Australian Options Limited To Speed SSN Purchases

In response to Bill Seney's good questions of July 31, 2023:

1. Limitations of UK engineering and scheduling for the SSN-AUKUS project prevent any such subs for Australia until the 2040s. The UK's only submarine builder needs to build the 4 future Dreadnought-class SSBNs before the mainly UK designed SSN-AUKUS's can be built.

Australia will need to wait for the UK submarine yard to complete the first SSN-AUKUS (that will then need about 3 years testing by the UK RN) first before tech and experience can be transferred to Australia's Osborne, Adelaide shipyard and the RAN.

Also the SSN-AUKUSs for the UK RN are a replacement and evolution of the UK's current Astute class. The UK is scheduled to only begin replacing the Astutes from the late 2030s. It is highly unlikely the UK will build SSN-AUKUS for Australia before the UK RN's requirements. The UK has a minute nuclear submarine labor force compared to the 2 US submarine build yards - so the UK has few people available to help Austalia until the late 2030s. 

SSN-AUKUSs can only be built after the future, not yet fully developed, PWR3 submarine reactor, to be used for the Dreadnoughts, is available. Once used in the Dreadnoughts the PWR3 then must be sufficiently miniaturised for SSN-AUKUSs - all taking about 15 years from now.

2. On "other potential suppliers" Since 1788 Australia hasn't bought key weapons from potential enemies. Which rules out SSNs from Russia and China. India will heavily rely on Russian advisers, Russian SSN reactor designs and other tech to develop Indian SSNs by the mid-late 2030s. So security and politics aside there is  no time saving, in the Indian project, for Australia's aims.

And yes Brazil, with its SSN project slipping to mid 2030s commissioning, is in no position to sell all the French non-nuclear tech to Australia. Brazil is developing its own first generation submarine reactor - a long term project.

3. "Do Australian plans include building facilities to refit SSNs?" Yes Albanese and Marles would CLAIM almost anything about the SSN hope. There might be underdeveloped "plans" but these might not be significant refit realities until well into the 2030s.

I would hazard a guess that a US submarine tender temporarally calling in at Fleet Base West might replace simple parts for a visiting US nuclear sub from that tender's existing stocks or parts flown in from the US. Submarine tender USS Frank Cable, visited in April 2022. 

Australia might not have the industrial base, nuclear expertise or political-legal clearances to perform substantial maintenance on US SSNs for many years.

The US hasn't even transferred the millions of Virginia-class design blue-prints to Australia. Only a handful of Australians are cleared (by US law) to view a tiny fraction of them. Even fewer Austalians have a broad and practical understanding of SSNs. My past USN contacts haven't been too forthcoming.

So the Australian SSN Hope is just a Wing and a Prayer, this side of the 2030s.

Complex Bathymetry & Subs: South China Sea

South China Sea depths (in meters). Map courtesy Silent World Foundation.

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On July 25, 2023 Anonymous commented (with some additions by Pete): 

The depth issues in the South China Sea (SCS) are not as simple as shallow and deeper parts. There is a collection of interconnected basins linked by deep valleys (or undersea canyons). Submarines can hide under water levels of differing  temperature and salinity.

There is at least 100 years of bathymetric data in the SCS collected by the British, US, French, Dutch, Japanese and now Chinese navies. Most of this data is kept secret although there are some public, but crude, sea depth maps, like the one above.

There are many ways of detecting submarines the oldest being naked eye visual, acoustic/sonar and magnetic anomaly (used in the destruction of submarines as far back as 1918). Magnetic anomaly detection needs to be very close range (certainly less than a mile at most) measuring a submarine's magnetic abnormality vs background magnetism. The volcanic areas in the SCS are very different from the magnetic uniformity found in the North Sea or the Baltic.

Most submarines as well as surface warships have a reduced Magnetic signature through the process of Degaussing.  

Here is also a list of ASW detection aspects that might be available to China's "SEAWEB".

