal (in the Solomons). Both represented Japanese threats on the approaches to Australia. The US doesn’t see Australia always fighting in alliance with the US as a “loss of Australian sovereignty”. The US sees it as in Australia’s best interests. This includes the mythical or actual US nuclear umbrella that theoretically keeps any Chinese nuclear threat to Australia at bay.
Marles’ spurious reaction “Australia
would retain its sovereignty” flies in the face of regular US State Department,
US Defense Department and retired US admirals' and generals' reminders that the US and
Australia have fought shoulder-to-shoulder for more than 100 years and will
continue to do so, through shared interests.
FOR EXAMPLE
Said current US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on the US DoD website in September 2021 https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2777798/australia-us-alliance-is-stronger-deeper-than-ever-officials-say/
“Today, we still stand
shoulder-to-shoulder as mates, ready to face the challenges and the
opportunities of the future,” Austin said. “That’s what this new trilateral
security partnership between the U.S., the U.K. and Australia is all about. …
An important first step for AUKUS will be our efforts to help Australia acquire
nuclear-powered submarines. This will significantly improve the Australian
Navy’s reach and defensive capabilities.
[and this is the "Kicker", Austin further stated] "It will also help contribute to what I call ‘integrated deterrence’ in the region — the ability for the United States military to work more effectively with our allies and partners in defense of our shared security interests.”
Pete Comment
Basically “‘integrated deterrence’ in the region” and US defined "shared security interests" (a la the US and allies deterring China over Taiwan) trumps separate Australian defence sovereignty or choice.
7 comments:
Hello Pete, sorry I haven’t posted for a while but thanks for keeping up the interesting posts.
You are correct to post about Sovereignty because I think it has become a misused word. What does it really mean? And I think you are correct to suggest critics of AUKUS have misused this term as a means to attack SSNs for the RAN.
To me having a sovereign capability means a nation having a defence system that it can operate independent of any foreign control. So that includes acquiring both the system and all of the IP, spare parts and training needed to deploy, operate maintain and if needed repair that system in service. Whether or not Australia has agreed to militarily support another nation in the event of a war (e.g. USA vs China) is a separate question of foreign policy. It could be applied to any defence purchased, from F35s to missiles.
I think there is no question that once an SSN is at sea, submerged and hard to contact, the (presumably Australian) captain, does ensure Australia has full control over it. The real question on sovereignty rests on the ability to maintain it and keep it stocked with weapons and fuel. Fuel is not an issue for an SSN and Australia is setting up a local missile manufacturing facility and is already a partner in the Mk48 torpedo program. That leaves spare parts for the mechanical systems. The more of the SSN and its components are made in Australia the more easily it can be maintained and repaired locally.
Some SSN components are bound to be manufactured in US or UK and a long term flow of spare parts from one or the other will be required to keep the RAN SSNs running.If there was a falling our between the RAN, UK and USA this could become difficult. Yet that argument could apply to any military - even the USN depends on some foreign suppliers.
So at this point I think we need to accept the AUKUS agreement, imperfections and all, and get on with it.
We shall all be watching the 2023 Australian budget with interest.
Hi Pete,
You may want to read this because it looks like Argentina is interested in getting either the Scorpene class Submarine, Type 214 or Type 209/1400. My Money is on the Scorpene class Submarine.
Argentina in talks with Naval Group, ThyssenKrupp for three submarines
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/04/14/argentina-in-talks-with-naval-group-thyssenkrupp-for-three-submarines/
Thanks Anonymous 4/19/2023 12:07 AM
Yes Australia will fail to have a sovereign, that is Independent, SSN capability until the mid 2040s when we Might have built and commissioned 1 or 2 SSN-AUKUS.
It will be difficult to just "get on with it." with the Virginias, because the US priorities, for a variety of reasons* suggest the US simply won't be supplying them in the 2030s.
* The variety of reasons include:
- only 1.2 Virginias being produced now and perhaps through to 2027, when, for the US to even consider supplying 3 to Australia, 2 Virginias need to be produced per year in 2023-2027. This while an average of 2 older SSNs (the Los Angeles class) are being retired per year.
- a high, more than projected, major maintenance backlog of something like 15 US SSNs, creating a severe US SSN availability shortage
- the US' pressing need to produce the Columbia SSBNs as a higher priority out to the 2030s
- Up to 20 more US SSNs than the current rolling average of 50 to combat the increasing numbers, higher quality and consequent greater threat from Chinese 095 SSNs, 096 SSBNs (each firing a greater number of longer range JL-3 SLBMs) coming into service from the late 2020s. Both the 095s and 096s will be sufficiently quiet to operate east of the First Island Chain and into the central and even eastern Pacific (off America's shores) .
