Australia's Government owned ABC News reports October 4, 2021:
"Taiwanese Foreign Minister warns his country is preparing for war with China, asks Australia for help "
Key points:
- Taiwan's Foreign Minister Joseph Wu warns of looming war with China and urges closer cooperation with Australia
- Dozens of Chinese military aircraft have flown into Taiwanese airspace in recent days
"...Taiwan's Foreign Minister warns his nation is preparing for war with China and urges Australia to increase intelligence sharing and security cooperation as Beijing intensifies a campaign of military intimidation.
...Australia does not formally recognise Taiwan diplomatically, but the [Australian] government regularly calls for a "peaceful resolution" of differences between China and [Taiwan] through dialogue and without the threat or use of force or coercion.
A communique issued after last month's AUSMIN meetings between Australia and the United States declared that "both sides stated their intent to strengthen ties with Taiwan, which is a leading democracy and a critical partner for both countries".
...Earlier this year, America's most senior diplomat in Canberra also confirmed Australia and the United States were discussing contingency plans in case a military conflict erupts over Taiwan.
Last year, Frances Adamson, the then-head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, warned she was more concerned about a "crisis" in the Taiwan strait than at any other point in her diplomatic career.
...Taiwan has also welcomed the recent establishment of the AUKUS strategic partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the growing activity between the Quad allies, the US, India, Australia and Japan.
...The Taiwanese Foreign Minister said that unlike Australia, [Taiwan] would not be trying to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, because it has a "different war strategy".
...[Australian] Defence analyst Professor Clinton Fernandes from the University of New South Wales warns it would be difficult for the US and allies to prevent any invasion attempt by China.
...Professor Fernandes doesn't believe China will launch any military strike on Taiwan before next year's Beijing Winter Olympics but warns something more coercive is likely ahead of Taiwan's presidential elections in 2024.
"The defence of Taiwan is predicated on a Chinese invasion – but if China's main effort is not an invasion but a blockade, then what? Taiwan doesn't have a Plan B – that's the big problem."
SEE WHOLE ABC ARTICLE HERE
32 comments:
Hi Pete:
I am aware of the past discussions about the Collins. What I don't know is which of the decision criteria (and subsequent conclusions) still hold in the new situation. Previous decisions may have been weighted towards protecting Philippine or Indonesian coastal waters 10 years from now. Taiwan crisis (?) seems much tougher to me.
Do you think I am too alarmed?
My understanding is that this is an international emergency: If the west does not convince China to stand down, the results are catastrophic. Three months ago I felt we had more time.
In emergencies risk and cost tolerance increase, and even old subs can be somewhat patched up. My questions are in view of the increased urgency (if you agree):
1. Travel time for Collins to waters around Taiwan is very long. In real world conditions, how many subs on station at one time over long duration? (Unclassified estimate...)
2. Need to snort every day or two (?). Are they viable here at all? (Collins in Philippine/Indonesian waters is easier/safer than Taiwan scenario)
I am not trying to be ornery. I can imagine some options that have not been discussed. I may be full of shit, but what do you think?
1. US or other friendly ships refueling/rearming Collins.
2. Which nearby country could host an Australian depot ship? How long would it take to set up one or more?
3. Australia could limit its Taiwan/Japan patrol area to east of Taiwan/Senkakus, leaving hotter areas to more capable allies. Taylor treaty/deployment options to fit Australia's capabilities for combined/balanced strategy.
4. Could Collins be replenished in open sea with bolt-on equipment on cargo ships? (emergency "Milch Cow")? China unlikely to attack civilian (or other) ships before conflict starts, so Collins could be on station much longer at start of conflict.
5. Post Duterte government likely less China friendly. Could Australia use Subic bay?
In general, if medium future (next 10 years) deployment scenario assumes replenishment is close to conflict zone, more typical SSK's may be viable. (Imagine Italian 212NFS or other near future LIB)
In my view, the China Sea situation is heating up so quickly that assumptions behind old decisions may need re-examining. The planned switch to SSN's for example.
My aim is simple: If attack is too risky, China will not attack.
Hi Anonymous [at Oct 4, 2021, 1:32:00 PM]
Unfortunately I'm not in the Australian Navy's Submarine Service so I have no answers to any of your questions. All the ifs, buts, unknown factors, make estimates by me pointless.
