June 10, 2016

Nuclear Propulsion Advocated in Major Australian Document of June 7, 2016

Peter JenningsExecutive Director of the Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute (ASPI)
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The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has produced a strongly worded briefing paper:
Agenda for Change 2016: Strategic choices for the next government, of June 7, 2016, [100 page PDF, 6.1MB]. A major purpose of Agenda for Change 2016 is to discuss a subject effectively blocked by political interests from being proactively discussed in the 2016 Defence White Paper [10MB]. That subject is the place of future submarine nuclear propulsion as a serious option for Australia. It argues Australia should "Prepare the ground for submarine nuclear propulsion" in order that this propulsion can be used in Australian submarines by the 2040s

Agenda for Change 2016 is intended for the incoming Australian Government that wins the July 2, 2016 Election and for public consumption. Major contributors to the briefing paper include:
-  former Defence Minister and former Ambassador to the US, KimBeazley
-  Executive Director of ASPI Peter Jennings
-  Graeme Dobell, Shiro Armstrong  and ASPI analysts.
-  and it is edited by Malcolm Davis.

Agenda for Change 2016, also covers non-nuclear topics including: 
-  concluding a major war,
-  redesigning ANZUS cooperation,
-  and reorienting the Australian defence industry to export markets.

Chapter 1 THE STRATEGIC AGENDA  [pages 10 to 18] by Peter Jennings

[page 10, "Key recommendations] "•   Prepare the ground for submarine nuclear propulsion."
[page 12, "New policy challenges] "•   Prepare the ground for submarine nuclear propulsion".

Prepare for submarine nuclear propulsion

The major nuclear propulsion discussion is on pages 15 and 16:

[page 15] " It’s been an article of faith since the 2009 Defence White Paper that Australia’s next submarine will be conventionally powered, using a combination of diesel and electric propulsion. Although geography imposes a unique requirement for our submarines to have extended range, nuclear propulsion (which essentially gives submarines unlimited range) has been off the agenda for political reasons. That’s unfortunate, because the capabilities required for our future submarine would in many respects be better performed by nuclear-powered boats. Readers will appreciate the irony of Australia selecting the French-designed Shortfin Barracuda—a nuclear submarine that will be adapted to conventional propulsion.

It may be that community thinking on nuclear power is changing. The South Australian Government is conducting a royal commission into the nuclear fuel cycle. In particular, the royal commission is examining the viability of expanding mineral extraction, processing and manufacturing, the use of nuclear fuels for electricity generation and the disposal of nuclear materials. [6. See the terms of reference for the royal commission, online]  Waste storage may offer a valuable industry for South Australia if safety issues can be properly addressed."

[Significantly Peter Jennings Chaired the Expert Panel & Community Consultations for the 2016 Defence White Paper (2016 DWP). I've bolded parts for emphasis. In strong wording:]

"In the defence field, the expert panel that advised the Australian Government on the 2016 DWP found in its 2015 community consultation that there was a strong public desire to understand the details of how nuclear propulsion might serve Australian interests. The panel recommended that the government ‘identify an opportunity to explain the “pros and cons” of nuclear propulsion for submarines.’[7. Defence White Paper Expert Panel, Guarding against uncertainty: Australian attitudes to defence, 2015, p. ix, online.] This didn’t happen in the 2016 DWP, nor indeed at the announcement of the preferred submarine design, which was accompanied with a risible 13-paragraph media announcement.[ 8. Prime Minister of Australia, Future Submarine Program, 26 April 2016, online] Unsurprisingly, a good deal of the public reaction to the White Paper and submarine design decision continues to seek further information on the issue. The 2016 DWP does, however, offer this somewhat cryptic remark:


During the long life of the new submarines, the rapid rate of technological change and ongoing evolution of Australia’s strategic circumstances will continue. As part of the rolling acquisition program, a review based on strategic circumstances at the time, and developments in submarine technology, will be conducted in the late 2020s to consider whether the configuration of the submarines remains suitable or whether consideration of other specifications should commence. [9. Australian Government, 2016 Defence White Paper, paragraph 4.29, online.] 

