Why the Japanese proposal is low risk (PART TWO)

Republished with permission from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

This article originally appeared in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute blog, The Strategist, on April 12, 2016, with the string http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-the-japanese-proposal-is-low-risk-part-2/

"Why the Japanese proposal is low risk (part 2)

12 Apr 2016 | Sumio Kusaka, Ambassador of Japan to Australia.

[ASPI Strategist]  Editor’s note: The Strategist has invited all three SEA 1000 contenders to explain their approach to meeting Australia’s future submarine requirement.

The first post in this two-part series explored several key questions pertaining to Japan’s ability to meet Australia’s future submarine needs. Those questions concerned cruising range, internal narrowness and operational lifespan. This second post will further explain the truth about the capability of the Soryu-class and the reasons why the Japanese proposal is low risk.

Is Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) necessary?

A concern has been expressed that since modern submarines are required to spend long periods of time submerged and to secretly evacuate to safer waters, AIP capability is indispensable. Yet it isn’t included in the Japanese proposal.

As a result of incorporating lithium-ion batteries into our submarines that surpass the capabilities of AIP, Japan doesn’t believe that AIP is an indispensable capability for modern submarines.

Japan has experience operating seven submarines installed with AIP systems. But after considering the evolution in lithium-ion battery technology—higher energy density, greater safety, faster recharging times—Japan decided not to install AIP systems on submarines that will be built from 2015 onwards. [see 27SS Soryu Mark 2, LIBs only in SORYU TABLE below] 

The new Soryu-class submarine will use lithium-ion batteries instead of AIP as that technology has led to improvements in submerged endurance and speed capabilities, thereby allowing operators to continuously traverse waters using a wider range of possible speed options that simply aren’t available to AIP.

We believe that this new Japanese technology will provide a capability that exceeds that of AIP.

Are lithium-ion batteries reliable?

There’s a concern that lithium-ion battery technology isn’t yet sufficiently developed to use in submarines.

As above, Japan made a decision to install lithium-ion batteries on any submarines to be built from 2015 onwards. Prior to their installation in submarines, our battery technologies have gone through a vigorous and complete verification testing. They’ve been thoroughly evaluated in over 20 different types of tests and no issue has been found concerning their reliability. Those tests include short-circuit tests, shock-resistance tests, drop tests, overcharging/over-discharging tests, seawater soaking tests and heat tests. The results clearly demonstrate that reliability isn’t an issue. With this assurance, we finally decided to install lithium-ion batteries in our own new submarines.

What does submarine cooperation mean for the ‘special strategic partnership’?

An argument has recently emerged in Australia suggesting that deepening defence and security cooperation with Japan would narrow Australia’s strategic flexibility and pose a strategic risk to Australia. But is a point of view that regards Japan as a source of strategic risk for Australia correct? Japan and Australia share the values of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, open markets and free trade, and we have a ‘special strategic partnership’ based on our mutual strategic interests.

Australia, along with a large number of other nations, has welcomed the more pro-active contribution Japan will make to the peace, stability and prosperity of both the region and the world in line with Japan’s ‘Positive Contribution to Peace’ based on the principle of international co-operation. It’s in that context that one should regard the deepening of security and defence co-operation between Japan and Australia.

As has been the case for many years now, Japan and Australia have been deepening security and defence cooperation based on our past 2+2 discussions and agreements. The Australian government’s 2016 Defence White Paper also endorsed the strengthening of security and defence cooperation between Japan and Australia. Our participation in the CEP for the future submarine program is just one part of a much wider and more diverse story. If we were to follow the logic of the argument, which is based on opposition to Japan and Australia deepening our defence and security cooperation, we simply are left asking ‘why?’

Furthermore, Japan regards Australia as a trusted partner which is why it concluded a bilateral agreement concerning the transfer of defence equipment and technology. Under assurances given by Australia based on the agreement, necessary technology will be transferred from Japan to Australia in the event that Japan is chosen as a partner for the future submarine program. The technology transfer will ensure that Australia will be able to possess and exercise its own sovereign control over its submarines.