I do assume though, that in fully submerged slow discrete speed mode, snorting regularly, the Collins (from their base near Perth, Australia) would be about the LAST NAVAL VESSELS OF ANY PACIFIC ALLY to reach Taiwanese waters.
Of Australia's assets our aircraft would get there first.
Australian destroyers/frigates travelling about 25 knots next.
If we were in the 2040s then Aus SSNs would likely be the first naval Aus vessels (travelling at 30 knots) to reach Taiwan's waters.
Cheers
Pete
As per Chinese blockade of Taiwan missing Plan B:
US may chose to escort convoys (think FONA on steroids). Pressure on US president would be pretty high, and if US opts to escort, it is also likely to try to pull in other allies.
References to winter Olympics and Taiwan elections would indicate "After February 2022 and before Taiwanese 2024 elections". I guess scenarios/options are under active development as we speak.
Hi Pete,
Violating the Taiwan ADIZ is not very difficult, since half of it covers the Chinese mainland. The borders can be seen on many maps, but here's a site with a few borders and outlines.
https://amti.csis.org/primer-m503-civil-aviation-asia/
Perhaps if Taiwan specifies specific areas, like within 12nm of it's main island, it'd be clearer.
Cheers,
Andrew
If I may add, in the shallow waters of the SCS, given the heavy electronic bugging might render most subs moot (may be small midget subs on LiB can be used)...
if a war like scenario does occur then any transit near the so called 'nine dash line' will be moot.
Au contraire, ASW UUV/AUVs, P-8s, EF-18 Growlers, E-2Ds, MH-60Rs, AAW ships, all supported with corresponding under water IUSS-SOSUS intelligence will likely be a better gambit.
The next 2 years are going to be very critical, china might soon decide, the international political cost of gobbling up taiwan are going to be easy enough to live with....
As things stand today, the so called 'Anglosphere' is totally insufficient in terms of scrotal fortitude and one gets the lingering feeling deep down the west under estimates the ability of china to be rash at short notice...
and of late china is about as calm as a bushmaster snake with inflamed hemorrhoids and won't back down.
Australia's future submarine requirements were outlined in the 2009 Australian Department of Defence, White Paper :
"Long transits and potentially short-notice contingencies in our primary operational
environment demand high levels of mobility and endurance in the Future Submarine. The
boats need to be able to undertake prolonged covert patrols over the full distance of our
strategic approaches and in operational areas. They require low signatures across all
spectrums, including at higher speeds."
These attributes clearly point to nuclear propulsion as a solution but yet was politically untenable until now.
Operationally if the RAN intend to be effective at the strategic chokepoints, the numbers speak for themselves when considering on station time (days) between SSN and conventional propulsion ;
SSN SSK
Malacca Straits 78 14
SCS 77 11
ECS 73 0
These numbers are taken from a CSBA document "Gateway to the Indo Pacific".
Brumby
Hi Anonymous [at Oct 4, 2021, 1:32:00 PM]
I'll chip in some responses to your list:
"1. Travel time" for Taiwan scenario only 1 Collins might very unlikely be spared - short term deployment operating from Japan/US Naval Base Yokosuka, Japan MAYBE.
2. Diesel noise of snorting would likely be fatal for Collins sub in a wartime Taiwan Strait and probably anywhere near wartime Taiwan. This is assuming more than 10 AIP Chinese Yuan subs likely in close area and Chinese undersea fixed acoustic sensors ringing Taiwan. So Collins probably unviable.
More likely viable in Australia's near north.
1. Maybe refueling at Esperance Western Aus, Darwin, Guam , Honolulu, Diego Garcia - all from onshore diesel stocks Maybe.
2. An Aus Sub Tender is constantly ruled out. Only friendly Submarine Tenders may be still be at US Guam and US Diego Garcia.
3. 35 (S Korean and Japanese SSKs) total more likely to function in their own near-Taiwan region rather than 1 Collins (way out of its region).
4. "Could Collins be replenished in open sea with bolt-on equipment on cargo ships? (emergency "Milch Cow")?"
Nope - open sea refueling never used to my knowledge (given satellites and long range radar these days). The WW2 Nazis had extremely bad experiences with all their Milch Cows being rapidly sunk.
5. Could Australia use Subic bay? Don't know.
Australia's Collins neither having LIBs nor AIP into the planned 2050s MAY render them indiscrete museum pieces even by the 2030s, against Chinese Navy.
