The S-80 Plus to Be the 1st 3,000+ tonne EuroSub Launched

Artwork of the future S-80 Plus courtesy maritimeherald.com. Estimated range/speed 10,000nm at 10 knots snorting. Has 6 x 533 mm torpedo tubes with total of 20? HWT DM2A4 torpedoes, Harpoon missiles, mines. Crew/Complement 32 (+ 8 Special Forces depending on mission)
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In the early-mid 1990s France and Spain jointly undertook a Scorpene S-80 Program. However events and different requirements led to a split between established submarine partners France and Spain.

The end of the Cold War cost cutting ("peace dividend") ended French interest in buying a high specs Scorpene S-80 for French Navy use. Instead France developed and successfully marketed an export Scorpene to Chile, Malaysia, Brazil and India. France relied soley on SSNs (Rubis class and soon the Barracudas) as its attack submarine arm.

Meanwhile Spain relied on its Agosta S-70 SSKs. By the late 1990s-early 2000s Spain wanted a much larger higher specs, second generation AIP, S-80 submarine for Spanish Navy use.

In 2010-2012 Submarine Matters' sitemeter picked up substantial Australian Government interest in considering the future S-80 for Australia's Future Submarine. But then, in May 2013, Navantia announced that a serious weight imbalance design flaw had been identified in the S-80 (under development) which would delay the delivery of the first S-80 submarine Isaac Peral 
(S-81) for the Spanish Navy until possibly 2017.

More specifically S-80 program management inadequacies did fully not take into account an extra 75 to 100 tonnes which prevented the simulated S-80 resurfacing after diving. The extra weight may have mainly been in the Lockheed Martin integrated combat system (sensors, databases and especially weapons (torpedo tubes and about 20 HWT torpedos / missiles).

In June 2013 Spain's Navantia hired US nuclear submarine builder General Dynamics Electric Boat to help solve the S-80's excess weight problem. The solution was that  S-80 needed to be substantially enlarged to achieve buoyancy:

-   from 71m long, and 2,200 tonnes surfaced (see "S-80" diagram above)

-   to 81m long, 3,200 tonnes (surfaced), 3,426 tonnes (submerged) (see "S-80 Plus" diagram above)

With these mistakes and uncertainty Navantia S-80 was excluded from the competition for Australia's Future Submarine (decided in April 2016). But the S-80 now has many characteristics worthy of technology transfer.

Now that the US and Spain have sunk considerable effort in making the S-80 the most modern large SSK approaching launch it may be useful for Naval Group to negotiate a substantial technology transfer from the S-80 to Australia's Future Submarine program. Australia's Future Submarine will need to be larger, of course, sufficient for a crew of 60 + 8 Special Forces. 

A useful source on Scorpene-S-80 history is page 5 of The Market for Submarines Product Code #F673 A Special Focused Market Segment Analysis by: Forecast International (2010?) at http://www.ForecastInternational.com/samples/F673_CompleteSample.pdf.

Pete

Naval Group Info Gathering to Reduce Delays in Aus Future Sub

I see the Shortfin Barracuda / Australian Future Submarine (AFS) as being delayed by 2 years. That is, the design phase might extend until first cutting of steel in 2024. The main reason is the delay in launching and testing of the partial baseline Barracuda/Suffren SSN.

To reduce the likely 2 year delay French Government majority owned Naval Group can still pursue the strategies mentioned yesterday:

In terms of technology transfer - cooperative or otherwise economic:

A.  Spain's Navantia may be willing to sell technical innovations and test data involving the now
      enlarged S-80 Plus (see English and Spanish wiki). Such information is especially valuable
      as the S-80 Plus evolved from Spain's early involvement with France in the Scorpene program in
      the 1990s. Since then Navantia has made many technical improvements. The S-80 Plus is also of
      interest because it is the first 3,000+ tonne, very modern European submarine, to be near
      launch stage.

B.   Naval Group is not the only major contractor involved in the Australian Future Submarine.
      Lockheed Martin (LM) is the Australian Future Submarine's Combat System Integrator doing
      30% - 40% of the work.

      LM is also the S-80 Plus's Combat System Integrator. This makes the Combat System solutions
      LM has developed for the S-80 Plus highly relevant to the Australian Future Submarine. In LM's
      solutions further Combat System similarities include the Harpoon missiles the S-80 Plus and
      Australian Future Submarine both deploy and both have expressed a future interest in being
      capable of torpedo tube launching Tomahawk land attack and long range anti-ship missiles. See
      more tomorrow on the S-80 Plus.

