Australia’s agencies involved with the Nuclear-Powered Submarine Taskforce include:- The Department of Defence,
- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
- Attorney General’s Department,
- Department of Education, Skills and Employment,
- Australian
Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency [ARPANSA], see 1.
and
- the Australian
Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation [ANSTO] see 2. below
Some ANSTO
and ARPANSA staff may form the nucleus (pardon the pun) of an Australian Defence
Nuclear Safety Regulator – like the UK Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/defence-nuclear-safety-regulator-dnsr
In the
longer term, to staff an Australian Regulator, many more postgraduate Australian
nuclear technology experts will need to be trained and UK (and maybe US) nuclear
contractors will need to be hired.
-----------------------------------------
1.
The Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency's (ARPANSA's) current role seems the best fit to form the basis of an Australian Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator's future role.
See
the ARPANSA’s website https://www.arpansa.gov.au/
for the following documents (from the internet January 31, 2022). They are very interesting and revealing. So I have included the full text, bolding some choice bits:
“Nuclear Powered Warship Visit Planning”
at https://www.arpansa.gov.au/research/radiation-emergency-preparedness-and-response/visits-by-nuclear-powered-warships which includes a subsection
on “Radiation monitoring”
FULL TEXT: Nuclear
powered warships visit planning
On
this page:
·
Visiting Ships Panel (Nuclear) VSPN
Port visits to Australia by
naval vessels of friendly nations, and reciprocal visits by ships of the Royal
Australian Navy, are one of the most visible aspects of the defence cooperation
between Australia and other countries in peacetime. These naval vessels may be
conventionally or nuclear-powered. Ship visits are made with the approval of
the Australian Government.
Due to the
nature of Nuclear Powered Warships (NPW) propulsion plants, special procedures
have been adopted to ensure that the safety of the general public is maintained
during visits by such vessels. These
procedures include Conditions of Entry and the arrangements for visits, as well
as contingency arrangements in the unlikely event of an accident resulting in
the hazardous release of radioactivity to the environment.
The nature of
these requirements necessitates that responsibility for the conduct of these
procedures is shared between Australian Government and state/territory
Governments. Australian Government responsibility is generally for
international negotiations, prescribing guidelines and approving and arranging
visits within those guidelines.
The Australian
Government requires contingency arrangements to be in place at all Australian
ports visited by NPW and also requires that there be the capability to
undertake radiation monitoring of the port environment. These arrangements are
formulated to cover two potential release mechanisms, which are failure or
malfunction of radioactive waste control systems within the vessel and an
accident involving the reactor plant.
The potential
for the external radiation exposure of personnel in the vicinity of a NPW at an
alongside berth is checked at regular intervals by radiation surveys of areas
designated as free for public access. The potential for radiation exposure from
the consumption of seafood is kept under surveillance by a program of marine
environmental monitoring. Analyses for fission and activation products and any
other radionuclide known to characterise radioactive discharges likely to arise
from a NPW is conducted on samples of the surface layer of the bottom sediment
from the vicinity of the NPW berth or anchorage, and selected local seafood
taken from the environs of the berth or anchorage (where possible).
The results of
NPW radiation monitoring program are published annually by the Department of
Defence. The reports on radiation monitoring for the last five years
are provided below:
- No
visits occurred in 2018
Visiting
Ships Panel (Nuclear) VSPN
An inter-departmental committee, the Visiting Ships Panel (Nuclear) (VSP(N)), oversees the arrangements for visits to Australian ports by Nuclear Powered Warships (NPW). These include the Commonwealth Plan OPSMAN1 dealing with visits by Nuclear Powered Warships, and the associated Radiation Monitoring Handbook for Visits by Nuclear Powered Warships to Australian Ports and the Department of Defence document Environmental Radiation Monitoring During Visits by NPWs to Australian Ports: Requirements, Arrangements and Procedures.