Hi Andrew [at Oct 4, 2021, 5:26:00 PM]
Thanks for the link you provide: https://amti.csis.org/primer-m503-civil-aviation-asia/
Its first five maps suggest that Chinese aircraft crossing Taiwan airspace is a far more complex matter than common sense would dictate.
The sixth and final map - caption beginning "Overlapping air defense identification zones (ADIZs) in the airspace over the East China Sea. " surely isn't true. This is given 100s or 1000s Chinese/PRC aircraft would cross the bit over the east China/PRC landmass each day.
Regards
Pete
The meaning of blockade in Chinese war gaming is very different from the idea of blockade in Western terminology. It is much more kinetic in nature involving multi disciplinary branches of the PLA.
In a Taiwan scenario, a joint blockade operation by the PLA would involve the use of a range of offensive capabilities to sever Taiwan's connections to the outside world, including electronic and cyber attacks, missile and air strikes, naval surface and subsurface raids, and offensive mine warfare. Chinese military writings view such attacks as necessary for obtaining information control (信息权), air control (制空权), and sea control (制海权). These attacks are intended to knock-out Taiwan's communications, isolating the island and weakening its defense capabilities and war making potential. (source: Project 2049 " China's top five war plans").
Such an operation is probably a prelude to an invasion rather than an independent operation without a significant strategic objective.
It is also noteworthy (from memory) that there is only a two month window in any given year when amphibious landings can be conducted safely across the Taiwan Straits due to weather conditions.
The scale and scope of an all-out Taiwan invasion defies human comprehension. We cannot
clearly see it in our minds because nothing like it has ever happened before. No event has occurred in history that is similar. The leading potential candidates, Operation Overlord (D-Day) and Operation Iceberg (the Battle of Okinawa), were each only a fraction of the size this operation would probably be and far less complex. Operation Overlord employed over 6,000 ships and over 1,000 aircraft, which together landed approximately 155,000 allied troops on D-Day, including 24,000 by air. Operation Iceberg involved 1,500 ships, which landed approximately 50,000 troops on D-Day. It is unknown how many troops the PLA might attempt to land on Taiwan on a notional future Z Day. The potential size of Taiwan’s defending ground force (and other factors) would suggest the PLA would have to land a far larger force in the initial days of the invasion in order to have reasonable prospects of victory. Taiwan could mobilize a counter-invasion force of at least 450,000 troops. This in turn means the PLA might have to deploy close to a million men i.e. more than 6 times the D day invasion force. The numbers are mind boggling.
Brumby
Thanks Brumby
"Gateway to the Indo-Pacific" being:
"Gateway to the Indo-Pacific: Australian Defense Strategy and the Future of the Australia-U.S. Alliance. dated November 9, 2013 [by] Jim Thomas, Zack Cooper, Iskander Rehman
at https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/gateway-to-the-indo-pacific-australian-defense-strategy-and-the-future-of-t/publication/1
Comparing SSN and Collins SSKs Days on station being on Map at page 33.
Pete
I don’t see Australia committing a Colins to a Taiwan conflict other than intel gathering or in support of a RAN surface task force (which would approach Taiwan from the east if it was to be committed at all). Australia just does not have the numbers. What Australia can do is completely close off all maritime traffic through Indonesia or around the Australian continent. US can easily close the Panama Canal & Bering Straight. UK can close off the Drake Passage. If they want, UK & US can close off the Persian Gulf & the Red Sea. UK can close off the Mediterranean. Between them, AUKUS can basically bring world maritime trade to a standstill on their own. Add in likely support from Singapore, India, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, France & possibly Chile. Can China take Taiwan? Yes, they likely can. Can they afford to take Taiwan? That’s a whole different question.
Taiwan's Ministry of Defense puts out each day the flight paths of PLA aircrafts intruding into its ADIZ. Yes, Taiwan ADIZ overlaps to the West with China. The intrusions here are mostly to the South of Taiwan and Kaohsiung.
On October 4, we have a record number of PLA aircraft intruding, 52 of which 36 SU-30/J-16 and 12 H-6 bombers. Nationalism running amok is dangerous to every one.
KQN
Hi Anonymous [your Oct 4, 2021, 11:31:00 PM]
I agree. A Collins travelling slowly and secretly out to unfamiliar Taiwan seas would have none of the political effect desired.
Much more likely a couple of Australian destroyer/frigates politically seen to join a US Japanese taskforce.