This could be hinting that nuclear propulsion may be considered a decade or more from now. However, no Australian Government in the 2030s or later will be in a position to adopt nuclear propulsion unless earlier decisions have been taken to prepare the ground for such a major development. In 2016, Australia has no viable option other than conventional propulsion for our future submarines because the Navy, the wider Defence establishment and Australia’s industry and infrastructure are simply not at the right level of capability to crew, operate and support nuclear-propelled submarines. Nor should we assume that the US as our key ally would be willing to give us access to some of its most carefully guarded military technology without Australia first demonstrating a serious intent to operate and support nuclear propulsion systems. Getting to that point will require a sustained investment effort to build a cadre of trained nuclear technicians, industry specialists and Navy crew able to work with nuclear propulsion systems.

After the 2016 election, the Australian Government should start to scope out what steps might sensibly be taken to create a realistic option for nuclear propulsion at the end of the 2020s. A key part of this strategy should be to have an open discussion with the Australian people explaining the basis for the submarine design decision. Government should consider the following steps:


1.   Commission an expert panel to evaluate necessary steps to position for a nuclear propulsion option. The panel should produce a public discussion paper setting out the challenges, risks, opportunities, financial cost and industry requirements necessary to support this technology.

2.   As Adelaide is being positioned to be the centre of continuous ship and submarine construction in Australia, the federal and state governments should jointly develop a plan to strengthen university-level instruction in physics, nuclear engineering and necessary supporting sciences based in South Australia. 
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[page 16] 
3.   The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) should develop a training program in collaboration with the US Navy and potentially the French and UK navies for officers and other personnel involved in operating nuclear propulsion systems.

4.   The Defence Science and Technology Group should do its own scoping study to determine Defence’s science and technology requirements to support a move to nuclear propulsion.

5.   Defence, in conjunction with other government agencies, will need to determine how to establish an appropriate safety regime to manage nuclear propulsion systems, and quantify the investment needed to make naval bases and support systems suitable to accommodate nuclear submarines.

6.   Defence should discuss with the US the possibility of seconding significant numbers of RAN personnel in to the US Navy submarine arm. Beyond the nuclear propulsion aspect, this has a number of benefits: the RAN can grow its own cadre of submariners, which it will have to do to prepare for the future submarine, and we will be able to enhance alliance cooperation with the US Navy in a critical area of strategic interest to both countries. 

These six steps point to the very substantial investment needed to make the capability leap to nuclear propulsion. They also point to the reasons why nuclear propulsion has been off the table for Australian Governments up to now. This is no small step. The 2016 DWP is, however, quite right to say that changing technology and strategic circumstances might well force an Australian rethink about nuclear propulsion. The responsibility of the government we elect in 2016 should be to do what’s needed to enable a government in 2026 or later to make realistic decisions about nuclear propulsion".

[page 17] "Conclusion 
The diversity of these four recommendations - concluding a major war, redesigning ANZUS cooperation, planning for nuclear propulsion and reorienting the Australian defence industry to export markets - shows the enormous task expected of the Australian Government. Most particularly, the Defence Minister will play a central role in delivering on these policy suggestions. It’s regrettable that since the publication of the last Agenda for reform paper in August of 2013 we’ve had four defence ministers (Stephen Smith, David Johnston, Kevin Andrews and Marise Payne) in less than 36 months. For any new policy initiative to get traction and to make a difference, we need the next Defence Minister, indeed the next

[page 18] government, to prize stability in cabinet positions—in the old phrase, ‘good process delivers good policy.’ To that nostrum one might add the thought that experienced ministers who have received adequate sleep and aren’t prone to panic are the sponsors of good processes. Australia needs these capabilities more desperately now than at any time since the end of the Cold War.

See the whole of ASPI's Agenda for Change 2016: Strategic choices for the next government, of June 7, 2016, [100 page PDF, 6.1MB] 

SUBMARINE MATTERS COMMENT

Peter Jennings' comments on the politicians is timely, frank and fearless. He may be right that there needs to be a lead time of 20+ years to prepare the way for nuclear propulsion. 

The South Australian nuclear fuel cycle royal commission actually delivered its Final Report in May 2016 to very little public interest or discussion (so far). This could be because both the South Australian Government and Federal Government have been very tentative in suggesting action this side of the July 2, 2016 Election and other milestones they can procrastinate about.