French strategic writers 

French strategic writers are of special value as they bring original perspectives. This is because they are not beholden to US assessments that dominate the Anglosphere. Greater originality is also possible because France is not automatically led by the US in being anti-Russian or anti-Chinese.

Here is an excellent, fascinating and long (equivalent to about 8 pages) study:

François-Xavier Bonnet's  Charting submarine routes in Southeast Asia 

in Hérodote Volume 176, Issue 1, January 2020, pages 25 to 41, Translated and edited by Cadenza Academic Translations, Translator: Peter Collins, Editor: Faye Winsor, Senior editor: Mark Mellor.

Bonnet's study has many things to say about: 

-  the increasing importance of SSKs and nuclear subs in Southeast Asian and SCS waters.

-  relatively low amount of publicity about ways through the Philippine islands.

-  well understood by some, though secret in detail, paths for nuclear submarines though the Philippine and Indonesian archipelagos.

-  US and Chinese secrecy about viable submarine paths and sensor arrays throughout the SCS especially within the so-called "Dangerous Ground" in the Spratly Islands

-  China's sensor buildups on and between its new militarized reefs since the 2010s eg. Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi reefs.

-  China's evolution in SSBN development including Type 094 "Jins" with JL-2 SLBMs (that can already hit Australia). There is an expectation Type 096 "Tangs" will soon be developed with ever longer range JL-3s that from the SCS (including "Dangerous Ground")  waters may have the range to hit the continental US.

Hérodote   Volume 176, Issue 1, January 2020, also has another article with deep submarine relevance. This is Benoît de Tréglodé's, Vietnam’s geostrategy regarding the Spratly Islands and the surrounding ASEAN nations

Other interesting Hérodote volumes are many, including:

-  Seas and Oceans, Volume 163, Issue 4, 2016 eg. Camille Morel's Threats beneath the seas: Vulnerabilities in the global cable network

-  Geopolitics of the Datasphere Volume 177-178, Issue 2-3, April 2020, and 

-  Osint: digital investigations and fieldworks, Volume 186, Issue 3, July 2022.

Virginias For Australia Rightly in Trouble

Pete Comment

Australian PM Albanese's and Biden's PR campaign for Virginias the US Navy desperately needs, being sold instead to Australia (which has good reasons not to fight Australia's largest trading partner China) is rightly in trouble. China will be the dominant power in Australia's region sooner or later. This is while the US remains President-by-President unpredictable (a la Trump) perhaps on the way to isolationism.

The US will only sell the Virginias to Australia if there is an ironclad understanding Australia will continue to be an ever loyal follower of the US into battle.

Australia should forego the A$250 Billion preparatory and unit costs of up to 5 Virginias, if that locks Australia into following the US into a war with China. Australia later buying/building mainly UK designed SSN-AUKUSs in the 2040s has not been costed by the Australian Government, but may well be another A$250 Billion.

REPORT

Part of Matthew Knott's Sydney Morning Herald, July 28, 2023 report is:

The “‘A risk we should not take’: Republican resistance mounts to [AUKUS] nuclear submarine plan

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has declared he remains confident Australia will secure Virginia-class submarines from the United States, even as almost half of all Republican senators came out against the current plan on the grounds it would dangerously weaken the US Navy as it competes with China.

Twenty-three Republican senators, including Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell, wrote to President Joe Biden on Thursday (Australian time) saying they did not support the proposal to provide nuclear-powered submarines to Australia unless the US doubled its own domestic production capacity.

...While noting that the AUKUS pact had broad bipartisan support in Washington, the senators wrote: “The administration’s current plan requires the transfer of three US Virginia-class attack submarines from the existing US submarine fleet without a clear plan for replacing these submarines.

“This plan, if implemented without change, would unacceptably weaken the US fleet even as China seeks to expand its military power and influence.”

The Republican senators noted that the US said it required 66 attack-class submarines, but the number of boats in its fleet is set to decline to 46 by 2030.