Naval Group, assisted by the French Government, can also gather information about other 3,000+ tonne SSK's from other nations/companies, including:

C.  TKMS' new design for 3,000+ tonne SSKs in response to South Korea's 3,000 tonne KSS-III
      request and Israel's (probably 3,000+) three Dolphin 3s that are on order.

D.  Japan's current and future 3,000+ tonne Soryus are also worthy of close study and perhaps
      negotiation especially concerning their Kawasaki diesels and future Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs)

E.  Innovations in Sweden's future 2,000 tonne A26s would also be of interest.

F.  Russia and China are also developing SSKs with some features of interest.

All this can feed French computer databases and be useful for ongoing and future simulations involving the Australian Future Submarine. The simulations are part of an information loop that throw up further Naval Group requirements for foreign submarine information. Information gathering is also useful for future large SSK competitions that Naval Group is eyeing.

Pete

Naval Group Steps to Reduce 2 Year Australian Shortfin Project Delay

So, as things stand it is likely that the serious delay in Naval Group's Barracuda / Suffren class Project has added at least 2 years to Australia's Future Submarine Naval Group Shortfin Barracuda Project (see previous articles here and here). Although in any case there are major differences (including speed, range, center of gravity and hotel load etc) between the nuclear propelled Barracuda and Australia's future conventional diesel electric Shortfin.

The other Naval Group submarine on which Shortfin is based is the Scorpene. Scorpene is an old design and less than half the size of Shortfin. This means that Shortfin will have many differences - especially internal - compared to Scorpene.

The realities are an old Scorpene design and the Suffren, first of class Barracuda, has not yet been launched, let alone commissioned in the planned 2017. So what can Naval Group do to further the Shortfin design phase? This should include:

-  Computer simulations of Shortfin performance (already ongoing)

-  Development and study of major components, especially deisels (eg. MAN working with 
   Kawasaki or perhaps MTU 396 or 4000. Comparison of LAB and LIB battery advances, and

-  Technology transfer from certain, more modern, closer to launch or not yet launced SSK projects,
    any ideas? Revealed tomorrow. 

Pete

Launch of French Barracuda SSN delayed by Reactor

Might this be the first almost externally complete Barracuda submarine (the Suffren) at Cherbourg? Note the X-plane tail, which no other French submarines have. Photo recorded May 7, 2018 courtesy le marin.

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See the latest and partly corrective article on the Barracuda K15 reactor issue at Submarine Matter's France's Barracuda Delay - Existing K15 Reactor Too Big To Fit in It, dated November 15, 2018.

Following the previous article - the main reason for the delay in launching France’s new Barracuda SSN is the delay in developing an adequate reactor for Barracuda. On the Barracuda is English wiki but see French article with important added content. France does not have the advantages of Britain in relying on some US technology transfer to develop world's best practice reactors for submarine. The first Barracuda submarine, Suffren, was laid down in 2007 and hasn't been launched yet.  

If the testing on the not yet launched Barracuda has not been completed by 2020 it will be difficult for Naval Group to adequately design and "cut steel" on a settled Australia's Future Submarine prototype by Australia's 2022 milestone.  

France's current K-15 reactor (fitted to the Triomphant class SSBN - see sidebar) is reportedly 42 years old (see page 54 at [1] below). The K-15's old age may be a pointer to how slowly a new reactor (project started in 2003? [1]) adequate for Barracuda may be developed.

This slow development of a new submarine reactor may have been limited by France's policy of using money saving dual (civilian-military) use nuclear facilities reliant on low enriched Uranium (LEU) for propulsion.

Instead of the K15's 7-10 year till Uranium refueling cycle (which means lower submarine availability), France may be aiming for at least 15 years between refuels. This is still short of the full and modern 33 year life of submarine reactor core solution being used in US and UK submarines which require Highly Enriched Uranium of around 90% U235. Under the 1958 US–UK Mutual [Nuclear] Defense Agreement (see 3rd paragraph) Britain has drawn heavily from US submarine reactor technology from the beginning. 