The responsibilities of the VSP(N) are to:
1. advise the Minister of Defence on proposals for NPW visits
2. develop and maintain procedures related to NPW visits
3. oversee the implementation of specific arrangements, especially
safety requirements, for visits by NPWs.
OPSMAN1
The Australian planning covering
visits by visiting nuclear powered vessels is detailed in OPSMAN1. OPSMAN1 provides detailed information on the conditions,
procedures and the responsibilities for the visits by nuclear-powered vessels
to Australian ports. Visits are only permitted to Australian ports, which have
been assessed and approved as suitable in terms of strict Australian
environmental and safety criteria. Conditions of entry to Australian ports by
visiting NPW have been established by the Australian Government. In the event of a reactor-based accident, procedures are in place to
ensure the early removal of the damaged vessel from the port, thus removing the
radiation source term.
The
2000 reference accident for nuclear powered warships
Much of the planning for
managing potential radiation exposures is based on the modelling results of the Reference
Accident. The Reference Accident is
a computer model devised for estimating the nature and extent of the
radioactive contamination for a severe accident scenario involving a loss of
coolant accident in a NPW reactor and the subsequent release of radioactive
material to the environment. The Reference Accident is
used to assess the acceptability of a port for visits by NPWs and to establish
the planning zones for the initial radiation emergency response.
The Reference
Accident predicts that, after the passage of the radioactive
cloud, the two principal pathways for exposure would be through external irradiation
and from ingestion of radioactivity. Resuspension of surface contamination and
the subsequent inhalation would be very small. The Reference Accident predicts
that the major component of the release would be radioiodine, with the initial
levels of [Caesium-137] Cs-137 contamination predicted to be at least an order of magnitude
lower than the initial radioiodine levels. Both Cs-137 and radioiodine
contamination can move easily into the environment, and this implies that all
foodstuff produced in the affected area, particularly milk would need to be
monitored closely to ensure that the radiation dose to critical members of the
public is minimised.
For the
purposes of Australian NPW emergency planning, the radiological consequences of
a severe hypothetical accident scenario are calculated and compared with
radiological acceptance criteria. The hypothetical accident, termed the
Reference Accident, is selected to represent an upper bound risk to the
surrounding population, and is used to assist in planning emergency arrangements.
The use of such a Reference Accident is also the basis for estimating the
adequacy of emergency planning for any research reactor sites in Australia. The
aim of the Reference Accident is to aid in planning emergency measures that
would take effect if an accident occurred on a visiting NPW, and involved the
release of radionuclides from the nuclear reactor on these vessels.
The calculated
consequences of this scenario are compared with port acceptability criteria to
determine, on a port specific basis, whether the impact of the Reference
Accident on the surrounding population meets the criteria. In addition,
emergency planning zones based on the calculated consequences of the Reference
Accident are used by emergency planning authorities in developing port specific
emergency arrangements.
Radiation
monitoring
The guidelines in OPSMAN1
require suitable radiation-monitoring programs to address two situations,
routine environmental monitoring and emergency monitoring related to a reactor
accident. Conditions of Entry for nuclear-powered warships (NPW) require that,
for the port being visited, there be an operating safety organisation,
competent to conduct a suitable radiation monitoring program and able to
initiate actions and provide services necessary to safeguard the public in the
event of a release of radioactivity following a reactor accident. The
organisation is to be well practised and capable of quick and effective action.
For each NPW visit routine environmental radiation monitoring
program
is conducted to provide means for:
a. confirming no release of radioactive material or emission of
ionising radiation
b. determination of the nature and extent of any releases/emissions
c.
assessing the levels of
radiation and any contamination in the environment around the NPW.
The potential for the external
radiation exposure of personnel in the vicinity of a NPW at an alongside berth
is checked at regular intervals by radiation surveys of areas designated as
free for public access. The potential for radiation exposure from the
consumption of seafood is kept under surveillance by a program of marine
environmental monitoring. Sensitive, high volume seawater monitoring and
analyses in the vicinity of the berth or anchorage are undertaken before and
after visits to verify there have been no environmental releases of radiation.
