Geoff Crittenden has written an excellent Nov 25, 2021 commentary titled "OPINION: A lack of local skills will impact [Australian] nuclear submarine manufacture", at Australia's Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter. The following is part of Geoff Crittenden's commentary:
"...Australia will need to rely heavily on the experience, skills and technology of the United States and the United Kingdom in building and maintaining these nuclear submarines because we do not have a local nuclear industry. We don’t have infrastructure, skills or experience in nuclear power—and none of this can be created overnight.
"...for Australian industry—building nuclear powered submarines presents an inordinate number of issues. The skills, knowledge and expertise required to build a submarine are akin to those required to build a space craft chartered for the moon. Building a nuclear submarine is equivalent to building a space craft set for Mars and beyond. It is an entirely new quantum.
Local Content Requirements
Without an existing nuclear industry, it will be difficult for any defence prime contractor building these nuclear-powered submarines to meet the local industry content requirements that are included in all Defence contracts
While ambitious, the Federal Government’s local content requirements are of enormous benefit to Australian industry. However, without exception, they have been extremely difficult to execute effectively on recent Defence projects. There are a number of reasons for this difficulty.
Firstly, the Defence projects are extraordinarily complex, requiring a highly skilled workforce, investments in cutting-edge technology and rapid upskilling. Secondly, the companies delivering these projects are global entities, with priorities that extend beyond Australia’s borders.
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, several of these major Defence projects were announced simultaneously. Local industry hasn’t been given the opportunity to keep up with the speed and scale of delivery expected. In some areas, and across some skillsets, there are gaps in the local industry. And this is in industries in which Australia already has proven experience—let alone nuclear power.
Mandating local industry content requirements is a powerful government tool that affords many benefits, but it is impossible to create industry capability and capacity overnight. As a result, the defence prime contractors can find themselves stuck between a rock and a hard place—the balance between delivering on time and on budget, and meeting local industry content requirements becomes unworkable.
A Lack of Local Skills
While the Prime Minister has stated that the nuclear-powered submarines will be built in Adelaide, it’s not yet clear whether this will involve manufacturing, or just assembly of US or UK supplied parts. Although, given that there are no welders in Australia certified to the Standards required for nuclear welding, it’s unlikely that manufacture will occur in Adelaide. This will obviously impact local industry content requirements, as well as upskilling, technology transfer and the shipbuilding workforce in general.
Not only that, Australia will need to invest in a whole gamut of infrastructure capable of handling nuclear reactors during both the construction and maintenance phases. It’s highly unlikely that the people of Port Adelaide will warm to a nuclear facility located on their back doorstep. So, where is the Federal Government planning to situate this facility?
All this is compounded by a lack of skilled nuclear engineers and captains. It takes years and years of experience to captain a nuclear submarine; Australia effectively needs mariners in training now to ensure they’re ready to captain submarines when construction is complete. Australia already struggles to crew its Collins Class submarines, which need up to 50 people aboard. The US Fast Attack submarines require crews of around 130 people. How will Australia bridge this shortfall?
Given all these challenges, the timeframe for having nuclear powered submarines battle-ready is quite extended. It is unlikely they would be in the water until the 2040s, at which time the technology could already be obsolete. Plus, in the meantime, the lifespan of the Collins Class fleet will have to be extended beyond recommended years.
No Simple Solution
While I fully support the local industry content premise, in practice it is just not delivering what the Federal Government intended. While the contract with Naval Group may not have been perfect, the Federal Government’s plan for nuclear submarines is beyond the existing skillsets of Australia’s local industry.
The question now is: should the taxpayer be forced to cover the cost of the Federal Government’s pipedream project?
Or, will the Federal Government purchase nuclear submarines from our allies in the United States and United Kingdom? The Morrison Government has already set a precedence for this—quietly shelving their plans to build the Pacific Support Vessel in Australia, and instead purchasing it next year to fast-track its deployment.
