2nd Response to WahooDaddy - Australia need be passive on Taiwan's Defence

On 7/28/2025 12:53 PM WahooDaddy commented in red. My responses are in black:

Working as a coalition, with the Aussies and JMSDF and other regional partners, what d'you think the subsurface warfare scene would be like in the South and East China Seas?

Quite complicated - see my previous article for Maps and the US-Western allies'  IUSS. Many naval coalitions have a history of inefficiency in terms of interoperability (communication including language, standard procedures, common weapons and ammunition). See the weak and poorly coordinated American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command easily destroyed by one country, the Empire of Japan, in early 1942.

Without full US involvement, with its internationally dominant submarine force and its full access to the IUSS undersea sensor network, regional countries with significant submarine forces (Japan, South Korea, Australia, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan (in about 5 years) and others) would be too weak to face the PRC Navy. 

This is considering the PRC has SSNs, large forces of conventional submarines, anti-submarine: surface vessels; UAVs; UUVs; satellites; large maritime patrol and carrier aircraft and land based missile torpedoes. 

The PRC likely has built up its own "IUSS" (weaponised with smart mines and submarines)  with many undersea arrays in the open, straits and narrows of the East China and South China seas. The islands the PRC has seized in the South China Sea present excellent platforms for criss-crossing undersea arrays.

Do RAN/JMSDF subs have the endurance to stick it out against the PLAN? If the balloon went up with the PRC invading Taiwan, would the RAN/JMSDF hang back, or try to support kicking the PLAN back from their ops in the Taiwan Strait?

No, the RAN has long transit distances, northwards, from its submarine base at Fleet Base West, south of Perth. Also other Australian bases are very distant for our slow diesel powered ships and subs to help Taiwan. The RAN would have trouble (our subs running out of fuel and food) discretely patrolling for PRC subs and surface ships passing through the Malacca Straits. So the RAN has to operate south of those straits. 

RAN Collins subs running their diesels, probably make them too noisy in the South China Sea against an enemy like the PRC. Japanese subs (all shorter range) cannot patrol much further south than the Luzon Strait, though when using air independent power (AIP) they are at least quieter. Singapore's force of 4 to 6 conventional subs (with AIP) are best placed to quietly shadow the PRC's conventional subs, but are very unlikely to attack them.

If the PRC invaded Taiwan the RAN, with a destroyer and frigate, moving as fast as the slow (15 knot cruise speed) supply ship probably would be too late and weak to  take on PRC forces. For speed and discrete movement Australia needs SSNs to be relevant in a PRC war against Taiwan. We are unlikely to have fully manned Australian SSNs until the late 2040s.

Japan is already better placed in seas south to Taiwan. But again, without US involvement all the allies would hang back because the PRC navy is too powerful in ship numbers, nuclear propulsion, emerging full sized aircraft carriers and long range anti-ship (and maybe sub) missiles. 

The picture would become considerably more complex if Russia and North Korea coordinated actions with China. Such as North Korea bombing or invading South Korea and Russia embarking on other territorial objectives in Putin's playbook.

I'm trying to look at it from a non-US perspective. I appreciate your thoughts and feedback!

No worries :) We'll talk off-line about what you're doing with these views.

Cheers Pete

1st Response To "WahooDaddy" - Some Water Space Considerations

Subsurface issues concerning the South China Sea and East China Sea are very complex and interconnected with physical and human matters.

For example in Part One of August 1, 2016, I argued China's 4 to 6 x Type 094 "Jin class" SSBNs in China's "naval Bastion" between the PRC mainland and First Island Chain (see Map A below) may continue to be too limited in capability to be effective, due to:

-  geography - very shallow water around China's SSBN Base at Yulin,
Hainan Island then a restricted South China Sea operating area, then sea depths too shallow especially south of Indonesia's Natuna Islands (see Map B), 

-  094s are known to be too noisy to be as stealthy as US, UK and French SSBNs

-  PRC commanders and crews lack operational SSBN patrol experience

-  the JL-2 SLBMs missiles with a range of around 8,000 km are too limited to hit US mainland targets from the protected (near Chinese) waters the SSBNs have to operate in. 

