October 19, 2018

Nuclear Propelled Australian Submarines? Huge Obstacles+Costs. Part 1.

Current articles by learned Australian writers as to whether Australia should acquire nuclear propelled submarines, have resurfaced since September 2018.

The following is the first in a series. Below I discuss a thought provoking essay written by Dr Tom Lewis, which proposes Australia should buy US Virginia class nuclear propelled submarines. Tom's essay is called “A working sub fleet – for less than half the cost”, dated October 5, 2018, which appeared on The Australian Naval Institute website

I have drawn some exact and sometimes, approximate, wording from Tom’s essay, and Agree and often Disagree.

Arguments For Appropriateness of Australian Nuclear Subs
Pete’s Reasons Why This Is Unviable or Viable

Now we have a new PM” scrap plans for the 12 new Shortfin Barracuda SSKs
Our 2 month old Prime Minister may only last until May 18, 2019 when a new Labor Government, with its own ideas on subs, is likely to take power.
Buying a paper concept sub is risky
True. Neither Australia nor France have any experience in converting a (Barracuda) nuclear propelled submarine into a conventional (Shortfin Barracuda) diesel-electric submarine.
Barracuda re-model will use diesel engines, and fuel tanks, in a design which will likely be fraught with problems. 
True. Also Australia’s Shortfin Barracuda is likely to be delayed owing to delays in France's nuclear Barracuda program (owing to major technical problems in the latter's K15 nuclear reactor).
“nuclear off the shelf option is the only way to go”
True. In the sense that, if buying nuclear, it should be off the shelf.

The US didn’t even transfer all its Virginia technical secrets to its nuclear ally (since 1958) Britain. The US won’t transfer such secrets to Australia. Virginia (and new UK SSN) reactors are 90%+ HEU nuclear weapons grade, with the proliferation issues that implies.
US Navy’s Virginia-class submarines are in production now, and cheaper than a new build diesel-electric variant
Virginia’s demonstrated price is calculated for internal US Navy purchase and may not include the development cost component.
But, the US Navy is already crying out for higher drumbeat production of Virginia’s for itself. The US would not accept a diversion of expertise, designers, workers, managers, shipyards to build Virginia’s for Australia or oversee construction of these subs in Australia.
Cost. The US Virginia class will only cost half the $50 billion for on its French Shortfin project.
This claim is only demonstrable once the first Australian Virginia is launched or when the last one is launched.
The $50 billion estimate for the build and operation of the French Shortfin is a rubbery figure that has already been revised to $100 Billion
Proven design. If we bought a nuclear boat off the rack, we would be buying something already in service. We would know it works. We never had difficulties with the off-the-shelf Oberons.
True.
A diesel-electric is limited by needing diesel in port, returning to port, from tanker-tenders or from Guam, etc.
True. The speed, range, tactics, strategy and “hotel load” (non-propulsion) functioning of conventional submarines are severely limited compared to nuclear propelled submarines.
US Virginia (and UK Astute class) submarines have whole of operational life reactors that don’t need refueling.
Meanwhile the French Barracuda’s revised K15 reactor will need refueling every 7-10 years (and that will be in France)
Undetectability. 
True. Nuclear allows for more discrete operation particularly avoiding regular snorting operations that are visible to Chinese satellites. But the sheer size of Virginia make them more detectable to ASW platforms in many of Australia’s shallow northern operational areas
Speed. Nuclear subs are much faster
True. Only a nuclear reactor allows a sub to remain protectively ahead or behind of a 15-30knot naval taskforce, protect SSBNs, and quickly transit Australia vast distances North, Indian Ocean, Southern Ocean and especially from the Fleet Base West(ern Australia) to the East Coast – including Fleet Base East.
“Crew. If we bought boats off the Americans, we could buy a few planeloads of crew too.”
Wrong. It takes huge efforts by the US to train crew (a limited resource) before and within operational nuclear submarines. Also crews are patriotic Americans who may consider Australian Virginias to be a defacto squadron of the US Navy when Australia separately needs its Virginia’s most. In the early 2000s the US shelved possible “sea-swap” plans to rotate submarine crews at Australia’s Fleet Base West for economic, political and US Naval professional reasons.
“Safety....The nuclear engine is a sealed unit.”
False. The US relies on the SUBSAFE Program, (here's a US Navy explanation) which is an extremely extensive, expensive and rigid set of nuclear submarine safety measures. These cover all nuclear navy practices, eg, over radiation leaks from reactor piping and fire risks, etc. There are also rigid armed, exclusion zone, security measures. Future nuclear weapon options, and civilian concerns have led nuclear submarines to be frequently based (at great cost) away from city harbours. Could Australian nuclear subs be based and/or repaired at Australia’s bases near Perth, in Adelaide or in Sydney Harbour?
“Pakistan”?
Pakistan has no serious plans (or the money or know-how) to build nuclear powered submarines. It has plans to mount nuclear tipped cruise missiles on French and Chinese designed conventional submarines.
Deterrence.
Israel already has Dolphin conventional submarines that carry nuclear tipped missiles. North Korea has been actively testing nuclear capable ballistic missiles on its conventional submarines.