Finally, with so much work available for local industry in the wake of recent onshoring motivated by COVID-19 import delays, are local contractors willing to take on defence industry work, which is notorious difficult to win, let alone deliver?
While there is no simple solution, the construction, operation and maintenance of nuclear submarines without a local nuclear industry will be challenging. Industry will need to stand by for clarification from the Federal Government."
10 comments:
STILL ON ABOUT THOSE SSNs FOR AUSTRALIA (Part 1 of 3)
These remarks continue on from some earlier observations on Australia's nascent SSN program, offered to the reliably interesting 'Submarine Matters' site in September and in October of 2021.
The earlier remarks canvassed the ideas that:
(i) to de-risk Australia's political and industrial commitment to operating SSNs, provide facts on the ground to future Australian governments, by raising the Australian ensign over two new wet leased SSNs (with mostly seconded crews) within five years of the original AUKUS announcement;
(ii) as the USN urgently needs every SSN construction slot that may arise at either of the existing US nuclear-capable shipyards, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) is very unlikely to receive any US Virginia class boats for decades; therefore:
(iii) let the RAN (a) lease UK Astute boats #six and #seven from the Royal Navy (RN), (b) place orders for long lead items for four 'Astute LMA' boats (see below) and (c) commit to the joint UK/Australian design and construction of sixteen UK SSN(R) boats (eight each) expected to replace all RN and RAN Astute boats after 30 years of service;
(iv) the UK can forestall an existential threat to its strategic deterrent (and perhaps its coveted membership of the UN P5) by keeping busy the Barrow in Furness submarine yard and the Rolls Royce naval nuclear propulsion facilities on which UK public support for that deterrent relies; and
(v) selling crucial SSN design, construction and support services to Australia is a once in a generation opportunity for the UK to power-up its submarine production volumes thus keeping nuclear boats affordable for the RN.
Whether or not Australia's SSN program should, in its present form, proceed or (sigh) be cancelled is a different submarine matter.
__________________________________________________________________
The mooted 'Astute LMA' (LMA = Lockheed Martin Australia), is a key actor in an eye wateringly expensive new production, tentatively entitled Boris and Scotty's Excellent Adventure.
I wrote [to Submarine Matters] at 14:14 on September 27, 2021:
"If the SSN pathway alluded to in my earlier jottings makes any kind of sense, in forty years time, as the UK prepares to de-fuel, disassemble and dispose of the eight Astute and five 'Astute LMA' boats it provided PWR2 reactors for, Osborne will have constructed the 'front halves' (including the fin and masts) of six new Astutes and, if the agreement were further extended, of sixteen UK Successor class boats under multi-phase AUKUS naval construction agreements."
An 'Astute LMA' design would combine the hull of the UK Astute SSN with the advanced CMS, US sensors and weapons suite preferred by the RAN, as planned for its cancelled twelve Shortfin Barracuda SSKs.
But would such a costly engineering change to the classic Astute design be 'enough' to satisfy the RAN or would it be 'too much' for a four boat production run?
If the answer is not 'enough' - what gets fixed first? What other changes, over an HMS Agincourt baseline, might make selecting the Astute class as the basis of Australia's first SSNs seem less 'adventurous' to the RAN, to Cabinet, to Parliamentary backbenchers and to the federal Department of Finance?
Bureaucratus Lex, November 29, 2021.
STILL ON ABOUT THOSE SSNs FOR AUSTRALIA (Part 2 of 3)
Public dismay has been aired over at least four UK Astute class SSN design and construction issues. These issues include its allegedly older style gearing and turbines; the weird looking semi-faceted shape of its outer hull; the UK's policy of incorporating incremental engineering changes in successive boats; and, of most concern, the reported vulnerability to certain failure cases of the PWR2 reactor design used in all the UK?s Vanguard (since 1993) and Astute (since 2014) boats.