-  JL-3 SLBMs of the mid 2020s with a 10,000+ km range that might reach the US mainland can apparently fit in 094s

-  China's military-political command and control system may not be flexible enough to allow SSBN commanders to carry armed JL-2s or JL-3s or deliver the codes commanders to launch. Basically against Communist Party's tight control of military.

Map A above - The inner "J" indicates China's "First Island Chain" is where China's four Type 094 SSBNs are effectively restricted. These SSBNs are based in China's South Sea Fleet bases (Map A above) specifically at Sanya/Yulin Naval Base on Hainan Island. Moving outside that chain would take SSBNs away from protective Chinese aircraft and these SSBNs would need to pass between island narrows where undersea sensors (see Map C) and enemy aircraft, surface craft, SSKs and SSNs are likely to be waiting.
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Also the following could intervene into the South China Sea to destroy Chinese SSBNs: enemy aircraft and submarines from Vietnam, Singapore (passing through the Philippines) also submarines further out from Guam, Japan, Australia, Hawaii and US West Coast. 

Map B above - The water (ideally 1,000+ m deep) restricts the already narrow South China Sea operating area and the sea becomes radically too shallow (less than 100m deep) south of Indonesia's Natuna Islands.
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Useful water depth for a submarine could be all the way down to "crush depth" which may be 1,000+ meters for a Chinese SSBN. While deep water past crush depth (maybe 1,000 meters) may not benefit a submarine there is a correlation between depth and usable surface area.

The lack of adequate 1,000+ meter depth in large areas of the 3,500,000 square kms South China Sea may limit usable SSBN operational area to less than 2,000,000 square kms.

This reduced area to cover with sensors makes it easier for the US to lay seafloor or tethered sensors (including IUSS SOSUS) in and around that reduced usable SSBN area.

Tethering means that even in a 2,000 meter deep area a sensor with a 1,200 meter long tether (from the seafloor) would be very useful detecting Chinese SSBNs.

Map C above - Map depicts some of the likely Western SeaWeb IUSS 
undersea sensor array positions. Chinese, Russian and North Korean submarines and surface vessels are likely to be of most sensor interest. (Map from page 54 “Map 4. The US ‘Fish Hook’ Undersea Defense Line” of the late Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter, The Tools of Owatatsumi Japan’s Ocean Surveillance and Coastal Defence Capabilities (2015, ANU Press) http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p309261/pdf/book.pdf?referer=444 . 
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FURTHER COMMENT

I've made many generalisations that might be disputed by reading other websites and documents including:

-  http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/strategic-warning-and-chinas-nuclear-posture/

-  US DoD's "Chinese Military Power 2016") large PDF at:
  http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf

-  China's Defense White Paper 2015

-  rightwing US and most Taiwanese websites should be treated with caution as they might tend to exaggerate China's SSBN "threat" as being serious and current.

China may take 25 years to attain the quality of US, UK and French SSBNs of today and to develop a JL-3 or a JL-4 SLBM with the range and accuracy of the Trident II SLBM.

Also see: 

https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2016/08/chinas-ssbns-limited-by-opposing.html Part Four

https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2016/08/chinas-current-ssbns-limited-by-their.html Part Three

https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2016/08/chinas-current-ssbns-limited.html Part Two

and

https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2016/06/chinas-seaweb-undersea-surveillance.html

Pete

HMS Prince of Wales Irrelevant To Australia's Defence

This is a particularly good video here and above, courtesy Nguoi Giai Ma, of AsiaPacificMilitaryWatch entitled “HMS Prince of Wales in Australia: A New Era of UK-Indo-Pacific Dominance?” uploaded July 24/25, 2025.
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Sorry to be negative about UK Queen Elizabeth (QE)-class carriers' usefulness in the defence of Australia, but:

Shared between both QEs the UK Royal Navy has only "37 F-35B aircraft (including 3 or 4 based in the U.S.) [as of] May 2025,^[45][46][47]"

Already the UK's NATO FIRST (against Russia) policies, with the UK to buy more than 100 F-35As (12 to be nuclear armed) are weakening any UK military assistance in defending Australia. The UK has decided to buy 12 F-35As (to be nuclear armed by 2030). This is instead of buying the planned 12 F-35Bs to strengthen the 2 QEs' (Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales) understrength airwings. 

I'm glad another expert, on July 29, 2025, agreed https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/debate/aukus-stress-test-alliance-pressures-australia-s-strategic-choices .

Those 2 carriers are also weakly protected by a shortage of UK surface and SSN escorts when in the Indo-Pacific. It may be that, at the moment, the Royal Navy operates with its 2 QE carriers sharing the one airwing of 17 F-35Bs. The Royal Navy does not have enough escorts to protect both carriers simultaneously.

China's land based medium range DF-21D anti-ship missiles and intermediate range DF-26 missile (which may have an anti-ship capability) present a major threat to powerful US Nimitz/Ford-class carrier groups. The threat to weaker UK QE carrier groups is even greater. 

Unlike the USN, which can send ships across the open Pacific Ocean, to Australia, the UK RN must send its ships through the straits and narrows of the Middle East and across the smaller Indian Ocean to reach Australia. It is in the narrows that China's large navy, with its powerful submarine force, can intercept under-protected QE carrier groups.

Like HMS Repulse and an earlier HMS Prince of Wales (both sunk by Japanese aircraft in 1941) the UK having nowhere near sufficient power projection to defend Australia, again applies to the UK's latest 2 big ships (the QE carriers).

How To Invade Taiwan: China's To Do List (So Far)

Over years China steps up its "heart and minds" soft power campaigns. For example those that apply to Taiwanese, US and Australian youth visits to China.

If Taiwan (T) does not surrender peacefully to diplomacy and economic pressure (like American style punitive tariffs):

Buy up sufficient overland piped Russian gas and oil for a stockpile sufficient for one year's supply in China.

Ask Russia to put decoy or actual pressure on Kazakhstan, Georgia, the Baltic States and anywhere else Putin wants. 

SURPRISE ATTACK?

Launch a mass cyber attack to disrupt T communications, internet, financial, trade and transport facilities. Expect and combat cyber retaliation from T and the US.

Launch sabotage plans by Special Forces' Sleeper Cells and assassinations, if deniable (at initial stage).

Take out Taiwan's (T's) air defenses using hypersonic missiles mainly launched by SSGNs and XLUUVs close to T's shore - mainly from seas East of Taiwan.

Using missiles, drones and aircraft destroy T's energy stockpiles and block ships exporting the 98% of T's energy to T in the form of natural gas, coal, oil and some LEU Uranium.

Simultaneously destroy T's merchant (not passenger) ships and naval shipping (including T's submarines) using missiles, drones, aircraft, pre-laid smart mines. "killer" UUVs and torpedoes.
-  Pre-laid undersea sonar/magnetic sensors that ring Taiwan will locate T's  submarines and small missile craft that evade aerial and satellite sensors.
-  Beware of T and US UUVs and smart mines.
-  Combat the US Navy if it is hostile, especially US subs. 

OR

BLOCKADE?

Inspired by Anonymouse’ July 24th comment I add:

As T produces only 1/3^rd of its food needs T’s food and energy vulnerabilities may make blockade a very effective PRC strategy. Although the PRC would lose the element of surprise in imposing a multi-month blockade.

PRC smart mines-killer UUVs (in "shipping channels to Taipei and Kaohsiung") present an alternative to the need to seize and develop islands around T PRIOR to a takeover of T.

