A US Plan for 5 New SSGN and 30 SSN(X) Submarines: Australia?

Partly drawing from David Axe’s learned article “The [US] Navy's New Submarine Plan Is In. Take a Look.” in The National Interest, October 24, 2018 https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/navys-new-submarine-plan-take-look-34202 . 

As well as Columbia SSBNs, the USN reportedly plans to develop two new classes of submarine, that is:

-  5 new Large Payload Submarine SSGNs. Will they have an Ohio SSGN or Columbia class size?

    and retain the 154 Tomahawk capability of Ohio SSGNs? 

    Are 5 SSGNs quoted with the expectation Congress will trim the number to 4? 

and

-  30 new SSN(X) to enter service from 2034. They would reportedly be bigger than the 8,000 ton

    Virginias, more like the 9,000 ton Seawolf class. "The Navy indicates that the next-generation

    attack submarine should be faster, stealthier and able to carry more torpedoes than the Virginia

    class". 

   The SSN(X) plan is instead of upgrading the Virginias. The SSN(X) would not have the later
   Virginia's 40 Tomahawk Payload Module capability. But have a greater capability for ASW [mainly

   against Chinese and Russian subs].

COMMENT

Russia has also been talking about a 2 or 3 new submarine type project, called "Husky", since at least 2017. This was to include new SSNs, "multi-purpose" SSGNs and SSBNs. But a new Russian SSBN class make little sense as Russia plans to keep on building Borei/Borey class SSBNs through to the 2030s.

If the SSN(X) means the Virginia class become “old” technology might this increase the chances second hand Virginia’s could be sold to (or built for) the Australian Navy?

Naval Group's and TKMS' Submarine LIBs May Be At Very Early Stage

In the context of the Paris based Euronaval 2018 arms show Naval Group announced un-assessable progress in Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) for submarine. This falls short of Japan’s launch (on October 4, 2018) of an actual LIBs submarine.

This is part of Naval Group’s Euronaval 2018 Press Release (repeated via many other sites in the submarine-sphere)  http://naval-group.com.au/2018/10/24/naval-group-presents-librt-its-new-generation-of-lithium-ion-batteries-system-for-submarines/ of October 24, 2018:

“Naval Group Presents LIBRT, Its New Generation Of Lithium-Ion Batteries System For Submarines... Naval Group brings its experience as a system provider and integrator, Saft [or SAFT] its expertise in the conception and production of state-of-the-art Li-ion batteries, CEA Tech provides Naval Group with its research capacities in the fields of chemistry, structure and electronics and, finally, EDF R&D volunteers its experience and its first rank testing facilities for energy production systems requiring high levels of safety, reliability and security...”

PETE COMMENT

Concept announcements in the context of arms shows like Euronaval 2016 and Euronaval 2018 need to be treated with caution. Announcements may be reactions to actual achievements by non-European submarine makers and in response to questions by European governments as to European progress made so far.

There seems to be little sense how technically mature the Naval Group and TKMS LIBs concepts are. What year will they first be launched in a submarine that will then become operational, 2025?

There is the risk that European submarine LIB intentions are at an early stage and if a customer wants LIBs it will need to pay a high portion of LIBs’ development costs.

A similar case was Naval Group’s announcement, again in Paris, at Euronaval (October) 2016 that it had developed a second generation fuel cell AIP known as FC2G. See this DCNS Youtube published two months later December 2016. After land based testing of FC2G some years ago there still has been no actual launch of a FC2G on a Scorpene. This also includes no launch of FC2G (which India's DRDO would label "indigenous AIP") in India’s Kalvari class Scorpenes. So India has had to postpone up to date AIP for its Scorpenes.

So reports of great strides in European LIBs for submarine need to be treated with caution.

DETAILS ON EUROPEAN LIBs

Anonymous suspects Naval Group’s LIB technology may rely on Lithium Iron Phosphate (LFP) or Lithium Titanate (LTO or ITO) LIBs with high levels [not yet operationally proven] of energy and safety. The use of LIBs in the Netherlands’ Walrus replacement and Poland’s ORKA submarine program is possible. (see Anonymous' kindly provided original comments of October 25, 2018 in the Comments section below this article).

