Some (likely) Naval Group Approaches to Australia's Future Submarine

After much discussion on Submarine Matters (here and here) and elsewhere on the direction Naval Group is going with Australia's Future Submarine...

Some observations are:

Descriptions of a huge 50 year to design, build and upgrade submarine program are made by different people, at different times, for different purposes, targeting different audiences.

Disruptions to the future submarine selection process made it difficult for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and contestants to nail down final submarine requirements and designs. Up to February 2015 then Prime Minister Abbott unilaterally chose Japan. From February 2015 a selection process hid the reality that Japan was quietly still the winner. Japan was ahead until Abbott was removed from the Prime Ministership in September 2015. Once Prime Minister Turnbull was appointed the field was opened up to the 3 contestants (Germany, France and Japan) with a normally 3 year submarine selection period being compressed into 7 months (September 2015 to April 2016).

Turnbull chose to rapidly publicise the Future Submarine winner on April 26, 2016 in order to win South Australian votes in the early July 2, 2016 National Election. With the pork barrel of a $50 Billion project mainly at Osborne, Adelaide, South Australia Turnbull’s submarine-to-win-the-election-strategy succeeded in getting his government over the line by one crucial electorate/district/seat/vote.

Naval Group (then DCNS) had to publicly react quickly to Turnbull’s premature (April 26, 2016) announcement with as positive and concrete a submarine package as possible. For example Naval Group’s concept submarine was termed the “Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A” to indicate to the public that it was a solid building block in a highly developed submarine program. Shortfin was also presented as a conventional outgrowth of an already highly developed Barracuda nuclear submarine program.

Final Issues To Be Decided In Years To Come

In fact in a huge submarine program specific submarine characteristics can only be assessed and finalised once a finalised scale model can be hydro-dynamically tested or even after the full-sized first of class begins trials in the open sea (noise? cavitation?) in about 2031. Issues include:

-  length will fluctuate depending on many variables including the size of the bow sonar (Lockheed

   Martin (LM) input as one small part of its combat system) and whether a pump jet is added or

   rejected.

-  diameter could fluctuate (how many decks, bunk sizes and numbers, arrangement of how many

   torpedo tubes (LM), VLS? how many and size of diesels, batteries, fuel tanks, water ballast?

-  fuel cell AIP? inefficient to carry the LOX over Australia’s long transit distances, lack of

   observable French progress with Fuel Cell and lack of observable RAN interest

-  the first pump jet as standard on a SSK class. This would be a radical solution for the

   technologically conservative RAN 

-  RAN conservatism would also likely reject Australia becoming the second LIBs user after Japan.

At 8/10/17 5:13 PM someone with access to Naval Group thinking commented, in part:

“I think you will find that the [Australian Government] govt was well aware that both the DCNS & TKMS designs were just concepts (basic design only). Both required complete detailed design from scratch. Both would have used existing designs for reference (you don't reinvent the wheel unless you have to)...It will definitely be more like a conventional powered Barracuda than a stretched Scorpene (for a start you would have to stretch a Scorpene in all directions, not just make it longer)...”

A submarine builder’s technical design knowledge base, influencing future submarine designs, often goes back a century. The designs of the Scorpenes and Barracudas are only the latest. See the Table below.

Naval Group Submarine Development TABLE (by Pete)

Submarine (how many built?)	First Sub Laid Down	Last Sub Commissioned	Some still building?
Classes pre Agosta 4 Arethuse 26 Daphne	1863 the Plongeur  1957 France only 1960?	many classes pre 1957 1960 1975 France & Export	No. eg. WWI era. Interwar and WWII  No
Redoutable SSBNs 6 built France only	1964 (1st commissioned 1971	2008	No
Agosta SSKs 13 built	Early 1970s French, Spanish & Pak Navy	2006, 3 Spanish, 5 Pakistani remain	No
Rubis SSNs 6 built 2,500 tonnes	1976	Re-commissioned as AMETHYSTEs	No
AMETHYSTE	Rebuilds of the 6 existing Rubis SSNs	1995	No
Triomphant SSBNs 4 built	1986	2010	No
Scorpene SSKs (14 total) 2 built--------------------- 2 built--------------------- 1 built so far -----------------------------	1999 O’Higgins Chile 2004 KD TA Rahman 2009 INS Kalvari India 2010 SBR-1-4 Brazil	2006 2009 Malaysia 2016 (1st planned) 2020 (1st SBR-1)	No No 5 x Kalvaris 1 per year 4 x SBRs (1 per year)
SN-BR SSN just 1 DCNS designing non-nuclear portion. 4 to 5,000 tonnes.	2024 (maybe) after the  SBR-SSKs Brazil building reactor.	2034 (or later) likely. Also depends on Brazilian economy.	1 in medium-long term
Barracuda/Suffren French only SSNs 6 planned	2007	2029 for the last of the six	Yes
Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A 12 planned	2028?	2052? Assuming all are SSKs? 1 built/2 years?	Future
France’s Next Generation SSBN (SSBN NG) 4 likely	2035? Armed with 10? to 16? M51.3 SLBMs	2050? Assuming one sub built every two years	Future