Temporarily, long range anti-air and anti-ship missiles from the PRC mainland, its SSGNs, warships. aircraft and large mother-drones could shutdown Western nation air and ship intervention to support T.

Post invasion, PRC take over of those islands around T would:
- more firmly guarantee PRC's ability to protect its new T possession and
- more easily transit ships and submarines through the First Island Chain that had hitherto blocked access to the Western Pacific.

Responses from Japan? South Korea? 

Singapore, India and Australia seizing or sinking PRC vessels in the Indian Ocean?

Western banking system freezing PRC assets worldwide?

Additional items for this To Do List?

Astute Submarine Shortage: No Astute Rotations to Australia?

Shawn C. made some interesting comments on July 16, 2025. My response on submarines is: 

The UK's Astute-class submarines have a record of low availability. This is perhaps because their PWR2 reactors have high pressure pipe issues that need frequent inspection and maintenance. Leaks are usually contained within the subs' reactor sections. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce_PWR#PWR2. 

Wiki advises https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astute-class_submarine#Propulsion_and_general_specifications 

"A 2009 safety assessment by the [UK] Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator concluded that PWR2 reactor safety was significantly short of good practice in two important areas: loss-of-coolant accident and control of submarine depth following emergency reactor shutdown.^[37] The regulator concluded that PWR2 was "potentially vulnerable to a structural failure of the primary circuit", which is a failure mode with significant safety hazards to crew and the public.^[38] Operational procedures have been amended to minimise these risks.^[39]"

Australia would be less able to maintain problematic Astutes (at Fleet Base West/HMAS Stirling or Osborne) than all the UK's 10s of Billions of pounds of inspection and maintenance facilities, developed over decades.

The UK has only 5 Astutes for the next 3 years. This is due to HMS Astute undergoing its first "decommissioning" and Mid Life Re-Validation Period (MLRP) in Devonport UK for around 3 years. The final Astute, HMS Achilles, will only be commissioned in 2028 or, more likely, 2029. So dividing the 5 commissioned Astutes by the naval Rule of Thirds yields only 1.66 Astutes being operational at any one time until 2028. 

The 2 or maybe 1 Astutes' highest priority is Vanguard SSBN escort duties, in and out of Faslane. When all 5 commissioned Astutes are under maintenance (as has been recorded) US or French SSNs might escort UK SSBNs in and out of Faslane.

The emerging NATO First policy may keep Astutes in seas around NATO more than currently. Their North Sea and Arctic Ocean duties include shadowing Russian ships and submarines and collection of Russian land based intelligence. The UK may insist NATO First will not diminish non-NATO missions - but worldwide Astute and associated US SSN availability is already stretched.

See mentions of AUKUS here https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/optimising-readiness-uk-astute-fleet. Also US SSNs are being shifted from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific against China in the above link. This is increasing the Atlantic workload for Astutes.

Between SSBN escort priorities the Royal Navy could perhaps spare one Astute for one month rotation every 2 or 3 years at HMAS Stirling. Ex submarine commander and continuing expert Peter Briggs reported all 6 Astutes are at times in dock. Their  maintenance issues (often kept secret) may frequently involve their reactors. Chronic maintenance problems may mean no Astutes might come to Australia for more than 3 years.

I'm glad another expert, on July 29, 2025, agreed https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/debate/aukus-stress-test-alliance-pressures-australia-s-strategic-choices .

"NATO First" UK NUCLEAR STRIKE Aircraft Less Emphasis on UK Carriers

Shawn C. made some interesting comments on July 16, 2025. My response on carriers, aircraft and "NATO First" is: 

With the rise of expensive UK RN nuclear submarines the UK turned away from full size carriers for decades until the Queen Elizabeth (QE)-class emerged in 2017-2023. The preceding half or 2/3rds size Invincible-class carriers only had fairly small airwings (of RN Harriers). In the Falklands War the non-Invincible-class Hermes needed to be supplemented by carrier based RAF Harriers. 

