January 6, 2022

Factors Determining Number of SLBMs

Pete Comment

The necessary number of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) determined by a country is based on many factors including: likely target selection; available budget; interdependence with submarine size, ballistic missile size and number of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) per missile; degree of miniaturisation of RVs; range and stealth/survivability of missiles and their RVs; and other significant factors. Overall a country needs to be satisfied that it has mature submarine and missile deterrent designs.

I would say the US Ohio (24 SLBM silos) and UK Vanguard (with 16 SLBM silos) classes represent the most mature operational systems against all the above factors. These US and UK SSBNs are equipped with Trident II D5 SLBMs with several available Trident MIRV combinations.

I think India is in a midway phase against these factors and may take another 20 years to have a system as capable as the current UK/US Trident II platforms.

ARTICLE

As a follow up to "Launch of S4: India's 3rd Arihant class SSBN: Reactors" of December 31, 2021 Gessler has provided additional comments to the effect:

An enlargement of the initial 6,000 tonne Arihant class ie. S2/INS Arihant and S3/INS Arighat to produce the larger 7,000 tonne just launched S4 “Arihant Stretch” design is unlikely to have been a simple plug-and-play affair. This is considering that the Arihant-class wasn't designed to be "modular". 

A future example of modular is the Common Missile Compartment (CMC) structure based on a 4 missile “quad pack”. This will be used in the future 16 SLBM US Columbia-class (see US Government artwork above with further details) and the 12 SLBM UK Dreadnought-class SSBN. The Columbia-class may carry more SLBMs because its potential targets may include Russia, North Korea and China (so far) while the Dreadnought-class may only have one potential country target, Russia.

Above artwork is courtesy H I Sutton's article at Covert Shores (the artwork can be enlarged here). It provides an idea of the relative size of the first 2 Arihant class (S2 and S3) with the Arihant Stretch (S4). India's The Wire provides a Janes' estimate of measurable  length of S2 and S3 length at 111.6m vs 125.4m for S4The Wire, perhaps also drawing on the Janes' report even indicates S2/INS Arihant uses 600 tonnes of Russian sourced Titanium in its pressure hull.
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Arihant's modification from 4 SLBM silos to 8 silos for the Arihant Stretch is major. And MAYBE there are some changes to increase the power output of the Reactor as well. Its hard to say. It is likely these changes have entailed a significant level of challenge for both the design and construction departments – with changes to the submarine's Centre of Gravity, Centre of Mass, Power requirements, all these would have changed to a considerable degree.

The reason why India saw it appropriate to take on the additional risk of this modification appears to be an executive-level decision taken by the former (Indian Prime Minister Singh)  Government monitoring committee in 2012. This decision is based on a conclusion that 4 missile silos simply don't amount to an effective deterrence posture. That is if this India Today article by Sandeep Unnithan is to be believed (he's usually a good source). Scroll down his article to the paragraph below the picture of the shore-based Reactor for the relevant part.

To effectively draw together the factors necessary for a mature SLBM system India is currently developing full sized SSBNs known as the S5-class. These will carry perhaps 12 to 16 full size SLBMs (perhaps designated "K6s"). The necessary minimum number of four S5s may be operational in the Indian Ocean by the early 2030s. Their K6s will be MIRVed with an expected 8,000km range - sufficient to hit Beijing as well as China's nuclear submarine Bohai shipyard to the east of Beijing.

2 comments:

Gessler said...

To add to what you've written, I'll go over 2 more aspects that could determine the number of SLBMs a given country would want on each of its SSBNs:

1) Reactor refueling frequency & refueling time period.

A reactor using 95-97% enriched HEU, such as those used by US & UK, would require refueling less frequently compared to a reactor using 40% enriched HEU, such as those used by Russia & India. Which in turn would be less frequent than the 5-7% LEU fuel used by France & China.

Additionally, advancement in reactor design would also play a factor in further prolonging the frequency of refueling. The LEU PWRs used on the Rubis-class SSN,as per the article linked below, required fueling once every 5 years or so, whereas the K15 PWR on Barracuda/Suffren-class SSN has extended that to once every 10 years.