A radiation
monitoring system is available during each NPW visit to provide early detection
of a reactor incident of sufficient severity to possibly cause a major release
of fission products to the environment. This early warning system is
complemented by arrangements for notification by the NPW should an incident
occur.
ARPANSA, the
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation and the Australian
Defence Forces are the main Commonwealth agencies providing radiological
support to the emergency plans. The coordination of the Australian Government
response is the responsibility of Emergency Management Australia as specified
in the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework.
The immediate
monitoring response to a NPW accident is provided by local Radiation Monitoring
Groups, comprising State radiation health, emergency services personal or navy
reservists under the direction of an ANSTO health physicist. ARPANSA provides
OSL monitors, analyses marine samples and in event of a NPW incident it may be
requested to provide additional teams and the Commonwealth Technical Advisor to
support the State response through the Commonwealth Disaster Plan (COMDISPLAN).
The objectives
for the conduct of emergency radiation monitoring for NPW visits are to:
1. provide accurate and timely data on the level and degree of
hazards resulting from the release
2. provide detail of the physical and chemical characteristics of
the hazard
3. determine the extent and duration of the hazard
4. assist decision makers on the need to take protective actions
and interventions on the basis of operational intervention levels (OILs)
5. confirm the efficiency of remedial measures such as
decontamination procedures
6. assist in preventing the spread of contamination
7. provide information for accident classification
8. provide information for protection of emergency workers
More extensive monitoring of
affected areas is conducted following the
immediate post accident monitoring.
This could continue for several
days, weeks or months, depending on the extent
of the release. The
ARPANSA
aims to address these objectives in
the context of a radiation release associated with a visiting Nuclear Powered
Warship in an Australian port.
It provides the recommendations on procedures
for sample collection and analysis and the basis for the training of the
relevant monitoring teams.
Note:
If you are unable to access PDFs, please contact us for access to an alternative
version of the information.
Not what you're looking for?
Occupational exposure: Emergency workers and helpers
ARPANSA establishing radiation monitoring network
Guide for Radiation Protection in Emergency Exposure Situations (RPS
G-3)
---------------------------------------
2.
Also gathered by Pete from the Internet on January 31, 2022 is the relevant News Release by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation
(ANSTO) https://www.ansto.gov.au/
News Release dated September 24,
2021 https://www.ansto.gov.au/news/ansto-looks-forward-to-lending-its-significant-nuclear-science-and-technology-capabilities
Titled: “ANSTO looks forward to lending its significant nuclear science and
technology capabilities to support AUKUS”
[with the text] The new trilateral
security partnership between Australia, the UK and the US (AUKUS) is
a historically significant development for nuclear science and technology in
Australia.
The
announcement of at least eight nuclear-powered submarines to be built
in Adelaide has been welcomed by the manufacturing and university sectors as a
positive development. As the centre of Australia’s nuclear research and
technology capabilities, ANSTO looks forward to supporting the Australian
government in delivering the capability.
All Australians should be
proud of our nation’s nuclear science and research capabilities with over 60
years’ of nuclear engineering and stewardship experience through ANSTO.
ANSTO
has ensured the safe management of Australia’s nuclear facilities at our
Lucas Heights campus in Sydney which enable leading research, the advanced
manufacturing of nuclear medicines and irradiation of silicon ingots for the
industry globally.
Through ANSTO, Australia is highly
regarded within international networks including the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and has already well-established research
partnerships with the UK and USA.
Over the next 18 months,
ANSTO will work with the Submarine Task Force project to determine the optimal
pathway for the delivery of a nuclear-powered submarine capability for
Australia.
This will involve working
with the United Kingdom and the United States to intensively examine the
requirements that underpin nuclear stewardship, with a specific focus
on safety, training, operation, maintenance, disposal, and environmental
protection.
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