The A$268 Billion estimated by the Australian Government as necessary to prepare for and buy Australia’s future nuclear submarines may have constrained funds for most of the defence purchases that were to be recommended by Australia's Defence Strategic Review (DSR). The subs are to be 3 to 5 imported Virginias and then up to 8 SSN-AUKUSs home built in Osborne, South Australia.
The secret version of the DSR Report was handed to PM Albanese and Defence Minister Marles by the main author, retired Air Chief Marshal Sir Angus Houston, on February 14, 2023 (photo above). The public version of the Report was expected to be released basically the same time as the March 14, 2023 AUKUS submarine announcement. A delay caused by culling of subsequently unaffordable Report recommendations may have occurred.
Albanese would be aware of significant political and public resistance to paying A$100s Billions for the subs and therefore public reluctance to pay for other new big ticket defence items.
A possible big ticket highlight of the public DSR Report may have been a recommendation that Australia consider buying a squadron of B-21 future stealth bombers from the US. A$100s Billions for the subs would clash with A$10s Billions for a squadron of B-21s to be based in central Australia. This would probably place a B-21 purchase, always a long shot for Australia, off the table, eliminating it as a Report recommendation.
Alternatively the DSR Report might re-announce the October 2022 announcement of a plan for B-52s being based part-time at Tindal, in the Northern Territory. But even a Tindal infrastructure upgrade for the
B-52s and for other support aircraft might cost A$Billions. So a Tindal upgrade might also be unpopular with the public on defence bill-shock grounds.
In short the huge future cost of the subs may have severely constrained DSR recommendations making the public DSR Report a very thin document indeed. Might be a great opportunity for the Report to wax lyrical about those subs?! :)
9 comments:
Canada also wants to expand it's sub force, if they can afford it:
"According to information published by Ottawa Citizen on April 4, 2023, the
Royal Canadian Navy is seeking the purchase of up to 12 new submarines at a
cost of $60 billion.
However, defence industry sources warn that the cost could climb to $100
billion, as military equipment procurement programs are often over budget."
See:
https://navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2023/april/13038-canada-navy-is-looking-to-buy-12-submarines-for-60-billion.html
Hi Anonymous at Apr 12, 2023, 12:41AM regarding future ADV Guidance
There has been some Australian shipbuilding and commentator concern that instead of Australia buying ADV Guidance second-hand for undersea surveillance system trials an Australian shipyard should have designed and built it.
Against that is the likely high priority to have a working ship quickly (and more cheaply) to serve AUKUS Pillar Two.
This would be for XLUUV and secret fixed undersea sensor needs. That part of Pillar Two is under the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AUKUS#Computer_and_cybertechnology heading and most publically related to the XLUUV Anduril GHOST SHARK Program.
I'm guessing more generally the Australian Government doesn't want to restart a highly politicised and inefficient (basically) civilian shipbuilding industry. Where each and every ship project would be a State/Federal/electoral issue with inter-Labor factional and other demarcation disputes.
The government might be concerned ADV Guidance might take 10 years for a local build costing over $500 million.
We'll see how much and how long ADV Guidance's post purchasemodifications take. Rust/corrosion, fit-for-purpose issues?
AGAINST that in the earlier stages of the Arafura-class OPVs there was much consideration of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arafura-class_offshore_patrol_vessel#Planning_and_design :
"the 2009 Department of Defence white paper, the planned vessels stem from Government instructions for the RAN to rationalise patrol, mine warfare, and HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY
assets into a single class of warship."
I'm guessing an Arufura "HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY" variant could have been what future ADV Guidance is going to be?
Regards Pete
Thanks Anonymous at Apr 12, 2023, 12:43 AM for this possible future Canadian submarine surprise
I'll write about it in more detail tomorrow but at this juncture https://navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2023/april/13038-canada-navy-is-looking-to-buy-12-submarines-for-60-billion.html passing along 12 SSKs possibly for C?$100 Billion sounds
like someone in Canadian Defence-Navy has been talking to the same people the Netherlands has been talking to.