Not only Naval Group, but also Germany’s TKMS is relying on SAFT for developing LIBs for submarine. [1] [2]. [3], [4]. LFP with good low-temperature stability is suitable for cold countries. Now, the market is implicitly forcing Sweden’s SAAB to develop a LIB option.

[Pete Comment - TKMS may also be recieving "reverse flow" submarine LIBs assistance from South Korean companies (quite advanced in LIBs - that have been building TKMS designed Type 209 and 214 submarines for 3 decades)!] 

[1] A Swedish language website on February 14, 2018 https://www.nyteknik.se/fordon/nya-ubaten-kan-bli-forst-med-litiumbatterier-6898850 carried an ambiguous message that Norway's future TKMS Type 212CD submarines “can be the first with lithium batteries - or last with lead-acid batteries.”

[2] October 22, 2018 https://www.aogdigital.com/component/k2/item/7668-thyssenkrupp-develops-new-lithiumion-batteries-for-submarines

[3] See the April 27, 2018 entry https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=4458240

[4] A 2015 based BMT study “The Design & Safety Challenges of a Lithium-ion Main Storage Battery for Conventional Submarines” http://www.bmtdesigntechnology.com.au/media/6988323/SIA%20SubSTEC-4%20Paper%20-%20Challenges%20of%20a%20Li-ion%20Main%20Storage%20Battery%20for%20Conventional%20Submarines%20v1.0.pdf , has a passing reference to the Shortfin on the first page with more substantial mentions on especially the sixth page (to Japanese, Chinese and TKMS (LFP LIB) intentions through to page twenty.

Pete Comment: So this French and German submarine LIBs activity has been re-announced at an arms show but falls far short of Japan’s achievement of actually launching the first large LIBs submarine

Anonymous and Pete

Option of TKMS for Dutch Walrus Submarine Replacement Program

The Dutch Government has a Walrus Replacement Program calling for at least 4 medium-large conventional diesel-electric submarines for launch in the mid-late 2020s.

On October 9, 2018 Anonymous examined technical issues for a Saab A26 concept meeting the Walrus Replacement requirement. 

Now Anonymous, in comments from October 21-23 2018, is looking at technical details involved with Germany’s TKMS meeting the Walrus Replacement requirement.

Drawing from those comments Walrus replacement concept could be a very large version of the TKMS 212A/CD, 214 or non-AIP 209. Assuming the South Korean 3,000 ton KSS3 is based on a TKMS design (lets call it a TKMS Type 3000). A 2,900 ton (submerged) Walrus replacement could also be a Type 3000.

Within the 2,650 ton (submerged) current Walrus class’s double hull structure (light & pressure hulls) there are 3 x MAN Diesel & Turbo owned SEMT Pielstick 12 PA4 V 200 SM [1] diesels (width ca.1470mm, not 12 PA4 200 SMDS) could be installed in parallel. Distances (ca.400mm) between diesel-diesel and diesel-pressure hull are small (ca.400mm).

In the Walrus replacement concept, 3 x 12 PA4 V 200 SMSD diesels could be installed in parallel, but the separation distances could be somewhat greater (ca.600mm). These latter diesels could be more powerful to propel a larger 2,900 tons submerged Walrus replacement [and/or charge Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) more quickly]. As result of these exchange of diesels, Walrus-concept becomes more powerful. See Appendices [1], [2], [3] and [4] below.

MAN Diesel & Turbo or SEMT Pielstick (now operate as a brand by MAN Diesel & Turbo) has the following three generators which are sometimes confused. Correct data are as follows:

-  8 PA4 V 200 SM, cylinder bore 200mm, V8, single supercharger (mechanical output 700kW). A26; (2 starboard + 1 port) x 8 PA4 V 200 SM (2,100kW)

-  12 PA4 V 200 SM, cylinder bore 200mm, V12, single supercharger (1,060kW).  Walrus-class; 3 parallel x 12 PA V 200 SM (3,180kW)

-  12 PA4 V 200 SMDS, cylinder bore 200mm, V12, single supercharger + single turbocharger (1330kW), Walrus -concept; 3 parallel x 12 PA V200 SMDS (3,990kW)

  

The next Dutch submarine will need much space to accommodate some female crew, for additional quieting measures and additional weapons spaces (possibly for anti-ship missiles, land attack missiles and UUVs, etc). 