“Under the current AUKUS plan to transfer US Virginia-class submarines to a partner nation before meeting the Navy’s own requirements, the number of available nuclear submarines in the US submarine fleet would be lowered further,” they wrote.

“This is a risk we cannot take.”

Roger Wicker, the top Republican on the Senate armed services committee, previously vowed to block the submarine transfer unless the Biden administration funded a massive increase in the US domestic production capacity.

The letter shows these concerns are widely held among Senate Republicans.

The senators say in their letter the US would have to produce up to 2.5 [Virginia] submarines a year – up from 1.2 boats currently – to make up for the sale of up to three submarines to Australia and avoid shrinking the US Navy’s operational capacity..."

MUCH MORE IN THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD REPORT

The Sensor Saturated South China Sea

The sensor sturated South China Sea (Map courtesy Wikipedia)
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Ghalib Kabir on July 24, 2023, made some interesting comments on the increasing difficulty of submarines operating in the generally shallow South China Sea (SCS).

It is suspected that China is laying undersea sensors of increasing quality and quantity. These are criss-crosing the SCS from and between the Chinese mainland and around Taiwan, China's Hainan Island province and between China's new SCS militarised islands (in the Paracel and Spratley island groups). Also China has increasing number of mobile sensors and weapons platforms, including increasing numbers of SSNs and Yuan SSKs to weaponise the sensor networks.

This sensor saturation of the SCS means Australia's current Collins will need to avoid their regular SCS mission area. Also even Australia's Virginias (if the RAN  ever receives them) may not be able to specialise in SCS missions.

Ghalib Kabir comments:

The 209s, Scorpenes, any future 218s, 212 derivatives etc will face a simple fact in the SCS.

The SCS is a shallow sea and the Chinese have bugged the damned sea floor with sensors already.

Here is a helpful extract from good ol' USN on the SCS,

"Nearly half its seabed is continental shelf in water depths less than [650 feet/200m] a single deep basin with several depths to more than [5,000m] makes up only 16 percent of the South China Sea."

See The South China Sea: Complex and Changing by Captain Lawson W. Brigham, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired), Published at U.S. NAVAL INSITUTE January 2023 Proceedings Vol. 149/1/1,439

[Down to 200m depths only] very quiet subs could have a chance. 200m in 70-80% of the SCS makes it prime territory for using expendable UUVs and [surfaced] USVs. The PLAN will face the same problem Autralian or other nations subs will face...shallow seas...ocean floor sensors can "ping" [active sonar pulses and perhaps LED or laser pulses] and get the readings of even Li-AIP subs crawling at 2 knots at 150m.

If war breaks out no Taigei/Soryu/U212 is going to survive for long against the giant dragnet the PLAN will activate no holds barred. On the other hand, the Yuans...even the so called 'ultra quiet' Type 039Ds might not be invincible....

Lastly.... I think any RAN Virginia would have to be an SSGN that can fire hypersonic missiles if need be....[at Chinese ships and islands in the SCS] 

We have discussed this since 2015...if the fat falls into the fire...then the Quad will need a mix of USVs, UUVs, XLUUVs, Manned special mission midget subs, AIP-Li SSKs and SSGNs along with surface fleet and Naval Air arm with P-8 MPAs, E-2D AEWs, MH-60R ASW, "Growler" EA-18Gs, F-35s and Sea Guardian [Reaper variant] MQ-9s capable of EW, LRSTOW [missiles with lightweight torpedoes?]  launch....plus the ability to knock out Chinese Yaogan reconnaissance satellites and other Chinese military satellites to blind the PLAN and PLAAF.

We either go all in or risk a solid pasting in the first island and second island chains.

This Tom Clancyesque fleet scenario is no more a joke...China can deploy 50 Type-54 frigates with 40 VLS each, 30 plus Type 052Ds with 80 VLS each and 15-20 Type 055 cruisers with 128-144 VLS each...plus 70 Chinese SSNs and SSKs with a combined missile capability 400-500 VLS equivalent.... 