Sumio Kusaka is the Ambassador of Japan to Australia"

© Australian Strategic Policy Institute

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PETE'S COMMENT

Re subheading "Is Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) necessary?"

This is very much in line with what S has reported for the last 6 months. With S advice summarized in the SORYU Tables. These Tables have become more accurate and comprehensive than information released by French and German sources. 

Ambassador Kusaka advises "Japan has experience operating seven submarines installed with AIP systems" That would be SS-501 to SS-507. Then 3 more (SS-508 to SS-510) are also "LABs + AIP" Soryus, and are in the pipeline. 

Now Ambassador Kusaka has confirmed that the first Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) only Soryu, which is designated SS-511, was Laid Down in 2015. I call it the first Soryu Mark 2 due to its propulsion differences from the preceding Soryus.

I think AIP fails to have a "wider range of possible speed options" mainly because it must be switched on for minutes before it can sharply accelerate the submarine and AIP's chemicals are also rapidly used up at speeds over 8 knots. 

[See page 16 here The [Figure 9] plot shows how the 150kW Stirling engine AIP starts to give the SSK endurance below 8 knots thus allowing extended poise in the Baltic Sea operating area where transit times to the patrol areas would be small.]

Both Japan and, even more so, Australia have longer transit times to patrol areas. For Australia this makes the marginal value of AIP very low in our very long missions compared to classic-Baltic-AIP (or parked just outside Singapore) patterns.

SORYU TABLE (with earlier Oyashios, as at April 12, 2016)

SS No.	Build No Name	Pennant No.	MoF approved amount ¥ Billions & FY	LABs, LIBs, AIP	Laid Down	Laun -ched	Commi-ssioned	Built By
5SS Oyashio	8105 Oyashio	SS-590/ TS3608	¥52.2B FY1993	LABs only	Jan 1994	Oct 1996	Mar 1998	KHI
6SS-15SS Oyashios 10 subs	8106 -8115 various	SS-591-600	¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003	LABs only	Feb 1994		Mar 2008	MHI & KHI
16SS Soryu Mark 1	8116 Sōryū	SS-501	¥60B FY2004	LABs + AIP	Mar 2005	Dec 2007	Mar 2009	MHI
17SS	8117 Unryū	SS-502	¥58.7B FY2005	LABs + AIP	Mar 2006	Oct 2008	Mar 2010	KHI
18SS	8118 Hakuryū	SS-503	¥56.2 FY2006	LABs + AIP	Feb 2007	Oct 2009	Mar 2011	MHI
19SS	8119 Kenryū	SS-504	¥53B FY2007	LABs + AIP	Mar 2008	Nov 2010	Mar 2012	KHI
20SS	8120 Zuiryū	SS-505	¥51B FY2008	LABs + AIP	Mar 2009	Oct 2011	Mar 2013	MHI
No 21SS			No 21SS built
22SS	8121 Kokuryū	SS-506	¥52.8B FY2010	LABs + AIP	Jan 2011	Oct 2013	Mar 2015	KHI
23SS	8122 Jinryu	SS-507	¥54.6B FY2011	LABs + AIP	Feb 2012	Oct 2014	7 Mar 2016	MHI
24SS	8123 Sekiryū	SS-508	¥54.7B FY2012	LABs + AIP	Mar 2013	2 Nov 2015	Mar? 2017	KHI
25SS	8124	SS-509	¥53.1B FY2013	LABs + AIP	22 Oct 2013	Nov? 2016	Mar? 2018	MHI
26SS	8125	SS-510	¥51.7B FY2014	LABs + AIP	2014	?	Mar 2019?	KHI
27SS Soryu Mark 2	8126	SS-511	¥64.3B FY2015	LIBs only	2015	2017?	Mar 2020?	MHI
28SS	8127	SS-512	¥63.6B FY2016	LIBs only	2016?	2018?	Mar 2021?	KHI
29SS	?	?	1st of New Japanese  Class	LIBs only	?	?	2023?	MHI?
Aus1	?	?	1st of new Aus class (if Japan chosen)	LIBs only	2028?	2030?	2033?	in Aus or Jpn?
Aus2 to 12?	?	?	between 5 and 11 additional Aus subs	LIBs only	from 2029?	from 2031?	from 2034?	??