France does not want to repeat some UK reactor deficiences. France would have observed Britain's problems using Vanguard SSBN's PWR2 reactor in the Astute SSN (launched in 2007). More specifically the mismatch between the powerful PWR2 and Astute's undersized steam turbine has prevented Astute reaching full power [2]. That British PWR2 will only drive the Astutes at a deficient speed of 29-30 knots when around 35 knots would fulfil Astute's mission requirements. The opposition, Russia's Akula (see sidebar) and Yasen can travel at 35 knots.

French Submarine Reactor Table Based on [1] page 54.

Class using reactor	Reactor on French Nuclear Submarine
Redoutable class SSBN	Called Pressurised Water Reactor “PWR” in English. 110 MW source (no K name)
Rubis class SSN	CAS48 = K48) Rated at 48 MW giving just 7 MW propulsion (confirmed here). For submerged speed of 25 knots). K48 must be recharged every 6 to 7 years
Triomphant class SSBN	Resulting fleet reactor: K15. The K15 design may go back to 1976 that is 42 years by 2018. [see page 54 [1] Lobner]. K15 rated at 150 MW.
Barracuda / Suffren class SSN	Reactor construction started in 2003, with land test module completed in 2005. Intended to replace K15.

[1]  Information on French SSBNs and SLBMs are on pages 49-83 of Peter Lobner’s 60 Years of Marine Nuclear Power: 1955-2015 - Part 4 - Other Nuclear Marine Nations, August 2015. large PDF (around 20MB) http://www.lynceans.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Part-4_UK-France-Others-60-yrs-of-marine-nuc-power.pdf Information on K15 is mainly on page 54.

[2]  see page 203 of David Ross's, The World's Greatest SUBMARINES: An Illustrated History, Amber Books Ltd, London, UK 2016.

Pete 

Why Naval Group Decoupled Australian Future Submarine from Barracuda

See Naval Group (was DCNS) stating the Australian Future Submarine "Shortfin" was based on Barracuda - in April 2016 Youtube above.
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In October 2017 it was reported Naval Group's (was DCNS) Executive Director, Australian Submarine Program, Mr Billig, said Naval Group is designing the Shortfin "from scratch". This directly contradicted Gerard Autret's and Sean Costello's both of  Naval Group's statement of April 8, 2016 that the Australian Future Submarine was using the Barracuda AND Scorpene as design references. Australia duly selected Naval Group (DCNS) as the winner of the submarine competition on April 26, 2016. 

Returning to Naval Group's statement of April 8, 2016 - this included the categorical words:

"As the nuclear Barracuda is designed to operate globally, shares the same hull form as the Shortfin Barracuda and is also compliant with nuclear safety standards, it is very suitable for the Australian requirement. This avoids many years of design studies for validation of equipment such as pumps and hoses, and allows the designer to take margins for higher performances elsewhere in the ship."

So this decoupling of the Australian Future Submarine design from Barracuda presumably adds:

"many years of design studies for validation of equipment such as pumps and hoses, 

And will not allow:

"the designer to take margins for higher performances elsewhere in the ship."

It is difficult for Naval Group to decouple Barracuda from the Australian Future Submarine because of their similar length and the same diameter/beam.

See Julien Kerr’s article of October 2017 in The Australian:

"Agreement has been reached on the length, diameter and tonnage of the Royal Australian Navy’s Future Submarine, an important milestone that will allow further progress on the concept design phase of the $50 billion program.

This was disclosed in the course of an industry briefing at the recent Pacific 2017 naval exposition in Sydney, although neither the Defence Department nor French submarine designer and constructor Naval Group would release specific details.

However, informed sources said the agreed dimensions were a length of 97 metres [Barracuda 99.4 metres], a diameter of 8.8m [Barracuda Beam 8.8 metres], and a submerged displacement of 4500 tonnes.”

Has Australian Future Submarine design been politically, but not technically, decoupled from Barracuda due to severe delays in the Barracuda Project?

On delays French wikipedia tries to explain the delay:

"The Barracuda definition phase started in October 1998. Then the design in 2002 for tests then planned in 2008 and an entry into service in 2010. In 2015, the entry into service of the first copy was postponed until 2018 following budgetary difficulties, then, in 2016, postponed until 2019."

The Barracuda severe delay may now amount to 3 further years (from no launch yet) until 2021 entry into service (ie: commissioning of the first of class). This omen provides little time for the Australian Future Submarine  to profit from real world testing of Barracuda's hydrodynamic, sonar performance, anechoic tiles, photonic masts and of many other parameters before the Australian Future Submarine Project is supposed to cut steel in 2022.