1. Astute's machinery has been compared to a car with a Jaguar's engine coupled to a Morris Minor transmission (the exact online quote is illusive, but the sentiment is the same). If this issue is real, the size and shape of the mooted Astute LMA (Astute and Virginia class SSNs are reported to have the same pressure hull diameter) may enable cloned Virginia class gearing and turbines to fit comfortably into the 'back half' of an Astute LMA hull.
2. The renewed submarine design emphasis on defeating detection by active sonar may see the characteristic semi-faceted shape of Astute's outer hull attracting less public criticism than before (eg. sundry US pundits claiming that "the Brits seem to know nothing about the benefits of hull streamlining").
3. Incremental engineering changes may indeed mean that "each UK SSN is a bit different to the other boats in its class" but also means any technology inserts benefit the fleet much earlier than if they were incorporated in a mid-life refit.
4. If Australia is concerned about the safety of the PWR2 itself and can be persuaded to stump up half the money to collaboratively build 16 SSNs with the UK (eight each for the RN and the RAN) then the UK may be persuaded to invest in two Astute LMA boats with an Australian-specification (US designed, UK licence-manufactured) power train, LMA CMS, US sensors and weapons.
__________________________________________________________________
The September 27, 2021 remarks I referred to above speculated that unless UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson can almost immediately pry loose two new Astute class boats from the RN for an extended wet lease to the RAN (i.e. 'Phase 1' of Australia's SSN program), then the closing scene of Boris and Scotty's Excellent Adventure will depict the SSN program's plunge into the basal ooze; taking the RAN's policy implementation credibility (and maybe its whole submarine service) with it.
However, if everything comes together nicely - following on from (4.) above, after two years in RN service, if no design or construction faults are detected, the first Astute LMA (a.k.a. Astute hull #8) built and launched at an expanded Barrow in Furness in the UK is transferred to the RAN; at which time the leased HMS Agamemnon reverts from the RAN to the RN.
The second Astute LMA boat (a.k.a. Astute hull #9), also launched at Barrow, would comprise a UK built 'back half' and an Osborne built 'front half'.
If, after two years in RN service, no construction or system faults are identified, the RAN takes possession of the second Astute LMA and the leased HMS Agincourt also reverts from RAN service to the RN (so completing 'Phase 2').
At this stage, say 2035, the RN would (once more) have all seven of its 'classic Astutes' in service and the RAN would have (a) nearly ten years of experience operating SSNs; and (b) two regionally superior boats of its own in the Astute LMA configuration with two more building.
Unless the UK substantially increased the share of the UK budget allocated to the RN's SSN force (unlikely), the RN will not be ready to take its first UK SSN(R) boat until the early 2040s, when Astute hull #1 decommissions. Unless Australia's risk appetite zooms right off the scales, the RAN will not operate the first UK SSN(R).
Bureaucratus Lex, November 29, 2021.
STILL ON ABOUT THOSE SSNs FOR AUSTRALIA (Part 3 of 3)
Therefore, the RAN's third and fourth SSNs (a.k.a. Astute hulls #10 and #11) would be the first Osborne launched Astute LMA boats. Their commissioning and RAN service entry would finalise 'Phase 3'.
Depending on RN delivery dates, the RAN could next take SSN(R) boats #2, #4, #6 and #8 from the Osborne shipyard (all with 'back halves' constructed at Barrow in the UK) to bring the RAN SSN force up to the announced eight units - in this scenario four Astute LMA and four SSN(R) boats (thus completing 'Phase 4').
Unless the UK substantially increased the share of the UK budget allocated to the RN's SSN force (unlikely), the RN will not be ready to take its first UK SSN(R) boat until the early 2040s, when Astute hull #1 decommissions. Unless Australia's risk appetite zooms right off the scales, the RAN will not operate the first UK SSN(R).
Therefore, the RAN's third and fourth SSNs (a.k.a. Astute hulls #10 and #11) would be the first Osborne launched Astute LMA boats. Their commissioning and RAN service entry would finalise 'Phase 3'.