However I disagree that the US and allies would escalate a Chinese invasion of Taiwan into a WW3 event withe US/allies scorched-earth stopping global sea trade. Remember the US and all other Western allies have no NATO like alliance with Taiwan.
Regards
Pete
Thanks KQN [your Oct 5, 2021, 4:29:00 AM]
The ambiguities of PLA-AF crossings into Taiwan's overly wide/political ADIZ is all the more reason the US/Western alliance should not blunder into a World War Three over Taiwan.
Pete
Hi Pete @Oct 5, 2021, 1:44:00 PM
Whilst I would love to share your optimism regarding WW 3 being avoided and indeed do desire the same outcome, lessons from history are replete with wars that nation-states stumbled into accidentally leading to small skirmishes growing into a big conflagration.
A scenario is very much possible here china underestimates the effort needed to 'integrate Taiwan' and as Brumby and the Anonymous at Oct 4, 2021, 11:31:00 PM point out, the military resources needed are going to be humongous even for a formidable PLA...miniscule may be the possibility at this juncture, but it will only a take a momentary 'miscalculation' by the CCP top brass for a hideous mess to unfold in Taiwan and the first island chain...
simulating escalation ladder analysis are fun only until the first missiles are fired....(even for a china that meticulously studies its adversaries and makes moves, like they did with my PM Modi, Xi met him a few times and decided Ladakh ingresses were worth the price, however, now a face saving climbdown is proving hard)
PS: Einstein was so right!, the never ending ability of humans to 'bungle big' is amazing
Hi Ghalib
In such a possible buildup to war, I need to rely on geo-strategic poetry:
I'm desperately hoping invading Taiwan
Embuggers China for decades to come.
Would that a Chinese Gorbachev appears
To roll back the CCP, after all these years.
Poet Pete
Perpetual Copyright Pending
I try never to rain on people's parades, however, nascent attempts in the past for liberalist reformers in China in the Gorbachevian mold have been brutally put down
Exhibit A being the 3rd Premier of China Zhao Ziyang for his attempts to ensure the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests were given a reasonable hearing.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhao_Ziyang
His Fate: political vasectomy sans anesthesia was his fate and he died in house arrest and disgrace as the entire standing committee of the politburo collectively punished him
After that there has been no Exhibit B. The chinese CCP took very good lessons from the mistimed Glasnost and Perestroika of Gorbachev and have not repeated it yet.
Any future mistake, hence, will be totally new and unique to china ;)
I am unsure if a Chinese Gorbachev will roll back CCP aspirations. The 9-dash line was dreamed up by KMT first. And through millennium's, China has invaded its "barbarian" neighbors numerous times. Before Alexander, before Rome, China was the original colonial power.
I agree that an invasion of Taiwan, across 180km of open seas, look pretty difficult, if not impossible. Overlord was over a much smaller distance. The crossing and landings of Mongols in Japan did not go well. If Taiwan wants to preserve the status quo, Taiwanese need to show their resolve to fight. Taiwan population is much smaller, but 180km of ocean prevents China from leveraging their 1.4B population perceived advantage. No standing army, regardless of how powerful it is, can subdue the resolve of 23M folks.
There is little doubt that China is growing more powerful. One danger lie is the extreme nationalism their government is pushing, as represented by their Wolf diplomacies we are witnessing around the world. The other danger is miscalculation. Human always overestimate their own resources and power, while underestimating their competitors or adversaries. Sure China does study their opponents extensively, but it is always through their eyes.
KQN
Best geo-strategic poem I ever saw. Submitting to prize committee at http://www.dynamit-nobel.com/
Also agree that west would like to avoid hot war in defense of Taiwan, but unfortunately that in itself increases CCP "adventurousness".
Anonymous [Oct 4, 2021, 11:31:00 PM] is a more positive note: A retaliatory embargo enforced at far away world choke-points, if broad, aggressive and durable enough, may threaten CCP with minimal escalation. If CCP can be credibly threatened with peaceful strangulation, that may be our best hope for avoiding a war. Hope CCP agrees.
Another thing that may be driving the crisis is the CCP need to distract from domestic problems. Below are references to possible real estate bubble pop and electricity problems.