More tomorrow on the actual reason Barracuda has been delayed and hence politically decoupled from the Australian Future Submarine Project.

Pete

US Losing Alliances - Japan Paying to Reinvent the F-22

wispywood2344 has provided diagrams for the XF9-1 jet engine under development for Japan's future stealth air superiority fighter F-3, including sideview XF9-1 jet engine (above) and 

the engine's XVN3-1 thrust vectoring in pitch-axis nozzle (below).

Drawing from wispywood2344's comments and Pete's own ideas:

After the US rejected the friendly alliance measure of exporting the F-22 stealth air superiority fighter to all countries (notably Japan and Australia) countries have reacted in different ways. Japanese strategy may be to:

1.  spend (or grudgingly waste) a large amount of money on developing (or reinventing a F-22 clone)
     indigenous F-3 or multinational stealth air superiority fighter. This is a similar situation to the
     special US nuclear assitance to the UK Agreement (1958) - but now isolationist America 
     downgrades alliances, despite the China threat...or 

2.  Japan discusses buying 25 extra 25 F-35As on top of the 42 F-35A Japan is already buying. Also
     Japan might buy some F-35B carrier jump-jet aircraft purchases. Such extra money may entice 
     Lockheed Martin to be more cooperative in assisting the future F-3 or joint fighter project. 

SUPERCRUISE JET ENGINES

Probably the most difficult aspect after full stealth integration is achieving the ability to supercruise (especially over Mach 1.5). That is remain supersonic without highly infra-red obvious afterburners. Fighters with supercruise capability include F-22, Typhoons, Gripens, Rafales and possible Su-35s (see list). Supercruise also means longer range because the high fuel use afterburner(s) are not used. 

Significantly the F-35 is too underpowered to truly supercruise. The F-35 is considerably heavier (ie. poorer power to weight ratio) than single engine lightweight fighters (especially the F-16) that it replaces.

China has not yet developed its WS-15 supercruise engine for its J-20 and WS-13 for its J-31 stealth aircraft projects.

The Japanese Air Force is proceeding with the deployment of F-35A as a successor to F-4 Phantoms scheduled to completely retire by around 2020.

Apart from this, since the retirement of the Mitsubishi F-2 (F-16 derivative) is scheduled to begin around 2030, the Japanese Ministry of Defense has conducted research and technology development on a future Mitsubishi "F-3" stealthy air superiority fighter as a successor.

If Japan's pays Lockheed Martin enough maybe much F-22 intellectual property and assistance can find its way to the F-3 - probably in about 2033. (Graphics courtesy Pakistan Defence)

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As part of  "F-3" technology development, production and testing of Japanese supercruise engines are in progress, with a prototype "XF9-1" due to be completed around mid 2018.[1]

The XF9-1 has been developed since 2008 with the aim to supercruise at thrust, speed and distances similar to the US F-22's F119 engine. See [2].

[1]  http://www.mod.go.jp/atla/img/kousouken/news_20170628.pdf
[2]  text and graphics on advanced XF9-1 jet engine
       http://blog.livedoor.jp/wispywood2344/archives/55607907.html

BACKGROUND/FIGURES

wispywood2344 indicates the Japanese Ministry of Defense wishes future performance for the indigenously built XF 9-1, at sea level, can be nearly equivalent to the F-22's F 119 engine, ie:

XF 9-1

-  Maximum wet thrust (with afterburner) >147 kN each and

-  Maximum dry thrust >108 kN each.

In comparison the F-22's 2 × Pratt & Whitney F119-PW-100

Maximum wet thrust (afterburner) : >156 kN each
Maximum dry thrust: 116 kN each

F-22 and F-3 performance:
Maximum supercruise: Mach 1.82. 
Range: 2,900 km 
Combat radius: 800 km 

In any case the corporate-political power of Lockheed Martin (LM) will pressure the US government and other countries to buy all the LM built  F-35s possible in the 2020s. Then, in the late 2020s, LM will re-establish production lines for the F-22s countries really wanted - rather than the underpowered F-35. That is production of high spec US F-22s and low spec export F-22s to maximise US strategic market power. 

Maybe by then, the attractions of Chinese competition will be too much for America's LM directed foreign export policies... 

wispywood2344 and Pete