However, even if Australia spent 10s of $Billions on fuel-cycle raising infrastructure, eg. enrichment and/or reprocessing facilities, actually refueling submarine reactors is another thing. Refueling and servicing submarine reactors is a highly specialised science and art. The K15 reactors on Barracuda SSNs present a major refueling problem as it would need to be done every 7 to 10 years.

Perhaps if Australia could avoid decades of moving up the nuclear fuel cycle by purchasing or leasing Virginia SSNs with reactors that do not need refueling during the 33 year life of those submarines. "...a cadre of trained nuclear technicians, industry specialists and Navy crew able to work with nuclear propulsion systems" could perhaps be trained in pre-existing US facilities rather than Australia duplicating training facilities here. This is noting the US already has a track record of sharing its facitilities, training, SSBN, SSN and submarine reactor secrets with the UK since 1958.

A similar case is Australia pre-paying F-35s. Australia has been part of the US based F-35 program for around a decade, buying some F-35s that have remained in the US for years, with Australian pilots training on these F-35's using multi-$Billion US training facilities for several years. Australia has not needed to duplicatethe multi-$Billion US training facilities or reinvent many of the high-tech technology.

Please connect with many Submarine Matters articles over the last 7 years including:


-  French Attack Submarines (SSNs) For Australia? First Published March 31, 2009



-  Australian Nuclear Submarine Option - Virginia SSNs of February 10, 2015 and others.

Pete

June 9, 2016

Serious Industrial issues for TKMS following DCNS's Aus Sub Win

The German Navy's sub Type 212A U36 at TKMS' Kiel Shipyard
(Photo courtesy AP via n-tv(dot)de June 6, 2016)
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This Submarine Matters article mainly draws on German media sources spotted by a friend. Translating using right-click then “Translate to English” is handy.

On June 1, 2016 several news outlets carried an Agency France Press (AFP) article DCNS is seeking submarine tie-up with ThyssenKrupp. DCNS has long suggested it and ThyssenKrupp band together to face new competition from Chinese, Indian and South Korean arms companies. DCNS rightly indicated that during ThyssenKrupp’s initial period of disappointment ThyssenKrupp was unlikely to respond positively to DCNS

Germany is still angry. Anger is over at least 7 published issues and for the inherently imprecise nature of Australia’s CEP, versus a tender, which would have been preferable. Germany and Japan also wonder whether DCNS won due to DCNS unique advantage of being able to offer nuclear propulsion to Australia in the longer term.

But the anger has been tempered by the hope that a German bidder will win Australia’s Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) CEP later in 2016. The announced shortlist of 3 bidders for that CEP includes 2 German bidders, Fassmer (offering the OPV 80) and Lurrsen (offering the PV-80).

TKMS is, to a degree, heartened by ongoing submarine orders in the Asia-Pacific including:
-  2 x Type 218SGs being built in Kiel for Singapore
-  providing parts for South Korean assembled Type 214s (for South Korea)
-  parts for 2 x South Korean assembled 209s for Indonesia
-  1 x 209 to be assembled in Indonesia, and
-  largely secret assistance in designing and assisting South Korea in building the future
   KSS-III 3,400 tonne (SLBM armed) submarines.

TKMS also hopes to help India build 4 to 6 Type 214s for Project-75(I for India).

However, with the Australian loss, TKMS does not have enough submarine or surface shipbuilding  business (over the medium 5+ year term) to keep all of its German workforce employed.

By June 6 there was increasing news of criticisms of TKMS from German shipbuilding unionists with calls for a review of management. Future job security, for around 3,500 shipbuilding workers and 600 "temporary" (casual?) workers, is a major issue.

European shipyards are threatened by defence cost cutting from their own governments. Increasing business from Asia-Pacific countries is valued highly but even there European arms sellers need to compete against Russian and Asian arms companies.


ThyssenKrupp AG's share price dropped sharply after high level leaks indicated TKMS and Japan had lost the submarine CEP, while DCNS had won. The leaks were quickly confirmed by Prime Minister Turnbull on 26 April 2016(Graph courtesy German Kursdaten Telebörse, 8 June 2016)
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Pete

June 8, 2016

Report "Southeast Asian Submarine Developments" available to donors.

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1.  I have emailed the first Submarine Matters Special Report to donors.