A double hull structure may be required for the stern drive sections (see red/blue in the 212A diagram above). This is if the Walrus replacement is an enlarged Type 212A/CD, 214 or 3000 equipped with LOx cylinders (diameter ca.1.7m) outside the pressure hull. To fit these cylinders the outer diameter of pressure hull in the drive sections would be considerably smaller (diameter ca.5.6m) than the 212s beam (of 6.8m) and would be an inefficient use of space. Also, the strength of pressure hull material for the 212A/CD is not high.

The Walrus replacement would need floating decks to insulate/isolate vibrations thereby reducing noise effectively, but, are not in 212A/CD or 214s. Floating decks also mitigate shock from outside thereby protecting equipment and crew. Floating deck are used in US nuclear submarines and already in the Stirling generator section of (LABs + AIP) Soryus.  Floating decks will also feature in the future Japanese Soryu with LIBs 29SS (to be launched in 2 to 4 years).

TKMS fuel cell AIP is more efficient than combustion type Stirling AIP. But fuel cell AIP, owing to its use of hydrogen is less safe than Stirling. For fuel cell hydrogen containers are placed out side the pressure hull (see red O2 Tanks and H2 Storage in diagram above). Meanwhile the Kawasaki Stirling AIP, licensed by Kockum’s Stirling, for use in LABs + AIP Stirlings, are very expensive.

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walrus-class_submarine

3 diesels, diesel-electric, 5,430 shp (4 MW): They confuse 12 PA4 V 200 SM (right) with 12 PA4 V 200 SMDS (wrong)

[2] Electrical output = 0.8 x mechanical output

[3] https://marine.man-es.com/docs/default-source/shopwaredocuments/pa4-sm-smdsfba3ca1740b144429518d4e002fd7d6f.pdf?sfvrsn=6f128e3a_3

[4] Some discussion of a TKMS option

 https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2018/03/23/emerging-german-dutch-naval-tie-up-has-industry-abuzz/

Pete Comment

The Netherlands may not use any AIP (fuel cell or Stirling) due to the Walrus' replacement need to travel long distance missions (maybe 8,000nm) from the Netherlands to the Dutch Caribbean and back. This is similar to Australia’s and Japan’s long transit missions making AIP inefficient (especially with high weight and imbalances of LOX tanks). Thus Australia in the 1970s and Japan now have decided against future placing of AIP in their submarines.

But Japan is obviously attracted to the submerged range and speed advantages of LIBs. TKMS and Naval Group are also marketing the advantages of their LIB solutions. See discussion of this tomorrow. 

TKMS corporate ownership changes/problems may be of concern to the Dutch government. Hence this may favour the A26 solution raised by a SAAB-Damen consortium or Naval Group.

Anonymous and Pete

Would Australia Buying French Rubis (SSN) Submarines be Viable?

KQN on October 22, 2018 raised the interesting comment that:

"There is also the option of acquiring the small and proven Rubis class. The French would need to re-start its production which should not be a problem. Re-fueling is still an issue as well as local political considerations."

Pete's Response

The interior design of the Rubis is a mystery with no interior diagrams that Pete has seen. Odd for such an old sub. All I can offer is this diagram courtesy Pakistan Defence forum.

---

However there are some Youtube videos which give partial views of Rubis interiors. See this Youtube from 45 seconds on, starring the Rubis submarine Perle, visiting Jacksonville, Florida in 2011. The Youtube seens imply the small size of this submarine class makes it very crowded and uncomfortable for the 70 officers and crew on lengthy missions. At 3 minute, 20 seconds, surely the periscope and red goggle restrictions could be replaced with photonic masts!

