Evolved Collins Sub - Most Likely SEA 1000 Option

Would an evolved Collins, or any type of future SSK have any chance of chasing down Chinese SSNs, like the Type 093 Shang Class submarine above?

---------

On the long term issue of Australia's future submarine SEA 1000 project John Kerin of the The Australian Financial Review, March 6, 2014 reported

http://www.afr.com/p/evolved_collins_favourite_but_timing_o1GOoSKyLUa9Eyvw4jO8wI

"Evolved Collins favourite but timing unclear"

"An evolved Collins-class has emerged as the favoured option for Australia’s next generation of submarines amid signs the much maligned existing boats will remain in service beyond 2030.

The former Labor government’s defence white paper pared back the options to an updated Collins or a new design in its 2013 version, but all options are on the table for the Abbott government’s new white paper to be completed within 12 months.

Few sources close to defence believe it will opt for a new design given the risk of having an orphan boat class. Treasurer Joe Hockey is said to be uneasy with the mooted pricetag of $36 billion.

Defence Minister David Johnston has also cast doubt on whether Australia will double its fleet to 12, saying the number first mooted in the former prime minister’s 2009 white paper has never been justified.

The original Collins sub was a modified Swedish Kockums design and Australia would be unlikely to go without the expertise of one big European diesel submarine builder as well as rely heavily on the US Navy and its systems technology expertise.

One cause for optimism has been the amount of remediation work that has been undertaken on the Collins fleet since the release of the 2012 John Coles report by former defence minister Stephen Smith, which found the fleet was floundering but blamed most of the problems on poor maintenance practices and co-ordination between defence, the navy and submarine maintainer ASC.

Ironically, one reason behind the life extension program is that the hulls of the boats have spent so much time out of the water.

On a visit to the Techport precinct in South Australia, Senator Johnston was happy to report that the availability of the Collins-class boats was as good as it has been for a decade.

Johnston seems to have had a change of heart. When the former Labor government released its 2013 white paper, he said he wouldn’t “want to go back near Collins if it was the last thing on earth we had to do’’.

Prime Minister Tony Abbott, on the other hand, has always been more ­circumspect, saying while the Collins had its moments, it was a pretty effective piece of kit. The Australian Financial Reviewunderstands that means as many as four of the six boats would be kept in the water.

Some defence sources question the cost of keeping the boats in the water given they are ageing, even as other navies in the region update their fleets, often with cheaper off-the-shelf boats.

“There was talk before the election of the cost of keeping the Collins in the water approaching $1 billion a year and it is only going to get more expensive as they get older,’’ one defence source told the Financial Review.

“So it’s a question of how much the government is prepared to pay to keep them going,’’ the source added.

A NOSE IN FRONT

Australian Strategic Policy Institute analyst Andrew Davies said there was “still scope for a change of direction but the evolved Collins definitely has its nose in front at the moment’.

“The availability of the existing six Collins-class boats is actually ahead of the target and it appears the life extension program will see them through to at least 2030,’’ Dr Davies says.

The regional arms race includes not only the big players such as China and Japan, but also Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam.

Labor’s 2013 defence white paper retained its earlier target from the more ambitious 2009 document, to double the size of the fleet from six to 12, with the boat being larger than the Collins – 4000 tonnes as opposed to 3000 tonnes – and having greater range and endurance. The Coalition, though less enthusiastic, has eventually come around to the political reality that the new boats will be assembled in Adelaide at the government-owned ASC, given Australia has an indigenous submarine capability, and marginal seats in Adelaide would be at stake otherwise.

As with big ship projects, the work is likely to be spread across other shipyards around Australia.

A debate has raged about the appropriate approach to buying new submarines since the Australian Strategic Policy Institute report in 2009, which estimated it would cost $36 billion to design and build submarines in Australia compared with a $9 billion tag for buying smaller conventional submarines from Europe.

But the purchase of small conventional submarines was suspended after it was considered they simply were not suited to the seas Australian submarines operate in, or the roles which they undertake, which include eavesdropping on long-range patrols on large countries in north-east Asia.

An assessment by the Australian Industry Group has estimated the future submarine program could employ up to 5000 workers and 1000 Australian businesses, many of them small and medium enterprises.

However, the best signal about the Abbott government’s future intentions will be its upcoming commission of audit and just how much political skin and money it is prepared to invest in the risky project." ENDS
-
Pete

Some Doubt Whether Australia Will Build 12 Future Submarines

Australia's Defence Minister David Johnston - prepared to speak out on submarines.