-  Report subject is Southeast Asian Submarine Developments.

-  This report is more than 1,250 words.

The report concentrates on the four Southeast Asian nations (Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia) that have submarines and discusses the chances of the other seven nations buying submarines. There are many reasons why submarines will be bought or not. Two reasons are strategic priorities and sea levels around a country (see map above).

If you wish to receive Southeast Asian Submarine Developments and subsequent monthly reports please donate (see upper right sidebar) then email me at pete74730@yahoo.com.au

2.  I am reopening the COMMENTS facility, at the bottom of future Submarine Matters articles, to
     all (except spammers) .

Regards

Pete

June 3, 2016

Much in doubt for arms projects & companies after July 2, 2016 Election

This is the once in a fortnight comment on submarine and shipbuilding issues in the runup to Australia's July 2, 2016 Federal Election. 

The table below compares two-party-preferred (2PP) polling (for the House of Representatives,  Lower House of Parliament seats) by percentage for States and Territories in Australia. The Liberal/National Party (LNP) Coalition is the Current Government under Prime Minister Turnbull. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) is the main Opposition party. 

Number of Lower House Seats by State/Territory
(NSW largest with 47...)
LNP Govern
-ment 2PP at 31/5/2016 (%)
ALP 2PP (%)
% Swing Against LNP  Government since September 2013 Election
51.5
48.5
2.9
Victoria (37)
46.0
54.0
3.8
Queensland (30)
53.1
46.9
3.9
48.9
51.1
9.3
50.6
49.4
1.7
Tasmania (5)
46.7
53.3
2.1
ACT & NT (4)
48.3
51.7
Only swing in favour of LNP,  5.2
Total Australia (150)
49.8
50.2
Total swing against LNP 3.7 %

The current polling is almost exactly 50:50. That has been the situation for several months. If an Election were held tomorrow either Party could win. Even a party with a smaller vote (like 49.8%  above) could win. If crossbenchers (Greens and Independents) are again prominent it makes the situation of submarine and shipbuilding projects even more unpredictable. 
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ANALYSIS

Much is in doubt for arms projects and companies in the runup to the knife-edge July 2, 2016 Election.

In Australia a Party or Coalition can form Government if it has a majority of seats in the Lower House (of Representatives). Such seats = electorates are held by Members of Parliament (MPs). The Upper House is the Senate, the house of review, which can block legislation and make government unworkable. The Senate is often "hung" ie. the Government needs Senate minor parties and independents ("crossbenchers" that hold the Balance-of-Power) to form a majority to pass legislation. Legislation includes Defence budgets which include naval shipbuilding projects.

I just need to recount some history to explain the current situation:

2010 - Following the 2010 Election both the LNP and ALP only had a minority of Lower House seats amounting to 72 seats each. The ALP managed to attract the support of the necessary 4 Lower House crossbench MPs (1 Green, 3 Independents) to form a Government.

But the price was that the ALP Minority Government appeared weak and indecisive because it had to compromise with its crossbench MPs. The rivalry between ALP leaders Julia Gillard and Kevin Rudd only served to weaken the ALP Government's reputation. The crossbenchers did not support such defence issues as shipbuilding - so no new shipbuilding was authorised 2010-2013

2013 - ALP weaknesses and a vigorous opposition effort by LNP leader Tony Abbott and actual co-Leader Peta Credlin led to the defeat of the ALP in the September 2013 Election. In 2013 the LNP won 90 seats versus 55 seats for the ALP (see right sidebar here). 

CURRENT SITUATION

In all except its decisive plan for naval shipbuilding the Turnbull Government has appeared weak and indecisive. Turnbull has failed to initiate new and necessary tax revenue raising policies. This has hobbled his Government's ability to pay for key civilian programs (health, education, welfare and industrial support).

Also Turnbull has reason to watch his back because he remains unpopular with the still Abbott-Credlin influenced conservative elements in the LNP.

So readers impressed with shipbuilding under the Turnbull Government may have gained an unrealistic impression of how potent the Turnbull Government really is.

The ALP Leader Bill Shorten enjoys the united support of the ALP (in all but illegal immigrant policy).