Even though this (distraction project) may indicate lower Chinese interest in a hot war, miscalculation risk still applies. Never underestimate the risk a falling bond market to an innocent submarine in the South China Sea.
https://www.ft.com/content/1abd9d4b-8d94-4797-bdd7-bee0f960746a
https://www.npr.org/2021/10/01/1042209223/why-covid-is-affecting-chinas-power-rations
Hi Ghalib [your Oct 5, 2021, 9:56:00 PM]
Gorby and then the fall of the Iron Curtain was a surprise to Kremlinologists who'd predicted unending Warsaw Pact and Cold War.
A Chinese Gorby may equally surprise Beijingologists.
Pete
Hi KQN [your Oct 6, 2021, 6:08:00 AM]
The type of any PRC-Taiwan unification is another worry.
In future PRC economic and political pressure may absorb Taiwan without the constantly wargamed shots being fired.
100,000s of Taiwanese living in PRC and vast PRC Taiwan investments are factors buried by wargaming.
The risk Taiwanese leading politicians and even generals/admirals might be bought or blackmailed by the PRC is possible.
Thanks Anonymous [at Oct 6, 2021, 7:39:00 AM]
Your PRC's economic proplems point is timely, that:
the PRC leadership might be increasing the PRC patriotic push against Taiwan due to "CCP need to distract from domestic problems" including "real estate bubble pop and electricity problems."
and in the PRC is the "risk a falling bond market".
Regards
Pete
Re PRC-Taiwan unification:
The Taiwanese economic elite have bazillions at risk in the PRC and massive influence in Taiwan. In my view, they represent a serious security risk. Even one Billionaire with his fortune at risk can do a lot of political damage in a corrupt democracy. Speaking from sad experience (in my rather larger) democracy.
Hi pete@Oct 6, 2021, 1:07:00 PM
As I said the chinese will come up with their own mistake and may be allow their version of a future Gorby to rise in the 'fullness of time'....
Till then life is gonna be pretty darn uncomfortable for all surrounding countries who will have to live with this misbegotten giant with huge chips on its shoulders (funny how just like hardline semitic sects a perpetual sense of victimhood is hardwired into the kernel of the 'communist' ideology)
the bigger danger is the tom clancyisque huge buildup in terms of gargantuan naval flotillas and the arming spree in the airforce...the type 55s, 52s and 54 ships alone have a minimum 3,500 VLS combined (the Indian Navy just touches 800 VLS currently)..this excludes the submarines which are also well armed....
peace? more like pieces really! on that decidedly doleful note let me sign off for the day...
Hi Anonymous [your Oct 6, 2021, 3:51:00 PM]
Yes added to the risk of the PRC buying Taiwanese politicians and admiral/generals is the risk major businessmen in ports/harbours/submarine building/and any other senstive sectors might be bought.
Hi Ghalib [your Oct 6, 2021, 8:27:00 PM]
Other things that may hobble China are: water/air pollution; too smaller proportion population of working age; insufficient farmland; economic shocks
all upsetting the social contract of high economic growth making CCP rule palatable.
In this vacuum the CCP:
- beating war drums and
- invading south, for Lebensraum, into lightly defended Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos
are major future problems.
As for Chinese Gorby:
Even if there is a Chinese Gorby right after Xi Jinping (at best) he is likely to rule perhaps 20 more years before he retires. In the meantime, we are stuck with containment (at best).
Hi Pete,
In assessing whether an event will transpire are two pre-conditions. An expression of intend and a capability to actually deliver that intend. In the case of re-unification with Taiwan, it is embedded in China's national will and that has been clearly emphasized by President Xi and that it will happen during his watch. The statements are a matter of public record. The second condition is the PLA's ability to actually deliver the plan. In this respect China has been expanding its capability to do just that and in particular it has been enhancing its amphibious lift capability. The second condition is only subject to a tipping point when China feels it is ready. The notion of a Gorby moment in my view is simply wishful thinking.
The Chinese had been planning for a Taiwan invasion since 1949. The military plans had over time coalesced around a set of plans publicly known as the Joint Island Attack Campaign which basically comprises of three distinct military phases. Much of the details of it are discussed in the book "The Chinese Invasion Threat" written by Ian Easton. The Taiwanese in return has developed their own deterrent plan known as "The Guan plan" which is based on a collective national effort to prevail to the end. Interestingly a segment of this plans were triggered and tested during a natural emergency in 2015. The Taiwanese plan is not primarily predicated on US intervention in the event of a crisis but is expected to ensure that China will pay a significant price should it decide to invade.