Table courtesy of information provided to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries,  

AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = lithium-ion batteries.  

Pete

Why the Japanese proposal is low risk (PART ONE)

Republished with permission from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

This article originally appeared in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute blog, The Strategist, on April 11, 2016, at the string http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-the-japanese-proposal-is-low-risk-part-1/

"Why the Japanese proposal is low risk (part 1)

11 Apr 2016 | Sumio Kusaka, Ambassador of Japan to Australia.

[pictured is Soryu submarine SS-505, which is Zuiryu "Sword Dragon"]

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At the end of November last year, Japan submitted to the Australian government its proposal for Australia’s future submarine program.

The Japanese proposal is low risk and meets Australia’s needs. It’s a proposal based on our accumulated experience and the proven technologies of the Soryu-class submarine, which is the world’s largest conventionally powered submarine. Seven Soryus are already in use by the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force.

Several key questions have been posed about whether our proposal will be able to meet Australia’s future submarine needs.

The following two posts will seek to explain to the greatest extent possible the truth about the capability of the Soryu-class and the reasons why the Japanese proposal is low-risk.

Can Japan’s proposal meet Australia’s cruising range requirement?

There’s a concern, promulgated in some quarters, that the Soryu-class submarine won’t be able to match Australia’s requirements regarding cruising range. Such a concern is mistaken, for in Japan’s pre-concept design, every effort was made to ensure that Australia’s cruising range requirements would be met.

Given that cruising range can be determined by the quantity of fuel expended and fuel consumption efficiency, the Soryu-class submarine was the basis of a comprehensive study on an internal layout made in order to ensure effective use of space by extending the hull and re-designing partitions. That study led to the conclusion that by increasing the capacity of the fuel tank and working on its positioning, as well as extending the hull design, the pre-concept design will be able to meet Australia’s cruising range requirements without any problems.

Is the internal space of the Soryu-class submarine too narrow?

The size of the reserve buoyancy compared to submarines from other countries and the double hull structure has led to questions about whether the internal space of the submarine is overly narrow.

The estimated surfaced displacement of the Soryu-class submarine is approximately 3,600 tonnes, while its dived displacement is around 4,200 tonnes. So in relation to the reserve buoyancy of the Soryu-class submarine, there’s no reason to believe that it possesses an excessive amount of reserve buoyancy compared to submarines of other nations.

Moreover, although it’s true that one section of the Soryu-class submarine consists of a double hull structure, a highly space-efficient outfitting using 3D digital mock-up technology and design techniques that prevent reinforcement structures such as beams from restricting space have created a wide internal space while avoiding a growth in the size of the submarine itself. Furthermore, the extension of the hull has allowed a much wider internal space than in the Soryu-class submarine.

The internal space of the Soryu-class submarine has been shown to a large number of Australians familiar with the internal space of the Collins-class submarine. So far, there hasn’t been any comments which indicate that the internal space of the Soryu-class is too narrow.

Is the lifespan of Japanese submarines too short when compared to Australian boats?

Until recently, Japanese submarines were used for a period of 18 years before being retired. The operational lifespan of the submarines was determined by the National Defence Program Guideline (NDPG) taking into consideration factors such as not exceeding the pre-set number of submarines to be retained by Japan (originally 16), technical obsolescence, and the introduction of new submarines incorporating technical improvements.

Japan decided to increase its submarine fleet to 22 vessels based on the 2007 NDPG, so a decision was made to extend the service life of our submarines by six years.

It’s not true to say that Japanese submarines can’t endure for long periods of time. If the Royal Australian Navy desires to use the submarines over a long period of time, the same level of technological checks that we carry out on our own vessels now will enable such desires to be met.