---

The Rubis is small, at 2,400 tons surfaced - 2,600 ton submerged (right sidebar). The Rubis only carries 14 Heavyweight (HW) shots - torpedoes and/or missiles. This suggests the French Navy had to make severe compromises between the Rubis small 14 shot warload and other essentials such as accommodation for a relatively large crew of 70, food, reactor and sonars, etc. 

With only 4 torpedo tubes much space may be allotted to a bow sonar. Nuclear propulsion notwithstanding, food in Rubises may be limited to 45 days.

For most navies succeeding submarine classes are steadily larger, carrying more HW shots - now with the additional requirement of land attack missiles and soon UUVs. In comparison Australia's Collins subs already carry 22 HW shots.

The Rubis' have a limited submerged speed of only 25 knots, lower than the 30+ knot requirement expected of SSNs.

Its Rubis' 7.6m Beam (right sidebar) accommodates the K48 (48MW of power) reactor. The Rubis would be unable to accommodate the updated K15 reactor which requires a beam of at least 8.8m.

Since the 1970s, when the Rubis was launched anti-submarine sensors have improved greatly in performance, meaning active and passive quieting measures (which add weight and size) are all the more important. Highly relevant are Canada's 1980's reasons for not choosing the Rubis:

"The Rubis-class as designed failed to meet the Canadian Statement of Requirement (SOR) as it was noisy underwater and slow. It also came with the caveat that the first 4-5 submarines would have to be built in France. [But] Unlike the British Trafalgar-class [presumably the UK Astute class would have the same legal problems], the Rubis design did not require USA permission to transfer the nuclear propulsion technology, as the Americans were certain to invoke their veto of the sale to Canada."

Yes, the need to refuel in France every 7 - 10 years constitutes a major downside for Australia choosing the Rubis or Barracuda. At Peter Lobner's "Marine Nuclear Power 1939-2018" at  is Marine Nuclear Power 1939 – 2018_Part 4_Europe & Canada which states on page 197:

"Unique French nuclear safety rules have resulted in naval reactor operating cycles that are substantially different than in US and UK naval plants. 

Following nuclear safety practices established by the French civilian nuclear safety authority ASN...the defense nuclear safety authority DSND...requires that all reactor pressure vessels be inspected from the inside every 10 years using a dedicated inspection machine and requires the withdrawal of fuel assemblies and all the internal components of the reactor pressure vessel. These pressure vessel inspections are performed during each major overhaul (an IPER) of the nuclear-powered ship, which typically occurs at 8 –10 year intervals."

So all in all the Rubis would fall short of Australia's modern warload and quieting requirements and even the Barracuda may fall short on refueling in France realities.

Pete  

Nuclear Propelled Australian Submarines? Huge Obstacles+Costs. Part 1.

Current articles by learned Australian writers as to whether Australia should acquire nuclear propelled submarines, have resurfaced since September 2018.

The following is the first in a series. Below I discuss a thought provoking essay written by Dr Tom Lewis, which proposes Australia should buy US Virginia class nuclear propelled submarines. Tom's essay is called “A working sub fleet – for less than half the cost”, dated October 5, 2018, which appeared on The Australian Naval Institute website. 

I have drawn some exact and sometimes, approximate, wording from Tom’s essay, and Agree and often Disagree.