Pete

Mutiny? on HMS Vigilant nuclear missile submarine.

HMS Vigilant, with crew, in happier times (Photo courtesy Royal Navy, 2012)

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What do you call it when:

1.  the Captain of nuclear missile submarine HMS Vigilant (SSBN) is removed for an inappropriate
     relationship with a female crew member,

2.  then his second in command (Executive Officer) is also removed – same reason – different female

     crew member, and

3.  then it is revealed these shenanigans “sparked anger among crew members, with five [officers]

     threatening to resign”?

This is very serious on account of HMS Vigilant constituting Britain’s whole active nuclear deterrent during the three to six months it is on patrol. During that period the other three Vanguards would be inactive while training or being overhauled. 

This Lockheed Martin document [PDF 10MB] also raises a third activity on page 6 - that is the Vanguards also regularly have their rented Trident missiles [right click mouse to translate] restocked at the US-UK Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic (SWFLANT) at the US SSBN Base at King's Bay, Georgia. 

Kings Bay Base is large, at 16,000 acres and employing 9,000 people. A likely photo of US-UK Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic's giant SSBN sheds is below - courtesy French Wikipedia. 

See inside one shed [on page 1. same PDF 10MB]

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A.  In view of the Vigilant Scandal the issue of having female crew on UK and US SSBNs is likely to

      be reviewed.

B.  The five officer threat to resign from what is a front line vessel might approach mutiny by some

      definitions. The most famous Mutiny on the Bounty was much more insignificant in comparison.

      HMS Bounty was an ex-collier only mounting 4 to 14 small guns. Vigilant is more a like a whole

      fleet in one vessel – mounting up to 16 city smashing “guns”.

Pete 

Mainstream Media Misses Naval Group's Misspeak *

In response to KQN's comment of 6/10/17 6:30 AM,:

Yes the Naval Group's Executive Director, Australian Submarine Program, Mr Billig, saying we are designing the Shortfin "from scratch" doesn't seem to have been picked up by the journos of the Mainstream Media.

Mr Billig's misspeak directly contradicts Naval Group's 2016 reference to Shortfin using the Barracuda AND Scorpene as design references. This 2016 reference was in Sean Costello's (then CEO Naval Group/DCNS Australia) who stated in ASPI's The Strategist, April 8, 2016.

"The main area where Barracuda design references were not used [for Australia's future Shortfin submarine] was in the area of the electrical system (batteries and voltage), power generation (induction and diesel generators) and propulsion (main electric motor)."

"In these systems the design reference comes from the Scorpene class of diesel electric submarines, or from an existing submarine technology within DCNS. Existing technologies are re-used in all systems in the Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A. System by system, the whole ship performance is validated and the design loop closed."

Comment - Maybe there's a French to English translation glitch?

Pete

Is Naval Group Backpedaling on the Australian Future Submarine Pump Jet Promise?

Thinking back on the pivotal April 26, 2016 announcement that Naval Group won the Australian Future Submarine competition.

A major part of Naval Group's public presentation was that Australia would benefit from stealth technology from France's nuclear submarine program. This was to be specifically in the shape of the winning French design having
"pump jet propulsion that replaces obsolete propeller technology".

See the pump jet offer 15 seconds into to Naval Group's (was DCNS) winning 2016 promotional Youtube.

At Pacific 17 reported by AAP via Australia's SBS (October 4, 2017) is a presentation by Naval Group executive director of the Australian submarine program Jean-Michel Billig: "The vessels may end up with conventional propellers...Mr Billig said." [Comment - Such propellers are what Naval Group previously described as "obsolete"]

Mr Billig dismissed fears about engineering difficulties. "We are not converting a nuclear-powered submarine into a conventional submarine, we are starting from scratch," he said.
[Comment - This is a big step back from the original major selling point of the French winner - that the French design would benefit from stealth technology from the French nuclear submarine program!]