Some have said that corrosion of the double hull structure is the source of the submarine’s shorter lifespan, but that’s simply not true. The construction of the Soryu-class submarine in sections allows for an appropriate level of anti-corrosive maintenance. Japan has never experienced any major fault’s which have interfered with the operation of its submarines.

These appropriate anti-corrosive technologies were developed to allow our submarines to operate in a range of environments, even in harsh warm waters conducive to corrosion. Japan believes that such technologies will guarantee the effectiveness of Australian submarines which will also operate in the same maritime environments.

Sumio Kusaka is the Ambassador of Japan to Australia"

© Australian Strategic Policy Institute

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PETE'S COMMENT

Ambassador Kusaka's advice is in line with information provided to Submarine Matters over the last few months:

Under subheading “Is the internal space of the Soryu-class submarine too narrow?”

This is the first time I’ve seen an officially published “estimated surfaced displacement of the Soryu-class submarine is approximately 3,600 tonnes”. This is very similar to the recalculated surfaced displacement of "3,700 tonnes" that Anonymous produced in the March 11, 2016 article Table. 

Note that this is forseen Wispywood2344 in a 11/3/16 10:31 PM comment [wait 10 seconds for auto-search] pointed out that “Soryus [displacement of] 2950 tonne, and this is the official "standard" displacement [whatever that means?] not "surfaced" displacement. See official specification of Soryu class submarine http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/gallery/ships/ss/soryuu/501.html

 [right click mouse for “Translate to English”].

So reserve buoyancy indeed doesn't seem excessive and there is more mission/crew space than the old misconstrued figure of 2,950 tonnes suggested.

Under subheading “Is the lifespan of Japanese submarines too short when compared to Australian boats?

Reasons for shorter life are very much along lines S has provided over the last few months – especially at S’s comment on 11/3/16 11:12 PM [wait 10 seconds for the auto-search] and at this Submarine Matters article of March 16, 2016.

Regarding “National Defence Program Guideline (NDPG)” see specifically 

“NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY 2014 and beyond, December 17, 2013”

page 31 of http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf which indicates the Present number of “16” submarines, which is to be increased to “22” in Future.

PART TWO is due out tomorrow.

Pete

Arrium - Pyne's Submarine Steel Claims Don't Stack Up

The MP from South Australia, Christopher Pyne, has made some hopeful, damage-control, claims regarding Arrium and Future Submarine submarine steel which seem to show a lot of ignorance.

Australia's ABC News Online, April 8, 2016 reported:

“While the Federal Government is not promising a bailout package, Mr Pyne strongly indicated this morning the company could get contracts linked to the next fleet of submarines.

"Because of the Government's commitment to the 12 subs, the nine frigates, the patrol vessels and so on, there will be a whole body of work coming through the pipeline," Mr Pyne told Channel 9.

An industry source told the ABC Arrium does not produce the type of steel needed to build submarines but said it could modify its operations or produce steel beams supporting the construction of the submarines….”

COMMENT

The steel plant at Whyalla, owned by Arrium, makes “long steel” products - mainly steel reinforcing bars and beams for homes and buildings. 

It is possible that Arrium could gear up to make the few hundred tonnes of steel beams needed in Australia's Future Submarine project. But this would only be needed in the mid 2020s based on the Turnbull Government's plans to delay the Future Submarines build until the late 2020s. For an Australian submarine build, first steel might only be cut in 2028.

The example of any Australian company making submarine steel overwhelmingly involves a fundamentally different type of product, that is flat steel for submarine hulls. 

The precedent of an Australian company producing submarine steel seems limited to Port Kembla-Wollongong based Bisalloy Steels Pty Ltd. This only involved Bisalloy making 8,000 tonnes of steel in the 1980s-1990s for the Collins submarine program. There was research and development involvement from BHP. 

Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) was also involved - see "High-strength steel and welds" here. 

It is unlikely an Australian steel maker could make submarine steel with economies of scale or have an export market for that steel. It is highly unlikely that the submarine contenders Japan, Germany or France would rely on Australia to be the sole/only source of submarine grade steel for the winning submarine type. Unsurprisingly Japan, Germany and France would value their own steel industries' ability to make highly strategic submarine steel.