What this means is that the Turnbull LNP Government has returned to the weak, indecisive, default position of many/most Australian Governments. This often means minority parties and independents in both Houses of Parliament get elected and hold the Balance of Power. If Turnbull or Shorten need MPs from the Greens to form Government the anti-defence Greens may slow down some submarine/shipbuilding projects in favour of civilian spending.

The Senator Nick Xenophon (NXT) Team is a new and minor party that supports shipbuilding and other centrist causes. NXT may do well in South Australia (perhaps 2 Senate spots and one MP). It is difficult to predict how NXT will do outside of South Australia.

If the ALP has the most seats it may form Government and divert substantial sub/shipbuilding work (first Offshore Patrol Vessels 2018-, then Future Frigates 2020- ) towards ALP heartland Victoria. 

Also if the ALP wins the quiet and efficient Marise Payne will no longer be Defence Minister. The way the submarine and shipbuilding projects were part decided and announced in April 2016 was unusually decisive and efficient by the usually low standards of other Ministers who have "served time" (their attitude) in the Defence portfolio.

So conditions for arms companies could change with little warning after July 2, 2016.

Pete 

June 2, 2016

China's SeaWeb Undersea Surveillance Network

The HQ of each of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army - Navy (PLAN's) Fleets are indicated, along with ship and submarine numbers in each. The undersea surveillance network particularly protects major ports - with (perhaps top) priority for China's 4 Yulin-Sanya (Hainan Island) based SSBNs (South Sea Fleet).  (Map courtesy US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress - Chinese Military Power 2016 on page 29)
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The following description of China's SeaWeb undersea sensor network is based on Prasun K. Sengupta's TRISHUL website article of April 15, 2016 which reported on DEFEXPO INDIA 2016 (March 28 -31, 2016). It indicates that China has developed/deployed its SeaWeb sensors relatively late compared to other major powers (eg. noting the UK's successful use of sensors, at Scapa Flow naval base in 1918).

China may give priority to sensor protection of naval bases and then seas in the following order: Bohai Sea, Yellow Sea, East China Sea and then South China Sea. Proximity of seas to Beijing may be one criterion. Officials and politicians in Beijing would be concerned about sub launched missile range to Beijing - this includes SSK launched cruise missiles. Also the smaller the sea (smaller in the north) the faster that sea can be "sown" with sensors by Chinese forces.

"China’s Undersea Trip-Wire

The PLAN’s seabed-based surveillance network, developed jointly by Ukraine [some current Russian, some ex-Russian Ukrainian interests] and China since 1996, has been under installation along China's territorial waters since 2012, with work expected to be completed later this [in 2016].

The seabed-based component of this network comprises arrays of hydrophones and magnetic anomaly detectors spaced along undersea cables laid at the axis of deep sound-channels roughly [“normal” orientated] to the direction that the arrays are to listen. This capability is next paired with maritime reconnaissance/ASW aircraft assets to establish a multi-tier ASW network. The first naval bases to be covered by this network were the PLAN’s submarine bases in four sites:

1.  the Bohai shipyard at Huludao on the Bohai Sea [Huludao is about 400 km east of Beijing] where all nuclear-powered submarines are built;

2.  the North Sea Fleet’s Xiaopingdao naval refit base near Dalian [see Dalian in map at bottom]  where the SSBNs are fitted out for SLBM test-firings from the Bohai Sea across China into Delingha in the Qinghai desert and the desert of Lop Nor in Xinjiang;

3.  the North Sea Fleet’s base at Jianggezhuang (Laoshan) approximately 18km east of Qingdao in Shandong Province;

4.  and the South Sea Fleet’s bases at Longpo and Yulin at Yalong Bay near Sanya on the southern tip of Hainan Island.

Elements of PLAN's undersea sensor network. The sensors can be tethered or sit on the seafloor to track a submarine, a UUV's or Diver Delivery Vehicle's presence, direction and speed. The sensors can then surface or remain submerged when alerting other submerged or onshore communications nodes including (in wartime) missile batteries. (see more readable large image)
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As far back as 2001, a researcher at the PLAN’s Institute 715 had published a survey of ocean surveillance technologies that included a detailed discussion of the US SOSUS programme....Another analysis by several PLAN researchers in late 2012 discussed this station and military applications for its seabed-based sensors, alongside civilian uses, including environmental protection, navigation, and disaster prevention.