A reference to 12 subs for more than standard small-medium Eurosub prices sounds distinctly Aussie Attack-class 2.0.
Canada also has long range needs - from its above the Arctic Circle missions down to its Caribbean missions.
Regards Pete
Hi again Anonymous at Apr 12, 2023, 12:43 AM
As the Ottawa Citizen article is paywalled to me I searched for a copy today and now have access to one.
I'll reproduce it tomorrow with the deflater that it mentions Canada might take 15-25 years to commission a new SSK class.
Out of under similar to Australia vast distances at speed needs
and Canada's long term need for under ice surveillance or even warfare considerations
I'm wondering why Canada, given new SSN sharing between the Five Eyes
hasn't seriously considered the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SSN-AUKUS option?
Regards Pete
I think Canada has a realistic assessment with what it means to operate SSN. And therefore does not consider them. Furthermore they see no need to defend their country in the South China Sea.
My feeling is that they will operate a mix of SSK with AIP and a fleet of L/XLUUX in the future.
Hi Pete,
Now that it's been some years after the AUKUS deal, do you think the delays and costs in overall sub capability refresh were inevitable? Do you reckon the French option was truly technically or commercially infeasible, due to problems at Naval Group, or were there more causes arising on the side of Australian DoD?
Hi Anonymous at 4/14/2023 4:18 AM
Yes Canada is already protected by 10s of US SSNs based on the shared North American continent so a token (due to extreme costs) force of Canadian SSNs makes little sense.
Also Canadian conventional SSKs have qualities (like being smaller, more maneuverable in choke points and closer to shore, and more cost effective surveilling Caribbean drug smuggling and illegal fishing.
I'll write about Canadian XLUUVs next week. Meanwhile what does your use of "L/XLUUX" mean in good old XLUUV terms?
On Canadian sub acquisition see my new article "Canada's RCN Using the RAN's Attack-class Plan?" of April 14, 2023 at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2023/04/canadas-rcn-using-rans-attack-class-plan.html
Regards Pete
Hi retortPouch at 4/14/2023 1:51 PM
Re your questions, in turn:
1. "Now that it's been some years after the AUKUS deal, do you think the delays and costs in overall sub capability refresh were inevitable?"
It hasn't even been 2 years since the September 2021 "AUKUS deal". Its been only a month since the March 14, 2023 for something failing to be an "overall sub capability refresh". In that regard whatever happened to the Collins' LOTE?.
So its too early to tell. But please read my latest AUKUS sub articles. Pleae ask me in 2034 - a year after the first Virginia MAY have been delivered to Australia.
2. "Do you reckon the French option was truly technically or commercially infeasible, due to problems at Naval Group, or were there more causes arising on the side of Australian DoD?
All of those factors came into it. Australia, in 2016, wanted a "regionally superior" attck submarine that could not be superior without a nuclear reactor (a reactor which of course was not on offer then).
Australia chose the winning SSK, too early, in 2016 for Federal Election (South Australian electorates voting) reasons
when, like the Netherlands, Australia should have waited 5-7 more years to eliminate 1 of the 2 contestants left standing (Naval Group or TKMS). This elimination period would have contributed to a more refined design and a far more competitive price.
BUT the highest bid won in recognition that the "competition" was all about the largest amount of Federal money justifiable for the Australian (not French) shipbuilding industry. This was in oder (you'll note the vicious circle) for the Turnbull Coalition Government to be in the best position to win the 2016 Federal Election...which it won. Turnbull's roundabout "submarine election" strategy worked.
Such "logic" is also driving the slender political promise that 8 x SSN-AUKUS's will be built in South Australia (for votes) from the lates 2030s to the 2050s. South Australian build prices are likely to be twice the build in UK or US shipyard prices...
...but Australian built submarines have always been about winning Elections.
Cheers Pete
L/XLUUX was a typo. I meant LUUV or XLUUV. People have different definitions. I would call it an XLUUV if it exceeds the size of a 40 foot container.
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