---------

Australia's Defence Minister David Johnston is one of the principal decision makers on current and future Australian submarine issues. Like all Defence Minister's he has his own public relations style.

On February 27, 2014 Rob Taylor and Patrick Barta of the Wall Street Journal reported some comments from Minister Johnston that may prove highly significant for future tenderers for Australia's future submarine program (SEA 1000). I've bolded what I see as the most significant comments. As will be seen the issue of how many future submarines Australia will build has not yet been finalized. see  http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304071004579408282844676104 :

"Australia Australia Reviews Plan to Double Submarine Fleet"

Decision to Revisit $32 Billion Purchase Comes as Asian Neighbors Bulk Up Military Muscle

CANBERRA, Australia—Australia will review plans to double its fleet of submarines, with the new conservative government under pressure to rein in its budget even as Asian neighbors dramatically ramp up military spending.

Defense Minister David Johnston said he was unconvinced that Australia needed as many as 12 new conventional submarines currently foreseen by military planners. It comes as regional neighbors, led by China, build up their naval and air arsenals amid disputes over territorial waters, especially in North Asia.

At a cost of up to 36 billion Australian dollars (US$32.28 billion), doubling the submarine fleet would be the country's largest single military purchase.

"It's a mystery to me [where that number of 12 future submarines came from]," said Mr. Johnston, who has called for a review of military-equipment spending as part of a year long strategic planning process launched by the conservatives, who swept to power in September elections on a promise of fiscal restraint."

[Pete's comment: The first major explanation (I know of) as to how 12 future submarines are arrived at is in Australia's 2009 Defence White Paper  Defending Australia in the Asia Paciic Century: Force 2030  section 8.40, page 64: "In the case of the submarine force,the Government takes the view that our future strategic circumstances necessitate a substantially expanded submarine fleet of 12 boats in order to sustain a force at sea large enough in a crisis or conflict to be able to defend our approaches (including at considerable distance from Australia, if necessary), protect and support other ADF assets, and undertake certain strategic missions where the stealth and other operating characteristics of highly-capable advanced submarines would be crucial. Moreover, a larger submarine force would significantly increase the military planning challenges faced by any adversaries, and increase the size and capabilities of the force they would have to be prepared to commit to attack us directly, or coerce, intimidate or otherwise employ military power against us."  see http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf ]

"That is a technical issue that the current circumstances will dictate and I want [the] navy to tell me what they foresee is the way forward. It might be more than 12, it might be less. I'm not sure," he said in an interview.

Australia's former Labor government in 2009 released a defense planning paper that called for a dozen large, conventionally powered submarines to replace the country's existing six-boat fleet of Collins class submarines.

Although much larger than submarines operated by regional neighbors, [Japan's 4,000 ton Soryus are larger!] the Collins class submarines have been plagued by technical problems. On Thursday, a fire erupted on the submarine HMAS Waller off the West Australian coast, Australia's Defense Department said. There were no casualties. [see http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/03/fire-emergency-aboard-australian.html ]

A new fleet of larger, more powerful and longer-range submarines would counter a growing undersea presence in Asia. Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia are fielding new submarines to counter threats to some of the world's most important energy-trade routes, as well as to hedge against Chinese ambitions.

China in January sent a surface warship fleet—possibly backed by a submarine—into waters between Indonesia and Australia, demonstrating Beijing's naval reach. The move prompted some alarm in Canberra, which sent a maritime patrol aircraft to keep watch.

Southeast Asian nations typically operate submarines of about 2,000 submerged tons, while Australia envisages boats of 4,000 tons or more, possibly equipped with submarine-launched cruise missiles for land attack and capable of deploying special-forces soldiers.

Australia's submarine-replacement program, no matter how ambitious it turned out to be, wouldn't add to regional rivalries, with the close U.S. ally having long fielded a small but highly capable military that was well respected regionally, Mr. Johnston said.

"For many, many years we have owned and operated the world's largest conventionally powered submarine, so the neighborhood is well used to us having a large and unique diesel-electric submarine," he said.

Australia already has embarked on an expensive buildup of military equipment, including two 27,000-ton [Canberra Class] amphibious assault ships, new attack and transport helicopters, [Hobart Class] guided-missile destroyers, tanks and Super Hornet strike and electronic attack aircraft.