The analysis compared different configurations for seabed-based sensor networks, including linear, circular, and tree-type designs, and also evaluating their respective cost, security and reliability implications. It also mentioned the Xiaoqushan Station as the basis for a larger ‘East Sea Ocean Floor Sensor Network’ that will be completed by 2016. The analysis also mentioned undersea mobile sensor stations, as well as fixed seabed sensors.


China is not only deploying sensors for surveillance but, in wartime, as triggers for explosive  destruction of unwelcome submarines. Once definitely detected China could send warheads small torpedos carried by cruise missiles, subrocs, aircraft or charges from mines (tethered, seafloor or mobile). More see Submaine Matters March 2016 article
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In early 2013, China Science Daily’s March 26 edition opted to go public with the system by publishing a feature with the banner headline: “Here They Are Quietly Listening to the Ocean: The Whole Story of the Building of Our Country’s First Deep Sea Ocean Floor Sensor Network Base”. According to this article, R & D efforts had commenced in 1996 and an initial prototype of the seabed-based sensor system was tested back in 2005 in the waters surrounding the PLAN’s base at Qingdao in Shandong Province. 

An additional site was selected for the Longpo naval base, and work formally commenced there in April 2009. Initial set-up was completed in 2010. The undersea-sensor system has since been integrated with a larger surveillance network that also has airborne and space-based components. Two articles appearing in mid-2013 in the technical journal Ship Electronic Engineering, confirmed that this network was now at an active deployment stage. One article discussed the technical challenge of energy supply by proposing a low-power ‘sleep-wake mode’, and mentioned the interesting additional problem that a country’s undersea sensors are subject to being captured by an adversary. Another article discussed the importance of advances in ‘burst communications’ for enhancing the military value of the seabed-based sensor network. A mid-2012 analysis in the naval magazine Modern Ships unequivocally confirmed the existence of PLAN’s network of seabed-based sensors.

The cover-story of a second quasi-official naval journal, Naval & Merchant Ships from mid-2013, similarly showed an acute PLAN sensitivity to its perceived vulnerability to Western and Japanese submarines. The central concern shown there was protecting the PLAN’s SSBNs, while the main threat vector mentioned was the USN.

(Map courtesy photos4travel)
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Pete

June 1, 2016

Japanese Report: Key Japanese Companies Were Not Interested in Exporting the Soryu

A Soryu submarine (left) and Oyashio class sub (right) are serviced at KHI's Kobe (Japan) submarine yard (Photo courtesy Kenichirou Akiyama in his Diamond Report, page 2).
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On June 22, 2015 a freelance journalist, Kenichiro Akiyama, in Diamond (one of Japan’s leading economic magazines) published an insider Report (at http://diamond.jp/articles/-/73594 ) detailing the lack of interest from Japanese arms companies in exporting submarines.

As this is a Japanese Report and was written 10 months before Australia announced the winning bid this Report has considerable significance.

It is likely that Australia Future Submarine CEP assessors, after reading this Report in June 2015, began to suspect a lack of Japanese corporate interest in being involved in the export of Soryu submarines to Australia.

A very brief translation of this Japanese language Report http://diamond.jp/articles/-/73594 is:

“THE REASON WHY THE [JAPANESE] DEFENSE INDUSTRY IS APATHETIC ABOUT LONG-SOUGHT ARMS EXPORTS”

A senior manager whose company produces submarines has explained that Japan’s arms export industry has not had to face international competition for many years. In May 2015 the Japanese Government made a firm decision to participate in the campaign to sell the technically advanced Soryu submarine to Australia.

But, surprisingly, the responses from defence companies was far from enthusiastic. In particular, MHI and KHI’s submarine sectors were not enthusiastic. This lack of enthusiasm was apparent in three ways: 

"First reason is" building submarines for export is "unprofitable"

"The second reason is a lack of capacity" in terms of as manpower and equipment/facilities, and

"Third, this is not a story limited to the submarine," which is a the military industrial market is shrinking.

.............................................................................................................................................................

Overall the Japanese defence industrial feeling appeared to be negative. Industries seemed to think that the weapon export activity was cumbersome.

As English speakers translating the Report (by Right-Clicking Mouse then “Translate to English”) can see there is much more of interest in the Japanese Diamond Report.


Pete