So far the Queen Elizabeth (QE)-class, including HMS Prince of Wales, only have half (or less) of a full airwing of UK F-35Bs. That number may remain low because UK carriers are poorly adapted to the Russian threat in Europe and given emerging UK "NATO First" policies. Rather the QEs may have been designed mainly for counter-insurgency airstrikes - a declining mission for the UK. Since June 2025 (see 1/3rd down here) there has also been a pause on buying new F-35Bs for carriers. 

Other "NATO First" priorities may see the low numbers of UK surface ship escorts continue. The UK relies heavily on foreign escorts and US Marine F-35Bs for its carriers when UK carriers are in the Indo-Pacific.

NUCLEAR STRIKE AIRCRAFT

Announced by the UK Government on June 24, 2025 NATO First will include 12 new F-35As for the RAF for NUCLEAR STRIKE by 2030. The "nuclear" F-35As are instead of the original intention of buying 12 new conventionally armed F-35Bs for UK carriers. 

UK defence policy toward the Russian threat will include more conventionally armed F-35s as UK Typhoons are gradually retired over several decades. This may mean more than 100 F-35As or at least a mixture of 138 F-35As and Bs. Scroll a third way down here. F-35As carry a greater war load over longer ranges than F-35Bs, if As and Bs are not mid-air refueled. 

Also the UK Army needs expansion for anti-Russia European wars, particularly in armoured vehicles, artillery and small drones. 

More UK money spent on military aid to Ukraine may also mean less UK money available for the conventionally armed AND conventionally powered UK RN.

Australia Rejects US Coercion on Taiwan

Australian Prime Minister Albanese has batted away public demands from US de facto Defense Secretary, Elbridge Colby, that Australia state it would defend Taiwan. This undiplomatic American baiting comes as Albanese visits China for 6 days to discuss trade. Albanese responded that Australia supports "the status quo" in regards to Taiwan. 

This US demand on Australia is hypocritical given the US has practiced strategic ambiguity since the 1970s, refusing to say whether it would defend Taiwan.

The official US Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth, an inexperienced, rightwing Yes Man, is mute. It is increasingly apparent to Australians and poor US citizens, that aggressive neo-fascism reigns in Trump's isolationist America. Neo-fascism? -Trump's ultranationalism, love of military parades, inciting a mob to storm the Capitol, setting troops on unremarkable protesters, hounding and expelling peaceful minorities, disdain for judicial processes and giving authoritarian Putin a 50 day invasion incentive while Trump repeatedly pressures democratic Zelensky. 

Undersecretary of Defence, Elbridge Colby, took to social media (24 hours ago)  attempting to coerce Australia and Japan into stating their positions on Taiwan's defence. This comes while the US is deserting or antagonising its allies, except for  Israel.  

Russia has a special place in Trump's heart. See the importance of Russia in financing Trump over the years https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Trump_Organization#Financing  

China is shaping up to be a more reliable ally for Australia, especially in economic terms, than Trump's US.

Australia could only make an impact on Taiwan's defence if Australia had SSNs that are fast enough to get to Taiwan in about a week. Colby is likely to demand higher gifts (than the current A$800 million per year) for Australia to then buy, at increasing prices, used Virginia-class SSNs in 7 to 15 years. It is highly unlikely that America, will deliver on Biden's AUKUS promise because the USN is desperately in need of all Virginias through to the 2040s. 

More see https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-07-13/albanese-taiwan-us-defence-demands-china-visit/105526626

Carrier HMS Prince of Wales Soon in Darwin, Australia.

