Hi Submarine Matters Donors
I have just sent you the Second Special Report
"China versus Taiwan/US: Avoiding World War Three"
Though I "Stand on the [proverbial] Shoulders of Giants" in presenting this work, any errors of judgement, not to mention typos, are mine own.
Pete
4 comments:
Hi Pete
May I say your latest report was brilliant as always, but I still don't feel I have completely mastered the topic ;-) I have many followup questions that even broken into two almost exceeds the blogspot comment word limit (around 4,000 characters).
The first lot (A) are mainly geo-political, strategic and tactical.
The second lot (B) are more specifically on submarines.
So beginning with:
(A) Mainly Geo-political, Strategic and Tactical.
So our (the Quad) awful strategic options below are as follows:
1. If China attacks but provides warning, the "Quad" will support Taiwan.
2. If China attacks without warning ("Short sharp war") the Quad will stand down.
3. If China strangles Taiwan by "relatively peaceful" means, the Quad will stand down.
Since the choice of escalation is with China, they likely prefer Options 2 and 3.
A major question here is does China have further ambitions? This is not well understood, but they have declared an interest in the Senkaku islands, as well as under-ocean economic resources (not to mention over-fishing) to the second chain of Islands. As of this time, no-one expects an "unprovoked" military attack that far east.
Another questions would be if the Quad stands down with China taking Taiwan and perhaps the Senkakus, what credibility will the Quad retain? If the Quad no longer has credibility, a "peaceful" Chinese neo-colonial expansion east and south may follow. An example of this can be seen in Myanmar (and perhaps Cambodia?): China is allergic to democracies: They set a bad example. They are perfectly happy with supporting local tyrannies while exploiting resources.
Democracy in Australia, New Zealand, and Japan may be stable enough to resist Chinese pressure indefinitely. On the other hand, if a Japanese or Australian Trump emerges, things could get more serious. Having gone through the Trump experience in the US and having seen maybe 40% of the US population subscribe to a pathological ideology, I would be worried.
I also worry because I was born in a Warsaw Pact country. My family has experience with puppet governments going back to before WWII. Eastern European political choices have not been particularly wise, but the puppet governments were always the worst (other than direct occupation). They were the will of occupying powers combined with plausible deniability.
On the other had, if Chinese expansion were to be resisted, I think doing so before Taiwan falls would be best. It should be as difficult as possible for China to isolate the Weakest member of an alliance.
China can certainly enforce a blockade of Taiwan. But to what degree can Taiwan enforce a blockade of China? Certainly more difficult and maybe impossible, but that is what we need to discuss. The blockade does not have to be 100% effective. People's willingness to withstand a blockade hinges on what they think they have to lose. That said, withstanding a blockade requires some preparations.
I don't know what the Taiwanese public's reaction was to events in Hong Kong, Ignoring Sinkiang, or Tibet.) If Taiwan prepares for a siege, how long can they last?
On the other hand, while the Chinese public may side with the government now, the economic disruption of blocking the ports, perhaps combined with cruise missile strikes on the rail network and high value industrial targets would degrade support for the ruling class. The outcome is uncertain, hence risky for whoever is contemplating starting the conflict.
MORE TO FOLLOW BELOW
FROM ABOVE
The second lot of questions
(B) are mostly on submarines.
You wrote that you think the Japanese are supplying Taiwan with submarine technology. Given that the Senkaku's are the next target, this seems logical: Low profile support of Taiwan's naval capability while making peaceful noises. Personally, I think it would be good for everyone here to follow Japan's lead. Supply military equipment to Taiwan, along with "freedom of navigation" exercises, especially with combined fleets while proclaiming peaceful intentions.
All of this is geopolitics, and your blog is normally about submarines, so lets get specific:
My question to you is this: What would be the best way to implement such a strategy? A fleet of mid sized diesel subs? XLUUV's deploying riser and torpedo mines? Laying sensor networks in the Chines littoral and prosecuting with long range missiles? Some combination of the above?
Also, if the Quad choose to support such a strategy, what is the effect on future naval requirements? Perhaps if Australia acquired submarine tenders, simpler, shorter range submarines would suffice. (If they chose stretched LIB Scorpene's but sooner than the Attack class, Naval Group may be willing to renegotiate the contract.) Perhaps Japan could also buy submarine tenders to support Australian submarines far from home.
You know a lot about submarines. If the Taiwan's goal was mutual sea denial while surviving a long siege, what's the best way to do it? If submarines are required, what kind? (Something like the HDS-500 or HDS-400?)
See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dolgorae-class_submarine :
"In September 2015, Jane's.com reported that Hyundai Heavy Industries started construction of a single 40 m (130 ft) long HDS-400 [small] submarine for an unnamed naval customer."
XUULV? A modernized Zwaardvis? )
What's the current state of the art in anti-invasion minefields? (small, fiber optic networked riser mines?) How effective would they be in deterring amphibious ops?
A related question: Would South Korea support Taiwanese acquisition of HDS 500 technology?
Regards
After Beijing 2022 Olympics, China might invade Taiwan.
Hi Pete
A most interesting assemblage of views and scenarios. From them I wd conclude that:
- direct invasion in particular poses enormous challenges. D-Day was mounted across ~300km of water with 8 Divs to land that day, 2 to follow the next, 3 the next, up a total 16 ashore by D+7. Only technological superiority and complete command of both air and sea in the operational zone made this logistical effort possible. China will have neither in the Taiwan Strait, where its principal advantage will be the shorter distance (~160km).
Assuming the Taiwanese army and people are willing to fight (unlike in Afghanistan today or Saddam's Iraq in 2003), they occupy a country superbly equipped by nature for defence (take a look at a decent topographical map: you will see that the coast facing China is rugged and mountainous, the East coast is much gentler.) A Chinese occupation wd be no walkover: the danger of a long war with no end in sight looms.
- the indirect options all seem to me to suffer from the same drawback: they can deteriorate to bloody stalemates with no clear winner in- theatre, which of course means strategic defeat for China, because only the conquest or capitulation of Taiwan can satisfy its war aims and hence enhance its prestige. An attempted blockade would risk maritime conflict with the West.
- no-one really knows when China will attempt to take Taiwan. China knows how to take the long view and has a deep sense of history. Clearly any enterprise aimed at taking Taiwan, whether direct invasion or indirect coercion, is a huge risk for China. The regime would not long survive a defeat of such magnitude: remember, this is a government which knows the greatest threat it faces is from its own people. They are fearful by nature, by default if you like, hence the rigid controls they are trying to impose domestically (which also motivate Taiwanese to resist these same controls, after Hong Kong, they can have no doubt of what awaits them if Beijing prevails). So: the question Beijing has to answer is - are we willing to risk the survival of our regime (and ourselves) on the invasion/coercion of Taiwan?
In the above I am assuming that the West comes to Taiwan's aid. Taiwan alone certainly cannot long resist a determined assault mounted with complete disregard for losses, as was done against Vietnam (for strictly limited objectives, tho) in 1979. But Western naval and air support - I wd not see a great need for ground forces here - can make the Taiwan Strait a killing ground. Despite all China's modernisation, the West is still supreme at sea and in the air. I think that defending Taiwan, as long as it wants to be, is in the strategic interest of all major regional actors, including us.
Sorry, I didn't intend to disgorge this unorganised jumble of thoughts upon your person, but I hope you get my drift: I don't think China will attempt invasion/coercion designed to force surrender against Taiwan anytime soon. I almost wish they would: it would be the death of Xi Jinping and his tyranny.
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