Germany, France and Japan would probably be nervous about their key classified pressure hull steel technology finding its way to any foreign companies affiliated/associated with Australian steel companies. Germany, France and particularly Japan would worry about Chinese affiliated companies due to Western strategic distrust of China and economic competition with it.

Quantum Entanglement for Submarines made Easy

The US Government, more precisely the USN, wishes to patent "quantum entanglement" technology

 for submarine positioning, navigation, ASW and mine detection. It is meant to be undetectable by enemies. See the funky video below - groovy music!

Submarines under Arctic ice apparently rely on inertial guidance to position and navigate. This is because thick ice can block the positioning signals that submarines usually rely on. Those signals may be from GPS satellites or VLF stations and other frequency range submarine radiocommunications. Ice also blocks a submarine's extended antenna or antenna buoys.

Using active sonar to avoid banging into things is too indiscrete and hurts cute dolphins and whales' hearing.

So the US Government wishes to patent quantum entanglement which is, in theory, so far, undetectable by an enemy. But Russian scientists, or spies, love a challenge.

Perhaps the US and UK have also thought of using the method for seafloor sensors in the littorals to detect wandering enemy subs?

For more details see Mary-Ann Russon'ss article in the UK’s International Business Times, March 17, 2016 http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/us-navy-patent-device-submarines-that-detects-anything-underwater-while-keeping-itself-super-1550105

Pete

Submarine "Announcement" Likely to be 12 Built in South Austrlia - No Winner

Turnbull's main target is beating Labor in the Election, not announcing the winning contender.
Cartoon by Valdman for the (Adelaide) Advertiser, April 7, 2016
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Prime Minister Turnbull's main pre-Election concern is, unsurprisingly, to win votes in South Australia and other shipbuilding States. Turnbull needs to head off submarine build uncertainty which the Labor opposition in South Australia and nationally, is exploiting.

Turnbull's "submarine announcement" might be restricted to saying, his Government has decided  that:

1.  all 12 submarines will be built in Australia

2.  with final assembly in South Australia (but Turnbull may not risk saying "ASC")

3.  BUT with significant work (undefined) from the other Shipbuilding States/Territories which just happens to be ALL other States/Territories 

[Turnbull won't be saying the descending order of work in other States/Territories, which may possibly be:

-  Western Australia (especially Civmec)

-  NSW (maybe mostly at Tomago, maybe steel from Wollongong)

-  Victoria (Williamstown)

-  ACT (DoD, RAN, uniformed, officials, politicians, their staffs, many public servants, white collar consultants and some electronic component offsets)]

-  Tasmania

-  Queensland

-  Northern Territory (port upgrades in Darwin)

As any building decisions only need to be set in stone by 2026 Turnbull (who probably won't be PM in 2026) has a lot of wriggle room. The first of the new subs will, after all, only be launched in 2031 and commissioned in 2033. This is noting the mid-life upgraded Collins class will operate into the 2030s. 

No announcement as to the actual winning COUNTRY/company contenders necessarily needs to be made until after the Election. The winning contender announcement is less political if all contenders will be said to build all subs in Australia anyway.

Meanwhile Industry Minister Pyne (from South Australia) will say this is a huge win for (normally Labor voting workers in) South Australia.

Noting that Twitters of Tweets don't make it to Submarine Matters but alerting to an article link is appreciated :) over the last 6 hours Pyne continues to talk to AAP/9News and in that same article Labor Leader Bill Shorten points to Turnbull's political vulnerability on submarines 

As no final WHERE TO BUILD decision needs to be made until 2026 everyone is happy.

Note that where-ever a submarine is built subs are only put together from parts overwelmingly made in the winning contender's country - anyway.

Like any 2016 Election Promise a decision by a new-different Government in the early 2020s may be totally different. Such a 2020s Government may well decide to have the first one or two submarines built in Japan, Germany or France. 

But four to ten then built in Australia will be in the Collins tradition. 

Pete