This is a follow up to Shawn C’s excellent article “When the Carrier Prince of Wales Cruised into Singapore” of July 11, 2025 at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2025/07/when-carrier-prince-of-wales-cruised.html 

See a great photo of HMS Prince of Wales (PofW) docking in Singapore at https://www.navylookout.com/uk-carrier-strike-group-sails-to-australia-for-multinational-exercise/ 

China’s Type 815 ship Beijixing (Polaris). Photo courtesy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_815_spy_ship#Type_815   
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Chinese spy ships (possibly Type 815s, photo and link above) are now in the Southeast Asian-Australian northern region, in part to monitor PofW, its F-35Bs and its carrier battle group https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-07-12/adf-watching-for-chinese-spy-ships-as-pm-heads-to-shanghai/105523778. This is during the Talisman Sabre 2025 (TS25) and Bersama Lima 25 exercises Shawn mentions. 

Note the UK RN has insufficient ships (only 14 destroyers/frigates in the whole RN) to fully escort PofW and the carrier Queen Elizabeth on Indo-Pacific missions. Between one and three non-British escort ships always form part of their carrier battle groups. A US SSN might also lend a hand.

The Chinese navy's job is made easier because PofW's coming and going from the Chinese owned port of Darwin can be easily tracked. PofW will likely be docking at Kuru Wharf, HMAS Coonawarra, Port of Darwin, mid to late July 2025. More on Kuru at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2025/03/darwin-port-hosts-us-ssn-us-submarine.html .

PofW is to host an afternoon tea for the Australian British Chamber of Commerce at Port of Darwin, Friday July 25, 2025. https://www.britishchamber.com/events/hms-prince-of-wales-darwin

A harder to spot Chinese Type 093 SSN surveillance submarine mission will also likely work with the Chinese spy ships, satellites and maybe UUVs, to surveil PofW and the other Western vessels involved in the 2025 exercises.

When the Carrier Prince of Wales Cruised into Singapore

From 23 June to early July 2025, the UK's Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales (R09) ("PofW") made a port visit to Singapore, to mark 60 years of relations with the UK and Singapore and to demonstrate the UK's commitment to the Indo-Pacific.

HMS Prince of Wales arrives at Singapore's Cruise Centre
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PofW leads the UK RN’s CSG25 Carrier Strike Group deployment, which held exercises in the Mediterranean with the Italian Navy around 5th May. CSG25 then cleared the Red Sea and conducted exercises via the Arabian Sea with the Indian Navy. There, one of the UK F-35Bs had a weather avoidance divert to Thiruvananthapuram International Airport (on India's southern tip) and had to be left behind after a mechanical issue. CSG25 then split up for port visits to Port Klang (Malaysia), Jakarta (Indonesia) and Singapore.

Several of CSG25’s ships docked at the traditional berths for visiting warships in Singapore, at Changi Naval Base and Sembawang wharves. PofW docked at Singapore’s Marina Bay Cruise Centre (photo above) which easily accommodated her. The main reason for CSG25’s visit, apart from stunning photos against the background of Singapore’s Central Business District, is that CSG25 was in Singapore to promote UK political and business interests.

PofW's docking at Marina Bay Cruise Centre therefore made it simpler for visiting guests and dignitaries. It also permitted the 1,600+ crew, in groups, to disembark quickly to catch a 15-minute Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) (subway) ride to Singapore's city centre.

In the photo above there are, what look like, a large number of marine security cameras. These may be used against commando/terrorist would be boarders, divers, suicide boats and shallow diving UUVs. These, perhaps fixed or mobile, cameras might be aimed horizontally and "look" down. Immediately below the walkway, on the bridge, there appears to be a large electro-optical sensor (camera) that may have night vision and infrared capabilities. It may be used to cover the rear half of the vessel for security and aircraft movement management duties. All these close range security cameras and sensors may have been to counter slow moving threats. They may have been installed before the rise of faster (and from longer ranges) one-way "kamikaze" UAVs and USVs, which can strike a high value target simultaneously from many directions.