Australia has a defense budget of some A$26 billion in the fiscal year to June, or 1.6% of gross domestic product. The government plans in the next few years to buy up to 100 F-35 Lightning joint strike fighters to provide radar-evading air power, at a cost of up to A$16 billion.

But the military has come under pressure to reduce costs as the world's 12th-largest economy retreats from a mining boom, driving up joblessness and eating into government revenues. The government in December forecast budget deficits totaling A$123 billion over the next four fiscal years to June 2017, and said it would cut billions from spending.

But earlier this week the country, which two years ago agreed to rotate thousands of U.S. Marines and their aircraft through Australia's north, said it would buy A$4 billion of new Boeing Co. BA +1.88% -built P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft capable of ranging well into Asia. Those aircraft are likely to be joined later this year by a A$2.9 billion fleet of seven long-range MQ-4C Triton drones.

Mr. Johnston said he was open to the idea of Australia's far-flung Cocos islands, in the Indian Ocean southwest of Indonesia, being developed as a base for U.S. or Australian Tritons. But he said there was no proposal currently to upgrade the islands' dilapidated airstrip to expand maritime reach, as Chinese vessels increasingly patrol further from home.

China's growing assertiveness in the East China Sea and elsewhere was to be expected of any country with growing energy needs, Mr. Johnston said, including a demand for Australian oil and gas resources. China is Australia's largest trading partner.

"They are hostage to the importation of food and energy. I think they would be dilatory were they not to want to protect those sea lanes," he said. "I'm not reactive to these things that are happening in the South China Sea." ENDS

Pete

Australia's Future Submarine Selection - Navantia in trouble.

From UK Daily Mail article "Too heavy: The [S-80 Isaac Peral Class], a new, Spanish-designed submarine is more than 70 tons too heavy, and officials fear if it goes out to sea, it will not be able to surface. Officials are pictured next to the engine of the vessel last November [2012]" also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navantia#Controversies

--------------

AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE SUBMARINE SELECTION - SEA 1000

It is not taken as given that Australia's new government, which came into being in September 2013, will totally agree with submarine decisions and defence white papers released by the previous government (2008-2013). Previous attitudes and statements regarding HDW, DCNS and Navantia might not be the same. Its probably true to say the following documents illustrate the thinking of the previous government - unless reconfirmed as policy by the new government:

- Defence Capability Plan 2009: Sea Project SEA 1000  http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/dcp/html/sea/Sea1000.html [now looking a bit out of date]

- Prime Minister, Minister for Defence, Minister for Defence Materiel – Joint Media Release – Next stage of future submarine project announced 3 May 2012 
 http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/05/03/prime-minister-minister-for-defence-minister-for-defence-materiel-joint-media-release-next-stage-of-future-submarine-project-announced/ ["...approved the release of Requests for Information to three overseas submarine designers (DCNS, HDW and Navantia),..."]

- Prime Minister, Minister for Defence and Minister for Defence Materiel – Joint Media Release – 2013 Defence White Paper: The Future Submarine Program 3 May 2013 http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2013/05/03/prime-minister-minister-for-defence-and-minister-for-defence-materiel-joint-media-release-2013-defence-white-paper-the-future-submarine-program-2/ ["The Government has now taken the important decision to suspend further investigation of the two Future Submarine options based on military-off-the-shelf designs in favour of focusing resources on progressing an ‘evolved Collins’ and new design options that are likely to best meet Australia’s future strategic and capability requirements. The Government has also taken the important decision to use the United States AN/BYG-1 combat system [see http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/msd/sea1439/index.cfm which indicates integration with US weapons] as the reference system for future design work. "]

Australia's subject to change 2013 Defence White Paper indicates a mixture of companies is more likely than with the pre 2013 options of HDW, DCNS and Navantia off-the-shelf. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Electric Boat and Thales are all likely to become/are involved. Outside of the US and Europe - the builders of Korea's projected KSS-III (using much HDW technology) and Japan's current Soryu Class propulsion system (with the Kockums Stirling AIP) might also be outside contenders. 

SEA 1000's official parameters suggest that the following are prime considerations: Australian Federal Government money for South Australia for manufacturing industry development; business; union; jobs; and electoral interests . SEA 1000's expected  in-service deadline is now apparently around 2035.