If Australia planned to buy just 6 x 2 crew (Gold and Blue) Virginia class SSGNs then that may be cheaper than the 12 Shortfin SSK project. The Australian Virginia’s land attack missiles (a major reason for nuclear propulsion) would be conventionally armed, at first...

Submarine Matters has been discussing the Virginia class option (or non-starter) as far back as 2012 (Barracuda SSNs 2012), Virginia's 2013 and 2015

Pete

14 comments:

Anonymous said...

Hi Pete,

In my amateur internet opinion, the biggest single issue is popular opinion, not the factual issues.

Politicians make the ultimate decision. Electorate no like, politicians no have job.

So the discussion is moot. It's been done over and over.

If you want nuclear subs, there needs to be a long term plan- slowly introduce an enemy, introduce the advantages our enemy have over our subs. The valiant politicans will try to do their best, with the 4 Collins they have (only enough crew for 4.5 subs), but can't cope with the long range, fast Chinese nuclear subs.

10 years after valiantly fighting, and several Chinese victories-hopefully intel losses, not losses of ships, territories, enough people might become on the fence.

Then after we get the decision to have nuclear powered subs, we'll need another 10-20 to build facilities, train crews, buy weapons.

That's how I see it.

Adrian

Nicky said...

If the Australians want to go Nuclear, they should look at getting the same Agreement the British had with JFK in the
Nassau Agreement that the US and UK signed on Dec 21 1964

Pete said...

Hi Adrian

Yes, most of the Australian public's distrust of anything nuclear will indeed make nuclear subs for Australia a long term aspiration.

Another problem is the building and/or contractor schedules of the likely nuclear sub suppliers. Choosing the US may need to await the end of construction of the Columbia class and if Britain chosen, awaiting contruction of the Dreadnought class.

Regards

Pete

Pete said...

Hi Nicky K.D Chaleunphone

Treaty stages for US nuclear subs for Australia would need to include Agreements similar to the:

- 1958 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1958_US%E2%80%93UK_Mutual_Defence_Agreement, and

- 1962 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nassau_Agreement

- 1963 In turn "The Nassau Agreement became the basis of the Polaris Sales Agreement, a treaty which was signed on 6 April 1963. Under this agreement, British nuclear warheads were fitted to Polaris missiles." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nassau_Agreement

So the agreements Australia would need might include nuclear propulsion and nuclear weapon delivery by submarine missile.

Due to proliferation obstacles Australia, like Britain, may need to develop its own nuclear warheads.

So we're talking many years and many military reverses (probably vis a vis China) to make all these Australian nuclear capabilities come about.

Regards

Pete

Anonymous said...

There is also the option of acquiring the small and proven Rubis class. The French would need to re-start its production which should not be a problem. Re-fueling is still an issue as well as local political considerations.

An interesting take:
https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1054142155390967809
KQN

Pete said...

Thanks KQN

For raising the option of Australia buying the small (and hopefully affordable) Rubis class SSN.

I'll write a response later today in article form.

I was unable to locate Shugart's Rubis article at https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1054142155390967809 . If Shugart wrote an article could you please send the text as a comment?

Regards

Pete

Josh said...

@Pete:

Besides public opinion, Australia would also have to arrange some kind of escape clause from the NPT in order to buy US/UK nukes boats, as the cores are bomb grade U235. The French nuclear option would bypass that problem as I believe they use fuel at 20% enrichment or less. Moreover the US and UK don't have the production capacity for their own programs and any additional boats...not sure where the French are at, but they can't be more taxed than the US is trying to maintain two SSNs a year plus SSBNs in the future.

Cheers,
Josh

Pete said...

Hi Josh

The lack of capability of France's <20% LEU K15 submarine reactor results in that unavailability flaw of needing a 2 year refuel process in France every 7 to 10 years.

With US nuclear submarine production rate worries Australia may need to turn to the UK for no need for refuel, late model Astute class SSGNs. I agree that a UK or US SSGN with a HEU reactor for Australia would involve an exception to the NPT, as is already officially applied to India and unofficially to Israel, Pakistan and North Korea.

By the time an Australia HEU reactor submarine is operating it is likely to be a different Pacific region with additional countries fielding nuclear weapons, firstly South Korea, then Japan and maybe Taiwan (if it hasn't been merged into China beforehand).

Regards

Pete

SpookyOne said...

Hi Pete,

With talk of a delay in launching the Shortfin Barracuda class, and the nuclear option being unviable (for the many reasons you outline), perhaps one 'safe' alternative, to bridge the gap in capability as the Collins become unserviceable(?), would be to take Scorpene S-BRs direct from the production line set up by France and Brazil? Our boats would be built after the last of theirs.

Perhaps we could buy 3 to 4 Scorpenes and then retire these when the last Barracudas enter service? The infrastructure is already in place, albeit, set up for the Brazilians. Of course the increased maintenance cost of operating two types of submarines for a time would be a problem.