 

During her stay PofW permitted the Singapore public to visit. A friend visited the ship who took these photos for me, and did not want to be credited. In its hangars PofW hosted a “defence and security” industry day (showcasing 30 British firms, including the Gravity Industries Jet Suit) and an Esports (video game) tournament. 

The last Royal Navy ship named HMS Prince of Wales to visit Singapore was the ill-fated King George V-class battleship . It jointly sank the Bismarck in May 1941, then later sailed to the "Far East" sailing into Singapore on 2 December 1941. It left on 8 December 1941, leading Force Z, to interdict an approaching Japanese invasion fleet, before being sunk by Japanese aircraft on 10 December 1941. 

May the current HMS Prince of Wales enjoy a far brighter future than her predecessor and fair seas throughout her career. 

Note CCTV cameras directly under bridge that are angled to monitor deck crews.

CSG25, joined by HMAS Sydney, has now departed Singapore and will participate in Exercise Talisman Sabre 25 in Australian waters, but on the return leg. CSG25 will also participate in Bersama Lima 25, the annual Five Power Defence Act (FPDA) exercise between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the UK. According to the Straits Times, the last time a UK RN aircraft carrier took part in a FPDA exercise was HMS Invincible in 1997.

In mid-July HMS Prince of Wales is due to make a port visit to Darwin, Australia, then later to Japan, back near Southeast Asia, India and then via the Red Sea, Mediterranean, back to the UK.  

Australia's AUKUS Gift Going to Columbia SSBN Construction

More than 2/3s of America's submarine building effort is going to America's highest priority Columbia-class nuclear missile submarines. [1]

Australia has no say on where our A$800 million per year gift to US submarine builders (GDEB and HII) goes.

It is highly likely most of our A$800 million gift is going to Columbia nuclear missile submarine construction [2] rather than to America's lower priority, hence underfunded Virginia-class submarine construction [3].

[1]  https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2025/06/us-gov-giving-columbia-subs-priority.html

[2]  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbia-class_submarine#Boats_in_class

[3]  Peter Briggs, March 11, 2025, at https://warontherocks.com/2025/03/when-it-comes-to-submarines-australia-is-going-to-be-left-high-and-dry/#:~:text=The%20building%20effort%20required%20for%20one%20Columbia%2Dclass,required%20to%20build%20one%20Virginia%20in%202015. 

The Unlikely Rise of the Indian Space Program

From REAL ENGINEERING uploaded May 18 2025 HERE.
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Like all space agencies India's ISRO is of dual-use military civilian benefit, particularly in rocket booster https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISRO#Launch_vehicles satellite sensors and guidance research. Wikipedia reports https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISRO : 

"The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is India's national space agency, headquartered in Bengaluru, Karnataka. It serves as the principal research and development arm of the Department of Space (DoS), overseen by the Prime Minister of India, with the Chairman of ISRO also serving as the chief executive of the DoS. It is primarily responsible for space-based operations, space exploration, international space cooperation and the development of related technologies.^[3] The agency maintains a constellation of imaging, communications and remote sensing satellites. It operates the GAGAN and IRNSS satellite navigation systems. It has sent three missions to the Moon and one mission to Mars.

Formerly known as the Indian National Committee for Space Research  ISRO was set up in 1962 by the Government of India. It was renamed as ISRO in 1969.

ISRO built India's first satellite Aryabhata which was launched by the Soviet space agency Interkosmos in 1975.^[8] In 1980, it launched the satellite RS-1 on board the indigenously built launch vehicle SLV-3, making India the seventh country to undertake orbital launches. It has subsequently developed various small-lift and medium-lift launch vehicles, enabling the agency to launch various satellites and deep space missions. It is one of the six government space agencies in the world that possess full launch capabilities with the ability to deploy cryogenic engines, launch extraterrestrial missions and artificial satellites.^[9][10][b] It is also the only one of the four governmental space agencies to have demonstrated unmanned soft landing capabilities.^[11][c]