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2019/07/more-details-on-suffren-the-french-navy-next-gen-ssn-on-its-export-ssk-variants/

Regarding HEU PWRs, it obviously cannot be verified but I won't be surprised if improvements in this regard have been made to the PWR used on India's new S4 (as compared to earlier S2 & S3 examples).

Similarly advancements on HEU designs on the part of US/UK have also yielded significant results - most notably the new "Life-of-Type" reactors that will equip both Columbia-class & Dreadnought-class SSBNs. These reactors would be built in "permanently sealed" pressure vessels which would never need to be refueled during the course of the submarines' designed service life of 40+ years***.

As opposed to existing American/British PWRs which have to be refueled once during their lives (after approximately 20 years of operation), and then have to be dry-docked for a full 2-year period for the extremely complicated refueling procedure - Two years that the SSBN is unable to deliver on the Deterrence role.

The Life-of-Type PWRs will alleviate this problem & contribute to increased availability, and I'm pretty certain this has played a significant role in reducing the American SSBNs' silo numbers from 24 on Ohio-class to 16 on Columbia-class and the British ones from 16 on Vanguard to only 12 on the Dreadnought.

Interestingly, you will note that the next-generation French SSBN, the "SNLE-3G", continues to employ 16 launch tubes, same as the existing Triomphant-class...ostensibly a result of their unwillingness to leave LEU designs.

However, they have indeed may considerable strides in minimizing the period of time it takes to actually refuel the reactor. If I recall correctly, its down to only a few months (can't be sure, it was heard word of mouth).

2) The presence of other means of delivering deterrence, or lack thereof

Based on a number of factors, including threat perception, geographical realities, financial and/or technical limitations or any other myriad reasons. a given country might decide in favour of ditching land & air-deliverable deterrence capabilities. UK is an example. France is another example, though only regarding the land-launched part.

But other nuclear weapon states like US, Russia, China & India have not decided to do so and it doesn't appear they have any intention to do so in the foreseeable future either.

Strategically, having submarine-based deterrence is one thing, having ONLY submarine-based deterrence is another matter entirely. Having the option to deliver a reasonably effective deterrence using land & air options, plus the relative sophistication (or lack thereof) of perceived adversaries' air & missile defence capabilities, certainly plays an important role in determining the number of payloads on a given country's SSBNs.

*** Life-of-Type reactors may actually be a good option for Australia. No need to refuel which saves a lot of time & money, plus the possibility to attenuate any public fears by highlighting the reactor's "permanently sealed" nature...which also precludes easy access to Weapons-grade HEU contained within.

Cheers

Anonymous said...

To Geissler
Sorry to come back again to the HEU/LEU perspective..so many time exposed

your views are not correct as the LEU choice in France is fundamentally an economical and N safety issue to piggyback on the civilan N industry..BTW it take a few weeks to change the fuel (2 has been documented) in the military harbours of Toulon and Brest using hatches and specialized robot.Not in Cherbourg yard.
LEU reactors as seen in the 2500 T Rubis classe can be very compact..

Military PWR are subject to the same safety standards as civilian (inspection of the inner part of the reactor..)and audited by the same independant people. This contribute to the political acceptance of having N reactors in the middle of large cities.The spent fuel can be treated nearly in the same processes as well.In the French view it is the HEU which is perceived as problematic...Sealed for life..?
Once the glut of bomb grade HEU due to the SALT treaties will be exhausted in the middle of the century in the US this question will be probably revisited as well in the US

As far as the number of SLBM tubes this has nothing to do with LEU ..Each M51 carry up to 10 MIRV at above 8000 km( everywhere on earth if you remember loxodromy vs orthodromy including China from the North Sea)..160 X 100 KTon in each sub... 500 Hiroshima..! France successive Gov.believe in "just sufficient deterrence"...Having 2 sub at sea , even partially loaded (they are in fact at least in the public domain in the UK..) is a much better deterrent..