Depending on RN delivery dates, the RAN could next take SSN(R) boats #2, #4, #6 and #8 from the Osborne shipyard (all with 'back halves' constructed at Barrow in the UK) to bring the RAN SSN force up to the announced eight units - in this scenario four Astute LMA and four SSN(R) boats (thus completing 'Phase 4').
The collaborative UK/Australian design and construction of all sixteen UK SSN(R) boats would include four additional Osborne launched boats to replace the RAN's four decommissioning Astute LMA boats (under 'Phase 5').
In 'Phase 6', the four Astute LMA boats constructed for RAN service would be sent to the UK for de-fuelling and disassembly. The vital quid pro quo, for the UK, of undertaking this complex end of life work is the agreed relocation to the arid deserts of South Australia of all of the de-fuelled UK nuclear boats' sealed and secured reactor compartments for permanent storage.
This is where the wheels are most likely to fall off the current AUKUS discussions on the Australian SSN program. Without Australia signing up to address the UK's, so far, intractable problem with disposing of 'hot' reactor compartments, why on earth would the UK loan the two best SSNs they've ever had to the RAN any time in the next fifteen years ?
Oddly enough, the UK Greens and the Scottish National Party may shortly become qualified supporters of the mooted UK/Australia SSN deal (just to be rid of the 'hot mess' that is the UK's presently stymied process of safely disposing of decommissioned SSNs) and the UK Conservative Party backbench one of its keenest detractors. To "Save the RN" (SSN force) from those uncouth colonials may actually throttle it to death,eh?
So hand me some fresh Canadian popcorn, for these are indeed 'interesting times'.
Bureaucratus Lex, November 29, 2021.
Thanks Bureaucratus Lex
For your 3 long, well thought out, comments.
A favour I ask.
I'm hoping you don't mind (?) if I use your comments, with credit to you, for most of the November Report to Donors. The Report will be copied to you of course.
This report will be on the nearer future Australian SSNs dubbed "Astute LMA".
In the New Year I will republish your comments (and some of mine) as a standard SubMatts article. This republishing will incorporate additional political comments as the currnet Australian Election Campaign "Phoney War" heats up.
eg. the Labor Left (a la Penny Wong) and the Greens will intensify criticism of the Weapons Grade 95+% HEU in the Astute LMA's PWR2 reactor core. Not to mention the Weapons Grade percentage in the future PWR3 that will likely bless a future generation of Aus SSNs.
Also Labor Left and Greens criticism of major potential safety risks of basing Astute LMAs
in outer Perth (HMAS Stirling) and forward based in Sydney Harbour (Garden Island etc).
I will be pushing for a new "safe" forward base to be very gradually evolved in the third-deepest natural harbour in the southern hemisphere at Eden, NSW https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eden,_New_South_Wales. Plenty of space there for a city of 100,000 and Eden is equi-distant from Melbourne and Sydney.
Regards
Pete
CD
One of your guesses may come true between now and 2050.
P
Hi Bureaucratus Lex
Your 3 Part, 1,740 word, "STILL ON ABOUT THOSE SSNs FOR AUSTRALIA" comment of November 29, 2021, has now been published in full at the top of this string.
We (Petra and Pete aka "P&P") have decided it is self evident that the purity of Lex's thoughts must, at all costs, stand above meddling by lesser mortals.
Instead we'll make the first one page Report to Donors about the possibility of Eden, NSW hosting Aus nuke subs.
This is assuming Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) Sydneysiders would prefer Aus nuke subs were banned from even short term forward basing at Fleet Base East, ie. in pristine Sydney Harbour.
P&P
Everything I have heard so far says that they are considering Astute with a US S9G reactor. PWR2 reactors only last 25 years & are no longer in production. PWR3 lasts 33 years as does S9G. I gather PWR3 will not fit in Astute. Because Virginia is narrower (but longer) than Astute, a S9G will fit beam wise. It’s a case of can you reshuffle enough using that extra beam width to make up for the added length of the S9G. If they can pull that off, it would mean that decommissioning of the reactor would be a US problem, not a UK problem. Unlike the UK, USA has been regularly decommissioning its nuclear boats & has its own existing storage facilities.