I included this two-submarine-type idea in the new (2018) Navy entry at Future ADF Page. Anyone checking out the site should note they are looking at an idealised future concepts page, that is somewhat divorced from present day reality.

Also, when it comes to future battery or energy storage technology, it is possible that the diesel electric boats will get a large boost in their capabilities by either switching to lithium-ion (as they are now) or with something much better.

All the best,

Spooky

Pete said...

Hi Spooky

Japan is producing a Lithium-ion Battery submarines on a yearly production line. If Japan already building very large submarines and can organise an Australian production line in Adelaide then that might be much easier than French risks.

Overall the lead-times complexities of organising interim Scorpene submarines would be great and would run counter to Australian political realities.

Already there are plans to extend the Collins program as an interim measure. For submarines "interim" can be 20-30 years. Collins are probably already more capable than Brazil's Scorpenes but less capable than Japanese LIBs Soryus, except for the Collins superior range.

Australian voters, companies, unions and politicians at federal, state and local level would oppose "our" submarines being built in Brazil, France, Germany or Japan.

Japan is producing Lithium-ion Battery submarines on a yearly production line. If Japan can organise an Australian production line in Adelaide...as Japan offered to do....

Regards

Pete

Lee McCurtayne said...

Before we get to carried away on the subject of Nuclear Submarines, we have to come to the realisation that nuclear subs were designed to carry a salvo of ICBMs. That said, a very large weapon with weapons that can vapourise vast expanses of land, is not there to go into duals with other subs or normal targets. They are a “Blue Water” assets keeping silent and deep, doing what they were designed to do. Their greatest advantage is they carry a massive punch in the face, and they are the ultimate “Deterrent “
So, dare I say it, if we buy Nuke subs you must carry nukes otherwise we are just ignore the purpose for which it was designed. Every Nuke sub carries that 100% promise of “ Don’t even think about it” swagger.
We are on the verge of a home grown drone tech called “Blue Bottle” that is self powered, carrying a suit of sensors and submarine monitoring capability. This tech is designed for Swarm patrolling, one person can control many many units, unlike 80 crew in one sub Sensors are everything and considering the purchase of Wedgetails,Reapers and many other intel systems is more important, right here at this point in time.
The ASC is the most experienced sub builder in this country and really should have been involved in the design and build process. It maybe faster and far more cost effective for the ASC and possibly Kockhams to design and build a Collins 2 with all the wish list.

Pete said...

Hi Lee

If only the multi-decade issues of nuclear, and/or the next conventional submarines for Australia, were that certain.

Legacies of the ASC Kockums combination that created Collins, are:

- unreliable diesels and rusted corroded fuel-seawater tanks

- resulting in many technical-operational restrictions,

- and vast yearly maintenance costs compared to conventional subs in other navies

Naval Group, TKMS and Japan have retained their corporate knowledge on how to build submarines for Indo-Pacific conditions. ASC no longer has it. Arguably the Collins, with its propulsion pack, was well suited - to Baltic conditions.

Cheers

Pete

alan B'Stard M P said...

If Australians wish to go nuclear, perhaps we should go with France as they have great nuke subs and with purchase of Uranium supplied commercially, which is how the Frogs do it, there is no need ask American permission

We perhaps should re align with the British who should develop their own nuclear requirements need to refuel the subs. Whatever we do, we should do it independent of the USA, as they seem to be stifling growth of our defence capability, such as making us use a US combat system, and not the native system

Our biggest enemy in all this is ourselves refusing to do what's good for us.

We also need modern AIP/fuel cell diesel electric for the littorals. Based on 12 boats, 8 conventional and 4 nuke propelled. The buke boats should be French or British, or even Russian. It appears working with the USA is too stifling. They don't trust their friends. Hell, they won't even sell F-22s!

I lived in the USA and have a high regard for the people. However, dealing with their defence types is a pain and I'm sick of them. It is arrested development

Lee McCurtayne said...

I really wonder, if Saab offered an A26 ER with our wish list accommodated, would this be the Collins II without all the “Legacy of Shame” that haunts Pete. would this not “help” fill the capability gap that ultimately is rapidly looming.
We can all go on and on about Nuclear subs but frankly most of the Littoral waters will be transparent in the next 10 years. Frankly drones will be the future and like fighter jets, ocean senors will be as common as aerial sensors. We all seem to be grasping with the past values.
The Asian threat is the quintessential numbers game, then a dozen plus subs either conventional or Nuclear is just not going to cut it. Naval EW is really the only game changer. Boeing’s Exporer Sub drones and that kind of concept will be the future of submarines sustainment. Even Saab Is contemplating modular subs with swap outs, which points to this kind of replenisment for either conventional subs or even drone re-supply. All this points to cheap drone subs all networked like our RAAF concept is full committed to now.I have no qualms in saying $50 billion buys a lot of drones, not to mention no life rebuilds. The next big one will be won by overwhelming numbers, the capability to replenish faster than your foe. It will be a high attrition affair.