ISRO's programmes have played a significant role in socio-economic development. It has supported both civilian and military domains in various aspects such as disaster management, telemedicine, navigation and reconnaissance. ISRO's spin-off technologies have also aided in new innovations in engineering and other allied domains.^[12]

The arrival of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) in 1990s was a major boost for the Indian space programme. With the exception of its first flight in 1994 and two partial failures later, the PSLV had a streak of more than 50 successful flights. The PSLV enabled India to launch all of its low Earth orbit satellites, small payloads to GTO and hundreds of foreign satellites.^[32] Along with the PSLV flights, development of a new rocket, a Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) was going on. India tried to obtain upper-stage cryogenic engines from Russia's Glavkosmos but was blocked by the US from doing so. As a result, KVD-1 engines were imported from Russia under a new agreement which had limited success^[33] and a project to develop indigenous cryogenic technology was launched in 1994, taking two decades to reach fulfillment.^[34] A new agreement was signed with Russia for seven KVD-1 cryogenic stages and a ground mock-up stage with no technology transfer, instead of five cryogenic stages along with the technology and design in the earlier agreement.^[35] These engines were used for the initial flights and were named GSLV Mk.1.^[36] ISRO was under US government sanctions between 6 May 1992 to 6 May 1994.^[37] After the United States refused to help India with Global Positioning System (GPS) technology during the Kargil war, ISRO was prompted to develop its own satellite navigation system IRNSS (now NaVIC i.e. Navigation with Indian Constellation) which it is now expanding further.^[38]

21st century

In 2003, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee urged scientists to develop technologies to land humans on the Moon^[39] and programmes for lunar, planetary and crewed missions were started. ISRO launched Chandrayaan-1 aboard PSLV in 2008, purportedly the first probe to verify the presence of water on the Moon.^[40]

ISRO launched the Mars Orbiter Mission (or Mangalyaan) aboard a PSLV in 2013, which later became the first Asian spacecraft to enter Martian orbit, making India the first country to succeed at this on its first attempt.^[41]

Subsequently, the cryogenic upper stage for GSLV rocket became operational, making India the sixth country to have full launch capabilities.^[42] A new heavier-lift launcher LVM3 was introduced in 2014 for heavier satellites and future human space missions.^[43]

On 23 August 2023, India achieved its first soft landing on an extraterrestrial body and became the first nation to successfully land a spacecraft near the lunar south pole and fourth nation to successfully land a spacecraft on the Moon with ISRO's Chandrayaan-3, the third Moon mission.^[44] Indian moon mission, Chandrayaan-3 (lit. "Mooncraft"), saw the successful soft landing of its Vikram lander at 6.04 pm IST (12:34 pm GMT) near the little-explored southern pole of the Moon in a world's first for any space programme.^[45]

India then successfully launched its first solar probe, the Aditya-L1, aboard a PSLV on 2 September 2023.^[46][47]

On 30 December 2024, ISRO successfully launched the SpaDeX mission, pioneering spacecraft rendezvous, docking, and undocking using two small satellites.^[48][49] On 16 January 2025, the ISRO Telemetry, Tracking and Command Network's Mission Operations Complex verified that the docking process was successful. India became the 4th country — after USA, Russia and China — to achieve successful Space Docking.^[50][51][52] ISRO also successfully managed to control two satellites as a single entity after docking.^[53]

Launch facilities

• Satish Dhawan Space Centre
• SSLV Launch Complex
• Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station

Future projects

ISRO is developing and operationalising more powerful and less pollutive rocket engines so it can eventually develop much heavier rockets. It also plans space station above earth where astronauts can stay for 15–20 days. The time frame is 5–7 years after Gaganyaan,^[150] to develop electric and nuclear propulsion for satellites and spacecraft to reduce their weight and extend their service lives.^[190] Long-term plans may include crewed landings on the Moon and other planets as well.^[191]"