As China's population ages and economically feels the pinch...trust them to find an outlet by picking a quarrel just as they did with India in 1959-60 in the middle of the great leap forward disaster..."

RSS Impeccable sub in Singapore: Interesting Military History

Shawn C has advised:

On July 8, 2023 David Boey reported on his blog the arrival of RSS Impeccable the first Invincible-class submarine to enter Singapore waters. This was on heavy lift ship Rolldock Storm. 

The Singapore Armed Forces appeared to implement extensive security measures to screen the RSS Impeccable from the wrong viewers. Steel modules and containers were used to cover the hull and fin/sail of the 70m long submarine.

[Pete Comment: Tight security could be because Impeccable has some of the "diamond hull" radar and sonar reflection characteristics that TKMS and its customers see as a major stealth advance in the latest TKMS subs. Also anechoic coating and hull sonars might be worth keeping secret for as long as possible. Meanwhile Impeccable's fin/sail has already been caught on Singapore Ministry of Defence camera as it entered Singapore Harbour (below).

What might be an intentionally fuzzy photo. Impeccable enters "RSS Singapura" better known as Changi Naval Base. (Singapore Mindef picture via Naval News).

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First of class RSS Invincible itself is being used as a Singapore crew training vessel in Kiel, Germany. This may be until sister boats RSS Illustrious and Inimitable have been completed and delivered to Singapore.

A Singapore Mindef News Release reports Impeccable had its official "welcome home" ceremony on July 20, 2023.]

Shawn reckons one of the two remaining Challenger class submarines, RSS Conqueror or RSS Chieftain, will retire by the end of this year, as they are both over 55 years old. They were originally launched in the 1960s in their previous Swedish Sjöormen-class lives. 

Some Singapore Military History

Speaking more generally Shawn advises when Singapore became an independent republic in August 1965 Singapore had to create its own defence structure and culture. Singapore approached much larger countries, Egypt and India, but those countries differed vastly in land area and population. It was Israel that had more similarities including the very high level of education and per capita GDP that Singapore planned. 

Israeli defence advice was extensive. Also with Singapore's limited military age population it needed to adopt an Israeli/Swiss National Conscription/Reservist system. 

 

Like Israel Singapore gets the most out of limited numbers of servicemen by having significant amounts of high quality equipment. That includes good French stealth frigates, submarines from Sweden and Germany; more Leopard 2 tanks than Australia has Abrams; US F-15s, F-16s, C-130s, F-35Bs (on order); and US Apache, Chinook and Seahawk helicopters, to name a few. 

[Pete Comment: "Other" ties with Anglo countries and Israel are reputedly of a high level.]

SSHNs or XLUUVs are Australia's Submarine Future

In response to Grampa Jim's July 23, 2023 post:

I think the extreme Australian and US investment in making Virginias for Australia a reality would make Australia more of an essential ally for the US. 

ie. Australia would be more the essential ally in peacetime, conventional wartime and even in a nuclear war. This might work to overide isolationist trends in US politics.

Also emerging hypersonic missile technology could make Australian Virginias small but critical platforms that could carry nuclear tipped hypersonic missiles to deter China. Submarines are the best means of nuclear deterrence. I would call these Australian subs "Submarines Hypersonic Missile Nuclear propelled (SSHNs)."

Conventional subs like Japan's Taigeis (and indeed the Collins) are of declining value in Australia's Indonesian Archipelago Straits and South China Sea critical mission areas. This is because China's fixed and mobile anti-submarine acoustic sensors are becoming more effective in detecting when conventional subs run their diesels in those areas.

Also such conventional subs are too slow to combat the more capable Chinese navy, air and rocket forces.

I think if Australia is unwillling to turn to submarine nuclear weapons then after the Collins life extension (LOTEs) keep Collins going through to the late 2030s, XLUUVs or XL-AUVs are Australia's submarine future. These XLUUVs include the RAN's Anduril GHOST SHARK project.