Arguments For Appropriateness of Australian Nuclear Subs	Pete’s Reasons Why This Is Unviable or Viable
“Now we have a new PM” scrap plans for the 12 new Shortfin Barracuda SSKs	Our 2 month old Prime Minister may only last until May 18, 2019 when a new Labor Government, with its own ideas on subs, is likely to take power.
Buying a paper concept sub is risky	True. Neither Australia nor France have any experience in converting a (Barracuda) nuclear propelled submarine into a conventional (Shortfin Barracuda) diesel-electric submarine.
Barracuda re-model will use diesel engines, and fuel tanks, in a design which will likely be fraught with problems.	True. Also Australia’s Shortfin Barracuda is likely to be delayed owing to delays in France's nuclear Barracuda program (owing to major technical problems in the latter's K15 nuclear reactor).
“nuclear off the shelf option is the only way to go”	True. In the sense that, if buying nuclear, it should be off the shelf.
	The US didn’t even transfer all its Virginia technical secrets to its nuclear ally (since 1958) Britain. The US won’t transfer such secrets to Australia. Virginia (and new UK SSN) reactors are 90%+ HEU nuclear weapons grade, with the proliferation issues that implies.
US Navy’s Virginia-class submarines are in production now, and cheaper than a new build diesel-electric variant	Virginia’s demonstrated price is calculated for internal US Navy purchase and may not include the development cost component. But, the US Navy is already crying out for higher drumbeat production of Virginia’s for itself. The US would not accept a diversion of expertise, designers, workers, managers, shipyards to build Virginia’s for Australia or oversee construction of these subs in Australia.
Cost. The US Virginia class will only cost half the $50 billion for on its French Shortfin project.	This claim is only demonstrable once the first Australian Virginia is launched or when the last one is launched. The $50 billion estimate for the build and operation of the French Shortfin is a rubbery figure that has already been revised to $100 Billion
Proven design. If we bought a nuclear boat off the rack, we would be buying something already in service. We would know it works. We never had difficulties with the off-the-shelf Oberons.	True.
A diesel-electric is limited by needing diesel in port, returning to port, from tanker-tenders or from Guam, etc.	True. The speed, range, tactics, strategy and “hotel load” (non-propulsion) functioning of conventional submarines are severely limited compared to nuclear propelled submarines.
US Virginia (and UK Astute class) submarines have whole of operational life reactors that don’t need refueling.	Meanwhile the French Barracuda’s revised K15 reactor will need refueling every 7-10 years (and that will be in France)
Undetectability.	True. Nuclear allows for more discrete operation particularly avoiding regular snorting operations that are visible to Chinese satellites. But the sheer size of Virginia make them more detectable to ASW platforms in many of Australia’s shallow northern operational areas
Speed. Nuclear subs are much faster	True. Only a nuclear reactor allows a sub to remain protectively ahead or behind of a 15-30knot naval taskforce, protect SSBNs, and quickly transit Australia vast distances North, Indian Ocean, Southern Ocean and especially from the Fleet Base West(ern Australia) to the East Coast – including Fleet Base East.
“Crew. If we bought boats off the Americans, we could buy a few planeloads of crew too.”	Wrong. It takes huge efforts by the US to train crew (a limited resource) before and within operational nuclear submarines. Also crews are patriotic Americans who may consider Australian Virginias to be a defacto squadron of the US Navy when Australia separately needs its Virginia’s most. In the early 2000s the US shelved possible “sea-swap” plans to rotate submarine crews at Australia’s Fleet Base West for economic, political and US Naval professional reasons.
“Safety....The nuclear engine is a sealed unit.”	False. The US relies on the SUBSAFE Program, (here's a US Navy explanation) which is an extremely extensive, expensive and rigid set of nuclear submarine safety measures. These cover all nuclear navy practices, eg, over radiation leaks from reactor piping and fire risks, etc. There are also rigid armed, exclusion zone, security measures. Future nuclear weapon options, and civilian concerns have led nuclear submarines to be frequently based (at great cost) away from city harbours. Could Australian nuclear subs be based and/or repaired at Australia’s bases near Perth, in Adelaide or in Sydney Harbour?
“Pakistan”?	Pakistan has no serious plans (or the money or know-how) to build nuclear powered submarines. It has plans to mount nuclear tipped cruise missiles on French and Chinese designed conventional submarines.
Deterrence.	Israel already has Dolphin conventional submarines that carry nuclear tipped missiles. North Korea has been actively testing nuclear capable ballistic missiles on its conventional submarines.
	If Australia planned to buy just 6 x 2 crew (Gold and Blue) Virginia class SSGNs then that may be cheaper than the 12 Shortfin SSK project. The Australian Virginia’s land attack missiles (a major reason for nuclear propulsion) would be conventionally armed, at first...