The advantage of Astute is smaller crew size, many of the sensors planned for Attack are the same, land attack is secondary as per Attack & much the same length as the Attack, so less changes to existing & planned infrastructure that was based around the Attack class dimensions.
Hi Pete
Recently, Bradley Perrett proposed introduction of used Oyashio submarine from Japan [1,2]. But, used Japanese submarines are not sold but always abolished for confidentiality.
[1] https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/second-hand-japanese-boats-could-rapidly-expand-australias-submarine-force/ (Second-hand Japanese boats could rapidly expand Australia’s submarine force)
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oyashio-class_submarine
Surfaced displacement of Oyashio is 2750 tons in JMSDF standard and may be 3200-3400 tons in RAN standard.
Regards
A Nuclear Origin Story
My spider senses were triggered recently when I spotted an unusual article in the Journal of Energy Conversion and Management. It may be relevant to naval nuclear propulsion for Australia. More from me on a possible ‘Plan B’ and what ‘the stuff’ (see below) may be used for in late January 2022, I hope.
Roll camera, fade to black, scene one, take one – a flash back to Christmas past . . .
Lenny the priapic grandpa was excited. Those in line of sight to his open door say that, having picked up his phone at the first ring, his facial expressions, eyebrow motility and gesticulation rate seemed to indicate either head office or his ex was on the line. As the call went on, his pen began to quickly record whatever was being said. So not the ex.
After ending the call and taking a few moments to check he could read his own handwriting, Lenny signalled that my attendance was now required. He had just learned that we had a nuclear opportunity or, he said, one of Beloved Leader’s deep thinkers felt it must be so. After the ritual defenestration of the last lot, these new bright eyed thinkers were determined to fix a perceived positive announceables drought.
As the low man, Lenny tasked me with promptly reviewing the literature, making cautious enquiries and touching base with certain people, in preparation for running the numbers. No: I could definitely not have a word with the relevant agencies, the universities or even with the often useful day care network.
Calls were made, names mentioned, NDAs refreshed and some small meet and greets arranged. In a Circular Quay café after our first meeting, Lenny and I were suffering from an overload of unexpected information. We realised just how deep our ignorance of all things radioactive then was. Somebody was going to be toast if the signed and dated NDAs were less than 100 per cent effective.
To get done that which Beloved Leader, hence the dynastic fornicators who dropped this on us, wanted; we needed to shift our aim. Rather than chasing whales locally, we looked more widely for actual fish, of the steel jawed type. Such heavy biters are not endemic to Australian waters, then or now.
Meanwhile, in an office far away . . . Manny (the actual fish) was biting into global nuclear opportunities.
Notwithstanding a minor resemblance to Mel Brooks, this guy was the one hired as our expert doer. Even as Manny worked his magic, the near-term announceable morphed into a “situation” requiring the urgent attention of big name flaks, a talented sketch artist and two fairly discrete NSW government agencies.
Later that year, truckloads of very unwanted stuff arrived at a location near the antipodes of its point of origin. Security there is at least as tight as a 55 gallon drum.
Even the brightest new thinkers sometimes do time in policy advisor rehab. Lucky for all concerned, the main event was run with barely a peep, let alone another riot. The sub-plot was never mentioned, the bolt cutters were needed only once and the artisan quality corridor brief went into the institutional cloaca.
So: Drinks and party pies time.
Beloved Leader needn’t have worried. Our nuclear opportunity was not just a complicated dream. Yet, as of today, it has garnered just six words on one obscure website. Had Magritte and Kafka lived in our time, I imagine they would have each drawn inspiration from this, the affair of the rusty Geiger counter.
Merry Christmas!
Bureaucratus Lex, December 24, 2021
Post a Comment