On a another tack - did Australia criticise the German TKMS Type 216 entrant (in 2016) on high modelled noise because it did not have that vital French pump jet?

What Naval Group (then DCNS) offered Australia in its winning presentation, at the point of competition decision in 2016. Note the pump jet promise 16 seconds in. Beware this Youtube is likely to be taken down in the next few days.
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Details courtesy Naval Group (was DCNS) - via Sydney Morning Herald, April 26, 2016. Note  "Super-quiet pump jet propulsion instead of propellor" is featured.
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Pete

Choice of Submarine LIBs - Management and Operation

In Submarine Matters' ongoing examination of Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) Anonymous's research and comments are always helpful. Anonymous's comments of  September 16 to 27, 2017 reveal much about the likely choice, management and operation of LIBs on submarines. Japan is leading the way with LIBs - planning full conversion to LIBs on new submarines launched from 2018 onwards (see Table below).

In the development of new LIB materials and control equipment for Japan's latest Soryu submarines, rigorous testing, prior to operational use, is required. LIB materials and equipment may fail under accelerated and severe condition testing. This includes testing under:

-  high or very low temperatures (the operational temperature of LIBs on Japanese submarines is
   within the range of 10-45 degrees C for efficient and safe operation) 

-  high pressures

-  strong mechanical stress, and

-  continuous vibration testing, etc.

Tri-ring advised the two simplest ways to avoid the particular LIB problem of "lithium plating" is to:

-   prevent over voltage during charging of LIBs (above 4.2 volts per cell), and

-   charging and discharging at low temperature (below 15⁰C). 

He adds that to counter thermal runaway of LIBs, great advances have been made in material science. One of them is a ceramic separator that has much higher resistance against heat.

The Japanese Ministry of Defence's (MOD) Acquisition, Technology & Logistic Agency (ATLA) and the Japanese Navy have been (and will be) conducting such testing of LIBs. For more accurate establishment of LIB safety standards, non accelerated testing under normal condition is preferable, even if this is time-consuming. 

Choice of LIBs

Japan has explored submarine use of many LIB combinations, including two that show exceptional stability at low temperatures and long charge-discharge cycle lives. These are : 

-  Lithium Iron Phosphate (LFP) 2,000 cycle lives. As indicated here Anonymous advises the next
   subclass of TKMS Type 212As may adopt LFP (Pete would say the new 212As would be launched
   during the 2020s) 

-  Lithium Titanate (LTO) ( Li₄Ti₅O₁₂ ) 7,000 cycles, made by Toshiba. 

For LFP and LTO such stability at low temperatures and with long cycle lives comes at the cost of  relatively low energy density.

-  Lithium nickel cobalt aluminium oxide (NCA) Drawing from this article. To remedy this low LIB
   energy density problem Japan may well have settled on NCA ( LiNiCoAlO₂ ) LIBs for its Navy.
   These LIBs are made by GS Yuasa. Such LIBs are ideal for the Japanese Navy's mid-range
   continuous patrol operations.

All this LIB testing and subsequent use on Soryu submarines via liaison with France's Naval Group may contribute to use of LIBs on Australia's Shortfin Future Submarines (FSM). LIBs on Shortfins may be added from the first Shortfins onwards or fitted to later build Shortfins. TKMS, Saab-Kockums, Naval Group, Russia, China and MHI/KHI may develop fundamentally different LIBs for other submarines. Also their differing diesel engines are an additional diesel-electric variable. This means the efficiency and safety of LIBs developed by one submarine builder may note ensure efficient and safe use by other builders. 

For example Saab-Kockums and Russia that build submarines mainly for cold water operations may prefer LFP LIBs that may be more efficient in icy temperatures. As a customer Canada may prefer low temperature LIBs for its near Arctic Ocean operations. 

LIBs Management and Operation

Anonymous does not think a submarine's LIBs are discharged homogeneously (all at once and evenly). The numbers of charges and discharges of  LIBs during (say) a total of 4 charge-discharge phases over 96 hours) might occur as follows:
i)  half of the LIBs in the forward battery section may be used for the sub's first fully submerged dive and then charged in the first snorting, 
ii)  the other half of the forward LIBs is used for the second dive, then charged in the second snorting phase 
iii)  half of the LIBs in aft battery section is used for the third dive and then charged in the third snorting, and
iv)  the another half of the LIBs in the aft battery section is used for the fourth dive and then charged in the fourth snorting.