Submarine Matters has been discussing the Virginia class option (or non-starter) as far back as 2012 (Barracuda SSNs 2012), Virginia's 2013 and 2015. 

Pete

Alternates Technologies (LTOs and LSBs) to Oryu's NCA Submarine LIBs

Drawing from Anonymous' statements in the Comments section under this article, is: 

Lithium Titanate Batteries, short name "LTO" LIBs (formula Li4Ti5O12) (see Table below) are an alternative to the NCA First Generation LIBs technology fitted in the Oryu (27SS) Soryu  submarine. 

Compared to NCA LIBs, commercial use LTO LIBs have (Scrolling one-quarter way down the Battery University website):

-  Lower specific energy

-  Higher Lifespan (in usage Cycles) 

-  Higher Cost. But the more years between battery “exchanges” (ie. between replacement of all a

    submarine’s LIBs) the lower the cost of the LIBs. and 

-  Higher Safety (for commercial batteries, but submarine grade LTO safety is unknown). 

See Anonymous mathematical description (below) of LTO issues:

The unit price of an LTO LIB (with an Energy Density of 80-100kW/kg) is 40-50% of NCA [1] , price of LTO module is expected 40-50% of NCA and 200-250% of LAB. Total cost (T) of batteries (480 module, operation period submarine) is as follows.

LAB (unit price US$26,700; battery exchange cycle 3years = 8 times exchange) [2]
T=26700 x 480 x (1+8) = US$115 million
LTO (unit price US$26,700 x 2.5; battery exchange 10 years = 2 times or 0) [3]

T=26700 x 2.5 x 480 x (1+2) = US$96 million or US$32 million

LTO (unit price US$26,700 x 4.5; battery exchange cycle 6 years= 4 times exchange) [4]

T=26700 x 4.5 x 480 x (1+4) = US$288 million.

Though LTO is relatively low power as LIB, whose excellent stability prove significant cost reduction cheaper than LAB. LTO is suitable for countries who have high, well funded, maintenance budget. A low maintenance budget can cause serious result such as the tragedy of Argentina’s ARA San Juan and the unavailability of all 6 submarines in Germany's fleet.

[1] “Battery Strategy” Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan, July/2012, page 11
[2] Comment by MoD in Administration Review: “LABs are exchanged every 3 years”
[3] Toshiba Home Page: Cycle life of LTO is 20,000 and 10 years
[4] Battery University civilian use analogy

Lithium-Sulfur (or Sulphur) Batteries LSBs are a possible future LIB for submarine technology that may take 20 more years to mature for submarine use. For development of LSBs to maturity, they need extensive testing then placing on the civilian market to establishment a reliability and safety record. LSBs for submarine would need to be produced (by GS Yuasa?) efficiently with adequate return of investment and profit.

TABLE OF LIBS BY GENERATION (provided by Anonymous)

	Name	Composition or abbreviation	Energy density [kW/kg] (theoretical)	Note
First Generation LIBs	Lithium Nickel Cobalt Aluminium Oxide	LiNiCoAlO2 or NCA	260	for Soryus 27SS & 28SS. NCAs built by Japan's GS Yuasa
	Lithium Cobalt Oxide	LiCoO2 or LCO	200 (1014)	Shinkai 6500
	Lithium Nickel Manganese Cobalt Oxide	LiNiMnCoO2 or NMC	200
	Lithium Manganese Oxide	LiMn2O4 or LMO	140 (410)	Proto-type by JMSDF
	Lithium Iron Phosphate	LiFePO4 or LFP	120 (575)	LFYP (China) is family of LFP
	Lithium titanate LTO	Li4Ti5O12 or LTO	80	CEP- Japan
LABs	LAB		40
LSBs	Lithium-sulfur LSB	Li2S3	theoretically about (2500)
Second Generation LIBs	Lithium Ion Silicate	Li2FeSiO4	(1584)	High Safety, low cycle performance
	Lithium Manganese Silicate	Li2MnSiO4	(1485)	High Safety, low cycle performance

Anonymous and Pete