NAVANTIA

The attitude to Navantia may be different given Navantia's 2013-2014 problems with the S-80 Isaac Peral Class. The following article from the UK Daily Mail, June 6, 2013, is rather extreme in tone but still troubling: Spain's £1.75billion submarine programme is torpedoed after realising near-complete vessel is 70 tonnes too heavy because engineer put decimal point in the wrong place http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2336953/Spains-1-75bn-submarine-programme-torpedoed-realising-near-complete-vessel-70-tonnes-heavy.html : "A £1.75billion Spanish submarine project has run aground after officials realised that the vessel is more than 70 tonnes too heavy - because an engineer put a decimal point in the wrong place...A former Spanish official has described the mistake, which has led to fears that the submarine might not resurface if sent to sea, as 'fatal'....The [S-80 lead vessel] Isaac Peral, the first in a new class of diesel electric submarines, was almost complete when the problem was noticed....Spain will now pay US Navy contractor Electric Boat £9million over three years to assess the issue and carry out the work required to correct it, according to the Spanish Defence Ministry."

Navantia's solid performance in being the major contractor for Australia's under construction Hobart Class Destroyers and Canberra Class LHDs may be allowing Navantia strong influence over Australia SEA 1000 selection process. Navantia may be considered a safe vender but its lack of experience in completing a submarine itself of ever exporting a submarine itself may be significant problems. 

Navantia was involved with DCNS in building Agostas and Scorpenes some years ago but Navantia did not build them by itself. http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/scorpene/

HDW and DCNS are the firms with the greatest export experience and deepest knowledge base in conventional subs. HDW and DCNS should therefore be the front-runners in Australia S-80 future submarine selection. Inter-operability with the US is important hence its is highly desirable that these firms would be permitted by the US to incorporate the US SSN equivalent combat system and weapons fit.

The Navantia S-80 apparently incorporates the US combat system-weapons fit and is working with US company Electric Boat - which are strengths. Australia also worked or works with Electric Boat in building-maintaining the Collins. However the S-80 falls down in not being completed and not yet exported. As indicated above the S-80 has been significantly delayed due to basic design faults.  The S-80 is reportedly 70 tonnes overweight - hence suffering major balance problems - leading to a delayed in-service of 2017 - and cost overruns http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navantia#Controversies.

The 70 tonne-balance error may be an outcome of inexperience or undue haste in developing and building the S-80.

Navantia's involvement with DCNS in submarine building apparently ended in 2010. Hence pre-2010 perceptions in Australia's Defence Department about Navantia for SEA 1000 appear not as valid in 2014.

Navantia apparently has never completed a submarine by itself or exported a sub by itself. As things stand this may make Navantia a higher risk sub maker than Kockums was in the 1980s for the Collins Class sub(?)

Note that in the 1980s Kockums was chosen over the more proven HDW at the last minute - and the rest is history. Now we have never completed a sub by itself Navantia in SEA 1000 contention.

If Navantia develops a demonstrably efficient S-80 and gets some export orders for subs experience before 2025 then it might be less high risk and less expensive a choice.

COMMENTS ON THIS GENTLESEAS ARTICLE

As this post was carried over from an old link it contains no visitor Comments facility.

However by other means MHalblaub commented January 20, 2014:
The Spanish S-80 and the Japanese submarines have something in common. The AIP of both submarine types is a licensed build by DCNS or Kockums. 

I doubt that Kawasaki acquired a license to retail AIPs and France will never sell the AIP to Australia without a submarine. 

There are just two western companies which have a good record for licensed building of submarines: DCNS and HDW. Kockums failed last time.

--------

Pete's reply January 21, 2014:

Hi  MHalblaub 

The S-80's AIP is neither DCNS MESMA nor Kockums Stirling but a bioethanol-processor (provided by Hynergreen from Abengoa) - see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-80-class_submarine#Propulsion . Meanwhile the Soryu does indeed utilise Kockums Stirling.

I don't know if Kawasaki could export its AIP as its never exported a sub or parts to my knowledge. Agree that France DCNS is unlikely to export its MESMA alone.

I agree that DCNS and HDW have the best record for licensed building.

Navantia might need two decades or more of providing licence building and exporting different sizes of subs to catch up with DCNS and HDW. 

Its unknown whether Navantia joint ventures with Electric Boat would improve Navantia's performance. see references to Electric Boat's assistance here.

-

Pete