- Australia will also have insufficient fully SSN trained and Experienced officer-crews and only Inexperienced deep maintenance facilities for Virginias until the late 2030s. In terms of Aussie maintainers training up, I don't think the USN would entrust deep maintenance of one of their Virginias in Australia's Fleet Base West or Osborne.
Our just "get on with it." Virginia Sovereingty might also rely on the high risk hope that Trump or some isolationist like him, Will Not refuse to release the Virginias. An isolationist or even reasonable future President will more likely recognise that the USN increasingly and desperately needs ALL the US can build.
March 14, 2023 was a good photo op for Albo, all bipartisan defence policy serious, and standing with the big boys.
However, it is unlikely the words of the doddery, outgoing Biden, would/could actually deliver Virginias already earmarked to the USN throughout the 2030s...
Cheers Pete
Hi Nicky
Thanks for "Argentina in talks with Naval Group, ThyssenKrupp for three submarines
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/04/14/argentina-in-talks-with-naval-group-thyssenkrupp-for-three-submarines/ "
If its budget is US$1.5 billion Argentina (Arg) would be very optimistic being able to buy 3 or even 2 TKMS Type 214s (each having expensive AIP) or extra large, not fully developed Naval Group (NG) Shortfin Barracuda SSKs.
So I think the shortlist is more likely TKMS 209s vs NG Scorpenes.
After NG saw the Attack-class contract terminated it doesn't have new back orders so it really wants its SSK division busy and receiving revenue. So I think NG will offer a very low/competitive up front price that will be publically/politically acceptable for Argentina, even though subsequent add-on costs will quietly creep in.
Also, in view of the 1982 Falklands War and continuing Argie claims on the "Malvinas" the UK or even the US might exert some pressure on TKMS NOT to sell subs to Argentina. As such subs might one day torpedo a UK patrol ship defending the Falklands/Malvinas. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_the_Falkland_Islands
France, especially its arms business frequently exerts a slightly non-aligned right to sell to who-ever wants to buy. In the Falklands War after all it was French Exocets that sank several UK vessels https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falklands_War#Air_attacks
One Argie hesitation, though, may be Brazil, which has commissioned 1 Scorpene and 3 more Scorpenes in the next few years https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riachuelo-class_submarine#Units . Brazil is occasionally a strategic competitor to Arg. If both countries have Scorpenes each will likely be aware of the all aspect acoustic and electronic emissions of their opposing Scorpenes. This May be a turnoff for Arg.
So I'm making an each way bet on what Arg will end up buying:
- 60% likely NG Scorpenes
OR
- 40% likely TKMS 209s or 214s.
Regards Pete
Hi Pete,
Unrelated to the topic, but relevant to the wider Indo-Pacific theatre:
The US & India have restarted the CopeIndia series of Air Exercises which were on hiatus since COVID.
https://twitter.com/IAF_MCC/status/1648306610530553857
Thomas Newdick over at The War Zone wrote a nice report on the same:
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/b-1b-lancers-fight-with-and-against-indian-air-force-in-historic-first
Gathering from various sources reporting on the on-going events, I find four points of particular interest in this edition of the Exercise:
1) The USAF has brought in its B-1B Lancer supersonic long-range bomber for exercises in India for the first time. Another asset of note is the F-15E Strike Eagle. Both aircraft types focused on Air-to-Ground Strike missions of varying magnitudes.
2) Special Forces units of the two countries have reportedly practiced Forward Air Control missions in the run-up to the Air component of the exercises.
3) The locations of the exercises. Spread across three China-facing Air Force Stations in Eastern India.
4) For the first time, the presence of personnel from the Japan Air Self-Defence Force (JASDF) in an observer capacity (which is usually a precursor to participation...we'll see).
Interesting events overall. Expansion in the size, scope & complexity of joint exercises is never a bad thing.
Cheers
Hi Pete,
I think Argentina would more likely go for Scorpene class SSK than the Type 209/1400. It would fit their needs and they would not be tied to US/UK pressure.
Thanks Gessler for putting the QUAD in exercise action Close to India-China Border links and comments together.
I'll use them for an article soon.
Regards Pete
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