None of the research papers I have seen to-date including those by RAND and Project 2049 would suggest that the Chinese currently have sufficient amphibious lift capacity to provide confidence that they can conclusively prevail. This is notwithstanding the age of precision guided weapons and ASCM that could seriously change the outcome. The RN found that out during the Falkland campaign when only having to deal with 5 Exocet in the entire Argentinian inventory. The calculus might change in another few years for the Chinese but the time now is not ripe for China.
China is headed in a specific trajectory with a national policy that might is right. China's rise is not peaceful. Each nation will have to deal with a China that fundamentally is not what we wish but a China that is in many ways different from our core values. Australia for many years had thought that it could separate politics from economics but that is no longer tenable. Australia has determined that China is an existential threat and has decided to strengthen its military reach especially with long range strike capability. The nuclear propulsion submarine allows us that flexibility in terms of reach. Obviously such a capability is in itself insufficient to deter China but it allows us a seat at the table in the overall collective. Appeasement is not an option and we know that from history.
Brumby
Pete: [Oct 7, 2021, 12:29:00 PM]
Business infiltration of submarine or other weapons programs represents nightmare threat to software. This is sometimes referred to as a "supply chain attack". The attacker here is especially strong and the defender is especially vulnerable.
Defense against this is difficult and expensive. In defense systems, for example, some combination of the following may be a start:
1. Emergency "limp back" modes of software than can override complex algorithms. Incidentally, I think an emergency switch to this mode could have prevented the two recent 737MAX crashes. (This is commonly done in systems such as pacemakers.)
2. "Attack tree" modelling of complete software specs, with mitigation requirements for all identifiable failure modes. These would need to be audited in software development, with the assumption that while some developers have been corrupted, most have not been.
3. Multiple independent "Flying" audit teams spot checking software implementations against requirements. No auditor should be able to predict which other auditor will spot check them. (Again, some but not all auditors may have been corrupted.) Anomalies should be monitored by counterintelligence operatives. (Assume counterintelligence may also be infiltrated.)
4. Multiple implementations of software modules may need to be written in parallel, with some form of alerts and voting before certain actions are taken. See "Byzantine Generals Problem". Also multiple independent fault indications and system logs, which will also need to be regularly monitored and analyzed.
5. Extremely tight control (and audits) of "off the shelf" software components used. (For example, the attacker may target an "off the shelf" real time operating system or middle-ware.
Taiwan infiltration vulnerability seems far more serious than even the Warsaw pact infiltration of West Germany, which was pretty bad to begin with.
The problem is so much greater than for any other player that revolutionary advances in software development procedures are probably called for. (But software development procedures and security awareness have been improving a lot recently.) That said, if these procedures are developed (difficult but not impossible) Taiwan could become a player in the world of safety and mission critical embedded software. (Cost will also be a serious issue.)
Taiwan also needs redundancy and protection modes in its civil infrastructure.
The good news is that the whole democratic world eventually needs to harden its infrastructure. This gives them an incentive to help Taiwan with the up front R&D costs.
Thanks Brumby and Anonymous's at Oct 7, 2021, 3:44:00 PM and 4:33:00 PM
Here's hoping Taiwan can resist the many ways China can absorb it.
If China wins this would free up China's armed forces (including its rising blue water Navy). Those forces are likely to justify themselves by carrying out expanded "patriotic" advances
- all legitimising further CPP control of China.
Regards
Pete
excellent post from Brumby@Oct 7, 2021, 4:27:00 PM.
I agree, when i said 'fullness of time', this is what i implied, a chinese gorby is not due for the next couple of decades at least...
Mearsheimer's prophetic writings of 2000-2004 are unfolding in real time at an accelerated space. Plus it pays to remember that from 1958 the Chinese have been watching with rising resentment across the Taiwan straits...Xi is not unlike Mao at his core thought 'power flows from the barrel of gun and in the 21st century an electromagnetic railgun ;)'
After Yuan, Ming, and the Qing, it might be time for the 'once in a hundred years' burst of paranoid madness from the CCP that increasingly seems to think and act like Qing Emperors Kangxi and Qianlong on territorial matters and the need to maintain a 'modern tributary system'
Additional thoughts on [Oct 7, 2021, 4:33:00 PM]
Taiwan should consider importing sensitive software (and electronics) from countries less likely to be infiltrated by Chinese operatives. The cost of "due diligence" is just too high.
Similar policies are advisable to other countries in similarly situations, Such as ex Soviet republics trying to maintain independence and/or democracy.
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