The management/operation (M/O) system of batteries/propulsion of  Japanese Oyashio and Soryu submarines is shown in 1 to 3 below. 

1 Oyashio class (built 1994-2006, see Table below)
In the eleven Oyashio class subs are classic DC motors reliant on limited capacity LABs. These make  the sub's fully submerged speed control complex. LABs are in 2 identical sections fore and aft (ie. 4 identical sections overall)
M/O of LABs are in parallel or series connection in sections/subsections
Propulsion: 2 identical DC motors

2 Soryu MK 1's (built 2005-present)
In the ten Soryu Mk 1s, latest Permanent Magnet Synchronous Motors (PMSMs) make speed control of the submarine easier. But the management of two power supply systems (LABs & AIP) is complex.
LABs: fore and aft sections consisted of 2 identical subsections, respectively (ie. 4 identical sections overall)
Stirling AIP
M/O of LABs: unknown
Propulsion: smaller and bigger AC motors; smaller one is for low speed

3 Soryu Mk 2s (estimation)(built 2015 (see Table) perhaps through to 2018)
Soryu Mk 2s adopt the simplest M/O system among Japanese submarines.
LIBs: fore and aft sections will consist of 2 identical subsections, respectively (ie. 4 identical sections overall)
M/O of LIBs: unknown, but may be in 4 phases, see i) to iv) above.
Propulsion: 2 identical AC motors

 TABLE - SORYU & Oyashio Program as at October 3, 2017 

SS No.	Build No Name	Pennant No.	MoF approved amount ¥ Billions FY	LABs, LIBs, AIP	Laid Down	Laun -ched	Commi ssioned	Built By
5SS Oyashio	8105 Oyashio	SS-590/ TS3608	¥52.2B FY1993	LABs only	Jan 1994	Oct 1996	Mar 1998	KHI
6SS-15SS Oyashios 10 subs	8106 -8115 various	SS-591-600	¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003	LABs only	15SS Feb 2004	15SS Nov 2006	15SS Mar 2008	MHI & KHI
16SS Soryu Mk 1	8116 Sōryū	SS-501	¥60B FY2004	LABs + AIP	Mar 2005	Dec 2007	Mar 2009	MHI
17SS	8117 Unryū	SS-502	¥58.7B FY2005	LABs + AIP	Mar 2006	Oct 2008	Mar 2010	KHI
18SS	8118 Hakuryū	SS-503	¥56.2 FY2006	LABs + AIP	Feb 2007	Oct 2009	Mar 2011	MHI
19SS	8119 Kenryū	SS-504	¥53B FY2007	LABs + AIP	Mar 2008	Nov 2010	Mar 2012	KHI
20SS	8120 Zuiryū	SS-505	¥51B FY2008	LABs + AIP	Mar 2009	Oct 2011	Mar 2013	MHI
No 21SS			No 21SS built
22SS	8121 Kokuryū	SS-506	¥52.8B FY2010	LABs + AIP	Jan 2011	Oct 2013	Mar 2015	KHI
23SS	8122 Jinryu	SS-507	¥54.6B FY2011	LABs + AIP	Feb 2012	Oct 2014	7 Mar 2016	MHI
24SS	8123 Sekiryū	SS-508	¥54.7B FY2012	LABs + AIP	15 Mar 2013	2 Nov 2015	13 Mar 2017	KHI
25SS	8124 Seiryū	SS-509	¥53.1B FY2013	LABs + AIP	22 Oct 2013	12 Oct   2016	Mar? 2018	MHI
26SS	8125	SS-510	¥51.7B FY2014	LABs + AIP	2014	?	Mar 2019?	KHI
27SS First Soryu Mk 2	8126	SS-511	¥64.4B FY2015	LIBs only	2015	2017?	Mar 2020	MHI
28SS  Second Soryu Mark 2	8127	SS-512	¥63.6B FY2016	LIBs only	2016?	2018?	Mar 2021?	KHI
29SS First Soryu Mk 3	8128	?	¥76B FY2017	LIBs only	?	?	2023?	MHI?
30SS Second Soryu Mk 3	8029?	?	¥71.5B FY2018	LIBs only	?	?	2024?	KHI?

Table from information exclusively provided to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = lithium-ion batteries. ¥***B = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI = Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries.

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So LIB Management and Operation is complex but as the batteries work to computer terminals a submarine's engineers should be able to manage and operate LIBs more easily than lead-acid batteries.

By Anonymous & Pete